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Preface
AT THE MENTION of the words "Ku Klux Klan," most peo-
ple, including many historians, immediately conceive of a
band of sadistic Southerners in white robes and hoods in-
timidating hapless Negroes. In the popular mind cCthe Klan"
is a fanatical, violent, white supremacy society, dedicated
to "keeping the nigger in his place." The average citizen
does not realize that historically there are not one but
three Klans. The fIrst was the Ku Klux Klan of· the Re-
construction period-secret, political, often violent,. pre-
occupied with turning out the Radical Republican state and
local governments in the South and with proscribing the
recently emancipated Negroes and their white Republican
allies. Then there was the "Invisible Empire, Knights of
the KuKlux Klan, Inc." -also secret, frequently violent, and
white supremist, but unlike the Reconstruction Klan, ultra-
patriotic~ nativistic, and moralistic. The formal history of
this organization extends from 1915 to 1944. The third
Klan is in reality several organizations-the various anti-
Negro societies, using the name of the previous Klans,
which have appeared from time to time in the southern
states since the end of the Second World War.
The modern-day image of the Ku Klux Klan stems large-
ly from the fIrst and third Klans, organizations confIned to
the southern states and concerned primarily with throttling
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ambitious Negroes and whatever white sympathizers they
might have. It is the middle Klan, however, the secret
fraternal order which had its heyday in the 1920s, that is
the subject of this study. The Invisible Empire, Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., was nationwide, spreading into
every state in the Union and recruiting perhaps five mil-
lion Americans to its many-sided cause. The Klan of the
twenties was an enemy not only of Negroes but of Cath-
olics, Jews, radicals, immigrants, bootleggers, moral of-
fenders, habitual criminals, modernist theologians, and as-
sorted other types. Its high-flown rituals, exotic nomencla-
ture, and charity work made it, in a narrow sense, like the
numerous other adult fraternal orders in America. Yet the
Klan differed from the respectable lodges in that not only
its ritual but its membership was secret. In most areas
where it became strong, the Klan evolved into a political
machine which often backed entire slates of candidates
and tried to vote its members as a bloc. Finally, it was a
giant financial organization which received and disbursed
millions of dollars and became one of the most profitable
businesses of the prosperity decade.
This study focuses on the career of the Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan in Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkan-
sas. I have, rather arbitrarily, termed the area encompassed
by these four states cCthe Southwest," knowing full well
that such terminology will probably offend many, and that
culturally, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas were predom-
inantly southern in the twenties, while Oklahoma bore
strong southern influences. I have referred to the four
states as the Southwest for purposes of simplicity and
brevity and because, since Klan activity in New Mexico
and Arizona was negligible, they really did comprise the
southwestern part of the Klan's cCInvisible Empire," or terri-
tory of operations.
,For some time I have felt that the chief value of local,
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state, and regional history is the opportunity to examine
the validity of accepted generalizations about broad, varie-
gated national movements. The Klan of the twenties was
such a movement. The theme of this study is that the
distinctive quality of the Klan in Texas, Louisiana, Okla-
homa, and Arkansas was its motivation, which lay not so
much in racism and nativism as in moral authoritarianism.
In the first few years of its existence in these four states
the Klan was, more than anything else, an instrument
for restoring law and order and Victorian morality to the
communities, towns, and cities of the region. Its coercive
activity and its later preoccupation with political contests
make vigilantism and politics the main characteristics of
Klan history in the Southwest.
Despite the fact that the Klan enlisted millions of mem-
bers in the twenties and wielded startling power in all
parts of the country, the organization has received compara-
tively little careful consideration from historians. Outside
of a few state and regional studies, scholars have pulled
back only a corner of the white sheet covering the Klan.
The handful of writers dealing with Texas, Louisiana,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas in the twentieth century have
either treated the white-clad fraternal order superficially
or ignored it completely. This study, by concentrating on
four of the strongest Klan states, aims at supplying a part
of the complex history of the organization.
The scarcity of scholarship on the Klan, amounting to
a hiatus in the historiography of the twenties, is largely
a consequence of the secret character of the order and
the disrepute into which the Klan has fallen everywhere
except among the most fanatical racists in the Deep South.
There is almost a complete absence of manuscript materials
in the form of Klan correspondence, membership lists, min-
utes of meetings, or financial records. Consequently, most
of the previous work on the Klan has been based largely
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on daily and weekly newspapers. Such heavy reliance on
newspapers also features this narrative of the Klan in the
Southwest.
The preparation of this study involved the help of many
people, more than I could ever thank adequately. Mrs.
James R. Hamilton of Austin, Texas, generously permitted
an examination of the papers of her husband, Judge
James R. Hamilton, one of the first jurists in the nation
actively to oppose the Klan. Two former offi~ials of the
Klan in Texas, who now live in Dallas and prefe.r tore-
main anonymous, gave valuable personal interviews. V. A.
Collins of Livingston, Texas, corresponded with me on
the Klan's role in Texas politics. I am obligated to Pro-
fessor T. Harry Williams, Department of History,. Louis-
iana State University, who confirmed sOIQe of my impres-
sions about the Klan's relationship to Huey P. Long, in the
twenties; Charles' Dwyer, interlibrary loan· supervisor "at the
University of Texas; Dr. Dorman Winfrey, former archivist,
and the staff of the University of Texas Archive~.;· James
Day, archivist of the Library of the State of Texas, and his
staff; Mrs. Virginia Gambrell and her associates· at the
Dallas Historical Society; V. K. Bedsole and the staff of
the Department of Archives, Louisiana State University;
Dr. A. M. Gibson and Jack Haley of the Division. of Manu-
scripts, University of Oklahoma; Mrs. Louise Cook, news-
paper librarian of the Oklahoma Historical Society; and
Miss Georgia Clark and Miss Grace Upch.urch of the Gen-
eral Library, University of Arkansas. I am .also grateful
to Professor Robert A. Divine, Department of History, Pro-
fessor Robert C. Cotner, Department of History, and Pro-
fessor Howard A. Calkins, Department of GovernIlJ.ent~ all
of the University of Texas, for reading the entire manu-
script and offering their comments, suggestions, and help-
ful criticisms; .and to Professor Barnes F. Lathrop of the
Department of History, University of Texas, for his efforts
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to secure much-needed microfilms during two critical stages
in the project.
My greatest indebtedness is to nve people: Professor
Joe B. Frantz of the University of Te.xas· History Depart-
ment, who had no formal connection with this study but
who helped in so many' ways during the-past .few years;
Professor David D. Van Tassel, also of the. Department
of History, University of Texas, who supervised the study
from beginning to' end and'- whose interest, gUidance, and
patience have gone far beyond what .1$ required of him;
my wife JoAnn, who typed, 'read, -and worried her way
through the manuscript; andmy-parents,- Mrs. Pauline
Alexander and the late C. C. Alexander, who we,re the
kind of mother and father every son should have, but
no son could deserve.
September 1964 CHARLES C. ALEXANDER
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Ku Klux Klan Terminology
Used in This Book
THE NOMENCLATURE, ritual, and ceremonial titles used by
the Klan,partially copied from the Klan· of Reconstruc-
tion by William J. Simmons but largely invented by him,
were designed to ~onvey a sense of mystery and power.
Klan terminology was much more elaborate, 'alliterative,
and weird than that used by other adult fraternal organ-
izations like the Masons or the Knights of Pythias. The
following list, consisting only of Klan terms- found in the
text, represents but a small fraction of the plethora of
Klan 'jargon.
Alien-anyone not a Klansman, and thus a member of the
"alien"" world outside the ~'Invisible Empire,,'"
Domain-an organizational unit consisting of a group @f
states, apparently in existence only during 19.21 and 1922.
Elimination primary-a device used especially by Klan
leaders in Texas and Arkansas, whereby a poll was' taken
among Klansmen in the chapters to choose candidates
to be backed by the Klan for local, district, and state
offices.
Emperor-a title created especially for William J. Sim-
mons after he gave up the Imperial Wizardship to Hiram
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W. Evans. After Simmons' departure from the Klan, the
title was combined with that of Wizard.
Exalted Cyclops-head of a local Klan chapter, elected by
the membership of the chapter and serving a one-year
term.
Grand ...-prefix meaning "of the state Klan organization."
Grand Dragon-the state chief executive appointed by the
Imperial Wizard for a term of one year.
Great . ..-prefix meaning "of the district Klan organiza-
tion."
Great Titan-head of a Province, or district Klan organiza-
tional unit, appointed by the Imperial Wizard or the
Grand Dragon.
Imperial . ..-prefix denoting the national Klan organiza-
tion, the headquarters of the order in Atlanta.
Imperial Commander-title held by the chief executive
of the Women of the Ku Klux Klan.
Imperial Klazik-national official charged with supervising
the affairs of the state Klan organizations.
Imperial Kloncilium-supreme judicial body and executive
council of the Klan, with headquarters in Atlanta. The
Kloncilium seldom functioned in its judicial capacity.
Imperial Klonvocation-the biennial national convention
of the Klan, attended by all national officials, state and
district officials, and one delegate from each state and
district organization. During the twenties only three pub-
licized Klonvocations were held, in 1922, 1924, and 1926.
Imperial Wizard-supreme ruler of the Klan, in theory an
all-powerful chief executive.
Invisible Empire-an amorphous designation meaning, in
the narrowest sense, the Klan's administrative structure
and territory of operations. The term could also refer
to the whole membership of the Klan, the ties between
Klansmen, or perhaps the spiritual character of the order.
By joining the Klan, one became a "citizen of the In-
visible Empire."
Kamelia-the women's organization formed by William J.
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Simmons and his allies during their fight with the Evans
regime in the spring and summer of 1923. The Kamelia
made little headway before opposition by Evans' fol-
lowers and the new Women of the Ku Klux Klan sanc-
tioned by national headquarters.
King Kleagle-title of the head organizer for the Klan in
one state.
Klabee-treasurer at the various organizational levels of the
Klan. Known simply as "]~labee" at the local chapter
level, but as "Great Klabee," "Grand Klabee," and "Im-
perial Klabee" at district, state, and national levels, re-
spectively.
KlalifJ-vice president at different Klan organizational levels.
Klankraft-all of the practices, concepts, and relationships
involved in Klan membership.
Klannishness-the practice of "sticking together" among
Klansmen, finding expression especially in economic
terms, such as trading with Klan merchants in prefer-
ence to non-Klansmen.
Klansman-at-Large-a special category of Klan member-
ship set aside by the Imperial Klan for citizens, usually
prominent politicians, who wished to join the Klan yet
J<eep their membership secret from their constituents,
including the rank-and-file Klansmen.
Klavern-the indoor meeting place of a local Klan, whether
owned or rented by the chapter.
Kleagle-a field organizer for the Klan, originally working
directly under Edward Y'. Clarke and Elizabeth Tyler
in the Propagation Department at Atlanta.
Klectoken-the $10 initiation fee paid by a person upon
joining the Klan.
Kligrapp-secretary at different Klan organizational levels.
Klokann-the executive conlmittee of a local Klan, com-
prised of the Exalted Cyclops and the other officers of
the chapter.
Klonversation-an exchange of greetings between Klansmen
featuring the use of acronyms.
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Kloran-the ritual book used in Klan initiations and for the
epening and closing of meetings.
Klorero-state convention of delegates from chartered Klans,
held annually after the formal establishment of the
Realm, or- state· organization.
Kloxology-a religiously tinged song delivered by Klansmen
at the end of a meeting.
Kludd-chaplain at different organizational levels.
Kluxing-a term used primarily by Kleagles to connote
their promotional and recruiting activities in an area.
Knights Kamelia---a C~second degree of Klankraft" invented
by William J. Simmons in 1923 in an abortive effort to
lure Klansmen away from Hiram W. Evans' administra-
tion. ·The Knights Kamelia idea was revived by Evans in
1925 as a legitimate second degree for which all Klans·
men were eligible.
Knights of the Great Forest-a "third degree of Klankraft"
devised by national Klan headquarters in 1928 and sup..
posedly t~ken by Klansmen when they officially discarded
their masks in ceremonies over the nation.
Konklave-any gathering, large or small, of Klansmen, but
usually referring to local chapter meetings and initiations.
Naturalization ceremonies-the initiation rites whereby one
became a Klansman, a citi2en of the Invisible Empire.
Nighthawk-an official whose responsibility was investigat-
ing the character of prospective members and the con-
duct of Klansmen and nonmembers. There was an Im-
perial Nighthawk, and each local Klan also had such
an officer.
Pr@vince-an organizational unit composed of a group of
counties and headed by a Great Titan. Provinces, an·
alogous to districts, were established simultaneously with
the Realm, the state organization.
Realm-the organizational unit within the Klan correspond-
ing to the state. After the chartering of a certain num-





IN EARLY DECEMBER of 1915, The Birth of a Nation,
David Wark Griffith's epochal motion picture, came to
Atlanta, Georgia, for the first time. The picture was sup-
posed to be a patriotic portrayal of the division and re-
union of the United States during and after the Civil War.
It also represented a remarkable advancement in the
technological development of motion pictures.1 But the
most conspicuous feature of the film for nostalgic Southern-
ers was its depiction of white-robed Ku Klux Klansmen
riding here and th.ere to save the beleaguered South from
the evils of Yankee and Negro domination during the
Reconstruction period. The film reinforced the romanticized
image _most Southerners held of the original cCKu Kluxers,"
_and the Georgians sat enthralled through the presentation.
When the crowd left the theater after a performance of
The Birt-h of a Nation, some Atlantan may have asked his
friends if anybody had seen a cross bwning on Stone
Mountain, outside the city, on Thanksgiving night. What
2
was this he had heard about the Klan being reorganized?
Was there anything to the rumor that some Atlanta men
were establishing a new Klan?
The rumor \vas true. On December 4 the state of Georgia
granted a charter for a new fraternal order formally named
"The Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc."
The twelve men \vho signed the petition for the charter
described the society as a "patriotic, military, benevolent,
ritualistic, social and fraternal order."2 The instigator of
this order was named William Joseph Simmons. On Thanks-
giving night he had led a party of friends up Stone Moun-
tain, burned a crude cross, and delivered a grandiloquently
phrased lecture on patriotism, white supremacy, and the
virtues of racial purity. That ceremony marked the founding
of the second Ku Klux Klan, a creation of Simnlons' dreamy
imagination fated to become the largest and most powerful
nativist and vigilante organization in Anlerican history.3
In 1915 Simmons could look back on a career that was
lackluster and a little frustrating. He was born about 1880 in
Talladega County, Alabama, the son of a country physician.
Simmons was in his early teens when his father died. By
that time he was already leading prayer meetings at the
community Methodist church. At eighteen he joined the
army and served in the Spanish-American War. After his
discharge he attended for a time the University of the
1 On the technological and social importance of The Birth ot a
Nation, see Everett Carter, "Cultural History Written with Lightning:
The Significance of The Birth of a Nation/~ American Quarterly, XII
(Fall 1960), 347-57.
:! The charter granted by the state of Georgia to the Klan is re-
produced in Winfield Jones, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (New York,
1941), 22.'3-26.
a WillialTI G. Shepherd, "How I Put Over the Klan," Collier's,
LXXXII (July 14, 1928), 6-7, 32, 34-35. This article and another
by Shepherd were based on interviews with Sinlmons, and are in
111any ways Inore infornlative than Sinlmons' testimony before the
House Rules Comnlittee. Taken together, they form the basis for
llluch of the 111aterial contained in this chapter on the early history
of the Klan.
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South at Sewanee, Tennessee, then left school and secured
a license as a minister in the Methodist Episcopal Church,
South. For several years he was a circuit rider, first in
Florida, then in Alabama, but in 1912 he abandoned the
ministry in anger after the Methodist Conference of Ala-
bama refused to award him a large church of his own.
The ex-preacher now became a fraternal organizer, in-
itially with the Woodmen of the World, and later with
other societies. He held the rank of colonel in the Woodmen,
and thereafter he referred to himself-and liked others to
call him-"Colonel Simmons."
As a professional fraternalist, Simmons earned twenty-
three degrees in seven fraternal orders, including the
various stages of Freemasonry, the Knights of Pythias,
the Odd Fellows, and the Woodmen. He was doing rather
well financially when an automobile struck him as he was
crossing an Atlanta street. During three months of hospital
confinement he outlined on paper something that had been
in his mind for years-a plan for a new fraternity to be
called the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Simmons drew
on his knowledge of the idealized Ku Klux Klan of the
Reconstruction years, about which he had read voraciously
in his childhood, and his own experience in the fraternal
world when he sketched his order. He had in mind the
appeal the original Klan held for Southerners, who re-
garded it as the epitome of heroism, the savior of white
supremacy and southern womanhood during a period when
both were in danger at the hands of carpetbagging North-
erners and unruly Negroes. He labeled his brainchild the
authentic lineal descendant of the Reconstruction Klan
and pledged it as a "living memorial" to the earlier order.
At the same time, as a good lodge man, he realized
the drawing power of secrecy, ritual, mystery, and weird
nomenclature. Thus, copying and paraphrasing Recon-
struction Klan terminology, he dubbed the Klan's terri-
tory the "Invisible Empire," over which he ruled as "Im-
4
perial Wizard," with subordinates whose titles included
"Kligrapp," "Klaliff," "Kludd," "Klabee," and "Nighthawk."
He even wrote a ritual book called the "Kloran," wherein,
along with numerous other instructions, he specified a
"Klonversation" using such acrostic passwords as AYAK (C'Are
You a Klansman"), AKIA ("A Klansman I am"), and ~GY
("Klansman I Greet You"). Membership in the order was
limited to native-born white Protestants, eighteen years
old and above.
When "Colonel" Simmons left the hospital, he began a
campaign of visiting lodges in Atlanta,- talking with the
members, and trying to get them interested in his fraternal
project. He met with some success, and on October 2-6 he
and thirty-four other men met in the office of his attorney,
E. R. Clarkson, to discuss the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan idea more thoroughly. Two of those who came were
men who had belonged to the original Klan. John W. Bale,
speaker of the house of representatives in the Georgia
legislature, called the meeting to order. Simmons talked
for an hour and convinced the others that "the idea would
grow." He also discussed the problem of the Negroes, who
were, according to Simmons, f>Cgetting pretty uppity in
the South along about that time." The group voted to apply
for a state charter. Then on Thanksgiving -night they
climbed Stone Mountain, carried out the cross-burning
ceremony, and "revived" the Klan. After they secured their
charter, Simmons and friends began advertising their order
through the newspapers and making personal contacts.
The advertisements were shrewdly timed to appear simul-
taneously with the initial Atlanta showings of The Birth of
a Nation, which gave Simmons some valuable free pub-
licity. As a result, ninety-one new members joined the
Klan, each paying $10 as an initiation fee and $(>.50 for
the cheap white robe- the Imperial Wizard sold as the
official uniform of the society. Moreover, forty-two new
Klansmen signed up for a total of $53,000 worth of Klan
5
life insurance. The insurance feature, a bit of practical
economics which did not survive the early years of the
Kla~, nevertheless revealed that Simmons designed his
order at least partly as a moneymaking scheme. For many
individuals associated with the Kla-n in later years, the
movernentwould never be anything else.
On a man-to-man basis SiInmons was an effective sales-
man of the Klan. 'His personal appearance was impressive,
for he stood over six feet tall and weighed around two
hundred pounds. His other characteristics included: "A
grim, set mouth .- . . ; a large nose; eyes of a metallic
grayish hue; shaggy, reddish eyebrows; good teeth; a square
chin; a spacious forehead; a strong, well-rounded voice
and .slow deliberation in speaking."4 But Simmons had little
talent for organization and expansion, and he had an
unfortunate weakness for being duped by his associates.
Before the United States entered the First World War, the
Klan had escaped the confines of Georgia and established
a few chapters in neighboring Alabama. Jonathan Frost,
the Imperial Wizard's most trusted subordinate, then ab-
sconded with several thousand dollars frrom Alabama
initiation fees, badly crippling the order's finances. The
Klan wandered on in obscurity. "There were times during
those five early years, before the public knew of the
Klan," recalled Simmons, "when I walked the streets
with my shoes worn through because I had no money."
During the war Simmons involved the Klan in the
national mania for self-appointed spy hunting. He joined
the Citizens Bureau of Investigation in Atlanta and pro-
ceeded to make "secret service men" of his Klansmen in
Georgia and Alabama. He later bragged: "I was in touch
in my wartime secret service work with federal judges,
federal attorneys, and federal secret service officials and
operatives. The Klan secret service reported to me." It
was during the war that Simmons changed the Klan, or-
4 Ibid., 7.
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iginally designed as a public order with members wearing
lodge buttons, into a secret organization, which it remained
for the duration of its existence. Thus the Klan gained the
element that made it unique among contemporary fraternal
orders-secrecy of membership.5
By the end of the war the Klan was fairly well known
in Atlanta, Birmingham, and Mobile. For the most part it
had left behind its original dual character as a white
supremacy society and a memorial to the Reconstruction
Klan, and had assumed the mien of a militantly moralistic
and patriotic order. It was active in getting rid of pros-
titutes around military bases, idlers, slackers, and "the
laborer who is infested with the I. W. W. spirit."6 Yet the
Klan's membership rolls remained thin; there were only
about 5,000 or 6,000 Klansmen scattered through Georgia
and Alabama.7 Simmons realized that he was making
little progress on his own and that he must have help if
his Invisible Empire were ever to encompass more than
a small part of the South. In the summer of 1920 he found
two people who possessed the organizing genius his
fraternal project required.
In Atlanta there was a two-member advertising and
publicity company called the Southern Publicity Associa-
tion, which had conducted "booster" campaigns for such
causes as the Salvation Army, the Anti-Saloon League, and
the Red Cross. The owners, managers, and sole employees
of the firm were Edward Young Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth
Tyler. Clarke, an unimposing figure in his thirties, with
thick black hair and black-rimmed spectacles, had gained
quite a reputation in the Atlanta area for his fund-raising
abilities. His partner, Mrs. Tyler, was a rotund, bluff
5 William G. Shepherd, "Ku Klux Koin," Collier's, LXXXII (July
21, 1928), 9.
6 New York Times, September 1, 1918, sec. IV, p. 5.
7 Testimony of William G. Simmons in The Ku Klux Klan Hearings
before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, 67th Con-
gress, 1st Session (1921), 87.
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woman who had married at the age of fourteen, been left
a widow at fifteen, and had since survived on her own busi-
ness acumen. Clarke and Mrs. Tyler had heard of Shn-
mons' Klan through her son-in-law, who happened to
join the order. At the same time, Simmons had watcl1ed
the two publicity agents for some months, and he wanted
them as salesmen for his shlnted secret society. In June
of 1920 the three got together and talked about the pros-
pects of the Klan. Clarke and Mrs. Tyler finally signed a
contract with Simmons to publicize and propagate the
order in exchange for eight dollars of every ten-dollar in-
itiation fee or "klectoken" paid by new Klan members. Of
their eight-dollar share the two boosters had to pay all
of their expenses, including secretarial and clerical help and
the fees they allowed their field agents to keep.8
For purposes of administering their publicity campaign
and collections they turned the Southern Publicity Associ-
ation into the "Propagation Department" of the Klan and
divided the whole country into what amounted to sales
territories-ccDomains," or groups of states; cCRealms," or
states; and ccprovinces," or subdivisions of states. They put
about 1,100 solicitors, called C'Kleagles," into the field, with
instructions to play upon whatever prejudices were most
acute in the particular areas the Kleagles were working.
Simmons must have sighed Wistfully when in later years
he remembered how C'They made things hum all over
America."9
The organizing Kleagles had plenty of incentive for
securing as many new members as quickly as possible.
Of the eight-dollar cut of each klectoken which went to
8 Shepherd, "Ku Klux Koin," 39; New York World, September 22,
1921, p. 2; "For and Against the Klan," Literary Digest, LXX (Sep-
tember 24, 1921), 34. The contract agreed to by Clarke, Mrs. Tyler,
and Simmons is reproduced, among other places, in Henry P. Fry,
The Modern Ku Klux Klan (Boston, 1922), 38-40, and Ku Klux
Klan Hearings, 32.
9 Shepherd, "Ku Klux Koin," 39.
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the Propagation Department, Clarke let the Kleagle have
a commission of four dollars. One dollar and fifty cents
went to the "Grand Goblin," or Domain administrator;
$2.50 went directly to Clarke and Mrs. Tyler; and Simmons
received the remaining $2.00.10
The application of booster techniques by the two pub-
licity agents brought striking results. In the sixteen-month
period from June 1920 to October 1921, the Klan added
from 90,000 to 100,000 new members and took in about
one-and-a-half million dollars from klectokens and the sale
of robes, ritual equipment, and other paraphernalia.11 By
the end of 1921 the secret order had spread throughout the
South and Southwest, had crossed the Potomac and Ohio
rivers and secured strong footholds in several northern
states, and had recruited thousands of Klansmen on the
Pacific Coast.
During this initial postwar surge the Klan received three
windfalls of publicity which greatly benefited its campaign
to get itself before the people. The first related to the
burning of gins and cotton bales in the southern states in
the fall of 1920. Irate southern farmers, desperate over the
collapse of cotton prices, resorted to the old practice of
night-riding in an effort to check the sale of cotton until
prices advanced. The Klan had no part in this economic
warfare, and in fact the property-minded Klansmen some-
times stood guard at gins and ,varehouses to prevent their
destruction. But there was some speculation that the or-
ganization might be involved, and letters came into Im-
10 Fry, Modern Ku Klux Klan, 16. Fry was a journalist who joined
the Klan in 1921, during its initial expansion, became a Kleagle, and
used his experiences in the order as a basis for his book.
11 Simmons' testimony, Ku Klux Klan Hearings, 87; "The 'In-
visible Empire' in the Spotlight," Current Opinion, LXXI (Novem-
ber 1921), 561. Simmons' commissions during the period totaled about
$170,000, while Clarke and Mrs. Tyler showed a net profit of
$212,000. Robert L. Duffus, "Salesman of Hate: The Ku Klux Klan,"
World's Work, XLVI (May 1923), 33.
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perial headquarters from all parts of the nation seeking
information about the Klan, its membership requirements,
and its program. Simmons and Clarke eagerly seized the
opportunity to advertise the Klan. To the question whether
its membership were confined to southern men, Simmons
announced: ~~Any real man, any native-born. white Ameri-
can citizen who ·is not affiliated with any foreign. institu-
tion and who loves his country and his flag may become a
member of the Ku Klux Klan, whether he lives no~th, south,
east or west."12
The second windfall came nearly a year -later, after the
Klan had become a power in the South ,and Southwest
(but only in those areas). The liberal New York World
undertook to expose the order as an un-American racket,
an example of southern backwardness, and generally a
malefic influence in American society. ,From September 6
to 26, 1921, the World's well-documented but highly
alarmist articles, syndicated in· some twenty other news-
papers, laid bare the history, ideals, aims,. -and practices
of the new Klan. Opponents of the Klan· hailed. the articles
as the eye opener needed to quash this reactionary move-
ment. Now, thought liberals, reasonable and thinking Amer-
icans in the southern and southwestern states would see
the Klan for the destructive cancer it really was and abjure
it.13 To their astonishment the Worlas crusade'. had pre-
cisely the opposite effect. The publicity afforded by the
expose introduced the Klan to receptive Americans who had
never heard of it, and they were intrigued by the hooded
society. When the Kleagles entered the northern and west-
ern states, they found thousands of worried citizens who
were just as eager to join the Klan as their fellow citizens
in the South and Southwest. Some zealots even mailed
12 New York Times, November 1, 1920, p. 27; Shreveport Journal,
November 20, December 8, 1920.
13 For an example of this type of naive sentiment, see the editorial
in the New York Times, September 10, 1921, p. 10.
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their applications for membership to Atlanta on sample
forms printed in the newspapers to illustrate the World's
articles.14
The furor raised by the newspaper publicity and letters
from constituents soon prodded members of Congress to
action, and the Rules Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives began a series of hearings on the Klan. The
result: more publicity, and more new Klansmen. Sim-
mons, Clarke, and other Klan officials appeared before the
committee to refute the testimony of the World's investi-
gators and to enlarge on the image of the Klan as a non-
violent, nondivisive defender of the American way, a simple
brotherhood of patriotic, native-born Protestants. After
several days of leading questions propounded by the Con-
gressmen and extended paeans offered by Simmons, the
committee suddenly ended its inquiry without making any
recommendations.15 The silence of the solons seemed to
place their stamp of approval on the secret fraternity.
"Things began to happen as soon as I got back to my little
office in Atlanta," Simmons remembered. cCCaIls began pour-
ing in from lodge organizers and others all over America
for the right to organize Klans."16 The KIeagles now re-
ported enlistments at a rate of 5,000 a day. The profits of
the Propagation Department jumped to an estimated
$40,000 per month.17
Now the Klan could travel on its momentum, and the
14 Tulsa Tribune, March 6, 1922; Thomas E. Dabney, One Hun-
dred Great Years: The Story of the Times-Picayune from Its Found-
ing to 1940 (Baton Rouge, 1944), 417. The New Orleans Times-
Picayune was one of the newspapers carrying the syndicated articles.
Other dailies in the southwestern states running the feature were the
Dallas Morning News and the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman.
15 Ku Klux Klan Hearings, 67-185; New York Times, October 2, 4,
8, 11-15, 18, 1921.
16 Shepherd, "Ku Klux Koin," 38.
17 HFor and Against the Klan," 34; Stanley Frost, "When the Klan
Rides: The Giant Clears for Action/' Outlook, CXXXV (December
26, 1923), 717.
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Atlanta leadership could relax a little and watch the appli-
cation forms pile up and initiation fees flow into the Im-
perial Treasury. Clarke, Mrs. Tyler, and their money-
hungry Kleagles, with assists from night-riding cotton
farmers, the hostile New York World, and Congress, had
done an effective job of selling the Klan, or "kluxing," as
the Kleagles came to call their recruiting. The success of
Clarke and his well-fed cohort was so phenomenal that
the early critics of the Klan, led by the World, tended to
explain the dismayingly rapid expansion of the movement
in terms of the evil genius of the two publicity agents
coupled with the stupidity of the people they lured into the
order. To these hostile observers the Klan was just not
supposed to be. It was wholly alien to the democratic ideal,
an intruder in American life. In the third decade of the
twentieth century, in a nation that had just fought a war
to make the world safe for democracy and was now
resuming its inexorable advance toward the good society,
how could this "un-American monstrosity" happen?18
The explanation for the Klan's resurgence lay in a reality
of which many liberals were ignorant-the character of
major elements of American society in the years after the
First World War.19 All the tensions of a society becoming
18 John Moffat Mecklin, The Ku Klux Klan: A Study of the Amer-
ican Mind (New York, 1924), 236. See also Clarke A. Chambers,
"The Religion of Progress in Twentieth Century America," Journal of
the History of Ideas, XIX (April 1958), 197-224.
19 Much has been written in an attempt to explain the remarkable
growth of the Klan; a substantial part of it is of dubious value.
Among the best items are: Benjamin H. Avin, "The Ku Klux Klan,
1915-1925: A Study in Religious Intolerance" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Georgetown University, 1952); John Higham, Strangers
in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Bruns-
wick, N.J., 1955), 234-99; Mecklin, Ku Klux Klan; Frank Tannen-
baum, Darker Phases of the South (New York, 1924), ch. I; Frank
Bohn, "The Ku Klux Klan Interpreted," American Journal of Soci-
ology, XXX (January 1925), 385-407; Guy B. Johnson, "A Sociolog-
ical Interpretation of the New Ku Klux Movement," Social Forces, I
(May 1923), 440-45; Norman F. Weaver, "The Knights of the Ku
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more and more complex and undergoing sweeping trans-
formation converged to produce the spectacular growth
of the Klan. DIJ.riI)g the war the American people had been
subjecteq. to the :flrst systematic, nationwide propaganda
camp~ign -in the history of the Republic. From both official
and unofficial sources .poured a torrent of material having
the objective of teaching Americans to hate-specifically
to hate. Genn.ans put, mQre broadly, everything that did not
conform to a formalize.d conception of "100 percent Amer-
icani~.m."2O In the fall of 1918, just as the indoctrination
process was reaching its peak, as patriotic feeling was
mounting to frenzy, the war came abruptly to an end.
Ame.ricans who had stored up an enormous volume of
superpatr.iotic zeal POW ·no longer had an official enemy on
whom to concentrate this fervor. In the months after the
Armistice, as the Versailles Conference deteriorated into
a cynical display 'of national interest, as labor strife, soaring
prices, and the continued scarcity of consumer goods
plagued the economy.....,..in short, as it became apparent
that the war had brought nothing like the hoped-for
millennium--disillusionment and a vague feeling of be-
trayal settled over the country.
Embittered by the confusion of urbanization and indus-
trialization, caughJ in ·a society that was changing rapidly
andradically~ where .il.otbing seemed permanent anymore,
Americ~ns fell victim to a sort of national choler. They
acquiesced as the United States Senate repudiated the
Treaty of Versaine~ -and Woodrow Wilson's League -of
Nations. They listened approvingly when Warren ·Gamaliel
Klux ·Klan in Wisc_o~sin, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan" ( unpub-
lished Ph.D.. dissertation, Univ.ersity of Wisconsin, 1954), ch. D;
and Robert L. Duffus,. dAn~estry and End of the Ku Klux Klan,"
World'$ Work, XLVI (Se~tember 1923), 527-36.
20 On the wartime propaganda effort in this country, see J. R.
Mock and Cedrjc Larson, Words That Won the War (New York,
1939), and George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York,
1920).
13
Harding and the Republican party told them that the coun-
try needed cCnot nostrums but normalcy . . . ·not submer-
gence in internationality but sustainment in triumph~i1tna-
tionality,~~ and they elected Harding by a l(]psid'ed ~argin
in 1920.21 They sought new outlets for their pent:.up ani-
mosities, and they found them by creating new ene~ies.
The wartime messianic spirit and the~ drive for conformity
be.came postwar hysteria. The year 1919 saw fearful Amer-
icans, spurred by the spectacle of bloody chaos in. Bolshevik
Russia, engage in a nationwide hunt fot ubiquitous. Com-
munists, anarchists, and nihilists. Even moderate Socialists
and labor unionists were branded as "radicals.':J This was
the "Red Scare," out of which came the Sa-ceo-Vahzetti
case; the doubtfully constitutional raids, carried out by
agents of A. Mitchell Palmer, Wilson's attorney genera-I,
and by state and local authorities; nnd wholesale deporta-
tions of supposed revolutionaries.22 The anti-Red paroxysm
subsided even more quickly than it had arisen, but in the
fall of 1920 a sharp economic depression caused citizens
to continue the frantic search for scapegoats, for some-
thing or someone to blame for the ills' of modern America.
Historically the Negro had served well as a scapegoat.
The year 1919 was one of lynchings and savage race riots
in such diverse places as Chicago and Elaine, Arkansas.
Eighty people were lynched during the year, the large,st
number in a decade. Seventy-four of these victims of rope
justice were Negroes.23 White people, North and· South,
were uneasy about warnings that a "new Negro," fHied with
ambitions for social and economic equality, was coming
home from the war. Southerners feared any "big. ideas" the
21 W'esley M. Bagby, The Road t6, Normalcy: Th~ Presidential
Campaign and Election of 1920 (H~ltiIl1ore-, 1962)..
22 The standard account of the Red Scare; marroo by SOUle serious
errors 'regarding the Klan's relatiopship to the phenomenon, is Robert
Murray) Red Scare (Minneapolis, ~955-).
23 New York World~ World Almanac and Encyclopedia (1923),
352.
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blacks might have, while Northerners worried about the
tremendous migration of Negroes northward beginning
during the war and continuing into the postwar years.24
Yet most Negroes proved to be not so ambitious after all,
and in the postwar period the few who tried to climb
upward soon fell back before the legal and extralegal de-
fenses of the American caste system.
A far more menacing specter was the Church of Rome
and its temporal monarch, the Pope. In 1920 Roman Cath-
olics made up 36 percent of the American religious popu-
lation; and many Protestants were convinced that the
papacy was closer than ever to establishing dominance in
the United States. The tense postwar period produced the
last great outburst of anti-Catholic sentiment in this coun-
try. Twice before, in the Know-Nothing movement of the
1840s and 1850s and in the American Protective Association
of the 1890s, hostility toward Catholics had erupted into
organized opposition to the real and imagined aims of the
Roman Church.25
In the decade before the First World War, enmity
toward Catholics abated considerably in most parts of the
nation, although in the South the embers of anti-Romanism
were kept smoldering by such figures as the onetime
Georgia Populist crusader Tom Watson, who tied Cath-
olics, Jews, and Negroes together in one xenophobic bundle,
and Sidney J. Catts of Florida, who rode up and down
the peninsula warning of a popish plot to take over the
United States. Watson eventually went to the United States
24 See Rollin Hartt, 4r4rThe New Negro," Independent, CV (Jan-
uary 15, 1921), 59-60, and John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to
Freedom: A History of American Negroes (2d ed., New York, 1956),
444-78.
25 On Know-Nothingism, see Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant
Crusade, 1800-1860 (New York, 1938), and William D. Overdyke,
The KnotV-Nothing Party in the South (Baton Rouge, 1950). On the
American Protective Association, see John Humphrey Desmond, The
A.P.A. Movement (Washington, 1912), and Donald L. Kinzer, An
Episode in Anti-Catholicism: The American Protective Association
(Seattle, 1964).
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Senate, where he continued to rant against minority groups,
while Catts served a term as governor of his state.26 Both
were around after the war to see their passions become
respected sentiments throughout the nation. And the prin-
cipal agent lending respectability to the Watson and Catts
brand of hate was the Klan.
The postwar years also saw an acceleration of the
drive to restrict foreign immigration, a movement that had
been gaining momentum since the 1890s, when the pre-
ponderance of immigration to the United States began to
shift from western and northern Europe and the British-
Isles to the southern and eastern parts of the Continent.
The fact that most representatives of the so-called "new
immigration" were poverty stricken by the time they
reached this country was one count against them. The
presence of a few radicals among them, like Nicola Sacco
and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, was another. But probably of
more importance in building support for restrictionism and
keeping it aroused was the growth of racial nativist think-
ing, fostered by the pseudoscientific pontifications of a
generation of self-styled historians and anthropologists, the
new intellectual racists. Most citizens never read the
published theories of such writers as the New England
politician Henry Cabot Lodge or the Park Avenue lawyer
Madison Grant.27 Nevertheless, the doctrine that some
kinds of white people, notably Italians, Greeks, and Slavs,
were racially inferior to other \vhite people, notably Scan-
danavians and Anglo-Saxons, found its way into congres-
sional hearings on immigration restriction bills, the popu-
26C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Radical (New York,
1938); Higham, Strangers in the Land, 292.
27 See Barbara M. Solon1on, Ancestors and Immigrants: A Chang-
ing New England Tradition (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), and Charles
C. Alexander, "Prophet of American Racism: Madison Grant and the
Nordic Myth," Phylon, XXIII (Spring 1962), 73-90. The best treat-
ment of the growth of intellectual racisnl beginning in the late nine-
teenth century is Thomas F. Gossett, Race: The History of an Idea
in America (Dallas, 1963), 310-69.
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lar press, and ultimately into the thinking of millions of
Americans who liked to consider themselves "Nordic" or
"Teutonic." Thus the Klan propagandists denounced the
cCcross...bre~ding hordes" from southern and eastern Europe
who continued to swarm into the country, asserted that
only the ~creal whites" could attain the standards of Amer-
ican citizenship, and called on the racially pure Caucasians
to' keep· the nation free of CCmongrelizing taints.'~8
Some of the cCnew immigrants" were Jews from Poland,
Russia, or elsewhere, and they ran into a nativist crossfire.
Anti-Semitism, endemic in virtually every Christian coun-
try, appears to have been relatively weak in the United
States until the late nineteenth century.29 Probably the
most famous single anti-Semitic episode in American his-
tory occurred in 1915 at the state prison farm at Milledge-
ville, Georgia, where Leo Frank~ wrongly convicted of
raping a young girl, was lynched by a large mob. Tom
Watson and his vitriolic weekly newspaper had a major
part. in whipping up lynch feeling in the Frank case.30 In
the years after the war, hatred of Jews, even of those whose
family lines reached far back into the American past,
mounted steadily. The Klan chose the Jewish population
as one of its principal targets and p,rofited substantially
from general animosity toward Jewish Americans. Yet
during the twenties not even the eHorts of the Klan could
provoke an epidemic of anti-Semitism equal to that which
swept Western society, and most spectacularly Nazi Ger-
many, 'in the succeeding decade.
The white, native-born Protestant American, as a mem-
ber 'of the religious and racial majority, was usually in-
capable of doubting his cCnative" institutions. The blame
28.Papers: Read at the Meeting of Grand Dragons, Knights of the
Ku Klux. Klan (Asheville, N.C., 1923.), 132-33; Hiram W. Evans,
The Menace. of Modem Immigration (Dallas, 1923),20.
29 JohI) Higham, "Anti-Semitism in the Gilded Age: A Reinterpre-
tation," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIII (March 1957),
559-78.
30 Woodward, Tom Watson, 435-49.
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for the maladies of his world must rest elsewhere. And
so he looked to "alien inHuences"-Roman Catholics who
supposedly challenged Protestant hegemony and the sep-
aration of church -and state, "unassimilable:J:JCatholic, East-
ern Orthodox, and Jewish immigrants -crowding onto Amer-
ican shores, Negroes seeking more equitable treatment,
American Jews who kept living costs up .while wages went
down, and numetous other elements of frustration before
which he felt helpless. Then the Klan entered his com-
munity and offered him a way to fight back.
People of southern ancestry, wherever they might live in
the United· States, had before them a clear precedent for
fighting back-the original Klan of Reconstruction. In
establishing his new Klan back in 1915, Simmons had'
shrewdly associated it with the earlier secret society. The
overwhelming majority of people· reared in the romantic
traditions of the South believed that the Reconstruction
Klan had sprung into being over the former Confed-
erate States as a desperate response to the abuses of carpet-
bagger, scalawag, and Negro dominance. Operating with
discipline and effectiveness, it was supposed to have helped
defeat the Yankee scheme for social revolution. They
ignored its atrocities, .its degeneracy, and the fact that
it actually had achieved very little. It was, according to
the popular vie\v, "the fulcrum on which the lever \vorked
that freed the Confederate people, and tore from the hands
of the fanatics the fruit they expected to gather.:J:J31
31 W. C. Wood, "The Ku Klux Klan," Quarterly of the Texas
Historical Association, IX (April 1906), 262-68. On the Reconstruc-
tion Klan, see also Stanley Horn, The Invisible Empire (New York,
1939); J. C. Lester and D. L. \Vilson, The Ku Klux Klan: Its Origin,
Growth, and Disbandment (New York, 1905); vVillialnGarrott
Brown, The Lower South in AtHerican History (New York, 1902),
191-2:2.3~ Freel Den1ing, The Organization and Political Influence of
the Ku Klux Klan (Des Moines, 1910); John A. Carpenter, "Atroci-
ties·· in the Reconstruction Period," ]ournaZ of Negro History, XLVII
(October 1962), 2,34-47; and Herbert Shapiro, "The Ku Klux Klan
during Reconstruction: The South Carolina Episode," ibid':J XLIX
(January 1964), 34-55.
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In this study Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma,
partly for convenience, are referred to as the Southwest.
Yet in their attitudes in the twenties, citizens in Louisiana,
Arkansas, Texas, and even Oklahoma were pre,dominantly
southern. For them the new Klan's purported tie with the
old Klan was just as magnetic as it was to Americans of
south'ern background elsewhere.. The first Klan was, and
the later Klan came to be, the embodiment of what W. J.
Cash has called the Southerner's "savage ideal" of repres-
sion and intolerance..32 The showings and reshowings of
The Birth of a Nation-beginning in 1915 and continuing
into the twenties, until theaters i.n practically every town
had run the film-helped to perpetuate the tradition of
direct action, not only for Southerners, but for Americans
throughout the country.33
In reality, racism, secrecy, and violence were the only
features the two Klans had in common. For by amalga-
mating longstanding distrust of Catholics and hatred of
Negroes with anti-Semitism, fear of radicals, and the
Anglo-Saxon superiority complex, the Klan, as promoted
by Clarke and Mrs. Tyler, went beyond Know-Nothing-
ism, the American Protective Association, the Reconstruc-
tion Klan, and every other instrument of prejudice in
American history. The Klan offered a target for every
frustration. And people from every stratum of society found
their way into the secret order. To assume that only riff-
raff and fanatics joined the Klan is to reveal a basic lack
of understanding of the movement. Excluding nonwhites
and non-Protestants, the membership of the order was
remarkably cross-sectional. Bankers, businessmen, sales-
men, physicians, lawyers, ministers, and even university
professors donned their white robes and hoods alongside
32 w. J. Cash, The Mind of the Sooth (New York, 1941).
33 Also helping to revive and spread the heroic conception of the
early Klan were Thomas B. Dixon's novels of Reconstruction, especi-
ally The Clansman and The Leopard's Spots, published in the early
years of this centwy but still selling well in the postwar period.
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mechanics, farmers, and day laborers. The Klan had some-
thing for them all. But as John Moffatt Mecklin early
observed, "The strength of the Klan lies in that large, well-
meaning but more or less ignorant and unthinking middle
class, whose inHexible loyalty has preserved with uncritical
fidelity the tradition of the original American stoCk."34
Anti-Catholicism, white supremacy, hatred of Jews, anti-
radicalism, opposition to foreign immigration-these were
the salients of Klan ideology.35 These were the biases
continually harped on in the literature of the order and
stressed by Kleagles and Klan lecturers in every area. All
of these appeals attracted members. Even so, there was
another side of the Klan, having less historical basis, but
fully as important as the formal antagonisms of the order.
This earthier component of the Klan's makeup, empha-
sizing not the ethnic or religious but the moral status quo,
found expression in a quest for C:C:law and order" and a
drive to maintain crumbling Victorian standards of per-
sonal conduct. Herein, it seems, lay the most powerful
stimulus for the prodigious growth of the Klan in Texas,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. There, more than
anywhere else, the Klan transcended the limits of a nativist
and racist organization and became a device for the ruth-
less dictation of community morals and ethics.
34 Mecklin, Ku Klux Klan, 103.
85 The most concise and comprehensive exposition of Klan ideals
is to be found in the writings of Hiram Wesley Evans, who became
Imperial Wizard of the order late in 1922. See the following items,
all published under his name: The Public School Problem in America
(Atlanta, 1924); "The Klan: Defender of Americanism," Forum,
LXXIV (December 1925), 801-14; "The Klan's Fight for American-
ism," North American Review, CCXXIII( March 1926), 33-63; "For
New Marriage Laws," Forum, LXXVII (May 1927), 730-39; "The
Catholic Question as Viewed by the Ku Klux Klan," Current History,
XXVI (July 1927), 563-68; and "Ballots Behind the Ku Klux Klan,"




DURING THE 1920s many writers tried to explain the
phenomenon of the Klan movement. Most of them, like
H. L. Mencken and his staff on the American Mercury,
remained in their eastern offices and penned caustic prose
about grown men in white robes and hoods burning
crosses on hillsides and trying to scare their neighbors.
Others ventured into the hinterlands, to places like Bir-
mingham, Tulsa, Dallas, Indianapolis, Denver, or even
Augusta, Maine, to observe the Klan in action. They were
the interpreters who came closest to fathoming "the mind
of the Klan." Stanley Frost, a journalist who had followed
Klan activities in the Southwest, \vrote that the "funda-
mental and unifying idea [behind the Klan] is nothing
more abnormal than a passion for reforn1.... With the
Klan this very common trait has an intensity, a directness
and a concept of personal duty to do something, such as
are seldom found. . . . Reform of some sort has been the
Inoving spirit of the Klan."l
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"A passion for reform" underlay the varied actions of the
Klan in the Southwest, from kidnapings and beatings to
politics and cross burnings. This emotion, more than any
other, accounts for the fact that during the early years of
Klan power the southwestern states were troubled by more
episodes of hooded violence than any other part of the
nation. To the Klan, reform meant preserving or restoring
the status quo-at the national level, the separation of
church and state, the primacy of Fundamentalist Protes-
tantism, white supremacy, a capitalist economic system,
dominance of the native-born whites in American society.
There was also in the Klan a definite strain of moral
bigotry. Especially in the Southwest this zeal found ex-
pression in direct, often violent, attempts to force con-
formity. Hence the southwestern Klansman's conception
of reform encompassed efforts to preserve premarital
chastity, marital fidelity, and respect for parental authority;
to compel obedience of state and national prohibition laws;
to fight the postwar crime wave; and to rid state and local
governments of dishonest politicians. Klan reform in the
Southwest centered on personal conduct rather than on
institutional change, on "law and order" rather than on
social amelioration. And to the Klansman, law and order
meant "not overscrupulous observance of the forms of
justice, but making the law-breakers quit or get out; not
squeamishness about the legal rights of defendants, but
unceremonious and drastic ccleaning' of the community.'~
Frost, again thinking mainly of the Southwest, estimated
that not more than 10 percent of the people who joined
the Klan did so because they were attracted by the "na-
tional aims" of the order.3 It is quite true that Klan lec-
turers, editorialists, and pamphleteers Hooded the soutl1-
1 Stanley Frost, The Challenge of the Klan (Indianapolis, 1924) ,
159-60.
2 Edward T. Devine, "The Klan in Texas," Surney, XLVIII (April
1, 1922), 10-11.
3 Frost, Challenge of the Klan, 173.
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western states with attacks on Catholics, Jews, Negroes,
immigrants, and radicals, just as they did in other sec-
tions of the country. The various weekly newspapers spon-
sored by the·· Klan in the southwestern states published
scurrilous edltorials on the imminence of popish plots to
take over America, and alleged ex-nuns toured from city
to city exposing the cruelties of convent life. Klan prop-
agandists harangued about anarchist conspiracies, the
"indigestible" character of "Dagos," "Wops/' and "Kikes,"
Jewish dominance of the nation's economic life, and the
need to "keep this a white man's country."4 The usual Klan
line was not neglected in promoting the order in the South-
west. In a general way this propaganda doubtless met ap-
proval. Yet the preponderance of evidence indicates that
the ideology of the Klan, the tenets of the order, held a
secondary appeal for most of the Texans, Oklahomans,
Arkansans, or Louisianians who entered the Invisible Em-
pire.
The "Negro problem," for example, seemed to give sur-
prisingly little impetus to Klan expansion in the Southwest,
considering the popular present-day image of the Klan. In
Oklahoma, of a total population of 2,028,283 in 1920, there
were only 149,408 Negroes, a percentage of 7.4. In Louis-
4 For plain, often crude, but honest expressions of Klan ideals, the
best sources are the many weekly Klan newspapers, which printed
mainly editorials and speeches by lecturers of the order, plus some
Klan news items. The Atlanta Searchlight and the Fiery Cross
(various state editions) were officially sanctioned by national head-
quarters. Enjoying wider circulation in Texas were the Dallas Texas
100 Per Cent American, Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, Fort
Worth American Citizen, Elgin Pure Democracy, and Tyler Amer-
ican. In Louisiana, Klan weeklies were the Merryville Protestant
Standard, Columbia Caldwell [Parish] Watchman, and Winnfield
Sergeant Dalton's Weekly. In Arkansas there was the Little Rock
Arkansas Traveller; in Oklahoma, the Muskogee Oklahoma Herald,
Tulsa Oklahoma Patriot, and Oklahoma City Fiery Cross. Of these
various weeklies the writer has seen files of Colonel Mayfield's Weekly,
American Citizen, Texas 100 Per Cent American, Pure Democracy,
Caldwell Watchman, Fiery Cross (Oklahoma edition), and Search-
light.
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iana there were in 1920 many more Negroes, 700,257 of
a total population of 1,798,509, but as a result of Negro
migration north during the war, the percentage had de-
clined from 43.1 to 38.9 in the decade 1910-1920. A similar
decline in the percentage of the Negro population had
occurred in Texas and Arkansas. In Texas, with a popula-
tion of 4,663,228 in 1920, there were 741,694 Negroes, 15.9
percent, whereas in 1910 the percentage of Negroes had
been 17.7. Arkansas in 1920 had a population of 1,752,204,
of which 472,220 were Negroes. Here the percentage of
Negroes was 27.0; in 1910 it had been 28.1.5
The actions of the Klan in these four states indicated a
strikingly small amount of hostility toward Negroes. A
traveler through the Southwest in 1922 wrote that "the
Ku Klux movement hereabouts is not conspicuously anti-
Negro. The ... Negroes with whom I have had an oppor-
tunity to talk are not greatly disturbed by it so far as the
security of their own people is concerned. They say, as
others do, that it is mainly an anti-bootlegging and anti-
home-breaking organization."6 Klansmen in Oklahoma and
Louisiana rarely made physical assaults on Negroes. A
significant number of acts of Klan violence against Negroes
occurred only in Arkansas and Texas, and most of these
incidents took place in the first few months after the order
entered the two states. In the early twenties, fear of the
more aggressive Negro the war was supposed to have pro-
duced subsided as he either a~cepted his old place or
moved north. The most sensational examples of masked
terrorism in the Southwest-the murder of two Klan haters
in north Louisiana, the brutal beating of an adulterous man
and woman in Texas, the Hogging, tarring, and feathering
of a defeated candidate for the state legislature in OIda-
G U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United
States (1920), ITI (Composition and Characteristics of the Popu-
lation ), :812, 388~ 984, 86.
e Edward T. Devine, "More About the Klan," Survey, XLVIII
(April 8, 1922), 42.
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horna-these offenses, and the great majority of others,
involved only white people.
Concern over the foreign-born and immigrant element
of the population does not appear to have been intense in
the Southwest. In 1920, foreign-born whites made up 2.0
percent of the population in Oklahoma, 0.8 percent in
Arkansas, 2.5 percent in Louisiana, and 7.7 percent in
Texas.7 What few foreigners there were in the four states
lived mainly in the larger cities, especially New Orleans
and San Antonio. In one corner of Texas, the Rio Grande
Valley, worry over the growing number of Mexican labor-
ers who entered the state during the fruit-picking season
and stayed probably contributed to the establishment of
local Klans, or chapter units, in a string of towns along
the river.8 Evidence of this anti-Mexican feeling was scarce
farther north.
As in other parts of the nation, fear of bomb-carrying
Bolsheviks, anarchists, and radical labor organizers (they
were all the same to most Americans) was present in the
Southwest during the war. In Tulsa, one night in Novem-
ber 1917, a mob calling itself the "Knights of Liberty"
whipped, tarred and feathered, and drove from the city
seventeen agents of the Industrial Workers of the World
who had attempted to organize laborers in the Oklahoma
oilfields.9 This act presaged the kind of terrorism that would
7 Fourteenth Census, III, 812, 86, 388, 984.
8 Along the Rio Grande there were local Klans in Brownsville,
Harlingen, Mercedes, Edinburgh, McAllen, and Laredo. On the
problem of Mexican migrants, see, for example, U. S. Bureau of the
Census, Immigrants and Their Children, 1920, by Niles Carpenter
(Washington, 1927), 52-53, 128-29; John H. Burma, Spanish-Speak-
ing Groups in the United States (Durham, N.C., 1954), ch. II;
Pauline R. Kibbe, Latin Americans in Texas (Albuquerque, 1946);
Manuel Gamio, Mexican Immigration to the United States (Chicago,
1960).
9 American Civil Liberties Union, The CCKnights of Liberty" Mob
and the I.W.W. Prisoners at Tulsa, Okla. (New Yor;k, February 1918),
pamphlet on microfilm in Division of Manuscripts, University of
Oklahoma Library, Norman.
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mark the Klan's career in the state. Antiradicalism carried
over after the war, but by the time the Klan entered the
Southwest, late in 1920, most of it had disappeared. Lack
of large-scale industrial enterprise besides the railroad, oil,
and lumbering industries militated against unionist ac-
tivity in the Southwest. The Klan always frowned on at-
tempts by unions to organize semiskilled or unskilled
laborers, but the writer has come across only two in-
stances of direct conflict between southwestern Klansmen
and union organizers, one in Arkansas and one in Louis-
iana.10
Although anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism were im-
portant in the kluxing of the Southwest, these prejudices
were not as prominent in that region as in the East or
Midwest. One way to measure Klan motivation is by looking
at Klan actions. And in the four states under consideration
there was comparatively little of the type of quiet but
vicious activity against Catholic and Jewish citizens carried
on by Klansmen in such states as Indiana, Ohio, Pennsyl-
vania, or New Jersey. Southwestern Klansmen did not
openly boycott Jewish and Catholic merchants, attempt
to fire Catholics and Jews from public school faculties, or
burn crosses before convents or synagogues. Not even in
Louisiana, where about half of the population-most of
them of French ancestry-belonged to the Roman Catholic
faith, did the Klan center its attention on the religious
question. Most of the Klan's strength in Louisiana was
concentrated in the Protestant northern part of the state.
There, as in Arkansas, Texas, and Oklahoma, moral and
political reform were the primary objectives of Klansmen.
In Texas the editor of a pro-Klan newspaper minimized
Catholic influence in state politics and estimated the num-
10 These incidents occurred at EI Dorado, Arkansas, and Shreve-
port. See Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, February 5, 1922; New Or-
leans Times-Picayune, January 15, 16, 1922; Shreveport Journal,
January 14, 1922.
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ber of Catholic voters at only 65,000.11 As late as 1926 a
newspaper correspondent said that there were about
40,000 Catholic voters in Oklahoma and that the supporters
of a gubernatorial candidate who was a Klansman were
expecting their man to draw some Catholic votes.12 Yet
Klansmen in the Southwest were no more trustful of Cath-
olics than their hooded fellows in other areas. Anytime
a member of the Roman Church announced for public
office in any state, he was certain to confront the unified
opposition of the Klan.
There is little evidence of overt antipathy on the part of
the Klan toward Jews in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, or
Oklahoma. The Imperial Klan made much of the "un-
blendable" character of the Jews, but outside of such
eastern states as New York or New Jersey, anti-Semitism
seems to have only moderate appeal during the 1920s,
whereas the next decade would see an intensification of
hostility toward Jews throughout the Western world. In
the Southwest, as everywhere else, Klansmen grumbled
about the alleged ruthlessness of Jewish businessmen and
the racial and religious cohesiveness of the Jewish people.
But their resentment had little effect on the social stand-
ing or economic well-being of prominent Jewish families
like the Florsheims and the Kahns in Shreveport, the Drey-
fusses in Little Rock, the Steinhagens and the Gordons
in Beaumont, or the Rosenfields in Dallas. In Monroe,
Louisiana, one of the strongest Klan towns in the South-
west, the Klan twice refused to campaign openly against
Mayor Arnold Bernstein.1s
Thus nativist sentiment, an ethnic and religious reaction
against foreign ideals and institutions, appears to have
played a secondary role in the Invisible Empire's spread
over Texas, L01.liSiana, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. Judging
11 Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, November 24, 1923.
12 Tulsa 'Tribune, June 5, 1926. .,
13 Shreveport Joumal, February 20, April 11, 1923.
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from the evidence at hand, the Klan's growth in the
Southwest stemmed mainly from a desire to protect and
defend the native American's own conception of what was
right and wrong-not so much from cCalien'~ influences, as
from such homegrown evils as the rise of the city, the
advent of the bootlegger, and a general postwar letdown
in private and public morals. Paradoxically, while the
Klansman called himself "progressive,~' the goals he had
in mind were conservative, even reactionary. The Klan
became the ideal of progressivism for hundreds of thou-
sands of middle-class white Protestant Southwesterners,
just as trust regulation, the secret ballot, initiative, and
referendum, and prohibition of liquor drinking were the
progressive archetypes of the prewar era. Postwar disil-
lusionment largely stifled genuine reformism in the twenties,
a decade when liberal thought centered on prohibition
repeal and modernist theology, neither of which had much
direct connection with social amelioration. To a great
extent, rural-minded America found its outlet in the Klan.
This was especially true in the Southwest, where progress
becanle reaction, progressivism became proscription.14
The rural-mindedness which lay at the bottom of the
Klan movement throughout the nation featured not an
isolated provincialism, but a sharp conflict between rural
values and the changing mores of a society undergoing
rapid industrialization and concentration. There was no
section of the country where the process of urbanization
and industrialization was more acute than the Southwest.
While the urban population of the nation as a whole in-
creased by 28.8 percent from 1910 to 1920, the number of
urban dwellers in Arkansas increased 43.3 percent; Okla-
homa, 68.5 percent; and Texas, 61.2 percent. The increase
14 For a more thorough exposition of the idea that prohibitionism
and the Klan represented a degradation of progressivism, see Rich-
ard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New
York, Vintage ed., 1960), 282-97. This writer is not prepared to ac-
cept Hofstadter's views completely.
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of the urban population of Louisiana was only 26.5 percent,
but 34.9 percent of the people in the state lived in urban
centers in 1920, whereas 30.0 percent of the population
was nonrural in 1910. All of the southwestern states were
predominantly rural in 1920~83.4 percent in Arkansas,
65.1 in Louisiana, 73.4 in Oklahoma, and 67.6 in Texas.
But in 1910 the percentages of rural dwellers had been
87.1 for Arkansas, 70.0 for Louisiana, 80.7 for Oklahoma,
and 75.9 for Texas.15
Almost all the cities of the Southwest displayed con-
spicuous growth in the decade 1910 to 1920. In Arkansas
the population of the Little Rock-North Little Rock com-
plex increased from 57,079 to 79,190 during the ten-year
period. Oil and gas discoveries in north Louisiana swelled
the size of Shreveport from 28,015 to 43,874 inhabitants;
while oil and a general population influx into Oklahoma
brought a growth from 64,205 to 91,295 in Oklahoma City,
4,176 to 17,480 in Okmulgee, and 18,182 to 72,075 in Tulsa.
Among Texas cities the population of Dallas jumped from
92,104 to 158,976; Fort Worth, from 73,312 to 106,482;
Houston, from 78,800 to 138,276; and San Antonio, from
76,614 to 161,379. Other cities experiencing rapid growth
were Alexandria and Baton Rouge in Louisiana; Muskogee
and Ardmore in Oklahoma; and Austin, EI Paso, Beaumont,
and Wichita Falls in Texas.16 The Klan was powerful in
everyone of the above-mentioned cities. Only San An-
tonio and Baton Rouge, together with cosmopolitan New
Orleans, escaped partial or complete control by the Klan.
Dallas probably had more Klansmen per capita than any
other city in the nation, about 13,000 in 1924.17
15 William F. Rossiter, Increase of Population in the United States,
1910-1920 (Washington, 1922), 75; Fourteenth Census, I (Popula-
tion 1920: Number and Distribution of Inhabitants), 150, 159, 169,
172.
16 Fourteenth Census, I, 181-82, 226-27, 280-82, 303-307.
17 This is the figure given in 1926 by former Grand Dragon Z. E.
Marvin of the Realm of Texas in New York Times, February 21,
1926, sec. vm, p. 1.
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Thus there is a correlation between the rapid growth
of southwestern cities and the presence of prosperous Klan
chapters. Urban centers were comprised of diverse aggre-
gations of individuals, transplanted into a strange environ-
ment and removed from the influence of stern public
opinion and family counsel of the rural community. An
increase of crime, the erosion of traditional morality, and
some degree of social deterioration usually accompanied
the boom of a new city. Many respectable, middle-class
city dwellers in the Southwest, who found themselves liv-
ing in an urban environment but seeking to preserve the
values of their rural upbringing, saw in the Klan a method
to bring "law and order" to the cities.1s
As in other postwar periods, the years after the First
World War saw a marked increase in crime of all types.
In many are-as local law enforcement officials seemed un-
able or unwilling to halt criminal activity. Police officials
in Houston and Dallas reported that thefts were so numer-
ous that accurate records C\ould not be kept.19 cCMurder,
theft, robbery, and hold-ups are hourly occurrences that
fill the daily press," declared Pat NIorris Neff, the governor
of Texas. cCThe spirit of lawlessness has become alarming.
OUf loose method of dealing with violators of the law is
in a large degree responsible for the conditions that today
confront US."20 Neff, asserting that the issue was "clearly
drawn . . . between law and lawlessness, benveen virtue
and vice, between social order and open violence, between
law-abiding citizens and insolent violators of the law," pro-
18 Several historians have assumed that the Klan thrived in the
small towns throughout the country but not usually in the cities.
See Hofstadter, Age of Reform, 293; William E. Leuchtenburg,
The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932 (Chicago History of American
Civilization; Chicago, 1958), 209; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919-1933 (The Age of Roosevelt;
Boston, 1957), 98~ 99. This assumption is not valid for Klan history
in any part of the country except the northeastern United States.
19 Galveston Daily News, December 21, 1920.
20 37th Texas Legislature, .Regular Session, House Journal, 316.
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claimed. "Law and Order Sunday" in Texas.21 Governor
Thomas C. McRae of Arkansas cited the crime wave sweep-
ing over his state and issued a similar proclamation.22
"Lawlessness in Tulsa MUST STOP," fulminated the Tulsa
Tribune. "If you have not enough police Mr. Mayor make a
loud noise that sounds like HELP and demand that the
citizens give you help. . . . Our jails are sieves and at times
our courts appear to be jokes. But the jokes are getting
too common and too costly."23 And when an editorialist in
Louisiana asked CCwhy it is that moonshiners and boot-
leggers in our district are not being handled," the Little
Rock Arkansas Gazette answered: cCWe could put down the
crime wave by enforcing the law rigidly and by eliminat-
ing those senseless delays that are so valuable to criminals.
. . . These days, in too many cases, there is neither severity
nor certainty."24
Probably the most frequent kind of law violation oc-
curring in the postwar period was the illicit manufacture
and sale of alcoholic beverages-"moonshining" and "boot-
legging." Liquor had never been legal in Oklahoma, its
constitution drawn up before its admission to statehood
in 1907 containing a prohibition article. Arkansas voted
coone dry" in 1916, and Texas followed with statewide
prohibition during the war. The Eighteenth Amendment
and the national Volstead Act in 1919 dried up Louisiana,
although prohibition had come to most of the northern
part of the state some years earlier through the device of
local option. Widespread abridgment of the prohibition
statutes, or rather widespread public concern over such
abridgment, came only after the war. In 1920, having
created a legal structure for prohibition, dry advocates
21 Dallas Morning News, February 18, 1921.
22 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, January 19, 1921.
23 Tulsa Tribune, June 2, 1920.
24 Shreveport Journal, January 2, 1921; Little Rock Arkansas
Gazette, April 12, 1922.
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found themselves without the legal means to enforce the
antiliquor laws.25
Bootlegging was especially prevalent in the oil boom
areas, where burgeoning wealth and population brought the
usual social parasites-prostitutes, procurers, gamblers,
saloonkeepers. In EI Dorado, center of the southern
Arkansas oil strike of 1920, in Haynesville in the north
Louisiana oil and gasfields, in Tulsa, Muskogee, and Okmul-
gee in the eastern Oklahoma field, and in various boom
areas of Texas, vice was rampant. One account from EI
Dorado revealed that cCthousands of cwild women»' were
in the town and that cCat least a dozen hotel operators are
raking in blood money hand over fist, carrying on and
abetting the illegitimate and damnable traffic.» Another
observer of conditions in EI Dorado wrote: "Gambling has
been run wide open in several places. . . . Booze has been
sold right over the bar, and every known kind of vice has
been going full sway.... All night long ... women can be
seen on the downtown streets with men in a drunken
condition.»26
Moral laxity may have been worse in the oil towns, but
many worried Southwesterners living in towns that were
far from an oil well believed that they also were in the
midst of moral chaos. The rural-minded American, schooled
in a stern tradition of Victorian prudishness, observed
25 On the relationship of progressivism to the prewar prohibitionist
crusade, see James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive
Movement, 1900-1920 (Cambridge, Mass., 1963). Adequate surveys
of prohibition in the twenties are Herbert Asbury, The Great Illu-
sion: An Infonnal History of Prohibition (Garden City, N. Y., 1950);
Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess (Boston, 1962);
and Charles Merz, The Dry Decade (New York, 1931).
26 EI Dorado Daily Tribune, quoted in Shreveport Journal, June
16, September 24, 1921. The writer's father, the late C. C. Alex-
ander, as a young man worked as a roughneck in the s6uth~m
Arkansas oi16elds. He often related to the writer his recollections of
open vice conditions in the towns of El Dorado, Norphlet, and
Smackover.
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"petting parties," C'joy rides," '1oose dancing," and other
indiscretions indulged in by "flaming youth,~' and an-
nounced that "modernism" was not for him. He needed
some bulwark against the new social tides rising in the
postwar years, and he found it in the Klan. He listened
receptively when Klan propagandists told him that the
order "stands pre-eminently against night auto-riding and
roadside parking,~~ "the salacious literature and the modem
dress," the "jazz dance," and "the seducer of girls or the
rape fiend."27
Local public officials were the ones the Southwesterner
most frequently blamed for the breakdown in law enforce-
ment and morals. In 1920 an epidemic of dissatisfaction
with local officeholders, particularly mayors, judges, sher-
iffs, and police chiefs and commissioners, hit Oklahoma.
"Things are pretty damned rotten in Tulsa and Tulsa
County," exploded the crusading Tribune. C'They have been
kept rotten year in and year out by a band of low-down
politicians whose one aim has been to protect the out-
laws.~'28 In the April city elections, Tulsa Democrats bolted
the "rotten" Democratic machine and elected a completely
Republican city administration, which promised reform.29
But only a few weeks after the new administration was
inaugurated, the crime wave accelerated and the bombard-
ment of criticism resumed. In Oklahoma City, Ardmore,
Okmulgee, and other places, there was similar unrest over
the increase of "hi-jackings," as robberies were called in
the Southwest; prohibition violations; open prostitution;
gambling; and drunkenness.3o
When the Kleagles entered the communities, towns, and
cities of the South\vest, they found indignant citizens who
27 Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, November 21, December
3, 1921, January 7, 1922; Tyler American, May 26, 1922.
28 Tulsa Tribune, July 27, 1920.
29 Tulsa Daily WOTld, April 6, 1920.
30 Tulsa Tribune, October 13, 1920, August 24, 1921; Oklahoma
City Daily Oklahvman~ April 15, 1920.
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were searching for a solution to the disordered conditions
that surrounded them. The Klan offered a solution: Here
was a fraternal order whose membership was secret, whose
national officials did not seem to care what the local chap-
ters did, and which looked like the perfect instrument for
extralegal cleanup operations. In charging his grand jury
to investigate the Klan, a Texas judge pictured the Klans-
man as one who "picks up a newspaper and sees where
there has been a miscarriage of justice, then broods over
this iniquity, turns one hundred percent American, sends
$16.50 to Georgia, buckles on a pistol, covers his face with
a mask, dresses in a long, white robe, leaves his family,
and goes out into the darkness and disturbs another man's
family by trying to stop crime waves with a bucket of tar
and feathers."31
In the four states of the Southwest the Klan benefited
from the deep strain of violence running through the his-
tory of the region. Here there existed "a tradition of rest-
lessness, of impatience with restraint, of" aggressive ac-
tion," which over the years had taken the form of lynch-
ings, the formation of vigilante bodies, and family feuds.32
The original Klan or similar night-riding groups roamed
Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas during the Reconstruc-
tion years. Oklahoma had been the Indian Territory, a giant
reservation, until 1889, when it was opened to white settle-
ment with a mad race for land from the Kansas and Texas
borders. Only thirteen years old as a state in 1920, it was
blessed with abundant natural resources and a thirst for
progress, but plagued by inadequate law enforcement and
intolerance of slow justice.
The white Protestant citizen of the Southwest had many
anxieties. His fears for the safety of his property, the chas-
81 Judge James R. Hamilton, Charge to the Travis County Grand
Jury, October 2, 1921, James R. Hamilton Papers, in the possession
of Mrs. Hamilton, Austin.
32 H. J. Haskell, "Martial Law in Oklahoma," Outlook, CXXXV
(September 26, 1923), 133.
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tity of his daughter, the honor of his wife, and the peace
of his community were supplemented by concern over
foreign immigration, the Catholic hierarchy, insolent Ne-
groes, greedy Jews, and Bolsheviks. And so he turned to
the Klan. When all the calamities he had feared did not
occur, he credited the Klan with the salvation of the nation
in general and his community in particular. In October
of 1921, during the investigation of the Klan by the Rules
Committee of the United States House of Representatives,
a Muskogee, Oklahoma, Klansman defended the order in
a letter to his Congressman, a member of the committee.
His letter vividly expressed the conditions and feelings
that inspired the Klan's growth in the Sou.thwest:
"In the oil towns filled with the bad and 'no counts'
of men and females and where no school girl is safe from
this rough and ~mble bootleg element, one 'visit' [from
Klan regulators] and the town is almost a 'Sunday-School
class.'
"I could mention three or four towns 1 have been in and
personally took the trouble to see if good had come out of
this 'new way' of dealing with this bad and tough element.
. . . I find that the very best Americans in all these towns
speak out in its favor. . . .
"I have not seen a case . . . that all the leading good
people of the town have not said, 'It's a good thing, push
it along.' It moves out the gangster, bootlegger, chock
[beer] shop, fast and loose females, and the man who
abuses and neglects his wife and children. It certainly was
born of a great necessity in this oil country.... The de-
lay in our laws is a great protection to the criminal class,
and the people, taxed to the limit, are taking this method
to put a stop to this cost on the town and country."33
In the fall of 1920, people in Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma,
and Louisiana were ready to adapt the Klan to their own
33 The Ku Klux Klan. Hearings before the Committee on Rules,
House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 1st Session (1921), 6.
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needs and use it as a shortcut to political and moral reno-
vation, to the reestablishment of law and order. The South-
west was ready for the Klan; this truth the order's Kleagles
would gleefully discover when they undertook the kluxing
of Texas, the first state of Klan prominence.
3.
The Klan Moves into
the Southwest
ONE DAY in late September 1920, Klansman Z. R. Up-
church stepped from a train at the Southern Pacific depot
in Houston. Upchurch was the chief agent for Edward Y.
Clarke and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler in the Propagation De-
partment of the Klan's Atlanta headquarters, where he was
considered one of the order's top Kleagles. Upchurch had
a twofold purpose in coming to Texas: to represent the
Klan at the annual reunion of the United Confederate
Veterans, to be held in Houston October 6 to 9; and to
survey prospects for making Texas part of the Invisible
Empire, ruled over nominally by Imperial Wizard William
J. Simmons but now actually administered by Imperial
Kleagle Clarke. At this time the Klan had chapters operating
only in Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee.!
Georgia was the one state where the Klan had attracted
much attention; everywhere else the organization remained
small and obscure.
Upchurch traveled over Houston, making contacts and
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talking to men about the Klan. Almost all of those he con-
tacted signed applications for membership in the masked
fraternity. By the first week in October, Upchurch had
signed up about a hundred Houstonians, the number ordi-
narily required for the establishment of a local Klan. The
Kleagle from Atlanta wired Clarke of his success, suggest-
ing that the Confederate Veterans' Reunion might be an
ideal occasion for the installation of the first chapter in
Texas. Clarke replied that he and Simmons would come
to Houston to preside personally at the creation of the new
Klan.2
On Thursday, October 9, the Confederate Veterans staged
their grand parade through the main streets of Houston.
The heroes of the Lost Cause walked, hobbled, and rode
at the head of the procession, followed by carloads of digni-
taries. One of the automobiles carried Imperial Wizard
Simmons, his red hair blowing in the autumn wind and
his pince-nez eyeglasses perched properly on his nose.
Probably few of the thousands who watched the parade
recognized Simmons or understood what he was doing in
the procession, although they could not help seeing the
banners reading "Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Atlanta,
Georgia," plastered on the sides of his vehicle. But the
onlookers clearly realized the meaning of the line of
marchers and horsemen in Klan garb appearing farther
back in the train. Some of the white-robed and hooded
marchers carried banners bearing the messages cCWe were
1 Testimony of Z. R. Upchurch in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.
v. George B. Kimbro, Jr. (No. 105180) (6lst District Court, Harris
County, Texas), reported in Houston Post-Dispatch, March 24, 1925.
This case was a civil action in which the Klan brought suit against
former Grand Goblin and Kleagle Kimbro for $25,000 in funds owed
to the Klan. Kimbro filed cross action of $250,000 for libel and
$50,000 in unpaid salary and commissions. The amounts eventually
awarded by the court to the two parties virtually canceled each other
out. The transcript of this trial, like many other state court records,
is in shorthand; thus testimony as printed in the newspapers was used.
2 Ibid.
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here yesterday, 1866," "We are here today, 1920," and "We
will be here forever."3
That night, in a field lighted with Haming crosses near
Bellaire, a suburb of Houston, the candidates for citizen-
ship in the Invisible Empire went through the Klan's
"naturalization ceremonies" and became full-Hedged Klans-
men. Simmons, Clarke, Upchurch, and other Klan officials
were on hand to participate in the rites and to administer
the necessary oaths. Immediately after the ceremonies the
new Klansmen held their first meeting. 'They chose "Sam
Houston Klan No.1" as the name of the first chapter to
be established in Texas and in the four states of the South-
west.4
Before he left Houston, Upchurch appointed George B.
Kimbro, a former deputy sheriff and presently part owner
of an ice cream factory, Kleagle for Texas. Kimbro had
full authority to conduct organization work in the state.
He rented an office in Room 427 of the First National
Bank Building in Houston and, with a staff of about twenty
Kleagles, began kluxing operations.5 Kimbro's Kleagles
quickly moved into several southeast Texas towns, secur-
ing the requisite one hundred membership applications
and granting provisional charters. The permanent charters
usually came from Imperial headquarters a few days later.
The kluxing of Texas followed no particular pattern. It
seems that local Klans were established in towns and cities
as the Kleagles reached them or as the inhabitants con-
tacted Kimbro's Houston office and requested that an
organizer be sent. Thus the second Klan to be chartered
was in the little oil town of Humble, north of Houston,
3 This description of the Confederate Veterans' parade is taken
from Houston Post, October 10, 1920, and Galveston Daily News,
same date.
4 Upchurch testimony, Ku Klux Klan v. Kimbro, in Houston Post-
Dispatch, March 24, 1925.
5 Fourth New York World article on Klan, printed in New Orleans
Times-Picayune, Septelnber 9, 1921.
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while to the southeast, Goose Creek Klan No. 4 was or-
ganized. The Beaumont Klan was the seventh to be
chartered, the Wharton County Klan the eighth. Galveston
Klan No. 36 came into being at an initiation in the island
city on November 18, an indication of the rapid, and at
the same time aimless, spread of the Klan over southeast
Texas.6 The San Antonio Klan, having the charter number
31, was organized in early November. But the Kleagles
did not solicit members and organize Klans in most of the
other cities in Texas until the first months of 1921. The
Dallas Klan was No. 66; Wichita Falls, No. 78; Austin, No.
81; EI Paso, No. 100; and Fort Worth, No. 101. Amarillo,
the largest city in the Texas Panhandle, did not have a
local Klan until the fall of 1921, a year after the Klan be-
gan organizing Texas.7 In the meantime the order had
spread up and down the Gulf Coast of the state, into the
piney woods of east Texas, the blacklands of the northern
part of the state, and the prairies of the central portion,
and over that vast area between the hundredth meridian
and the Pecos River known as West Texas.
Representatives of the Klan arrived in Louisiana about
the same time that Upchurch came to Houston, perhaps
slightly later. As far as is known, no Texans belonged to
the Klan before the establishment of the Houston chapter.
But there were at least two Klansmen in Louisiana before
the Klan began organization work in the state. L. P. Butler
of Shreveport and A. B. Booth of New Orleans joined the
order back in 1917. At that time Imperial Wizard Simmons
termed them charter members of "Klan No. 0, Realm of
Louisiana," meaning that there were then no chapters in
the state.8
w. V. Eaton was the Kleagle for Louisiana. Sometime
6 Galveston Daily News, November 19, 1920.
7 Dallas Morning News, November 17, 1921; San Antonio Express,
December 10, 1921.
8 Shreveport Journal, November 24, 1920.
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in late 1920, probably in October, he set up propagation
headquarters in Room 414 of the Canal Commercial Bank
Building in New Orleans. His staff was small, probably
fewer than ten Kleagles. The first chapter installed in
Louisiana was "Old Hickory Klan No.1" of New Orleans.
The New Orleans Klansmen rented Shalimar Grotto Hall,
1125 Dauphine Street, at forty dollars a month for their
meetings. The vice chairman of the hall, a member of
the lower house of the state legislature and a prominent
Mason, was Thomas F. DePaoli. Despite his name, DePaoli
was a Protestant, and he would become one of the top
Klan officials in Louisiana.9
In mid-November 1920 a Shreveport newspaper reported
in an obscure corner of one of its issues: "Definite an-
nouncement was made today that plans are now being made
for organizing in Shreveport a branch of the Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan." A Kleagle from Eaton's New Orleans
office was in town to confer with "prominent citizens . . .
interested in the movement."lO A week or so later a Klan
unit was installed in Shreveport, and in the last days of the
month a Kleagle visited Baton Rouge, the state capital, to
sign up new Klansmen and grant a provisional charter.
The Louisiana Kleagles appear to have had more system
in their organizing campaign than Kimbro's agents had in
Texas. The expansion of the Klan in Louisiana has the
mark of a rather well planned kluxing operation. Whereas
in Texas, Klan organization work followed no real pattern
except one of expansion in all directions from Houston,
in Louisiana the Kleagles first entered and organized the
cities of the state, regardless of how far they had to travel
from New Orleans. The Klan in Shreveport was the second
to be chartered. The Baton Rouge Klan was No.3; Monroe
9 Fourth New York World article, printed in New Orleans Times-
Picayune, September 9, 1921. See also the Times-Picayune, Sep-
tember 30, 1921.
10 Shreveport Journal, November 14, 1920.
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Klan, No.4; Lake Charles Klan, No.7; Alexandria Klan,
No. 12. From the cities the Klan spread into the towns and
villages of northern and central Louisiana. Chapters were
established in most of the parish seats of south Louisiana,
but the heavily Catholic, antiprohibitionist population in
that region of ricegrowers, sugar planters, and fur trappers
always stifled the Protestant, and dry, Klan.
The Klan attracted little attention during its first three
or four months in Texas and Louisiana. In February of
1921, however, the Texas Klan emerged with a vengeance,
initiating a campaign of violent moral and social reform.
On February 4 Kimbro, the head Kleagle for Texas, led a
party of hooded Klansmen who whipped, tarred, and
feathered a Houston lawyer named B. I. Hobbs because
Hobbs had the "wrong kind" of clients-mostly Negroes
and habitual lawbreakers. The Hobbs incident precipi-
tated a wave of Klan brutality in Texas that would continue
for the next two and a half years. The spring and summer
of 1921 saw masked regulators take the law into their own
hands on fifty-two occasions to punish moral transgressors,
bootleggers, and others whose conduct was in some way
objectionable to the Klan. In Dallas a band of local Knights,
probably led by Exalted Cyclops Hiram W. Evans, dragged
Negro bellhop Alex Johnson from the Adolphus Hotel and
branded the initials "K.K.K." across his forehead with acid.
Klansmen in Fort Worth gave a local gambler coats of tar
and feathers on two separate occasions. At Tenaha, in the
pine forests of east Texas, Klansmen tarred and feathered
a woman accused of bigamy and clipped her hair.11
11 Testimony of George B. Kimbro in Ku Klux Klan v. Kimbro, in
Houston Post-Dispatch, March 19, 1925; testimony of Erwin J.
Clark in Senator from Texas. Hearings before a Subcommittee at the
Committee on Privileges and Elections, United States Senate, 68th
Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions (1924), 117-18; Dallas Morning News,
July 18, 1921. For a survey of the Klan's career in Texas, see
Charles C. Alexander, Crusade for Conformity: The Ku Klux Klan in
Texas, 1920-1930 (Houston, 1962).
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Outside Beaumont masked Puritans Hogged, tarred, and
feathered J. S. Paul, a local physician suspected of per-
forming abortions on two women, and then whipped a
Deweyville citizen who sent one of the women to Dr. Paul.
After the two assaults, Beaumont Klansmen published a
letter under the official Klan seal in a local newspaper.
The Klansmen admitted punishing Paul and R. F. Scott,
the other man. "The eyes of the unknown had seen and
observed the wrong to be redressed," proclaimed the
hooded Knights. ~~Dr. Paul stood convicted before God
and man.... The law of the Klan is JUSTICE.... The
lash was laid on his back and the tar and feathers applied
to his body."12
As often as not, an act of violence or the dispatch of a
threatening note heralded the entrance of the Klan into a
Texas community. On other occasions the Klansmen posted
warning signs around town or paraded at night with all
the street lights turned out, the only illumination furnished
by a fiery cross or torches carried by the white-robed
marchers. Frequently the parading Klansmen carried ban-
ners of admonition making clear their reasons for organ-
izing. Typical messages painted on the banners were: cCOne
hundred percent Americanism," cCBooze must and shall
go," "Bring in the stills or we will come after them,"
c'Love thy neighbor as thyself, but leave his wife alone,"
"Crap shooters beware," and "Wife beaters beware."13
In contrast with the violent debut of the Klan in Texas
society, the order was quiescent in Louisiana during the
early months of 1921. The Klan made its first public ap-
pearance in Louisiana the night of April 9, 1921, when
about three hundred Klansmen paraded in single file
through the streets of Shreveport. The next month several
12 Senator from Texas Hearings, 683-86; quotation from thirteenth
New York World article, ·printed in New Orleans Time-Picayune,
September 18, 1921.
13 See Fort Worth Star-Telegram, July 8, 16, 18, 24, 1921; Gal-
veston Daily News, May 9, 1921; Houston Post, August 4, 1921.
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members of Old Hickory Klan No.1 of New Orleans en...
tered the Carrollton Presbyterian Church and gave a
lecture on Klan principles to the congregation.14 The
Klan had been organizing in Louisiana for more than six
months before Klansmen in the state were implicated in an
act of violence. On May 25, 1921, Shreveport police abruptly
released wifebeater and vagrant Jack Morgan. A few min-
utes later he was seized by hooded men, taken to a point
on the Mooringsport road, stripped naked, and coated with
tar and feathers. The next day Morgan, having doused him-
self with gasoline to remove the tar and feathers, donned
some borrowed clothes and left Shreveport for parts un-
known. Two months later Shreveport Klan No. 2 published
a full-page advertisement in the local afternoon newspaper
offering a $500 reward for "persons guilty of acts of vio-
lence or of sending or posting anonymous communications
bearing the name or initials of the Ku Klux Klan."15
Oklahoma did not become a factor in the Klan's his-
tory until early 1921. In February, word came from Im-
perial headquarters in Atlanta that Simmons and associ-
ates, acting on "numerous requests" for the extension of
the Klan to the Sooner State, had dispatched an "imperial
officer" to survey prospects in Oklahoma.16 The Imperial
officer was probably Clarke himself, who sometimes person-
ally took charge of a major kluxing campaign. The head
Kleagle for Oklahoma (by now this official was called
"King Kleagle") was George C. McCarron. McCarron's
home was Houston, where he had served on the original
staff of Kleagle Kimbro in late 1920. He had been pro-
moted and sent north to conduct Kleagling activities in
Oklahoma. McCarron's state headquarters were in Room
503 of the Baltimore Building in Oklahoma City, where
14 Shreveport Journal, April 11, 1921; Thomas E. Dabney, One
Hundred Great Years: The Story of the Times-Picayune from Its
Founding to 1940 (Baton Rouge, 1944), 415.
15 Shreveport Journal, May 26, 27, July 27, 1921.
16 Tulsa Tribune, May 26, 1921.
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he started work with about twelve Kleagles on his staff.17
McCarron's agents did their work even more covertly
than Kleagles in other states. Like Louisiana, and unlike
Texas, the kluxing of Oklahoma followed a pattern of or-
ganizing the cities first, then moving on to the county seats,
towns, and villages. By the spring of 1921, thriving chap-
ters were quietly furthering Americanism and morality in
Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Muskogee, Lawton, and Enid. Yet
the Klan remained undercover, despite persistent rumors
of its existence in the state. In May the Tulsa Tribune must
have felt the Klan near when it commented: c'Tulsa has
had a pretty exhibit of the sort of thing that brings such
as the Ku-Klux into a town. [Its] purpose ... might be
as much to put the fear of God into the hearts of derelict
officials as the fear of death into the hearts of the crim-
inal."18 A few days later, May 31 and June 1, a savage race
riot broke out in Tulsa. For more than twenty-four hours
armed mobs roamed through the Negro district of the city,
burning, pillaging, and fighting gun battles with armed
Negroes.19 There is not a particle of evidence to connect
the Klan with the riot, but it is likely that the brief, devas-
tating race war gave some spur to the Klan's growth in
Tulsa.
The first reported appearance of the Klan in Oklahoma
came the night of July 6, when fifteen or twenty men wear-
ing the white hoods of the Klan walked into a cafe in
Muskogee and, at gunpoint, abducted a dishwasher named
Billy Ware. Grabbing a nearby newspaperman and taking
IT Fourth New York WOf'ld article, printed in New Orleans Times-
Picayune, September 9, 1921.
18 Tulsa Tribune, May 26, 1921.
19 Tulsa Daily World, June 1, 2, 3, 1921; Tulsa Tribune same
dates. Governor J. B. A. Robertson had his attorney general institute
ouster proceedings against Police Chief Gustafson of Tulsa for
negligence during the race riot. On July 22 a Tulsa jury found him
guilty and suspended him from office. For an assessment of blame
for the riot, see Gaston Litton, A History of Oklahoma at the Golden
Anniversary of Statehood (4 vols., New York, 1957), I, 552-53.
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him along, the maskers drove out of town. They stopped
in a clump of woods and whipped Ware until he confessed
to kidnaping a teenage boy because the boy could identify
him as a burglar. The newspaperman reported the inci-
dent to the Muskogee police, who did nothing. In a
thinly veiled reference to the Klan the police disclosed
that Ware's assailants were '''members of a secret organi-
zation which has figured in similar affairs throughout the
southwest.'~2o
In mid-July a band of hooded men seized Walter Bill-
ings, a theater owner, near the Rock Island depot in Enid,
spirited him out of town, accused him of wifebeating and
philandering, and administered a severe horsewhipping.
Later that month Mayor John C. Walton of Oklahoma
City ordered his police chief to conduct an investigation
of a "secret night-riding organization" which had been
holding meetings at the state fairgrounds. A few nights
later Oklahoma City law officers came upon a meeting of
several hundred Klansmen on the outskirts of the city.
Federal officials in the capital city said that 1,000 to 2,500
citizens belonged to Oklahoma City Klan No.1. And
August saw the first sign of the Klan's presence in Tulsa,
when the Reverend Caleb R. Ridley, the Imperial Kludd
(chaplain) from Atlanta and a popular Klan lecturer, ad-
dressed a crowd in Convention Hall on the principles of
the Klan. Wash E. Hudson, who one day would be the
Klan leader in the state senate, introduced the Klan
lecturer.21
By the summer of 1921 the Klan was well established in
Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, although it had at-
tracted an appreciable amount of public attention only in
Texas. In that state the hooded fraternity undertook a
campaign of systematic terrorism, aimed mostly at boot-
20 Tulsa Tribune, July 7, 1921.
21 Ibid., July 13, August 11, 1921; Oklahoma City Daily Okla-
homan, July 19, 23, 1921.
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leggers, moral offenders, gamblers, and wifebeaters. The
order's campaign of violence brought stirrings of opposi-
tion from various quarters. In the Texas house of repre-
sentatives, Wright C. Patman introduced a resolution at-
tacking the Klan, which the jittery solons tabled indefi-
nitely by a vote of 69 to 54. District judges in San Antonio,
Austin, Beaumont, and other cities charged their grand
juries to investigate the epidemic of masked assaults, but
no indictments would be returned until 1923. Mayor Oscar
F. Holcombe of Houston, who had joined the Klan and then
quickly resigned, imported a half dozen peace officers from
West Texas to protect Bayou City citizens from hooded
regulators operating without fear of the city police de-
partment.22 Throughout the state, city and county law of-
ficers were hurrying to join the Klan, some of them im-
pressed by the secret society's claims as an aid to law en-
forcement, others fearful of the growing power of the Klan
in their communities and counties.
For the most part the Klan's expansion over Louisiana
and Oklahoma went unnoticed. In September, C. L. Chap-
puis of Acadia Parish introduced a bill in the Louisiana
house of representatives making it unlawful for anyone in
the state to belong to an organization whose membership
rolls were not open for public inspection. Jules Dreyfous
of Iberia Parish submitted a bill to prohibit any group of
persons from appearing masked except at Mardi Gras.
During hearings on the bills before a house committee,
Representative Thomas F. DePaoli of New Orleans de-
fended the Klan and claimed that cCsome of the best citi-
zens in New Orleans" belonged to the order. Both of the
2237th Texas Legislature, House Journal, 1st Called Session, 51,
73-74; San Antonio Express, August 21, 1921; Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, November 8, 1921; Judge James R. Hamilton, Charge
to the Travis County Grand Jury, October 2, 1921, James R. Hamil-
ton Papers, in the possession of Mrs. Hamilton, Austin; testimony of
Oscar F. Holcombe in Ku Klux Klan v. Kimbro, in Houston Post-
Dispatch, March 25, 1925.
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bills were reported from committee without action, and
their sponsors withdrew them.23
The next month, at DeQuincy, near the Sabine River in
Calcasieu Parish, the local Klan introduced itself by post-
ing signs warning disorderly boys and negligent parents;
threatening "professional loafers, whiskey dealers, and law
violators"; and promising help for "Negroes who conduct
themselves as they should."24 The Klan nevertheless grew
slowly in Louisiana, perhaps because the state~s deplor-
able road system made travel and communication. dif-
ficult and because about half the population, the C~tholic
"Cajuns" in southern Louisiana, were bitterly hostile to
the order.
The Klan moved rapidly over Oklahoma,. but there, as
in Louisiana, the organization was tardy about coming. into
the open. In the late summer of 1921, when investigators
for the New York World were using Klan activities in
Texas as evidence for their charges of Klan violence to be
published in the fall, the order had still not made a fonnal
public appearance in Oklahoma. To be sure, there were
signs of Klan doings here and there-the tarring and feath-
ering of a mailclerk by masked men at EI Reno, near Okla-
homa City; the dispatch of notes signed by the Klan warn-
ing a judge, a deputy sheriff, and a constable at Slick, an
oil town in Creek County, to cease their collaboration with
bootleggers; the gift of twenty dollars to a destitute widow
by Klansmen at Ada.25 But the initiation of a class of
about three hundred by Tulsa Klan No. 2 on the last night
in August marked the first time that "aliens" witnessed
Klan activity in Oklahoma.26 Thenceforth, throughout Sep-
23 Louisiana General Assembly, House lournal, First Extra Session
( 1921), 35, 41, 42, 49, 505; New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sep-
tember 30, 1921.
24 New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 5, 1921.
25 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman~ August 12, 1921; Tulsa
Tribune, August 28, 29, 1921.
26 Tulsa Tribune, September 1, 1921.
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tember and the autumn months, reports came from all
parts of the state of silent parades by white-robed figures,
mysterious initiations or "naturalization ceremonies" in
pastures and on hillsides outside towns, and the direct,
often violent, efforts of Klansmen to effect law enforce-
ment and morality in their communities.
An especially popular method Oklahoma Knights used
to announce their presence featured a lone Klansmen on
horseback galloping furiously down the main street of a
town, a burning cross held high and signs like "Beware
bootleggers, hijackers and gamblers" and "Decent people
have no fear" attached to the sides of the horse. The
Klansmen would also form their automobiles into a line
and ride in their white robes and hoods through a town.
At other times they marched, carrying banners \vaming
undesirables to leave the community.27 Frequently the
hooded Knights used more forceful means to let "aliens"
know they were at hand. In Tulsa, twenty masked men
brought along a newspaperman when they whipped sus-
pected car thief and hijacker J. E. Frazier. Afterward the
leader of the regulators told the group: "We will now
return home, conscious that we have done our duty in
ridding Tulsa of one criminal-may the others fare like-
wise." County Attorney John Seaver, when asked about
the Frazier whipping, replied that. there would be no in-
quiry into the affair. Frazier probably got what he de-
served, said Seaver, and, besides, an investigation would
only bring criticism to the investigators.28 Such an attitude
amounted to an open invitation for the Klan's extralegal
marauding. During the next four months masked bands
whipped twelve persons in various parts of Tulsa County.
After it moved into an Oklahoma community, the Klan
27 See, for example, Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September
12, 21, 1921; Tulsa Tribune, September 2, 15, 24, 1921; New York
Times, September 22, 1921, p. 3.
28 Tulsa Tribune, September 3, 4, 1921.
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lost little time making its influence felt. A minister at
Ponca City, in the northern part of the state, expressed
feelings common to many in Oklahoma when he told his
congregation: cCThere is certainly a great opportunity in
Ponca City for the Ku Klux Klan to do its work. Law
violators here know everyone of the police officers and it
is almost impossible to get evidence against them." Klans-
men got their own evidence, not only on criminals, but on
negligent law officers as well. Irate citizens at Bristow,
Creek County, probably inspired by the Klan's presence,
chose a law and order committee and made plans for
cleaning the town of bootleggers, prostitutes, gamblers, and
hijackers. At Sapulpa, near Tulsa, a jury convicted the
local police chief of allowing liquor and prostitution in
the town and removed him from office. In Okmulgee a
superior court jury found the sheriff guilty of official mis-
conduct and permanently relieved him of his duties,
prompting the county attorney to assure his constituents:
c'So far I am for the activity of the Klan in Okmulgee
County." And late in the year Tulsa Klan No.2, claiming
a membership of 3,200, sent Sheriff William D. McCullough
a note demanding law enforcement in Tulsa County and
threatening ouster proceedings against the harassed sheriff
if he failed to curb lawbreaking.29
During this early period, opposition to the Klan on the
part of "respectable" elements in Oklahoma was virtually
nonexistent. In Louisiana the order encountered stiff re-
sistance from the citizenry and from most public officials
in the parishes and towns of south Louisiana. In New
Orleans, the largest southern or southwestern city in 1920,
with a population close to 400,000, the size of the member-
ship of Old Hickory Klan No.1 probably never approached
that of Klan No. 2 of Shreveport, a city less than one-
ninth as large as Ne\v Orleans. A considerable amount of
29 Ibid., October 11, September 25, October 14, November 13, 17,
1921; Tulsa Daily World, December 22, 1921.
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antipathy existed toward the Klan in Texas, where the
order grew at a mercurial rate. In charging their grand
juries, judges over the state excoriated the white-sheeted
society; the Texas Chamber of Commerce went on record
against the Klan; and a few holdover progressives, like the
former lieutenant governor and attorney general Martin
M. Crane of Dallas and United States Senator Charles A.
Culberson, attacked the divisive character of the order.
Even an occasional law officer spoke out against the Klan.
John W. Saye, the sheriff of Young County, denied the
need for the organization in his county and warned Klans-
men not to go outside the law.30 Another sheriff, Bob
Buchanan of McLennan County, where Waco Klan No. 33
thrived, tried to stop a Klan parade at Lorena, a village
south of Waco. His actions precipitated a gun and knife
fight in which several people were wounded and one man
stabbed to death. For his troubles Sheriff Buchanan re-
ceived a bullet in his leg and a sweeping rebuke from the
McLennan County grand jury.3!
The riot at Lorena, which brought nationwide publicity
to the sleepy central Texas village, was not the only time
that enemies of the Klan met violence with violence. In
December a band of about 150 robed and hooded Klans-
men met at night near the southern Oklahoma town of
Wilson, in Carter County, to plot a raid on the home of
suspected bootlegger Joe Carroll. A short time later nine
of the self-appointed liquor raiders tried to force their
way into Carroll's house and met a volley of gunfire from
Carroll and from his neghbors in the house next door. The
Klansmen returned the fire, and a gun battle of several
minutes' duration followed. When the Klansmen retired,
Carroll was dead inside his house, and one of their own
30 Dallas Morning News, October 16, 1921; Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, December 30, 1921.
31 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, October 3, 4, 5, 1921; Waco Times-
Herald, November 5, 1921.
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number, John Smith, lay dead before the crude shack. A
few hours later law officers found the lifeless body of C.
G. Simms in a blood-spattered Klan robe and hood outside
Wilson.32
Governor James B. A. Robertson sent his attorney gen-
eral to conduct a preliminary hearing and gather evidence
for the state. The hearing disclosed the full story of the
riot, and eleven citizens,.:of Carter County, all confessed
Klansmen, were indicted by the grand jury. A year passed
before the first of the defendants, Jeff Smith, came to
trial. The jury deliberated thirty-six hours on Smith's guilt,
finally reporting its failure to agree on a verdict. At a sec-
ond trial, held in late February 1923, Smith was acquitted,
whereupon the county attorney admitted that he had ex-
hausted all his evidence in the Smith trial and dropped
charges against the remaining ten defendants.33
By late 1921 Texas had become the most notorious state
of the Invisible Empire, Oklahoma Klansmen were making
headlines with their vigilante raids, and the Klan was firmly
implanted in Louisiana. But no one had yet seen a white-
robed figure or a flaming cross in Arkansas. Klan organ-
izers had come into Arkansas in the summer. In September,
King Kleagle A. E. Brown sat behind a desk in a room at
the Marion Hotel in Little Rock. There were no chartered
Klans in the state at that time, and the only field Kleagle
on Brown's staff was his brother, L. J. Brown.34 The Klan's
progress in Arkansas was slow, a condition probably re-
sulting from the poor system of roads and communications,
which virtually isolated parts of the state, and the state's
overwhelmingly rural and semirural character. In the early
twenties, Arkansas was essentially a rural and small town
state; the only cities of any size were Little Rock and Fort
32 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, December 18, 21, 23, 1921.
33 Ibid., December 24, 27, 1921; Tulsa Tribune, January 29, 31,
February 1, 4, 26, 28, March 1, 1923.
34 Fourth New York W orid article, printed in New Orleans Times-
Picayune, September 9, 1921.
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Smith. The Browns recruited enough native-born white
Protestants for the installation of a chapter in Little Rock,
with local attorney and fonner Republican political leader
James A. Comer as Exalted Cyclops. But Prescott, not Little
Rock, was the scene of the Klan's first public act in Arkan-
sas. In mid-December the Prescott Klan gave fifty-four
dollars to the Christmas fund of the local newspaper.35
The Christmas season saw the Klan come into the open
in different parts of Arkansas. The debuts of most local
Klans did not feature masked assaults or torchlit parades,
but acts of charity like donations to the poor at Christmas,
about the only time of the year when communities re-
membered their destitute citizens. During December,
Klansmen appeared at Gurdon, Hot Springs, Malvern,
Russellville, and Little Rock.36
The Christmas season over, Arkansas Klansmen turned
to the main order of business-cleaning up their cOlnmuni-
ties. In Texarkana, the stateline town whose Klan chapter
both Texans and Arkansans supported, masked regulators
whipped a young Negro for "fooling about a white woman."
In EI Dorado a crowd led by a local Klansman ordered out
of town an attorney for eleven members of the Industrial
Workers of the World. Three men wearing Klan hoods
Hogged a Little Rock poolhall operator, warned him to sell
his establishment and stop associating with Negroes, and
advised him to support his wife properly. In Hope, Klans-
men beat up a local bootlegger, told him to clothe his chil-
dren and put them in school, and dumped him from an
automobile on a downtown street. Early in February a mass
meeting of EI Dorado citizens brought into existence the
"Law Enforcement League" to combat prostitution and
other forms of vice in the oil-rich southern Arkansas town.
The chairman of the League said that he was a member
35 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, December 14, 1921.
36 Ibid., December 17, 21, 22, 25, 26, 1921.
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of Little Rock Klan No. 1 and that the chapter would
furnish whatever men and money were needed to enforce
the law in Union County. And the first public "naturaliza-
tion ceremonies" in Arkansas occurred a few days later,
when members of Klan No.1, aided by Knights from Ben-
ton, Hot Springs, Morrilton, Clarksville, Conway, Malvern,
and other towns, initiated about 650 "aliens." A newspaper-
man reported that the class included "state, county and
city officials, preachers, lawyers, doctors, merchants, labor-
ers. . . . There were men who have barely reached their
majority, and there were men whose hair is snowy white.~~
The initiation supposedly brought the Klan~s active mem-
bership to three thousand in Pulaski County.87
By the spring of 1922 the Klan was moving at a startling
pace in almost every part of the nation. The order had
already entered Indiana and Ohio, where it would reach
its numerical peak in later years. In Oklahoma about 70,000
men had joined the Klan; in Texas, according to Clarke,
between 75,000 and 90,000.88 About 25,000 Klansmen for
Arkansas and about 30,000 for Louisiana seem to be reason-
able guesses of Klan membership at that time. When people
thought of the Klan as a night-riding and terrorist organ-
ization, they thought mainly of the deeds of the order in
the southwestern states. They perhaps conceived of an in-
cident such as took place in Alexandria, Louisiana, where
nine robed Klansmen, revolvers buckled· around their waists,
walked into a hotel lobby and warned the manager to
leave town or suffer the consequences. Or perhaps they
had read of the Methodist preacher in DeRidder, Louis-
iana, accused of wife desertion and business dishonesty,
37 Ibid., January 9, February 5, 7, 11, 1922; Shreveport Journal,
February 6, 9, 1922.
88 The estimate for Oklahoma is from Tulsa Tribune, March 6,
1922. Edward Y. Clarke gave the estimate for Texas in an inter-
view with a newspaper reporter, in Dallas Morning News, January
28, 1922.
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who was abducted at his office by white-robed men, tarred
and feathered, and then thrown from a car in front of the
town drugstore.39
These and numerous other episodes of brutality, insult,
and intimidation colored the Klan's early career in the
Southwest. The Houston Chronicle asserted in the late sum-
mer of 1921 that "Texas Klansmen have beaten and black-
ened more people in the last six months than all the other
states combined."40 By the next spring, Klansmen in Okla-
homa, Louisiana, and Arkansas had also done their part
toward making the name of the Klan synonymous with
terror.
But the order's violent crusade to bring "law and or-
der" and moral orthodoxy to the Southwest had just be-
gun. During the next few years, perhaps a half million
Southwesterners would pay their initiation fees, buy their
robes, and become hooded Knights of the Invisible Empire.
This total included a good portion of the "substantial"
people in the communities of the Southwest. It was the
responsibility of these supposedly respectable and law-
abiding citizens to see that law enforcement remained in the
hands of the duly constituted authorities, not with bands
of masked terrorists. Yet all too often the C:C:better element'7
acquiesced as the more fanatical Klan members took it
upon themselves to define right conduct and punish trans-
gressors.
39 Bouanchaud Campaign Committee, The Ku Klux Klan in Alex-
andria and Rapides Parish (pamphlet), Louisiana Collection, Louis-
iana State University Library, Baton Rouge; New Orleans Times-
Picayune, February 26, 1922.
40 Houston Chronicle, quoted in "For and Against the Klan,"
Literary Digest, LXX (September 24, 1921), 39.
4.
The Klan's Drive for
Law and Order
IN THE SUMMER of 1922 a wave of Klan terrorism was
sweeping Oklahoma. "Alfalfa Bilr~ Murray, the crusty "Sage
of Tishimingo,~~ surveyed conditions in the state from the
vantage point of a temporarily retired politician and con-
cluded: ~~It is a sad commentary that just now the hope
of good morals and restraint against criminality is found
in a body of men whose organized method is not sanc-
tioned by law."1 Although Murray did not care for the
Klan, his comment carries a sentiment shared not only by
his fellow Oklahomans, but by numerous other Americans
in the 1920s. Alarmed and exasperated by a rapidly chang-
ing social order and the rising crime rate, many citizens,
especially in the Southwest, found in the Klan "the hope
of good morals and restraint against criminality." They
saw thieves, bootleggers, gamblers, and other sinners go-
ing unpunished by law enforcement officials and the courts;
and they turned to the Klan with the hope of bringing
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retribution to the wrongdoers, by one way or another. And
if sometimes they went outside the law, what of it? Wasn't
it better to horsewhip a hoodlum everybody knew was
guilty than to bring him into court and see him set free?
Because of such thinking, a considerable amount of
social approval attached to the Klan's night-riding forays
in Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. The sense
of helplessness felt by people in the Southwest, together
with a tradition of violence and vigilantism, goes a long
way toward explaining why, for the most part, the Klan
escaped public chastisement for its terrorist campaign.
As an Oklahoma judge remarked after the Klan had nearly
ceased its vigilante pursuits in all the southwestern states:
"In actual results, the thing [Klan coercion] worked pretty
well. I don't defend it, 'of course, but from what I've seen
I should say that~he night-riders averaged nearer justice
than the courts do."2.
Yet the Klan's continual abrogation of due process of law
alienated large numbers of citizens. In the Southwest and
in every part of the country there were people who might
offer no objection to the Klan's nativism and racism, but
who could not accept the order's arrogation to itself of
the function of moral arbiter. Even some Klansmen were
disgusted by the Klan's habit of prying into other people's
affairs, and occasionally they spoke out against masked
vigilantism or left the Invisible Empire. As one traveled
from south to north in Klandom, the number of Knights
who had no stomach for violence increased. In the north-
ern and eastern states, Klansmen rarely indulged in physical
coercion, although they frequently resorted to nonviolent
1 William H. Murray to Campbell Russell, July 20, 1922, Campbell
Russell Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma
Library, Norman.
2 Quoted in Stanley Frost, C~ight Riding Reformers: The Re-
generation of Oklahoma," Outlook, CXXXV (November 14, 1923),
439.
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coercive techniques-threats, boycotts, cross burnings.3 In
the South and Southwest, however, the majority of Klan
members, while they may never have done any night-riding
themselves, made little protest when "the boys," their fellow
Klansmen, set out to punish evildoers.
The Klan's official attitude toward acts of violence was
almost always to deny that the order was involved.4 Wil-
liam J. Simmons established the formal "Klan line" on
this subject when he appeared before the Rules Committee
of the United States House of Representatives, which in-
vestigated the Klan in the fall of 1921. There Simmons
maintained that he knew of no instances of Klan lawless-
ness, but if there were indeed any such cases, he could
assure the committee that the charters of the guilty Klans
would be revoked. But really, asked Simmons, how could
the Klan be guilty of lawless acts when one of the tenets
of the order was assistance of the authorities in law en-
forcement?5 The founder of the Klan could have answered
his own question by admitting that to many Klansmen
"assisting" law enforcement meant going outside the law,
doing things the duly constituted authorities could not
legally do.
The policy of denying the existence of Klan night-riding,
followed by the Simmons-Clarke regime in the immediate
postwar years, was perpetuated by Hiram W. Evans and
the "insurgent" group which won control of the Klan in
November 1922. Time after time, when someone was
whipped, tarred and feathered, run out of town, or other-
wise mistreated, Klan leaders disclaimed any responsibil-
8 See, for example, Emerson H. Loucks, The Ku Klux Klan in
Pennsylvania: A Study in Nativism (Harrisburg, 1936), ch. Ill, IV.
4 A notable exception to this policy was the Beaumont, Texas,
Klan's public acknowledgment of responsibility for assaulting Dr.
J. S. Paul and R. F. Scott in 1921. See above, p. 42.
5 The Ku Klux Klan. Hearings before the Committee on Rules,
Hoose of Representatives, 67th Congress, 1st Session (1921), 67-185.
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ity and charged the incident up to lawless elements outside
the order. On some occasions Klan chapters offered sizable
rewards for the arrest and conviction of persons misbe-
having under the guise of the Klan.6
There was at least a particle of truth in the Klan's por-
trayal of itself as victimized by unruly parties trying to
discredit the organization. Anyone could put on a mask
and go prowling about the community, or send a threaten-
ing note signed cCK.. K. K.'" There were doubtless some
crimes committed in the name of the Klan for which the
order bore no direct responsibility. This was especially
true in the northern states, where Klansmen usually re-
frained from violent activity. Even so, in this writer's
opinion the whole idea of non-Klan violence in the south-
ern and southwestern states has been greatly exaggerated,
most frequently, of course, by the Klansmen themselves.
It seems that responsibility for a large majority of the
vigilante forays in the Southwest rested heavily-and justly
-on the secret fraternity. If people outside the order were
to blame for the myriad of masked attacks occurring in
the early twenties, then why could not the Klan, with its
reputation for helping to apprehend criminals, working in
conjunction with law officers who were members of the
organization,briI)g the culprits to justice? The obvious an-
swer is that the local chapters were naturally reluctant to
punish their own members.
The epidemic of hooded attacks which followed the en-
trance of the Klan into each of the southwestern states
continued cl·uring 1922 and 1923, long after the order had
established itself in the region. The great bulk of these
personal indignities was directed against white people.
There were a few examples of Klan brutality involving
Negroes, but the infrequency of assanlts on colored citizens
6 See Dallas Morning News, March 22, 1922; Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, July 11, 1922; Shreveport Journal, July 27, 1921.
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only reinforces the contention that anti-Negroism was not
of primary importance to the Klan's growth in the South-
west. Coercion of Negroes was socially accepted procedure
in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma; yet south-
western Klansmen spent most of their time proscribing the
conduct of errant whites.
Probably the preponderance of Klan vigilante acts
featured a handful of Klansmen acting precipitately and
without the sanction of local officers of the order. One or
two Klansmen might see some person misbehaving in the
community, perhaps a man who beat his wife and chil-
dren. Thereupon the Knights would get a few brothers
together, don their robes and hoods or some other disguise,
climb into a Model-T Ford, and sally forth to right the
wrong that had been done.7
Some local Klans, usually the larger ones, went about
the task of purifying society much more elaborately and sys-
tematically. One of the officers of a chapter was the Night-
hawk, or investigator, whose only function was supposed
to be inquiring into candidates' suitability for admission
to membership, but whose duties frequently included spy-
ing on the morals of the community.s Sometimes the "Klo-
kann," the Exalted Cyclops' executive committee, served
as the instigator of regulatory activities. The Klokann of
Waco Klan No. 33, in Texas, supervised an elaborate spy
system and meted out punishment to evildoers. A former
official of the Waco Klan recalled: "If we had a report
about a man's immoral conduct we would select one of his
neighbors, some one who knew him well, and we would
authorize this party to watch him from day to day and
7 After reading accounts of about two hundred acts of hooded
violence occurring in the Southwest in the years 1921-1924, this
writer is forced to conclude that most of these deeds involved a few
Klansmen acting independently of their leaders.
8 Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (At-
lanta, 1921), art. xvm, sec. 12.
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night to night and render reports. . . . If we wanted tele-
phone conversations, why we got them; or anything else
of that nature."9
In Oklahoma, where the volume of Klan violence was
probably greater than in any other state, the order's ter-
rorist campaign was especially well organized. Oklahoma
City Klan No. 1 had a "whipping squad" comprised of
eighteen Klansmen appointed by Exalted Cyclops Grant
Landon. The squad, which the members of Klan No.1
c'alled the "Sanhedrin" after the ancient Hebrew council,
was "to take care of . . . these little matters in our neigh-
borhoods."10 Shawnee Klan No.8 had not one whipping
squad, but five, with a local Klansman and captain in the
Oklahoma national guard serving as the overall head of the
chapter's vigilante program. But the Exalted Cyclops of
Klan No.8, Dr. J. A. Walker, always gave his permission
before any punishment was inflicted on wayward towns-
people.11
Louisiana Klansmen often gave their chapter whipping
bands names like "Vigilance Committee," "Citizens Com-
mittee," or "Law Enforcement League." Such groups op-
erated under the supervision of the chapter executive
board, the Klokann. At the close of a meeting, or "Klon-
klave," the Exalted Cyclops announced that a meeting
of the Klokann and the Vigilance Committee would fol-
low. The Exalted Cyclops or some other officer presided
at this meeting. Each member of the Vigilance Committee
reported any misdeeds he had discovered in the com-
9 Testimony of Erwin J. Clark in Senator frOf11, Texas. Hearings be-
fore a Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections,
United States Senate, 68th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (1924),
125, 128-29.
10 Testimony of Dr. A. A. Maupin before the military court in
Oklahoma City, reported in Oklahoma City Daily OklahOf11,Qn, Sep-
tember 21, 1923.
11 Howard A. Tucker, Governor Walton~s Ku Klux Klan War (Okla-
homa City, 1923), 41-43. See also Tulsa Tribune, September 14,1923.
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munity and made recommendations on how the wrong-
doers should be handled. The presiding officer then ap-
pointed several Klansmen to attend to a particular indi-
vidual and specified the type of punishment to be admin-
istered. No member of a punishment squad was to reveal
the names of his fellow regulators, not even to other Klans-
men, on fear of banishment from the Klan. If the Klokann
feared that the victim would recognize his assailants, the
council might call in Klansmen from a neighboring Klan
to perform the vigilante work.12
There were a few occasions when the Klan used what
might be termed "front" organizations to carry out its
cleanup operations in towns and areas. During the early
part of 1922, Klan organizers moved into the Ozark Moun-
tain region of northern Arkansas. In kluxing the towns of
the Ozark counties the Kleagles profited from the resent-
ment many conservative people in the area felt against
the striking workers on the Missouri and North Arkansas
railroad line. The strike, which began in the summer of
1921, lasted throughout 1922 and into the next year. Strong
Klans were organized in Harrison, Heber Springs, Mar-
shall, and other towns in the Ozarks. Hostility between
union members and nonunion citizens grew steadily as the
strike crippled the economic life of the towns along the
M. & N.A., and as the workers, becoming increasingly des-
perate, began blowing up railroad trestles and sabotaging
locomotive engines.I3 The nonunion element, many of
them Klansmen, countered by forming CCCitizens' Commit-
tees" in various towns. There is evidence that the local
Klans served as nuclei for the committees, although the
12 These facts were disclosed by "a former federal agent who is
a former Klansman," reported in New Orleans Times-Picayune, Jan-
uary 10, 1923.
13 The issues of LittleRock Arkansas Gazette and Fort Smith
Southwest American for the au ':lImn months of 1922 are full of ac-
counts of the strikers' sabotage activities.
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citizens' groups unquestionably included scores of indi-
viduals who did not belong to the order.
A citizens' organization calling itself the "Committee of
1,000" went into action at Harrison on January 16, 1923,
and at Eureka Springs, Heber Springs, and elsewhere the
next day. At Harrison a band of men wearing black masks
lynched a striker named E. C. Gregor and Hogged a busi-
nessman and strike sympathizer, George W. O'Neal. A
"Citizens' Court" of twelve members, wholly extralegal,
assumed authority in Harrison and began quizzing strikers
brought before the kangaroo court by armed vigilantes.
The Citizens' Court listed a member from each of twelve
towns along the M. & N.A.-Harrison, Leslie, Marshall, St.
Joe, Everton, Alpena, Green Forest, Berryville, Eureka
Springs, Western Grove, Jasper, and Heber Springs. The
regular courts, under the dominance of the Committee of
1,000 and the Citizens' Court, quickly sentenced two-
strikers to prison. The Citizens' Court also forced the city
council at Harrison to resign and decreed the expulsion
of strikers and their families from Boone, Carroll, Marion,
and Searcy counties. Soon every place of business in the
M. & N.A. towns displayed a placard proclaiming that the
proprietor was "100 Per Cent for the Railroad."14
The Arkansas legislature appointed a joint committee to
investigate the disturbances in Harrison and the other
towns. Hundreds of witnesses, union and nonunion, ap-
peared before the legislative committee, which held ses-
sions at both Little Rock and Harrison. One member of the
Citizens' Committee of Heber Springs testified that the
organization had several squads led by captains to take
whatever measures were necessary to curb the strikers'
activities. He also said that there was an "inner organi-
zation" which c'knew about what was going to happen,
something similar in character to the Ku Klux Klan; an
14 Fort Smith Southwest Amerkan, January 17-21, 1923; Little
Rock Arkansas Gazette, same dates.
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organization which seemed to function but which nobody
knew anything about."15 The legislative investigating com-
mittee listened to weeks of testhnony but was unable to
establish a definite connection between the~ CJtizens' Com-
mittee and the lynching of Gregor, or to id'e~tify the in-
dividuals responsible for the violence in the railro.ad towns.
In its report to Governor Thomas C. McRae" submitted
more than four months after the breaking of the ·~trike, the
investigating committee made no recomrnendatjolls for
action and refused to assess blame for the antiunion dis-
turbances.16
Episodes of Klan violence transpiring in the four states
of the Southwest are too numerous and too repetitious in
character for all to be mentioned. Examples of assaults
carried out by hooded night-riders in Texas, included the
tarring and feathering of D. L. Matthews of Beaumont on
two separate occasions; the Hogging and expulsion from
San Augustine County, in east Texas, of jitney driver
Charles Sisson; the whipping of B. F. Clark, a constable
at Mineral Wells, Palo Pinto County; the viciou~ beating
of a man and woman accused of adultery in the oilfields
outside Goose Creek, southeast of Houston; the lashing of
storeclerk Ray Daniels at· Marshall, a thriving, east.. Texas
market town. Each of these cases involved. some alleged
moral offense or violation of the prohibition laws by the
victim.17 Only one of these episodes, the attack on the
man and woman near Houston, brought indictments from
a grand jury, and in that case t\velve admitted members
of Goose Creek Klan No.8 got off with fines of $100 each.
"It cost Goose Creek just $1200 to clean up,'" exulted the
editor of a pro-Klan weekly newspaper. "It cost the boys
15 Fort Smith Southwest American, February 2, 1923.
16 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 29, 1923.
17 San Antonio Express, January 12, 22, 1922; Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, July 8, 11, 1922; D"enison Herald, March 2, 1922; Austin
Statesman, January 13, 17, May 6,1923; Dallas Morning News, July
6,26,1923.
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down there $1200 to transform a rough and tumble oil camp
into a progressive and God-fearing community of industri-
ous toilers. . . . The Ku Klux Klan has made a new and
different town of Goose Creek."18
Examples of Klan truculence were not nearly as numer-
ous in Arkansas as in the other southwestern states, per-
haps because the Klan got a late start in the Wonder State
and, outside of Little Rock, grew slowly. Yet Arkansas
Klansmen committed their share of physical attacks on
sinners. Early in 1922 the Nashville Klan sent Joel Harris,
an old man, and Walter H. Gibbs, his young friend and
protector, warning notes about keeping Negro women.
When two carloads of vigilantes clad in overalls and
gunnysack masks tried to kidnap the two men, Gibbs fired
at the assailants from inside his and Harris' house. The
maskers riddled the house with buckshot, killing Gibbs,
and then seized Harris and beat him with a plank. The
sheriff of Ward County conducted a brief inquiry and an-
nounced that he was destitute of clues.19 In July of the
next year a mob of 75 to 100 men, some of them wearing
regular Klan garb, others in black robes and hoods, en-
tered the bunkhouse of the EI Dorado Natural Gas and
Petroleum Company, seized rigworker Eddie Foreman,
and whipped him severely for making advances to a
Klansman's wife. Sheriff Hancock of Union County arrested
five men for the attack on Foreman and charged them with
'night-riding, a felony in Arkansas. But the grand jury
failed to return indictments, and the five accused floggers
went free.20
Hooded moralists were especially active in Oklahoma, so
18 Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, July 28, 1923.
19 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, March 21, 22, 1922.
20 Ibid., July 7, 8, 20, 1923; New Orleans Times-Picayune, same
dates. The official Klan regalia of course consisted of white robes
and hoods, but it appears that some Klan chapters also had black
robes and hoods, which the Klansmen wore during their night-riding
work.
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much so that a power-hungry governor, attempting to cover
up the ineptness and corruption of his administration, could
use the Oklahoma Klan's penchant for violence as an ex-
cuse for putting the entire state under martial law. The
account of John C. Walton's war with the Klan during the
summer and fall of 1923, culminating in his removal from
the governorship, properly belongs in a political context,
and consequently that story is reserved for a later chapter.
But the testimony given before the military courts estab-
lished in different parts of the state provided some startling
revelations of the Klan's night-riding career in Oklahoma.21
National guardsmen, sometimes working with county
authorities, arrested about forty men in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
Creek, Wagoner, Pottawatomie, and other counties during
the course of military rule in Oklahoma. Hundreds of
witnesses testified before the military courts, many of them
victims of assaults by masked bands. Most of the deeds
of violence disclosed under the martial law regime oc-
curred during 1922. There was, for example, the case of
Edward S. Merriman, an Oklahoma City cabdriver abduct-
ed from a restaurant the night of March 7, 1922, by two
men posing as law officers. The two men threw Merriman
into an automobile and drove to a spot outside town., where
about eight carloads of white-robed men accused him of
immorality with a young woman in Oklahoma City,
whipped him with a rope, and told him to leave town.
Merriman returned to Oklahoma City after a month's
absence and gave the names of eighteen men he believed
were among his attackers to the county attorney's office.
21 Unfortunately the writer was unable to locate transcripts of
the hearings before the various military courts. Adjutant General
Roy W. Kenny of the state of Oklahoma informed the writer
(January 11, 1962) that the records were not in his office and he
had no idea where they might b~. The governor's office made public
some of the testimony through the. newspapers at the time of the
hearings. Howard A. Tucker, a· confidant of Governor Walton, also
had access to the testimony for the. preparation of his polemical his-
tory of Walton's fight on the Klan, cited in n. 11 above.
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The authorities did nothing. A few days later his employer
threatened to fire him if he did not withdraw his charges,
but he refused. A former member of Oklahoma City Klan
No.1, Dr. A. A. Maupin, swore that N. Clay Jewett, the
Grand Dragon of the Realm of Oklahoma, told him re-
garding the Merriman affair: "I am the man who led that
one, I led that party, and I know what I was doing. I am
the fellow who held the whip and put it on his back and
made him confess." The military court charged Jewett with
whipping Merriman and had him arrested. But the Grand
Dragon soon established an alibi, and the military authori-
ties dropped their charges.22
John K. Smitherman, a prominent Tulsa Negro, testi-
fied that about 2 A.M. on March 10, 1922, three masked men
forced him from his home, beat him with a pistol butt when
he struggled with them, and shoved him into an auto-
mobile. He was driven to a hillside near Tulsa, where he
faced twelve men, eight masked by handkerchiefs, four
unmasked. Smitherman said he was handcuffed around a
tree and accused of registering Negroes to vote in the
Democratic primaries and of being discourteous to a Tulsa
white woman. A little man spat in his face; the maskers then
lashed him with a blacksnake whip. After the whipping,
the little man cut off Smitherman's ear with a pocketknife
and tried to make the Negro eat the ear, all..the time beat-
ing him with the butt end of the ,vhip. The regulators
finally left Smitherman with a warning to get out of the
state, but he remained in Tulsa.23
During the summer of 1922, at the little southeastern
Oklahoma town of Broken Bow in McCurtain County, a
group of robed and hooded Klansmen kidnaped a middle-
22 Tucker, Governor Walton~s Klan War, 22-24; Dr. A. A. Mau-
pin's testimony before the Oklahoma City military court, reported
in Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 21, 1923. See also
Daily Oklahoman, September 22, 23, October 11, 1923.
23 Tucker, Governor Walton~s Klan War, 28-32; Tulsa Tribune,
September 24, 1923.
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aged married couple, Joe and Annie Pike, from their home.
The Klansmen accused the Pikes of brewing Choctaw
beer, an intoxicating beverage made from an Indian recipe,
and Hogged them both. At the time Mrs. Pike wore only
a nightgown. The Pikes related the story to officials in
Governor Walton's office, adding that they had gone to
the county authorities several times but had never received
any serious attention.24
In Tulsa County alone, military authorities filed charges
of night-riding and assault against thirty-one citizens, all
of whom eventually admitted membership in the Klan.
Four of the defendants confessed to participating in Hog-
ging parties and promised to aid the state's investigations
in exchange for light prison sentences. Only one of the
convicted Klansmen, Constable William Finley of Broken
Arrow, ever served any time in the state penitentiary at
McAlester; and he soon was pardoned by Martin E. Trapp,
who became governor after the Oklahoma legislature im-
peached and ousted Walton. The other three Klansmen
remained in Tulsa until the spring of 1924, when the state,
now under the Trapp administration, vacated their sen-
tences and discharged them. Later they were fined twenty-
five dollars apiece in court of common pleas for assault
and battery. In July the attorney general's office dropped
charges against twenty-seven Tulsa County citizens impli-
cated in twelve Hogging episodes dating from November
28, 1921, to July 25, 1923.25
Walton found that martial law was not the answer to
Klan violence. The imposition of military rule on Okla-
homa accomplished very little except to speed Walton's
ouster. The failure of the military courts and the attorney
general's office to get wholesale convictions, despite abun-
dant testimony from victims, demonstrated that arrests and
24 Tucker, Governor Walton's Klan War, 36-38.
25 Tulsa Tribune, August 24, 26, 27, November 4, 1923, February
29, March 30, June 13, July 19, 1924.
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charges were of small benefit in the face of hostility from
local civil authorities and citizens. But Walton could have
learned this fact from the governor of Louisiana, who ex-
perienced similar frustration earlier in 1923 in his attempts
to secure the convictions of Klansmen in the notorious
Mer Rouge murder case.
Easily the most famous instance of Klan terrorism, and
one of the best known murder cases of the 1920s, the Mer
Rouge affair provides an illustration of the Klan's ability
to move into an area and nourish longstanding jealousies
and animosities between communities and citizens.26 For
twenty-five years a bitter rivalry had existed in Morehouse
Parish, in northeastern Louisiana, between the towns of
Bastrop and Mer Rouge. Bastrop, the parish seat, was
a grimy town of about 3,000 people, dominated by the
Baptist church and fiercely proud of the pulpmill and
carbon plant located nearby. Mer Rouge, by contrast, was
only a village, more easygoing than Bastrop, less "pro-
gressive," less puritanical. The Klan came to Morehouse
Parish late in 1921. It quickly enlisted most of the adult
males of Bastrop and the other towns in the parish-except
Mer Rouge, the majority of whose inhabitants held the
Klan in contempt. So the Klan became one more element in
the bitterness between the people of the two Louisiana
towns.27
In the spring of 1922 the membership of Morehouse
Klan No. 34, with the acquiescence of Sheriff Fred Car-
penter and his deputies, all Klansmen, instituted a vigor-
ous drive for moral reform in the parish. Led by Exalted
26 The contemporary coverage of the Mer Rouge cases in the
newspapers and magazines was quite extensive. For periodical ma-
terial dealing with the episode, see Robert L. Duffus, "Salesman of
Hate: The Ku Klux Klan,'" World's Work, XLVI (May 1923), 31-
38; Leonard L. Cline, "In Darkest Louisiana'" Nation, CXVI (March
15, 1923),292-93; ("Murders of Mer Rouge'" Literary Digest, LXXVI
(January 13, 1923), 10-12; "Mer Rouge Murders Unpunished," ibid.
(March 31, 1923), 10-11.
27 This summary of the background for the murders is from Cline,
("In Darkest Louisiana," passim.
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Cyclops J. K. Skipwith, an irascible Civil War veteran in
his seventies, Morehouse Klansmen broke into the homes
of suspected bootleggers, ran a teenage girl out of town
for immorality, and threatened to swoop down "100 strong"
to wipe out liquor-making and concubinage in Mer Rouge.
The Klan haters of Mer Rouge cursed the Klan and dared
Skipwith and his raiders to invade the village. Among the
most vocal opponents of the Klan were old J. L. Daniel, a
wealthy Mer Rouge planter; his son F. Watt Daniel, a grad-
uate of Louisiana State University; and Watt Daniel's
friend Thomas F. Richards, a garage mechanic.28
Early in August 1922, Dr. B. M. McKoin of Mer Rouge,
leader of the Morehouse Klan's whipping squad, returned
from a professional night call with a bullet hole in the
front seat of his automobile. McKoin said someone had
fired on him from ambush. The Klansmen in Bastrop and
the rest of the parish were convinced that Watt Daniel and
Richards, who had threatened to kill the physician, were
the ones who fired the shot. Wearing black robes and hoods,
their raiding attire, the Klansmen kidnaped Richards in
broad daylight from the Bastrop garage where he worked
and quizzed him about his threats on McKoin's life. When
Richards remained silent, the Klansmen released him
unharmed. A few days later Watt Daniel stumbled upon
a moonlight meeting of Klansmen in a wooded area near
Mer Rouge. "Old Skip" or "Captain" Skipwith, as the aged
Cyclops was called, and other Klansmen held guns on
Daniel while they warned him to behave and stop talking
about the Klan.29
On August 24 the people of Morehouse Parish gathered
28 Ibid.
29 The facts included in this discussion of the kidnapings came
from the testimony given by various witnesses before the open hear-
ing held in Bastrop during January of 1923. Dozens of newspapers
over the nation carried the wire releases on the murders, but for
firsthand coverage of the testimony during the open hearing, the
writer has relied Qn the issues for January 6 to 26, 1923, of New
York Times, New Orleans Times-Picayune, and Shreveport Journal.
70
in Bastrop for a cCgood roads" bond rally, picnic, and base-
ball game. After the festivities a train of about fifty auto-
mobiles started the seven-mile drive back to Mer Rouge.
About halfway between the two towns a score or more of
black-robed and hooded men stopped the procession and
began walking down the line of cars, peering closely into
each vehicle. At gunpoint they forced Watt Daniel, Rich-
ards, J. L. Daniel, W. C. Andrews, and C. C. c'Tot" Daven-
port from their cars and ordered the drivers of the other
vehicles to proceed to Mer Rouge. That was the last time
Watt Daniel and Richards were seen alive. Late that night,
Andrews and J. L. Daniel wandered onto the Collinston
road, their backs lacerated by leather straps. Davenport
appeared in Mer Rouge uninjured. Still later in the night
a family sleeping in their car near Lake Lafourche, south
of Bastrop, saw an automobile and a runabout truck filled
with black-hooded men speeding toward the lake. Two
blindfolded men sat in the bed of the truck. About forty-
five minutes later the car and truck reappeared, but this
time minus the two blindfolded men. In Bastrop, Skip-
with ordered a telephone operator to terminate service be-
tween the parish seat and Mer Rouge; after she refused, the
telephone lines were cut.
The Morehouse Parish grand jury met in September. In
all likelihood a majority of its members were Klansmen.
At any rate, the grand jury conducted a hurried investi-
gation of the disappearance of Watt Daniel and Richards
and the Hogging of the elder Daniel and Andrews. Its re-
port did not even mention the incident, although the
grand jurors noted, ironically, that cCthere was a marked
decrease in crime in Morehouse Parish since the last grand
jury was in session."30
Open warfare impended between the Klansmen in Bas-
trop and the anti-Klan faction in Mer Rouge. Mrs. Rich-
ards and a group of Mer Rouge citizens appealed to
30 New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 9, 1922.
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Governor John M. Parker, who answered: "Neither mob
violence nor the Ku Klux Klan shall run this state." Parker
reopened the case and offered a reward of $500 for the
arrest and conviction of the kidnapers. ~~Old Skip" wrote
a public letter to Parker condemning the reopening of the
case and accusing the governor of "aligning yourself with
a lot of midnight assassins and open law violators in More-
house Parish."31 In November, Parker and Attorney Gen-
eral Adolph V. Coco journeyed to Washington to ask
President Harding and Attorney General Harry M. Daugh-
erty for a few Department of Justice investigators to help
the state's inquiry into the kidnapings. This brought cries
of federal interference and denunciations of the governor
from Representative James B. Aswell, in whose district
Morehouse Parish was located, and other Louisiana public
officials.32 But Parker, now determined to crush the Klan,
pressed his attack on the secret organization. He de-
nounced the hooded order before various groups over the
state. In return the Klan slammed the mustachioed gov-
ernor as a political opportunist and charged him with
working for the Democratic vice-presidential nomination
in 1924. Baton Rouge Klansmen decorated the lawn of the
governor's mansion with placards shaped like gravestones
advertising a Klan initiation, and tied Parker's Airedale
puppy to a tree.33
On December 19 Governor Parker declared Morehouse
Parish under martial law. A Louisiana national guard de-
tachment took positions around the courthouse at Bastrop,
in Mer Rouge, and at Lakes Lafourche and Cooper, where
divers began a search for the bodies of Daniel and Rich-
ards. Newspaper correspondents from over the nation
swarmed into Bastrop, packing the town's lodging places
31 Ibid., September 10, 12, 1922.
32 For material on Congressman Aswell's tilt with Parker, see
James B. Aswell and Family Papers, scrapbook #15, pp. 131-39, De-
partment of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
33 New Orleans Times-Picayune, November 29, 1922.
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and exhausting its restaurant facilities. The local telegraph
operator worked around the clock to send their pungent
dispatches to newspapers in every part of the country.
Three days after the declaration of martial law, a mysteri-
ous dynamite explosion in Lake Lafourche brought two
badly decomposed bodies to the surface. Parker immedi-
ately dispatched Attorney General Coco, Assistant Attor-
ney General T. Semmes Walmsley, and two New Orleans
pathologists to examine the bodies and begin preparation
of a case for the state. The pathologists identified one
of the bodies as Watt Daniel by a belt buckle bearing the
initials "F. W. D."; the other was identified as Richards
because of the presence of patches of shirt material Rich-
ards wore the day he disappeared.34
Federal agents, cooperating with the state officials,
arrested T. Jeff Burnett, a Bastrop Klansman, as one of the
black-robed kidnapers. They also arrested McKoin, now in
Baltimore doing postgraduate medical study, and brought
him back to Bastrop.35 Parker, Coco, and their subordin-
ates arranged an cCopen hearing" to aid the investigation
of the kidnapings and murders. Such a hearing made it
possible for any citizen to come forward and testify about
anything he had seen, heard, or suspected in connection
with the crime. The attorney general's office, assuming
that District Attorney David I. Garrett and his staff in
Morehouse Parish were under the dominance of the Klan,
now relied for the establishment of its case solely on evi-
dence secured by the federal operatives or disclosed in the
hearing.
During the open hearing, the grand jury investigation
that followed, and the whole course of the Mer Rouge cases,
the state contended that the bodies found in the lake were
those of Watt Daniel and Richards; that they had been
34 New York Times, December 20, 1922, p. 1, December 21, p. 6,
December 23, p. 12; New Orleans Times-Picayune, same dates.
35 New York Times, December 26, 1922, pp. 1, 3, December 27,
pp. 1-2, January 4, 1923, p. 21.
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murdered and thrown in the lake by a band of about
seventy-five Klansmen from Morehouse, Franklin, Rich-
land, and West Carroll parishes in Louisiana and two
Arkansas counties; and that the killings were part of a
systematic reign of terror carried out by the Klan in north
Louisiana. The official Klan version of the affair, reiterated
by local Klansmen and national officials, was that Watt
Daniel and Richards were whipped by unknown parties,
but not by Klansmen; that they simply ran away after the
whippings and were still alive; and that the bodies in Lake
Lafourche were cadavers from a medical school "planted"
by the state.
The state called more than fifty witnesses during the
open hearing, which lasted from January 5 to 25, 1923.
Klansmen, ex-Klansmen, and anti-Klanners testified, some
willingly, some reluctantly. The state established almost
conclusively that members of Morehouse Klan No. 34 were
among those responsible for the kidnaping and beating
of J. L. and Watt Daniel, Richards, Andrews, and Daven-
port. But Coco and his aides were unable to prove that
Klansmen actually murdered Watt Daniel and Richards
and disposed of their bodies, or to show what Klansmen
were involved in the beatings and killings. After the open
hearing, the state took its findings- before a new grand
jury which, after listening to testimony from 125 witnesses,
refused to return indictments because of "insufficient" evi-
dence. "It is needless to say that I am highly elated," com-
mented Skipwith, the venerable Cyclops, before he em-
barked on a speaking tour to tell Klansmen in other states
about the "frameup" in Morehouse. "The state has done
its duty and I hope it is satisfied and will rlet the matter
rest."36
But the state would not let the matter rest. In April, At-
torney General Coco had District Attorney Garrett file
thirty-one bills of information against eighteen Morehouse
36 New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 16, 1923.
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Klansmen for conspiracy to kidnap, assault with deadly
weapons, unlawfully carrying firearms, and other offenses,
all misdemeanors. All of the charges pertained to offenses
committed before the disappearance of Daniel and Rich-
ards. Among those named in the bills were Skipwith, his
son Oliver, McKoin, and T. Jeff Burnett. Shortly before the
misdemeanor trials were heard in district court in Bastrop,
the two pathologists who had identified the bodies in Lake
Lafourche ·as Watt Daniel and Richards made a disclosure
that threw a shadow over the state's entire case. The path-
ologists said that the bodies could not have been in the
lake three months., as the state contended, and that they
were there not more than forty-eight hours. Yet the state
had ignored this piece of information during the open
hearing and the grand jury investigation. In May of 1924,
just before Parker vacated the governorship, the head of
the Louisiana Department of Healfh wrote the governor
that national guardsmen had prevented the parish coroner
from examining the decomposed bodies and that the
coroner had never signed a death certificate.37 It appears
that the state's conduct during the inquiries in More-
house was questionable in at least some respects.
Parker's and Coco's continued prosecution of the Klans-
men on misdemeanor charges ultimately came to have the
appearance of political spite. In November 1923 District
Judge Fred Odum found Skipwith, Benton Pratt, Marvin
Pickett, and W. G. McIntosh guilty of "carrying firearms
on the premises of another" while raiding a bootlegger,
and fined them ten dollars each plus court costs. Before
the judge could pass any more sentences, William C.
Barnette of Shreveport, counsel for the Klan in Louisiana,
demanded that Odom withdraw from the case because of his
prejudice against the defendants. When the judge re-
fused, Barnette filed notice of appeal to the state supreme
37 Ibid., April 19, October 31, 1923; Shreveport Journal, May 21,
1924.
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court. That was the last of the state's prosecutions. The
supreme court refused to uphold Barnette's appeal, but the
rest of the Morehouse cases were postponed until Feb-
ruary of 1924, when the state dismissed its charges.38 In
such an obscure fashion the great Mer Rouge murder cases
came quietly to an end. They remain on the list of un-
solved crimes of the state of Louisiana.
Thus far the discussion of the Klan's drive for law and
order has featured the order's direct and violent efforts.
Yet there was more to the Klan's vigilantism than physical
coercion. The white-robed reformers also used nonviolent
methods to effect law enforcement and morality, and such
activities could be fully as annoying and offensive, if not
as physically painful, as the corporal attacks. One objec-
tive of the Klan's parades and cross burnings was to ~~put
the fear of God" into whiskey makers and other evildoers.
Local Klans frequently sent threatening notes bearing their
official seals to errant citizens; regulatory ~'visits" might or
might not follow the notes.39 If the Klansmen were dis-
satisfied with the status of law enforcement in their com-
munities and counties, they often adopted resolutions in
which they demanded better performance from their public
officials. Harrisonburg, Louisiana, Klan No. 75, for example,
cited the lawless condition of Catahoula Parish, where "the
criminal and law-violating element . . . openly defies the
Law, resist [sic] and threatens the life of the Sheriff and
his deputies, holds the Law in contempt, openly and above
board boasts of the fact that they handle the Judge, and
that the District Attorney is easy." The resolution called
on "all good citizens of this Parish whether you are Klans-
38 Shreveport Journal, November 22, 24, December 6, 1923.
39 For examples of threatening letters sent by Texas Klansmen, see
Klan No. 27, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Edna to Sherell Car-
ville, September 7, 1921, photographic copy, Oscar B. Colquitt Pa-
pers, University of Texas Archives, Austin; Ku Klux Klan to Judge
James R. Hamilton, March 31, 1922, James R. Hamilton Papers, in
possession of Mrs. Hamilton, Austin.
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men or not to cooperate with us in seeing that the Law is
enforced."40
Members of Denison Klan No. 113 in Texas donned their
white robes and hoods to frighten amorous couples park-
ing on the roads outside the town.41 Houston Klansmen
made a practice of tapping telephone wires over the city,
intercepting messages at the telegraph offices, and main-
taining spies in the city postoffice. "Klan spies would go
out in a car with a listening set and tap the wire up the
pole near the house they'd want to listen in on," related
an ex-member of the Houston Klan.42 The Klan continually
admonished bootleggers to "bring in the stills" and halt
their illegal business, and there were a number of occa-
sions when Klansmen CCcaptured" stills and deposited them
in the middle of town. The Klan was always quite proud
of these "citizens arrests" of liquor-making apparatus.
Local chapters readily acknowledged their responsibility
for such acts and received credit from law officers.43
Sometimes the Klan undertook veritable wars on boot-
leggers. Although these purification drives were supposed
to be nonviolent, frequently they did not remain so. In
November of 1922 two hundred members of the "Cleanup
Committee" of Ouachita and Union counties in southern
Arkansas, wearing the white robes and hoods of the Klan
and representing the "better element" in the area, moved
through the oilfields around Smackover, burning gambling
dens, prostitute houses, and saloons. At one point twenty-
five vice operators fought a gun battle with the vigilantes.
40 Printed in Caldwell [Parish, La.] Watchman, July 13, 1923.
41 Houston Colonel Mayfield~s Weekly, August 4, 1923.
42 Testimony of Fred A. Bryan and L. E..Ogilvie in Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. George B. Kimbro, 1r. (No. 105180) (61st Dis-
trict Court, Harris County, Texas), reported in Houston Post-Dis-
patch, March 25, 1925.
43 See, for example, Atlanta Searchlight, March 18, 1922; Houston
Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, April 21, 1923; Little Rock Arkansas
Gazette, April 17, 1922; Fort Smith Southwest American, November
4, 1922.
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One anti-Klanner was shot down as he tried to escape the
Klansmen, and about a dozen other people were Hogged,
tarred, and feathered. Sheriff Ed Harper of Ouachita
County finally arrived after the rioting had ended. He
estimated that the white-clad regulators drove about two
thousand "undesirables~~ from the oilfields.44
The Klan's preoccupation with morality and crime in the
Southwest led Klansmen to enter local politics in an effort
to control the law enforcement machinery in towns and
counties. Practically every city in the Southwest came
under the dominance of the Klan, as well as numerous
smaller communities and hundreds of county governments.
But the Klan did not stop with electing sheriffs, mayors,
and prosecuting attorneys; it sought control of jury com-
missions, judges, and even the juries themselves. Lee
Cazort, the Klan's candidate for governor of Arkansas
in the 1924 campaign, bragged about the order~s law en-
forcement program in his hometown and county. "In John-
son County," Cazort told the crowds, "we had a mighty
crew of bootleggers and innumerable liquor dispensaries
which were debauching the youth of Lamar and of the
county. I joined the Klan and with others sat on juries
and backed up the prosecuting attorney and circuit judge
until we cleaned up Lamar and Johnson County.~'45
The Klan secured control of grand and trial juries for
one purpose-to indict and convict. Except for Klansmen
charged with night-riding, law violators in Klan-dominated
communities could ordinarily expect convictions and hard
sentences from biased juries and stern judges. By the spring
of 1925 the Klan was on the decline in most areas of the
Southwest, but Lake Charles, Louisiana, in the western part
of the state, was one town where the Invisible Empire re-
mained supreme. That spring two bootleggers, Byron and
44 Shreveport Journal, November 29, 30, 1922; Little Rock Arkan-
sas Gazette, same dates.
45 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 4, 1924.
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Robert Dunn, were arrested, tried, and convicted for the
murder of Deputy Sheriff Sam E. Duhon of Calcasieu
Parish. The Dunns received death sentences from District
Judge Jerry Cline. Attorneys for the two condemned men
appealed to the state supreme court, which in 1926 up-
held the decision handed down in the district court.46
The Dunns applied for writs of habeas corpus before
state district court in Baton Rouge, the state board of
pardons, federal district court in Monroe, and the United
States Supreme Court:l and for stays of execution before
Governor Oramel H. Simpson. In all of their appeals and
petitions the Dunns maintained that the court in Lake
Charles that convicted them was controlled by the Klan
and that as a consequence they did not receive a fair trial
and were denied due process of law. Specifically they
charged that District Judge Cline, Sheriff J. Horace Lyons,
and Court Clerk E. Claude House were charter member~
of Lake Charles Klan No.7, and that several Klansmen lied
about their membership in the organization to get on the
jury, including a relative of Duhon, the victim. They also
charged that wealthy businessman and Klansman William
K. Gray sat beside the judge with a pistol in his pocket; that
Paul D. Perkins, a former state official of the Klan, made
hand signals to the jury throughout the trial; and that
the Klan threatened two witnesses until they refused to
testify in the defendants' behalf.47 In 1928, after the Su-
preme Court had denied the Dunns' second appeal, Gov-
ernor Simpson commuted Robert Dunn's sentence to life
imprisonment. Byron Dunn died on the gallows, long after
the organization that had helped to convict him had ceased
to be an important factor in Louisiana society.48
The Klan worked through the legal processes to impose
46 State v. Dunn et al., 109 S.o. 56.
47 New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 20-24, 1927; Dunn v. Louis-
iana 273 U.S. 656.
48 Dunn v. Lyons, 276 U.S. 622; Shreveport Journal, January 27,
1928.
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its ideas of morality and law and order, as long as it had
any strength in an area. But after 1923 the order virtually
ceased to use cCdirect action" methods-threats, intimida-
tions, beatings, unauthorized liquor raids. The' main reason
for the decline of vigilantism was the Klan's increasing
entanglement in politics, not only in the Southwest, but
throughout the nation..
The Klan's entry into politics resulted largely from the
machinations of one man-Hiram Wesley Evans, former
Exalted Cyclops of Dallas Klan No. 66. Evans, like Sim-
mons, was a native of Alabama, where he was born in
1881 in the town of Ashland. He came to T"exas before the
war and set up a profitable dental practice in Dallas. He
was a charter member of the Dallas Klan and its first Ex-
alted Cyclops. Lacking eloquence, but possessing an at-
tractive frankness and a great deal of determination, the
stout Evans became a "Great Titan," or district leader,
when the Realm of Texas was organized early in 1922.
In the spring of that year, Simmons appoinfed Evans Im-
perial Kligrapp (national secretary), from which office the
Dallasite could exert great power. At Evans~ instigation
the Klan jumped into state and local primaries and elections
in various parts of the country, but especially in the south-
western states. The new emphasis on politics brought a
deemphasis of the Klan's terrorist activities.49
In November of 1922, at the first Imperial Klonvocation,
or national convention, of the Klan, Evans won election to
the Imperial Wizardship, thereby seizing control of the
order from the Simmons-Clarke faction. 5o Evans quickly
moved to strengthen the order's political potential by
changing several aspects of Klan practice. He realized that
the Simmons-Clarke policy of paying little attention to
49 Biographical material on Evans from Stanley Frost, The Chal-
lenge of the Klan (Indianapolis, 1924); Winfield Jones, K'flights of
the Ku Klux Klan (New York, 1941), 246.
50 See William G. Shepherd, "Fiery Double Cross," Collier~s,
LXXXII (July 28, 1928), 8-9, 47, 48-49.
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local Klan doings, as long as the chapters remitted the
proper amount of money to Atlanta, made possible the
terrorist operations for which the order had become
notorious. He also realized that vigilantism weakened the
Klan's political force by creating opposition which would
not form otherwise. Hence the new Imperial Wizard insti-
tuted several "reforms" in an effort to erase the common
conception of Klansmen riding through the night to punish
wrongdoers. Under the Evans regime an attempt was made,
at least ostensibly, to rid the order of lawless elements,
and national headquarters denounced any chapter that
engaged in violence. Evans d~creed that robes and hoods
could be taken from the local meeting place, the Klavern,
only for use at official Klan functions like parades, initia-
tions, or church visitations. The Klan sent nine Imperial
investigators to Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, during the
open hearing on the Watt Daniel and Richards murders,
theoretically to see if the state's allegations were true. If the
Klan sleuths found anything, they "never made public their
findings.51
The new Klan policy of discouraging violence was based
strictly on political ambitions and a desire to improve the
organization's public relations; it did not mean that Im-
perial Wizard Evans and his associates at Atlanta were
any more humanitarian than their predecessors. While
Exalted Cyclops in Dallas, back in April of 1921, Evans
-allegedly had led a party of Klansmen in the kidnaping
and acid-branding of Negro bellhop and suspected pan-
derer Alex Johnson.52
Evans' edicts controlling use of regalia and his policy of
eliminating vigilantism in favor of political action did
eventually bring a halt to Klan terrorism, at least in the
51 Arnold S. Rice, The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics (Wash-
ington, 1962), 10-11; Stanley Frost, "'When the Klan Rules: The
Ciant Clears for Action," Outlook~ CXXXV (December 26, 1923),
717-18; New York Times, October 31, 1923, p. 19.
52 Clark testimony, Senator from Texas Hearings, 117-18.
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states of the Southwest. The spring and summer of 1923
saw a brief renewal of masked violence in Texas and Okla-
homa. In Texas, Lieutenant Governor T. W. Davidson sent
Texas Rangers to various parts of the state to help the
county authorities apprehend the Hoggers.53 In Oklahoma
the outbreak of night-riding brought the entire state under
martial law. But by late 1923 the truculent phase of the
Klan's career in Texas and Oklahoma, and in Arkansas and
Louisiana as well, had about ended.
The Mer Rouge revelations, the disclosures before the
Oklahoma military courts, and the publicity given to other
instances of Klan coercion probably contributed to growing
opposition to the Klan in some areas. In the fall of 1923, in
Texas, a Klansman was convicted and sentenced to two
years in prison for Hogging a traveling salesman in William-
son County. In Amarillo another Klansman received a two-
year sentence for "whitecapping," threatening a person
while disguised, although the conviction was later re-
versed in criminal appeals court.54 In the spring of 1924
two Klansmen at Altus, Oklahoma, were convicted of as-
saulting a man on the highway outside town a year earlier.
They received two-year sentences, which the criminal court
of appeals upheld.55 But it was mainly the Klan's attempts
to achieve its objectives politically that brought an end to
two and a half years of night-riding.
What can be said of the Klan's reign of repression?
Stanley Frost, from his observations in Oklahoma, credited
the Klan with working for public morality, vvith carrying
out an effective drive against crime, and with organizing
public opinion behind law enforcement.56 Yet Frost is
53 Dallas Morning News, August 19, September 9, December 12,
1923.
54 Ibid., April 15, September 25, October 10, 11, 1923; Murray
Jackson v. State, 103 Texas Crim. Rep. 318; T. W. Stanford v. State,
99 Texas Crim, Rep. Ill.
55 Perkins et al, v. State, 250 Pac. 544.
56 Frost, "Night Riding Reformers," 438.
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about the only spokesman one can find outside the Klan
who believed the violent activities of the order had any
truly commendable effect.
In the mid-1920s newspaper editors still pointed with
alarm to the mounting crime rate, while young men and
women still went for nocturnal automobile rides and parked
on the roadside. Drunken husbands still beat their wives
and deserted their families. Bootleggers still corrupted
public officials and operated without hindrance through-
out the nation. After nearly three years of organized ter-
rorism and meddling in other people's affairs, the Klan
had accomplished little in the way of moral and social
refonn.
The major effect of the Klan's brutal efforts at com-
munity uplift was adverse-the alienation of thousands of
people who shared the outlook of the Klansmen on mat-
ters of morals, race, and religion. Although the Klan may
have "cleaned upn a few places, although it tried to match
its deeds of violence with a highly organized program of
philanthrophy, and although it later discarded force for
political action, thoughtful persons must have seen the
incongruity of hooded zealots, intent on law enforcement,
taking the law into their own hands. And even many
Klansmen could not help realizing that such actions in the
name of law and order only incited others to lawlessness.
5.
Gestures of Peace
NOEL P. GIST, a student of American fraternalism, has
offered as many as twelve categories for modern secret
societies. Although Gist classified the Klan as a cCpatriotic"
society, the sheeted fraternity might also fit into at least
four other divisions for secret organizations-ccbenevolent
and philanthropic," ,cinsurance," 'Creligious," and cCconvivial."l
Initially in the southern and southwestern states the Klan
was a vigilante organization, an instrument of masked ter-
rorism that threatened and punished people suspected of
CCobjectionable" behavior. For most of its leaders under the
Simmons-Clarke regime the Klan was also a moneymaking
scheme, and the opportunity for financial gain remained
a strong attraction for the men who supposedly cCreforrned"
the organization under Evans. In practically every state
where it was very strong the Klan evolved into a political
machine at both local and state levels.
As a rule, the Klan's vigilantism, its political machina-
tions, and its practice of hiding behind a mask were the
features that inspired the most opposition among people
who might share the order's ideological framework. On
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the other hand, the average white Protestant did not mind
the Klan's posturing as a militant wing of American Prot-
estantism. He ordinarily did not care if the local Knights
paraded, held their mysterious and entertaining p1)blic ini-
tiations, or carried on the other activities of an adult fra-
ternal order. If members of the local Klan gave money to
widows or the town's poor at Christmas, this was accepted
as a sincere manifestation of the benevolent spirit; the
Klan's charitable ventures seemed particularly admirable
in a period of parsimony in public affairs. Whatever else
there was objectionable about the Klan, people in the
Southwest and in the rest of the nation generally found little
fault in the religious, charitable, and fraternal phases of its
career. Indeed, these aspects sometimes seemed to excuse
the numerous acts of violence and terrorism.
A fervent religiosity pervaded almost every facet of the
Klan movement. "I've attended a lot of church gatherings
and conventions," remarked a Pennsylvania Exalted Cy-
clops who went to the Klan's 1924 national convention, "but
I never attended one where the revival spirit was as pro-
nounced as it was at the Klan Klonvocation."2 And this
revival spirit was evident in practically everything the
Klansmen did. The crusading zeal most hooded Knights
possessed largely accounts for their devotion to the Klan
and their fierce loyalty in the face of corruption, ineptness,
and cynicism on the part of many of their leaders.
Religious symbolism was sprinkled throughout Klan
thought and practice. The Klan's initiation ritual, oath of
allegiance, and numerous official documents of the order
bristled with such phrases as "the tenets of the Christian
religion," "the law of Christ," "my witness, Almighty God,"
and "God being my helper." One of the officers of a local
1 Noel P. Gist, Secret Societies: A Cultural Study of Fraternalism in
the United States (University of Missouri Studies, XV, October 1,
1940), 24.
2 Quoted in Emerson H. Loucks, The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsyl-
vania: A Study in Nativism (Harrisburg~ 1936), 120.
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Klan was the cCKludd," or chaplain, who ended each meet-
ing with a benediction in which he reminded the brethren
that cCthe living Christ is a Klansman's criterion of char-
acter."3 The Klansmen then gathered before their altar, an
essential piece of furniture in every Klavern, and sang a
hymn called the cCKloxology" or some traditional Protestant
hymn. Among hymns the Klansmen especially liked were
"Blest Be the Tie That Binds," cCWhen I Survey the Won-
drous Cross," "The Old Rugged Cross," and cCOnward,
Christian Soldiers," the last piece becoming something of
an unofficial anthem of the order.
When the Klan claimed to be the defender of cCProtestant
Americanism," it meant the Fundamentalist variety of Prot-
estantism. To Klansmen, Modernist theology was nearly
as inimical to the American way as Roman Catholicism.
The Klan championed the "oldtime religion," although it
would be a mistake to impute any official connection to the
Klan and Fundamentalist movements of the twenties.4 The
white-robed movement and the Fundamentalist crusade,
taking form in attempts to eradicate Darwinian science
from the public schools, stemmed from the same fearful
reaction to change in the South and Southwest. But Biblical
literalism was a basic assumption for an overwhelming
majority of people in the two regions, and perhaps for citi-
zens in the midwestern states. Most of the white Protes-
tants who for one reason or another fought the Klan shared
the order's notions concerning the divine character of the
Scriptures.
In 1923 the Oklahoma house of representatives, with
Klansmen comprising a substantial portion of its member-
ship, passed a bill to provide free textbooks for children
in the public schools of the state. The bill carried an
3 Kloran (Klan ritual book), 2, quoted ibid., 118.
4 See Robert M. Miller, "A Note on the Relationship between the
Protestant Churches and the Ku Klux Klan," Journal of Southem
History, XXII (August 1956), 257-66; Norman F. Furniss, The
Fundamentalist Controversy, 1918-1931 (New Haven, 1954), 37-38.
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amendment denying the textbooks to elementary and sec-
ondary schools that taught Darwin's theory of biological
evolution. The state senate accepted the bill with the
Fundamentalist amendment, and the measure became law.
Two years later a legislature more concerned with economy
than theology repealed the free textbook law, and thus the
antievolution amendment. The same year that the Okla-
homa solons acted against Modernism, several pro-Klan
members of the Texas house of representatives introduced
a bill to prohibit the teaching of evolution in the public
schools. The bill passed the house but died in the senate.
In 1929, long after the Klan had fallen apart in Texas, the
state legislature passed a resolution urging the state text-
book commission not to accept textbooks in which the Dar-
winian theory was taught. The Klan was no longer a factor
in Louisiana politics and government in 1926, when the
state house of representatives passed an antievolution bill
which the senate killed by voting to postpone indefinitely.
The next year a bill to prohibit the presentation of evolu-
tion to the state's children passed the Arkansas house of
representatives, but as in Louisiana, the state senators voted
to postpone its consideration indefinitely. In 1928, how-
ever, the people of Arkansas by referendum vote enacted
an antievolution law.5
Hence, four of the six attempts Fundamentalists made in
the southwestern legislatures to prohibit teaching of the
Darwinian theory came after the Klan had passed its peak
in the region. Klansmen and ex-Klansmen unquestionably
5 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 22, March 21, 1923;
38th Texas Legislature, House Journal, Regular Session, 49, 163, 185,
655, 1165, 1313, 1459; ibid, Senate Journal, 1064-66; Alst Texas
Legislature, House Journal, 2d Called Session, 31, 112, 115, 217,
362-63, 487-88; New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 16, 22, 23, 1926;
Louisiana General Assembly, House Journal, 3d Regular Session
( 1926), 167, 190, 575, 700, 762; ibid., Senate Journal, 597; 46th
Arkansas General Assembly, House Journal, Regular Session, 68, 78,
277.
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supported these later legislative drives for theological ortho-
doxy, but they were joined by thousands of non-Klan South-
westerners. And the best the Klan as an organization could
do was to help attach an ephemeral Fundamentalist amend-
ment to a free textbook law.
Throughout the nation, thousands of Protestant ministers
(one Klan lecturer estimated the number at 40,000) took
citizenship- in the Invisible Empire.6 Others, while not join-
ing the Klan, looked kindly on the order and encouraged
the male members of their Hocks to join. While it was on
the rise in the Southwest, the Klan made constant overtures
to the Fundamentalist ministers. These overtures included
posing as the preserver of the conservative moral code, mak-
ing war on bootleggers, contributing money to impover-
ished preachers and their churches, and exhorting Klans-
men to be cCone hundred percent Christian" and cCgo to
church every Sunday; give your support and encourage-
ment to your ministers; send your children to Sunday
school."7
The most familiar device Klansmen used to demonstrate
their devotion to Protestantism was the church visitation,
which served remarkably well to publicize the order's re-
ligiosity. A rather popular procedure followed by south-
western Klansmen when they called on a church featured
an unannounced appearance by Knights in full regalia,
including hood visors worn down. Klansmen would enter
a church abruptly, march down the aisle to the pulpit, in-
terrupt the minister in the midst of the service, give him
an envelope, usually full of money, and march from the
building to their waiting automobiles. Or perhaps one of
the Klansmen would use the occasion to deliver a short talk
to the surprised congregation on the principles of the Klan.
6 The figure is one given by the Reverend John H. Moore, a Klan
lecturer, in a speech in Little Rock, reported in Little Rock Arkansas
Gazette, July 11, 1923.
7 Atlanta Searchlight, December 1, 1923.
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The donation the minister found when he opened the en-
velope was usually large enough to compensate for what-
ever irritation he felt at the interruption of his service.8
The Klan pictured itself as the great unifying force in a
divided American Protestantism, the essence of a solid
front against the Roman Catholic menace. Within some
churches and congregations, however, the Klan frequently
became a source of trouble. In the Baptist churches at
Denison and Austin in Texas and at Tullas, near Monroe,
Louisiana, wrestling bouts and fist fights broke out when
Klansmen entered the places of worship and encountered
the ire of anti-Klan church members. An Apostolic congre-
gation at DeQuincy, Louisiana, forced its minister to resign
when he refused to return a donation given him by
Klansmen.9 In 1924 a newspaper correspondent reported
from Winn Parish in Louisiana: "Efforts are being made
to bring . . . a more harmonious state . . . among the
churches. Feeling concerning the Klan has been so intense
for more than a year that many of the churches have been
divided in their congregations and very little work has been
done along religious lines."10 And a former member of the
Klan at Corsicana, Texas, told how the local chapter
brought pressure on the ministers of the town to join the
order. The Presbyterian pastor refused, whereupon the
leaders of his church, all Klansmen, advised him to resign.
When the congregation voted on the matter, "All that voted
8 For accounts of Klan church visitations, see, for example, Little
Rock Arkansas Gazette, March 6, 7, 1922; Tulsa Tribune, March 20,
1922; Shreveport Journal, May 29, July 11, 1922; New Orleans
Times-Picayune, June 21, 1922; Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly,
October 7, December 30, 1922, May 5, 1923; Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, August 1, 8, 1922; Galveston Daily News, December 17,
1923. The size of the donation left by Klansmen varied with the size
of the local Klan, but donations as large as $300 were not uncommon.
9 Denison Herald, April 3, 1922; Austin Statesman, August 15, 1922;
Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, August 23, 1923; New Orleans Times-
Picayune, July 3, 1923.
10 Shreveport Journal, May 15, 1924.
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against the preacher, they were families of the Ku-Klux
organization . . . [But] everybody that was against the
Ku-Klux was with the preacher." The anti-Klanners won
the balloting, and the harassed divine stayed on with his
troubled church.II
Undoubtedly many Protestant ministers sighed thank-
fully when the Klan disintegrated in their communities and
they no longer had to endure the vicissitudes of pastoring
a congregation rent by the Klan issue. But during its hey-
day a large number of them had embraced the secret so-
ciety. The Klan looked like an ally to "fire and brimstone"
clergymen engaged in the exorcism of liquor and vice. Such
ministers agreed with a Wichita Falls, Texas, pastor, who
declared that "there has never been a time . . . when there
was so much freedom among the sexes . . . and so much
light thinking, frivolous thinking about the serious things
in social life and moral life."12 They perhaps even con-
curred with the minister who ~~bless[ed] God that men of
high standing and clean and cool judgment have banded
themselves in an order that demands law enforcement and
local reforms."13
Some Protestant clergymen left their congregations and
became itinerant lecturers for the Klan. These included,
in Texas, J. T. Renfro (Methodist) of Dallas and Alonzo
Monk (Methodist) of Arlington; in Oklahoma, Stephen B.
Williams (Presbyterian) of Muskogee; in Louisiana, Wil-
liam McDougald (Presbyterian) of New Orleans; and in
Arkansas, Harry G. Knowles (Disciples of Christ) of Little
11 Testimony of W. H. Castles in Senator from Texas. Hearings be-
fore a Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges aiul Elections,
United States Senate, 67th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions (1924),
994-96.
12 The Reverend H. D. Knickerbocker, pastor of the First Metho-
dist Church in Wichita Falls, quoted in Houston Colonel Mayfield's
Weekly, December 10, 1921.
13 The Reverend Harry G. Knowles of the First Christian Church
in Little Rock, quoted in Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 3, 1922.
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Rock and John H. Moofe (Baptist) of Pine Bluff. The
traveling evangelists of the day, men like B. B. Crimm,
Bob Jones, Charlie Taylor, and "faith healer" Raymond T.
Richey, frequently devoted part of their messages to lauda-
tion of the Klan. Even Billy Sunday, the greatest revivalist
of the early twentieth century, spent some time praising the
Klan and accepting contributions from prosperous chap-
ters.14
Several of the best known leaders of the Klan in the south-
western states were ordained Protestant ministers. Dr. A. D.
Ellis, rector of St. Mark's Episcopal Church in Beaumont,
brieHy held the office of Grand Dragon of the Realm of
Texas. The Reverend A. C. Parker of the Forest Avenue
Christian Church in Dallas served as Exalted Cyclops of
Dallas Klan No. 66. Dr. E. L. Thompson of the Central
Christian Church was Cyclops of Shreveport Klan No.2,
while the Grand Kludd (state chaplain) in Louisiana was
the Reverend C. C. Miller of Kenner Memorial Methodist
Church in Baton Rouge. Dozens of other clergymen held
local and district offices in the southwestern states. A pro-
Klan newspaper editor was so impressed with the Klan's
standing among the ministers of Texas that he wrote en-
thusiastically: "I find the preachers of the Protestant faith
almost solid for the Klan and its ideals, with here and there
an isolated minister . . . who will line up with the Catho-
lics in their fight on Protestantism, but that kind of preacher
is persona non grata in most every congregation in Texas."15
The cordial relationship obtaining between Protestant
ministers and the Klan was mutually profitable, if at times
a bit risky for both parties. The Klan espoused a literal
interpretation of the Bible and gave encouragement and
14 For a good description of an appearance of both Klansmen and
members of the Women of the Ku Klux Klan at a Sunday revival, see
Shreveport Journal, March 29, 1924. On Sunday's relation to the
Klan, see William G. McLoughlin, Billy Sunday Was His Real Name
(Chicago, 1955), 274-76.
15 Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, December 8, 1923.
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financial rewards to theologically intransigent preachers.
But as the Klan devoted an increasing amount of attention
to politics, an even more profitable area of activity, the
monetary favors, if not the moral support, dwindled stead-
ily. Politics eventually obscured every other form of Klan
endeavor, but before southwestern Klansmen became thor-
oughly embroiled in political enterprises, the order had
spread goodwill as a philanthropic institution.
When William J. Simmons wrote into his constitution for
the Klan an article stipulating that the order was to "ex-
emplify a practical benevolence," he was simply following
the philanthropic tradition of other adult fraternal orders.16
Like the Masons, Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias, and
other societies, the Klan carried on a fairly large amount of
charity work wherever it was organized. Imperial Klan
headquarters announced that local chapters gave more than
one million dollars in charity during the year 1921; the fig-
ure was probably a fairly accurate estimate. Imperial Wiz-
ard Simmons maintained that Klan aid had been a major
factor in helping many communities, schools, and families
through the depression of that year. "The pursuit of char-
ity has become a paramount issue with members of the Ku
Klux Klan," proclaimed Simmons, "and whenever the or-
ganization is active, assistance will be rendered to the
needy."17
The Klan's national leaders ordinarily left charitable un-
dertakings to the state and local units. Consequently the
great bulk of Klan philanthropies involved gifts to local per-
sons or agencies. These contributions were distributed
among a wide variety of "worthy" organizations and indi-
viduals; they ranged from modest donations to widows
and sick people to ambitious fundraising drives for the con-
16 Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
(Atlanta, 1921), art. II, sec. 1. While the Klan constitution bears the
copyright date 1921, the Imperial Klonvocation, or national conven-
tion, did not ratify the document until November 1922.
17 Quoted in Tulsa Tribune, January 27, 1922.
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struction of hospitals or orphans' homes. Klansmen were
anything but silent Samaritans. They invariably publicized
their acts of benevolence, frequently leaving the recipient
of the gift instructions to report the deed to the local news-
paper. The Klan in almost every case made an investiga-
tion of the character of an individual before contributing
to his welfare. When Fort Smith Klan No. 15 played Santa
Claus to 120 needy families at Christmas (a favorite oc-
casion for Klan benevolence), the chapter informed the
public that Klansmen had checked the relief rolls in the
Arkansas city to prove the worthiness of each family and
to avoid duplication with other organizations. The Houston
Klan announced that each family which received one of
its Christmas baskets had undergone investigation to deter-
mine whether the head of the family were vagrant or just
luckless. A shiftless husband meant that the family was
eliminated from consideration.18
Some local Klans went to great lengths to display the
spirit of giving at the organizational level. Alexandria Klan
No. 12, in Louisiana, created a relief fund of nearly $2,000
for victims of a tornado at Pineville. In Arkansas, EI Dorado
Klan No. 92 initiated a fundraising drive for an "Arkansas
Oil and Gas Field Klan Hospital," to cost $125,000 and to
be open to patients of all religious denominations. Dona-
tions came in from Klansmen over the country, but not a
brick of the hospital building was ever laid. Fort Worth
Klan No. 101 pledged $1,000 toward the construction of a
new Y.M.C.A. building in the city; San Antonio Klan No.
31 contributed $2,500 in gold for a new 'ey" building in
the Alamo City; and the Houston Klan gave $2,000 to a
Baptist hospital fund in Houston. In the spring of 1925
Little Rock Klan No. 1 financed a charity circus which
played before a separate group of handicapped children for
18 Fort Smith Southwest American, December 25, 1923; Houston
Post, December 25, 1922.
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a week, all proceeds going to a fund for the children. Later
that year the Little Rock chapter of the Women of the Ku
Klux Klan dedicated a fourteen-room children's home on
Woodlawn Avenue. But the home, crippled by a split in
the local chapter membership and general apathy, made
little contribution to the city's welfare problem.19
A much more elaborate and somewhat more successful
undertaking was Hope Cottage, an institution for homeless
children financed and built by the largest chapter in the
Southwest, Dallas Klan No. 66. In May 1923 the Dallas
Klan collected enough money to begin construction on
Hope Cottage by staging a blackface minstrel show. In
October, Klansmen from Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma
gathered in Dallas to witness ground-breaking and dedica-
tion ceremonies, and the following March the Dallasites
inaugurated a "Kolossal Klan Karnival" to raise funds for
the operation and maintenance of the finished orphans'
home. The lavish and well-attended carnival served to ad-
vertise the essential goodness of the Klan in general and
Klan No. 66 in particular.20
In 1925 the Realm (state) organization assumed control
and management of Hope Cottage, changing its name to
"Klanhaven." The Klan secured a charter from the state for
its operation by an agency called the "Texas Klanhaven
Association." But financial difficulties, brought on by a
rapidly declining membership in Texas, plagued Klanhaven
from its inception. In the late twenties the Klan turned the
orphans' home over to the city, which renamed the institu-
19 New Orleans Times-Picayune, April 12, 1923; Shreveport Jour-
nal, July 13, 1923; Fort Worth American Citizen, April 13, 1923;
Fort Worth Star-Telegram, July 11, 1922; Dallas Texas 100 Per Cent
American, November 10, 1922; Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly,
July 8, 1922; Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, March 23, 24, Decem-
ber 21, 1925.
20 Houston Colonel May{ield's Weekly, May 26, 1923; Dallas Morn-
ing News, October 25, 1923; Dallas Texas 100 Per Cent American,
March 21, 1924.
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tion Hope Cottage. This move ended the Klan's connection
with what had been the biggest single charitable enterprise
of Klansmen in the Southwest.21
During the late 1920s a dwindling Klan membership
made it hard for local Klans to secure funds for philan-
thropic work. As a consequence, Klan beneficences be-
came rare. These acts had given the movement a touch of
respectability it would not otherwise have obtained. As
larger and larger amounts of Klan moneys were diverted
to political ventures, however, charity, like the order's do-
nations to the Protestant churches, came to be neglected.
Failure in politics, apathy, and dissension ravaged the mem-
bership of the Klan in the Southwest, and the order ceased
to "exemplify a practical benevolence."
The Klan might be many things-philanthropic agency,
militant arm of the church, terrorist organization, political
machine, business corporation-but it \-vas just another lodge
for many respectable businessmen who joined the organiza-
tion. In fact, the Kleagles commonly began their solicita-
tions in a town by calling on the local Masonic lodge. In
1923 the Klan claimed that 500,000 Masons were citizens of
the Invisible Empire.22 Both Simmons and his successor as
Imperial Wizard, Evans, were Masons, and so many Masons
joined the Klan that in some communities the Masonic
lodge became simply an adjunct of the local Klan unit.
Speaking before the Grand Lodge of Texas in 1922, Grand
Master D. Frank Johnson denied that there was any con-
nection between Freemasonry and the Klan, although he
admitted that the activities of Kleagles among Texas Ma-
21 Dallas Morning News, September 11, 1925. The writer has been
able to obtain only vague and general information regarding the his-
tory of Klanhaven and the Klanhaven Association in the late twenties.
An ex-Klansman who was a director of the association, interviewed
i\lay 18, 1959, could give little specific information, stating simply
that Klanhaven eventually went bankrupt and that the home had to
be turned over to the city of Dallas.
22 Atlanta Searchlight, November 3, 1923.
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sons had caused so many factional disturbances that a split
in the Grand Lodge almost had occurred.23 Some Masons
eventually voiced disapproval of the Klan, but Masons were
never officially advised not to join the hooded fraternity.
The prominent men of a community, provided they were
Protestants, were special targets for the Klan's Kleagles.
And in many places, membership in the Klan became quite
a status symbol. When a highly respected Klansman died,
the local Knights had an opportunity to ape the other fra-
ternal orders by performing ritualistic graveside services.
Klansmen often appeared while a brother was peacefully re-
turning to dust, laid a 4:4:fiery cross" of red roses on the grave,
and then knelt for a moment of prayer.24 If an especially
"veIl known civic figure died as a Klansman, the Klan might
use' his death to publicize the good repute of the order.
Tulsa Klan No.2, for example, placed a notice in the Tulsa
newspapers memorializing E. Rogers Kemp, prominent
banker, churchman, and philanthropist, as 4:4:the exemplar
of real Klansmanship." The notice, in the form of a resolu-
tion, read in part: 4:4:We commend the spirit of our Fellow
Klansman to the tender keeping of the Perfect Emperor of
the Invisible Empire of the Soul, and the fervent fellowship
of his fellow Klansmen."25
The literature of the Klan repeatedly emphasized that the
Klan was a fraternity·and that Klansmen were obligated to
practice fraternalism or, in Klan parlance, "Klannishness."
In an economic sense this concept meant that Klansmen
were supposed to trade with other members of the order
as much as possible. Simmons once defined the practice
of 4:4:vocational Klannishness" as: "Trading, dealing with and
patronizing klansmen in preference to all others. Employ-
23 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, December 6, 1922.
24 See, for example, Shreveport Journal, December 21, 1921; Tulsa
Tribune, March 22, August 21, 1922; New Orleans Times-Picayune,
January 30, 1923.
25 Tulsa Tribune, June 18, 1922.
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ing klansmen in preference to others whenever possible.
Boosting each other's business interests or professional
ability; honorably doing any and all things that will assist
a klansman to earn an honest dollar, thereby adding to his
Inaterial wellbeing, lightening the burden of life for him and
constantly succoring him with new strength and refreshing
encouragement."26 Many businessmen joined the Klan sim-
ply to take advantage of the trade of its members. Klan
newspapers carried advertisements for places of business
with names like "Klean Kut Kleaners" or "Klansman's Kafe."
Colonel Mayfield:s Weekly, published in Houston, continu-
ally called on members of the organization to: "Trade with
klansmen, there is a klansman in every line of business in
every community; trade with klansmen, and see that all of
your friends do the same." On other occasions readers were
assured that "if you will trade only with klansmen for 30
days, you will have the Kikes grovelling at your feet in
30 days."27
Men of enterprise outside the Invisible Empire were not
above soliciting the favors of Klansmen. Railroad lines
sometimes offered reduced fares to Klansmen and ran extra
trains to take the sheeted Knights to their special Kon-
klaves.28 October 24, 1923, was "Ku Klux Klan Day" at the
State Fair of Texas, so designated by the Fair Association.
That day some 75,000 Klansmen, wives, and children from
Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas thronged Fair Park in
Dallas for the festivities, climaxed by an address by Im-
perial Wizard Hiram W. Evans. The next March the di-
rectors of the Southwestern Exposition and Fat Stock Show
in Fort Worth set aside a day for the enjoyment of the
26 William J. Simmons, The Practice of Klannishness ( Atlanta,
1918), 3, pamphlet in M. S. Newsom and Family Papers, Merrit M.
Shilg Memorial Collection, Department of Archives, Louismna State
University, Baton Rouge.
27 Houston Colonel"Mayfield's Weekly, April 17, June 23, 1923.
28 See the New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 17, 1923; Little Rock
Arkansas Gazette, November 3, 1923, July 5, 1924.
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hooded Knights. Klan Day in Fort Worth, however, was
not nearly so well attended as the October gathering in
Dallas.29
With all the other money making devices the Klan's lead-
ers dreamed up, it would have been surprising if some
enterprising Klansman had not taken advantage of the
excellent prospects the order offered for the sale of insur-
ance benefits to the faithful. In 1923 Grand Dragon Z. E.
Marvin of Texas originated a plan for a national fraternal
insurance company and had the Klorero, or state conven-
tion of chartered Texas Klans, endorse the idea. Marvin
and his associates secured a charter from the state of Texas,
and by the end of the year the company supposedly had
sold about one million dollars worth of insurance. Early in
1924 Imperial headquarters in Atlanta assumed control of
the company, rechartering it under the laws of Missouri
and naming it the Empire Mutual Life Insurance Company,
with home offices in Kansas City. National headquarters
set up an Insurance Department to administer the affairs
of the Empire Mutual, which began operations with a capi-
tal stock of $100,000 and a surplus of $25,000. While the
insurance company was designed for national operations,
most of its work was confined to Missouri, Arkansas, Kan-
sas, Oklahoma, and Texas. By the fall of 1924 its directors
claimed to have three million dollars worth of insurance in
force. Very little is known about the history of the Empire
Mutual after 1925. The business was probably in existence
only about four years before it fell into arrears and dis-
solved.30
29 Dallas Moming News, August 13, October 25, 1923; Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, March 14, 1924.
30 Proceedings of the Second Imperial Klonvocation, Held in Kan-
sas City, Missouri, September 23-26, 1924 (Atlanta, 1924), 131-32.
The writer was able to ascertain only that the Empire Mutual ceased
operations "around 1928." A former member of the Klan, interviewed
May 18, 1959, commented that the company never had capable man-
agement and that a few large claims and the depletion of Klan mem-
bership were sufficient to cause its dissolution.
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One of the biggest inducements for becoming a Klans-
man was the opportunity to participate in the order's mani-
fold social functions. The regular chapter meetings were
important social events for most members, with Klansmen
in their white robes and hoods exchanging the mysterious
SOG (Sign of Greeting) with their fellow Knights and go-
ing through the heavily ritualistic opening and closing cere-
monies. The Klan outdid all the other lodges in secrecy,
ritual, and weird nomenclature. Then there were the cross
burnings, the parades, the initiations, the picnics for the
Klansmen and their families. Such fraternal doings were
especially popular with the rural-minded folk who Hocked
into the Klan. The hooded order became the biggest thing
in the social life of most people who left the "alien" world
and became "citizens of the Invisible Empire."
Parades and initiations were the most spectacular and
widely publicized social events staged by the Klan. These
demonstrations, often held on the same night, constituted
displays of strength and brotherhood and required much
planning and preparation. The size of the parades and the
grandeur of the initiations depended on the occasion and
the strength of the local Klans, but most of the demonstra-
tions followed roughly the same procedure. The big Kon-
klave held in September 1923 at Shreveport furnishes an ex-
ample. Klansmen from allover Louisiana and from south-
ern Arkansas and eastern Texas packed the local hotels on
Saturday, the day of the festivities. A capacity crowd al-
ready sat in the grandstand at the fairgrounds stadium
when, at 6:00 P.M., an aerial bomb exploded over the
throng. More explosions followed at thirty-minute inter-
vals until 8:00, when the membership of Shreveport Klan
No.2, over 3,000 strong, joined by robed Klansmen from
other towns and surrounding states, paraded around the
racetrack of the stadium. At 8:15 Klan No.2 staged c;c;nat_
uralization ceremonies" for a class of aliens, featuring a
human square formed by Klansmen and the singing of
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cCOnward, Christian Soldiers." After the initiation, Imperial
Wizard Evans, Imperial Kligrapp H. Kyle Ramsey (a na-
tive of Shreveport), and J. K. Skipwith of Morehouse Par-
ish fame all spoke on the tenets, aims, and struggles of the
Klan. At 10:00 came a fireworks display and then the cli-
max of the evening-the igniting of a thirty-foot-tall wooden
cross covered with oil-soaked rags. As the giant symbol of
the Klan burst into Hames, the assemblage sang c'The Star-
Spangled Banner."31
There were some occasions when Klansmen encountered
hostility to their plans for staging fraternal pageants. The
nationally famous riot at Lorena, Texas, in October 1921
has been mentioned earlier.32 A few months later, at La-
redo, a heavily Catholic and Mexican-American town on
the Rio Grande, county and town law officers armed about
one hundred special deputies and set up a machinegun to
prevent an announced Klan parade. In December of 1922
a rock-throwing battle and fist fight broke out during a
Klan parade in the north Texas town of McKinney. The
city council of Alexandria, Louisiana, adopted an ordinance
to prohibit masked parades in the city limits, although the
people of the town later voted to rescind the ordinance.
When anti-Klanners placed a notice in the Bartlesville, Okla-
homa, newspaper proclaiming that C'the American flag will
not be permitted to be carried down the streets by a masked
mob tonight," the local Klan went ahead with its parade,
272 Klansmen marching with the usual flags, banners, and
crosses. Klansmen were not so brave in San Antonio. In
January 1924 the city commission passed an ordinance for-
bidding masked parades. That month some 150 fully robed
Klansmen from Dallas alighted from a train and formed
ranks for a march into the downtown section to advertise
a rodeo the San Antonio Klan was going to present. Sheriff
John Stevens of Bexar County, his deputies, and three
31 Shreveport Journal, September 15, 1923.
32 See page 50.
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squads of policemen arrived at the railroad station and
turned back the Klansmen, some of whom reentrained for
Dallas, while others hired taxicabs and went to the local
Klavem.88
Still, incidents of opposition to Klan functions were rare
in the southwestern states. Most of the time the local
officials either belonged to the Klan and encouraged the
demonstrations, or bowed before the Klan's might in their
communities-or were not even consulted before the robed
Knights appeared. When Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas,
or Texas Klansmen wanted to march, have a picnic, or in-
duct a group of aliens, they usually were not bothered.
As the Klan gained in strength and power during the
early twenties, the prospect of organizing a secret women's
society to parallel the men's order grew increasingly attrac-
tive. Evans was already thinking about creating an or-
ganization for women when he took over the Imperial Wiz-
ardship late in 1922. After all, if the Klan were to achieve
the aims of its political program, it would be necessary to
organize the native-born Protestant women as the Klan had
done \vith a large portion of the male population. Then
too, a secret society for women would mean new sources
of revenue for the Klan-initiation fees, robe sales, taxes,
contributions. The Evans administration was making plans
for the establishment of an organization to absorb a num-
ber of women's patriotic groups in the country when Sim-
mons, now holding the purely ceremonial office of "Em-
peror," began a movement to regain some of the power
and money he had lost by giving up the Wizardship.
In March 1923 Simmons, using a women's group in
Oklahoma called the W.A.P. (White American Protestant)
Study Club, with chapters in Tulsa, Claremore, and a few
33 Denison Herald, March 20, 1922; Dallas Morning News, Decem-
ber 10, 1922; New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 25, September 6,
1922; Tulsa Tribune, August 28, 1923; San Antonio Express, January
23, 26, 27, 1924.
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other places, as a nucleus, started organizir15 a new secret
order for women, the "Kamelia." Simmonlts move caught
the Evans regime off guard, and it was several days before
the Wizard moved to quash the Kamelia project by decree-
ing that Klansmen could in no way participate in or assist
the Kamelia or any other women's group. Simmons, now
calling himself "EI Magnus" of the Kamelia, denied that a
Klansman's obligation to the Klan precluded his helping the
women's order. The conflict over the Kamelia precipitated
an involved legal battle between the Evans and Simmons
factions for control of the Klan. A court decision eventually
established a compromise whereby the interests of both fac-
tions were recognized. In the meantime the founder of the
Klan and his organizers busily went about the work of
organizing "Kamelia Kourts,lt' mainly in the southwestern
states. Units of the Kamelia were formed at Little Rock in
Arkansas and at Tulsa, Claremore, Guthrie, and various
other towns in Oklahoma, where H. Tom Kight, Blanche
Kight, C. W. Beeson, and Rowena Beeson, Simmons' allies,
had previously organized chapters of the W.A.P. Study
Club.34
The Kamelia made some initial progress, but soon Evans'
warning to Klansmen to avoid any association with Sim-
mons' new order, together with the quick solidification of
the Evansite state administrations behind the Wizard, de-
stroyed the chances of the society. Grand Dragon H. C.
McCall of Texas announced that Texas' 140,000 Klansmen
and all of the 275 Klans in the Realm were supporting their
fellow Texan Evans. A statewide meeting of Arkansas
Klansmen, under the control of Grand Dragon James A.
Comer, endorsed the Wizard and denounced the Emperor.
N. Clay Jewett, Grand Dragon of Oklahoma, and the lead-
34 Tulsa Tribune, March 25, April 1, 5, 1923; Fort Smith South-
west American, May 23, 25, 1923; New Orleans Times-Picayune,
May 25, 1923; Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, May 25, 1923; "The
Clash in the Klan," Literary Digest, LXXVII (April 21, 1923), 13.
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ers of the powerful Tulsa and Oklahoma City Klans backed
Evans, as did district leaders Paul D. Perkins, Thomas F.
DePaoli, and R. Will Germany, the Klan bosses in Louis-
iana. Klan moguls in other strong Klan states like Indiana
and Ohio also repudiated Simmons and lined up with the
Evans regime. As a final note, early in May the "Imperial
Kloncilium" in Atlanta, the official council and judicial body
of the Klan, voted its endorsement of the Texan.35
The legal contest and the infighting at Atlanta continued
for the remainder of 1923 and into 1924. Highlights of the
conflict included the banishment from the Klan of Edward
Y. Clarke, the original salesman of the order, by the Evans
regime; Simmons' attempt, after the Klan had sanctioned
the formation of another women's order, to create the
"Knights Kamelia," a "second degree of Klankraft" wherein
Klansmen would owe allegiance to him as Emperor; and
the murder of W. S. Coburn, the Emperor's attorney, by
Klan propagandist and Evans supporter Phillip Fox, for
which Fox received a sentence of life imprisonment.36 In
early 1924 the Klan bought out Simmons' interests in the
organization for about $146,500, and the father of the Klan,
whom Evans once described as "the most impractical man
I have ever met," left the Invisible Empire to squander his
remuneration on other fraternal projects.37
Technically, the Klan did not establish the Women of the
Ku Klux Klan, the order formed in June 1923. In a legal
35 New Orleans Times-Picayune, April 10, 1923; Fort Smith South-
west American, May 13, 1923; Minutes of the Imperial Kloncilium,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Meeting of May 1 and 2, 1923, Which
Ratified W. J. Simmons' Agreement with the Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Together with Certified Copies of All Litigation I nstituted by
W. J. Simmons against the Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan (Atlanta, 1923), passim.
36 See New York Times, September 16, 1923, p. 23, November 6,
pp. 1, 5, November 7, p. 15, January 3, 1924, p. 3, January 12, p. 1,
February 13, p. 5, February 25, p. 17.
37 William G. Shepherd, "'Fiery Double Cross," Collier's, LXXXII
(July 28, 1928), 48; ""Colonel Simmons and $146,500 from K.K.K.
to K.F.S.," Literary Digest, LXXX (March 8, 1924), 36-40.
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sense the Women of the Klan was a separate and distinct
organization with its own set of officers and finances; Im-
perial Klan headquarters only CCsanctioned" the enterprise.
Yet the women's organization was always so much under
the dominance of the men's order as to make it actually an
auxiliary body. On June 9 Mrs. Lulu A. Markwell and
Grand Dragon Comer headed a group of petitioners who
secured a charter for the Women of the Ku Klux Klan in
Second Division Circuit Court in Little Rock. The affairs
of the women's order were to be administered by a Board
of Directors, with national headquarters in Little Rock.
The board never really carried out an executive function;
like the Klan, power in the Women of the Klan was cen-
tered in one office, that of Imperial Commander. Mrs.
Markwell became the first Imperial Commander. When the
charter was granted, there were already about 2,500 Klans-
women in Little Rock, and eight Kleagles had gone into the
field in Arkansas.3s
At its inception the Women of the Klan benefited from
advantages not enjoyed by the Klan in its early years. The
new order absorbed various other women's groups organ-
ized on a local basis, primarily in the Southwest, like the
Order of American Women in Fort Worth, the Ladies of
the Invisible Empire in Louisiana and Arkansas, and the
Ladies of the Cu Clux Clan in Oklahoma. Then too, there
was already in existence a powerful men's organization,
which subsidized the Women of the Klan and assisted the
work of the women Kleagles. Klansmen were supposed to
influence their wives and sisters to join the Women of the
Klan, and many relatives of Klan members, as well as other
moralistic, nativistic, and race-minded females, paid their
five-dollar initiation fees.39
Local chapters of the Women of the Klan appeared
38 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, June 10, 13, 1923.
39 The best treatment this writer has seen of the national career of
the Women of the Ku Klux Klan, with emphasis on one state, is in
Loucks, Klan in Pennsylvania, ch. x.
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quickly in the Southwest. Klanswomen came into the open
in Fort Worth only five days after the issuance of the Im-
perial order sanctioning the organization.40 Soon women~s
Klans were thriving in Dallas, Shreveport, Tulsa, Oklahoma
City, and Little Rock. By the fall of 1923 organizers for the
Women of the Klan were moving into the smaller towns of
the Southwest and other parts of the nation; and Klan news-
papers, like one in Columbia, Louisiana, were urging
"wives, mothers, and daughters of Klansmen, as well as
sympathizers," to "make application for membership at
once and get in as charter members.... Enlist today."41
Imperial Commander Markwell announced that 250,000
women over the nation had joined the women's order.42
The Women of the Klan never possessed the strength in
the southwestern states it did in Indiana, Ohio, or Pennsyl-
vania, where the women's state organizations attained a size
comparable to the men~s order. The organizational drive for
the women's society was still gaining momentum when the
Klan began declining in the Southwest. Like the men's
order, the Women of the Klan hit its peak in the Southwest
in 1924, with Oklahoma probably having more Klans-
women than any other southwestern state. The deteriora-
tion of the men's order was perhaps the greatest handicap
the women experienced in the Southwest; the Women of
the Klan simply got underway too late to equal the strength
and prestige of the Klan in the region. Factional squabbles,
arising mainly from Comer's efforts to make a personal
satrapy of the women's organization, also crippled the
movement. These internal disturbances, which split the
Little Rock women's Klan and damaged the order else-
where, will be treated in a later chapter. Here it suffices
to say that in the Southwest the Women of the Klan made
40 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 9, 1923. The costumes of the
Women of the Ku Klux Klan were quite similar to those of the men's
order, except that the women never wore masks.
41 Columbia Caldwell [Parish] Watchman, October 26, 1923.
42 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, October 7, 1923.
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little progress outside the cities. After 1924 the member-
ship of the women~s Klan declined as precipitately as that
of the men~s order.43
Where women~s chapters existed, Klanswomen entered
into charitable and social activities with the Klansmen, dis-
playing as much enthusiasm, and frequently more. During
1924 the Klan also set up an organization, the Junior Ku
Klux Klan, open to boys 12 through 18 years of age. Un-
like the Women of the Klan, the Junior Klan was legally
an auxiliary order of the Klan. Not much is known of the
junior order except for the appearance of the organization
in a few cities over the country. In the Southwest there
were chapters of the Junior Ku Klux Klan in Cedar Grove,
a suburb of Shreveport; Tulsa; Little Rock; and Arkadel-
phia, Arkansas. The Junior Klan sometimes took part in
the demonstrations staged by the Klan and the Women of
the Klan.44
All aspects of the Klan~s fraternal program, whether eco-
nomic or social, suffered with the disintegration of Klan
membership in the last half of the 1920s. The giant Kon-
klaves cost money, and a depleted membership made in-
creasingly difficult the collection of funds for such displays.
Conversely, the infrequency of exciting demonstrations and
the disappearance of a merchant's Klannish patronage re-
moved much of the incentive for remaining in the order.
The Klan~s rituals, its religious overtones, and its philan-
thropic activities made it look like one of the familiar lodges
in America. This heightened its appeal and helped it to
gain acceptance among middle-class Americans who might
43 Miss Agnes B. Cloud, State Commander of Texas Klanswomen,
probably exaggerated when, addressing the first women'8 Klorero at
Dallas in the spring of 1924, she said that 300 delegates were present
from 200 women's chapters. Dallas Morning News, May 3, 1924.
44 Shreveport Journal, July 5, 1924; Tulsa Tribune, September 10,
19, 1924; LUtle Rock Arkansas Gazette, June 1, July 1, August 27,
1924. The Women of the Ku Klux Klan also had an auxiliary order
for girls, the Tri-K Club. Apparently no local units of this organiza-
tion were established in the states of the Southwest.
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otherwise have found unacceptable the terror and violence
that marked much of its early history. Its religiosity, its
charity, and its fraternity also made the Klan more palatable
to "aliens," those outside the Invisible Empire. But these
activities underwent deemphasis with the evolution of the
Klan into a political machine. The money, time, and inter-
est spent in courting ministers, aiding widows and orphans,
and staging initiations and parades were diverted to the
benefit of aspiring Klan politicos.
On the whole the tremendous growth of the Klan, its
many-sided appeal, and its multifarious endeavors furnish
a striking commentary on the nature of American society
in the 1920s. Its makeup was far too complex and its rami-
fications were far too sweeping for its career to be dismissed
as representing the antics of a few on the lunatic fringe.
6.
A Taste of Victory
AT THE BEGINNING of 1922 the Atlanta officialdom,
Kleagles, and ordinary Klansmen had plenty of reason to
be happy. The Klan had spread over the South and South-
west, had crossed the Mason-Dixon line and the Ohio River
and had inaugurated a promising kluxing campaign in the
northern states, and had taken in about 500,000 members
over the nation. In the Southwest the induction of new
Klansmen and the chartering of local Klans proceeded at
a feverish pace. Funds from initiation fees and the sale of
Klan regalia poured into Atlanta from the South, South-
west, East, Midwest, and Pacific Coast. These were indeed
grand times for William J. Simmons, Edward Y. Clarke,
and Mrs. Elizabeth Tyler. Simmons, as Imperial Wizard,
did little but make speeches and grow wealthier by the
day from the two dollars of each initiation fee that went
to him. Clarke and Mrs. Tyler made enormous profits, as
much as $40,000 a month, from the Klan's Propagation De-
partment, by now their own personal kingdom.
Yet all was not well in the Invisible Empire. The Sim-
mons-Clarke regime was not ambitious enough to suit a
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growing number of Klansmen in the strongest Klan states
-Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Georgia. There
were also disgruntled Klansmen in Indiana, where the
Klan was just beginning its expansion. These insurgent
Knights in various states saw the potentialities of the Klan
as a political organization and regarded the woolgathering
Simmons and the cynical Clarke as millstones impending
the order's fulfillment. They also distrusted the financial
practices of the Atlanta coterie. The insurgent group in-
cluded Nathan Bedford Forrest, Jr., of Georgia, son of the
famous Confederate cavalry general and alleged "Grand
Wizard" of the original Ku Klux Klan; David C. Stephen-
son and Walter F. Bossert of Indiana; H. Kyle Ramsey of
Louisiana; James A. Comer of Arkansas; Edwin DeBarr of
Oklahoma; and H. C. McCall, Brown Harwood, and Z. E.
Marvin of Texas. Texas was the star Klan state and the
home of the most ambitious Klansmen, politically and other-
wise, during the early years of Klan expansion. The leader
of the political-minded Klansmen was Hiram Wesley Evans,
the first Exalted Cyclops of the mighty Dallas Klan No. 66.
During January 1922, Imperial headquarters formally
established the four Realm, or state, organizations for the
Southwest. At the head of each Realm was a Grand Dragon
appointed by Imperial Wizard Simmons; the Realm was
divided into Provinces, or districts, headed by Great
Titans.1 In Texas, after a brief term served by Dr. A. D.
Ellis of Beaumont, Brown Harwood of Fort Worth be-
came Grand Dragon. McCall of Houston and Evans were
two of the five Titans for Texas. Ramsey of Shreveport was
the Grand Kligrapp, or state secretary, in Louisiana. Comer,
Exalted Cyclops of Little Rock Klan No.1, became Grand
Dragon of the Realm of Arkansas. The first Grand Dragon
of Oklahoma was DeBarr of Norman, whose background
made him unique among Klan officials. DeBarr held a doc-
1 Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (At-
lanta, 1921), art. XVI, sec. 1.
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torate of philosophy in chemistry from the University of
Michigan. He had come to the University of Oklahoma in
the early 1890s as a member of the original faculty. DeBarr
was extremely popular on the Norman campus, both as a
personality and as a teacher, and by 1922 he had advanced
to the vice-presidency of the university.2 The chemistry
professor may have been about the last person one would
expect to find in the Klan, but he was nonetheless a zeal-
ous Klansman, devoted to the cause of the order and
anxious for the secret organization to become a force in
state and national politics.
In the spring of 1922, after a short term as Great Titan
of Province No.2 in Texas, Evans came to Atlanta as Im-
perial Kligrapp (national secretary). Simmons brought the
Dallasite to national headquarters partly because he wanted
an efficient assistant in the Imperial hierarchy and partly,
it seems, to quiet the demands of the disgruntled Texas
Klansmen for more representation at Atlanta. But Simmons
soon discovered that he had taken a viper to his bosom.
Evans immediately began working to turn the Klan into
what he called "a great militant political organization."
Operating within the two major parties but never on its
own, the Klan would control nominations and elections
over the nation. This achievement, as Evans conceived it,
necessitated the elimination of Simmons and Clarke as
powers in the Klan, the regularization of the order's
financial practices, and the conversion of the Klan into a
~~movement" rather than a terrorist organization or a lodge.3
Evans was remarkably successful in carrying out his per-
sonal program for the Klan. During 1922, under his leader-
2 For a brief sketch of DeBarr's life, see the article printed at the
time of his death in Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, December 19,
1950. See also Roy Gittinger, The University at Oklahoma, 1892-
1942 (Norman, 1942), 9-10, 59, 92.
3 Testimony of Robert L. Henry in Senator from Texas. Hearings
before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections,
United States Senate, 68th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions (1924), 46.
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ship-and with the acquiescence of Clarke and the ineffec-
tual Simmons-the Klan entered local and state political
contests in various parts of the country, scoring some
notable victories. In November, fortified by the Klan's
triumphs in politics, Evans' followers "persuaded" Simmons
to relinquish the Imperial Wizardship and accept the
specially created but powerless position of ~~Emperor."
Evans was elected Wizard by the delegates to the first
Imperial Klonvocation in Atlanta. "They thrust that Wizard
job on me," was the way Evans later described his ascen-
sion to the leadership of the Klan movement. One of his
first official acts was to cancel Clarke's contract with the
Klan for propagation work. "As long as I wasn't responsible
for Clarke, I was satisfied. . . . But as soon as I became
Wizard I didn't dare take the responsibility of permitting
Clarke to make so much money," recalled Evans.4
The removal of Simmons from the Wizardship and the
severance of the Klan's relations with Clarke marked the
beginning of a process by which the original rulers of the
Klan were driven from the order. In 1923, as related earlier,
Simmons' efforts to organize a secret women's organiza-
tion precipitated a long, involved power struggle with
Evans, fought out both in the courts and within the ranks
of the Klan. By the end of 1923 the Evans regime had
liquidated the influence of the Simmons-Clarke faction,
and in the early part of the next year the Imperial Wizard
banished the founder of the order and its chief salesman.5
By that time Evans had also put an end to most of the
Klan's vigilante activities and had seen the organization,
under his direction, become essentially a political machine.
Yet the Klan would probably have evolved into an in-
4 William G. Shepherd, "Fiery Double Cross," Collier's, LXXXII
(July 28, 1928), 48.
5 See New York Times, January 12, 1924, p. 1, February 13, p. 5,
February 14, p. 16. Mrs. Tyler left the Klan early in 1923 and mar-
ried a wealthy Atlantan. She died the next year. Arnold S. Rice,
The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics (Washington, 1962), 10.
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strument for gaInIng political power if there had never
been a Hiram W. Evans. The character of the masked
order seemed to make some sort of activity in politics in-
evitable. Church work, terrorism, parades, and charity
might serve quite well for a while, but how could the
Klan really implement its program if it did not put the
"right men" in public office? The Klan had some rather
definite objectives. Its program included, at the local level,
rigid economy and merciless law enforcement, particularly
of prohibition laws and ordinances against gambling, pros-
titution, and other forms of vice. At the state level the
Klan wanted measures to strengthen law enforcement and
to outlaw Catholic schools and prohibit Catholics from
teaching in public schools. Nationally, the order worked
for strict limitation of "undesirable" foreign immigration,
federal aid to public education, an isolationist foreign
policy, and a host of other demands. These objectives could
be realized only if the Klan took to politics, or so the over-
whelming majority of Klansmen came to believe.
But Klansmen found it easier to enunciate a sweeping
set of objectives than to enact them. A student of early
American nativism laid down a principle for movements
like the Klan when he observed: "Radical or reactionary
political programs advanced by those seeking power . . .
are frequently tempered when opportunity and responsi-
bility for execution have been gained."6 Klansmen con-
trolled hundreds of local governments, but no noticeable
moral improvement or decrease of crime occurred in most
of the areas ruled by the Klan. The order secured a ma-
jority in several state legislatures, but only one genuinely
Klan-inspired measure became state law. That statute, a
requirement that all school children in Oregon must at-
tend the public schools through the eighth grade" was in-
itiated by the voters of the state, not enacted by the legis-
6 William D. Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party in the South
(Baton Rouge, 1950), 91.
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lature.7 There was some talk that the Klan would outlaw
Catholic schools in Oklahoma if the organization got
control of the legislature, but when it did, no such meas-
ure was introduced in either house. Attempts to outlaw
the teaching of evolution in the southwestern states came
from a group much larger than the Klan, and most of the
antievolution bills appeared in the state legislatures after
the Klan had lost the bulk of its influence. At the national
level the Klan claimed credit for the passage of immigra-
tion restriction legislation, but sentiment for curbing the
influx of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe
and Asia was almost universal among native-born Ameri-
cans, many of whom also opposed the Klan.8
Thus while the Klan enjoyed considerable success in
politics during the first half of the twenties, its attempts to
carry its policies into effect usually failed. The Klan never-
theless had a program and a set of power-hungry leaders.
The character of the order, with its unified membership
and revivalist spirit, bred political ambitions. During 1922
and 1923 Klansmen turned to politics in states where
Realm organizations had been set up and a chain of com-
mand established. By the middle of 1923 the organization
was a potent element, indefinable and feared, in state
and local politics from North Carolina to Oregon and from
Texas to Indiana. In the Southwest the white-robed society
suffered some defeats, but its victories were spectacular
and manifold. Its most publicized battles came in Texas and
Oklahoma. The Klan engaged in scattered contests in
Louisiana during political off years in that state. Arkansas
was the scene of some conspicuous local conquests, in-
cluding one of the first triumphs the Klan ever scored
in politics.
The Little Rock city election of April 4, 1922, furnished
7 In 1925 the United States Supreme Court declared the Oregon
law unconstitutional in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.
8 See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativi$1n, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, 1955), ch. XI.
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a real surprise. Most observers expected this election to
follow the usual pattern for elections in one-party Arkansas,
with the candidates nominated previously in the Demo-
cratic primaries winning easily over the token opposition
of a few Republican contestants. This time, however, there
was extraordinary heavy voting in the city's fifth ward,
where the Klan was especially strong. When the ballots
were counted, Charles M. Snodgrass, an "independent"
candidate for alderman in the fifth ward and a Protestant,
had overwhelmed E.dward L. Younger, the Democratic
nominee and the only Catholic on the ticket, 1,040 votes
to 462. Snodgrass' victory was the work of the Klan. On the
night before the city election the Little Rock Klan had
held a meeting in the fifth ward. Exalted Cyclops and
Grand Dragon Comer instructed Klansmen to scratch
Younger, the incumbent, and write in the name of Snod-
grass, whom Younger had defeated for the Democratic
nomination in the city primary the preceding December.
On election day only about O,ne-fifth of the city electorate
voted. Late in the afternoon, word of the Klan's tactics
got around in Little Rock, but a last-minute rush of Younger
supporters proved futile. 9
The Klan's upset of Younger, the Catholic candidate for
alderman, marked the debut of Little Rock Klan No.1 in
politics. For the next few years what transpired in the
local Klavern, at 4th and Main streets, had a decisive
impact on the political affairs of Little Rock, Pulaski
County, and, ultimately, the state of Arkansas. With per-
haps 7,800 members, the Little Rock Klan was by far the
largest chapter in Arkansas and one of the largest in the
nation.10 Until mid-1924 it was dominated by Comer, an
ex-Bull Moose and Republican politician and currently a
Little Rock lawyer. As Cyclops of the largest Klan in the
state, Grand Dragon of the Realm, and a favorite of Evans,
9 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 5, 1922.
10 This was the estimate of the Reverend Harry G. Knowles, a Klan
lecturer, reported ibid., February 5, 1923.
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he ruled almost absolutely over the fortunes of the Klan
in Arkansas.
In the late spring and early summer of 1922 Klan No.1,
under Comer's direction, carefully prepared to nominate
a slate of its favorites in the Democratic primaries and
thus to win control of the government of Pulaski County.
Simultaneously with Texas Klansmen, the Little Rock
Knights used a highly effective device called the "elim-
ination primary." Klansmen in Little Rock and throughout
the county were mailed ballots along with a request that
they indicate their preference among the candidates for
each office. The candidate receiving the largest number
of votes would receive the united vote of the Klansmen.
Finally, on July 26, about two weeks before the Demo-
cratic primary, the Little Rock Klan made public the full
slate of candidates it was backing for county, district, and
state office. Everyone of the Klan endorsees running for
county or district office and for the state legislature was
a Klansman. Anti-Klan elements in Little Rock, led by the
former governor George T. Hays, greeted the announce-
ment of the Klan ticket with a denunciation of "Comerism"
and "Bull Moose interference" in county politics.11
During the week preceding the Democratic primary
Klan No.1 staged nightly political rallies in different parts
of Little Rock. In midweek the Klansmen gathered at night
in a field outside town, initiated a class of about 170
neophytes, and made arrangements for the county pri-
mary. Comer and his followers agreed to have five Klan
workers at each polling place in the county and to have
available one thousand automobiles to carry voters to the
polls. Every night for the remainder of the week saw Klan
candidates and lecturers exhort crowds on the principles
of the order. An anti-Klan organization called the "Com-
mittee of Democrats" also held nightly rallies, always
11 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 15, 18, 20-23, 26, 29, 1922;
Fort Smith Southwest American, July 29, 1922.
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only a short walk and within hearing distance of the pro-
Klan gathering. Throughout the state the Pulaski County
campaign attracted more publicity than the statewide
races. "Wi~h red fire ahd parades," reported the neutral
Arkansas Gazette of Little Rock on the day of the pri-
mary, "one of the most exciting political campaigns in
the history of Pulaski County came to an end last night."12
On Sat~rday, August 8, the Klan swept Pulaski County.
Every candidate endorsed by the Klan at the county and
district level won the Democratic nomination, including
Heartsill Ragon, bidding for a seat in the United States
House of Representatives. Throughout Little Rock, Klans--
men simply scratched through the names of four unopposed
candidates for reelection to the county Democratic com-
mittee~ three of them Jews and one a Catholic. In a few
wards anti-Klan poll watchers challenged the ballots of
known Klansmen, but the party officials allowed no dis-
qualifications. Comer looked over the results of the county
primary and remarked contentedly: "I think the boys did
fine." And from the daily Arkansas Gazette: "The Klan
bloc decided this election. . . . The results of the Pulaski
county primary were . . . determined when the Klan held
its elimination contests or decided to support this candi-
date against that one."13
The Klan did not make an open fight in other Arkansas
counties, although in Faulkner County (Conway) the
local Knights offered a reward of fifty dollars for "election
crooks and boodlers" while proclaiming their determina-
tion "that the will of the people as expressed at the polls in
Faulkner county shall prevail and shall not be thwarted."14
At the state level the Klan was not a factor in the 1922
races. The Little Rock Klan endorsed a complete state tick-
et, including ultraconservative Thomas C. McRae, the in-
12 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 31, August 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8,
1922.
13 Ibid., August 9, 10, 1922.
14 Fort Smith Southwest American, August 6, 1922.
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cumbent, for governor.15 Probably not more than one or
two of the state candidates endorsed by Klan No.1 were
Klansmen. Apparently Comer and his minions, in lieu of
nominating their own slate, simply endorsed the man most
likely to win in each of the state races. Comer could there-
fore claim a Klan victory when all but one of the candi-
dates favored by the Little Rock Klan won the Demo-
cratic nomination.
McRae won the renomination as the Democratic guber-
natorial candidate and insured his reelection in Democratic
Arkansas. Running on a strict law enforcement platform,
he polled about four times as many votes as his little-
known opponent. McRae was not a member of the Klan,
but the order regarded the economy-minded, "bone-dry"
governor as a "friendly neutral," and he received the votes
of Little Rock Klansmen and most other Arkansas Knights.
The governor's private secretary, Clarence P. Newton,
belonged to the Little Rock Klan and in 1924 would be
elected county judge of Pulaski County on the Klan ticket.16
Little Rock Klan No. 1 followed up its successes in the
August primary with a victory in a special municipal judge-
ship election the next month. Its candidate for municipal
judge won over two non-Klan opponents by a margin of
5 to 1. In November, Klan No.1 publicized its official ticket
for the upcoming primary for city offices. The ticket,
headed by Mayor Ben D. Brickhouse, included choices
for municipal judge, city treasurer, nine seats on the board
of aldermen, two places on the city school board, and
twenty-seven posts on the county Democratic central
committee from the city's nine wards. All of the Klan
favorites had been chosen in a series of elimination pri-
maries held at intervals during October and November.
In the city primary, on December 4, two Klan aldermanic
candidates were beaten, but the rest of the Klan ticket
15 Ibid., July 29, 1922; Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 26, 1922.
16 New York Times, August 9, 1922, p. 6, November 1, 1923, p. 1.
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was nominated. The next spring, before the city election,
the Klan threatened once again to use write-in tactics to
defeat the two non-Klan nominees for alderman, one a
Jew, the other a Catholic. At the last minute Comer called
a Konklave of Little Rock Knights and instructed them to
vote for all the Democratic nominees, thereby canceling
the original plans for a second Klan bolt.17
It is impossible to assess the influence of the Klan in
the 44th Arkansas General Assembly, meeting in January
1923. To be sure, there were Klansmen in both legislative
houses; the Pulaski County delegation, a senator and four
representatives, consisted of members of the hooded order.
A correspondent for a Fort Smith newspaper commented on
. the "strong membership of Klansmen" in the legislature.18
But the senators and representatives spent most of their
time dealing with economic matters, and no issues arose
to reveal the strength of the Klan.
In a number of local contests during 1923, however, the
Klan was clearly the dominant issue. After a heated cam-
paign the candidate of EI Dorado Klan No. 92 won the
Democratic nomination for mayor of the southern Arkansas
oil town. In Fort Smith the forces of Protestant morality,
led by the Klan, forced a recall election on Mayor Fagan
Bourland, a Catholic, whom the order accused of misap-
propriation of funds and softness toward bootleggers and
prostitutes. The Fort Smith Klansmen and their allies
succeeded in recalling Bourland, 1,737 votes to 1,079. At
Camden, in the southwestern part of the state, and at Bald
Knob, a little town northeast of Little Rock, the Klan
even backed candidates for school trustee, and won in
both instances.19 The Bald Knob contest, and Klan versus
17 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, September 30, October 4, Novem-
ber 30, December 5, 1922, April 1-4, 1923; Fort Smith Southwest
American, April 3, 4, 1923.
18 Fort Smith Southwest American, January 10, 1923.
19 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, February 8, May 20, 22, 1923;
Fort Smith Southwest American, May 16, 18, 25, 1923.
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anti-Klan fights in villages throughout the nation, demon-
strated that no town was too small, no election too minor,
for the Klan to become the preeminent issue.
By the end of 1923 the Klan in Arkansas, under the
leadership of Comer, dominated the governments of Pu-
laski County and the city of Little Rock, had things its own
way in Fort Smith and Sebastian County, and' was the
most powerful element in scores of other towns -and sev-
eral other counties over the state. The Klan had awed
most of its opposition into silence. A New York Times cor-
respondent, writing in late 1923, quite accurately appraised
the status of the Klan in Arkansas: "There is apparently
no organized movement under way to challenge the
domination of the masked organization."20 Yet the Klan's
political power had not really been tested at the state
level. Such a test would not come until 1924, when the
Realm of Arkansas made an all-out bid to control the
state of Arkansas.
To the south of Arkansas, in Louisiana, the Klan never
became the force in state or even local politics that it did in
Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, or, outside the Southwest,
in Indiana, Oregon, Colorado, or Georgia. There was much
talk about the Klan's power here and there in Louisiana,
but in fact the influence of the organization on politics
in the Pelican State was comparatively small. With at
least half of the state's population, the Catholic element,
Hatly opposed to the Klan, the strength of the order was
limited to northern and western Louisiana and the "Flor-
ida parishes" in the extreme eastern part of the state. The
size of the Klan in Louisiana never exceeded about 50,000
members.21 The Louisiana Klan always lacked the kind
of ambitious, ruthless, and capable political leadership
that operated in Arkansas under Comer, in Texas under
Z. E. Marvin, or in Oklahoma under DeBarr and N. Clay
20 New York Times, November 1, 1923, p. 1.
21 This estimate is from Washington Post, November 2, 1930, sec.
I, p. 4.
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Jewett. As a result of its sectional concentration within the
state, its relatively small size, and its lack of a determined
leadership, the Klan's career in Louisiana politics was not
notably successful. Nevertheless, as the discussion in a
later chapter will show, the presence of the Klan did have
some bearing on the 1923-1924 gubernatorial campaign in
Louisiana. And during 1922 and 1923, when there were
no state or parish elections, the Klan occasionally threw
its weight into local campaigns.
The city primaries of the summer of 1922 in Baton
Rouge, the state capital, furnish an example of the Klan's
activities in local politics in Louisiana. Turner Bynum, a
Baton Rouge banker, anti-Klanner, and candidate for the
Democratic nomination for mayor in the city primary,
charged that his opponent, railroad conductor Ralph Mc-
Burney, was a member of the Klan and had the support of
the local chapter. In the first primary, a month earlier,
McBurney had led the ticket, but since he had not polled
a majority over Bynum and a third candidate, McBurney
and Bynum had entered a "runolI" primary. McBurney
ignored Bynum's charge of membership in the Klan. Baton
Rouge Klan No.3, however, accused the Reverend Leo
GassIer of St. Joseph's Catholic Church of instructing his
parishioners to vote against the alleged Klan candidate.
The stigma of the Klan proved fatal to McBurney's chances
in the capital city, where the Klan was fairly strong, but
where opposition to the order was stronger. Bynum won
the nomination with 1,892 votes to McBurney's 1,749. In a
race also centering on the Klan issue an anti-Klan candi-
date for city judge won the nomination over an opponent
generally credited with Klan support. The Democratic
nominees were elected in the fall general election, a'mere
formality in one-party Louisiana.22
Beginning in the fall of 1922 and continuing through
most of the next year, Governor John M. Parker of Louis-
22 New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 3-5, 1922.
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iana carried on a running fight with the Klan in his state.
At the height of Parker's feud with the hooded crusaders
came one of the few unequivocal Klan versus anti-Klan
election contests -in Louisiana. Judge R. R. Reid of Amite
died in November 1922, leaving a place vacant on the
state supreme court from the Fifth Judicial District, in
southeastern Louisiana. Columbus Reid, Judge Reid's son;
Robert D. Ellis, also of Amite; and District Judge H. F.
Brunot of Baton Rouge announced their candidacies for
the supreme court seat. A special primary was to be held
in March 1923 to choose the Democratic nominee for the
seat. Reid and Ellis, admitting that they belonged to the
Klan in Tangipahoa Parish, concentrated their attention
on the virtues of the Klan and the demagoguery of John
M. Parker. Brunot, a Protestant and an avowed opponent
of the Klan, drew the support and praise of the governor.
Throughout March, Klan and anti-Klan rallies were held
in the fifth district. Dean R. L. Tullis of the Louisiana
State University law school spoke at a big gathering of
Brunot forces held at the Elks Theater in Baton Rouge.
On election eve Klansmen from various parishes in the dis-
trict staged a joint Ellis-Reid rally outside Baton Rouge,
where William C. Barnette of Shreveport, general counsel
for the Klan in Louisiana and lawyer for the Klansmen in
the Morehouse Parish investigations, denounced Parker and
e'his tool," Brunot. Returns from the special primary gave
Brunot a majority of 409 votes over his two Klan adver-
saries, thus obviating a runoff primary. Reid and Ellis
charged fraud and appealed to the state supreme court,
which denied their plea.23
Brunot's victory over the two Klansmen illustrated a
basic lesson for the Klan and other strong minorities seek-
ing political power: United, there was a good chance of
winning, but division of voting strength or indecisiveness
23 Ibid., March 16, 23, 27, 28, 29, April 1, 1923; Reid v. Brunot
(Ellis, Intervener), 96 So. 43.
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in choosing a candidate was fatal. Reid and Ellis divided
the sizable Klan vote in the Fifth Judicial District, with
the result that Brunot won a clear majority; the combined
vote of the Klansmen carried only five of twelve parishes
in the district.24 Perhaps the Klan leadership in the area,
headed by Great Titan Thomas F. DePaoli, planned to let
the outcome of the first primary determine which Klans-
man would get the unified support of the Klan in the run-
off. But as a result of these foolish tactics, there was no
runoff, and the Klan suffered a serious setback just as the
Realm and Provincial officials in Louisiana were scheming
to make the influence of the organization felt in the coming
gubernatorial election. The special primary in the Fifth
Judicial District of Louisiana provided an excellent ex-
ample of the weakness of the Klan's political leadership
in the state.
Such fatuity did not characterize the career of the order
in Texas politics. During 1922 the Klan was especially suc-
cessful in the Lone Star State, where the secret society
electioneered more openly and on a grander scale than in
any other state. From 1922 to 1924 the Klan was the chief
issue in the politics of Texas, where the voters, experi-
encing the apathy of the postwar years, needed issues.
In the spring of 1922, as the Klan prepared for its en-
trance into Texas politics, local Klans in the Realm of Texas
laid aside whatever reservations they had previously had
about admitting "aliens" to the Invisible Empire. CCThey
just throwed the doors open, and every man that had the
money, they took him in to get his vote," recalled a former
member of a north Texas chapter, cCand if he did not have
any maBey, they took his note payable in the fall, and the
thing then was to get his vote.''25 Such methods swelled
the membership of the Texas Klan to perhaps 100,000.
During 1922 the efforts of this unmed minority sent Klans-
24 New Orleans Times-Picayune, March 29, 1923.
25 Testimony of W. H. Castles in Senator from Texas Hearings, 992.
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men to the state legislature; elected sheriffs, attorneys, and
judges at the local and district level; and won one of the
most important victories in Klan history-the election of
Earle B. Mayfield to the United States Senate.
In 1922 the followers of Evans were active in bringing
about Klan successes in various states, but Texas was the
only state where the Imperial Kligrapp intervened directly.
Evans' heavy hand was most evident in the Texas sena-
torial race, the major statewide contest, since Governor
Pat M. Neff, not openly hostile to the Klan, was almost
certain to be renominated and thus reelected in overwhelm-
ingly Democratic Texas. When Evans came to Atlanta in
April as Imperial Kligrapp, he was unhappy over an
agreement reached by the Klan bosses in Texas a few weeks
earlier, whereby three Klansmen who had announced for
the United States Senate-former Representative Robert
L. Henry of Waco, attorney Sterling P. Strong of Dallas,
and Mayfield, a member of the Texas Railroad Commission
-were to have equal opportunities to bid for the votes
of Texas Klansmen. Evans, as one of the Great Titans, had
attended the conference in Waco at which the agreement
was made and had urged the Klan officials to unite the
organization behind Mayfield. At one point Evans turned
to Erwin J. Clark, Great Titan of the Waco Province and
a booster of Henry, and said: "Erwin, I have a dead one in
Dallas [Strong] and you have a dead one here in Waco
[Henry]. Mayfield is the man. Now, they are all three
Klansmen, and Strong and Henry are both good fellows,
and we do not want to hurt their feelings. Let them ride
for awhile and at the proper time we will ditch them and
concentrate on Mayfield."26
After Evans became Imperial Kligrapp, he set out to
solidify the Texas Klan behind Mayfield. He held two
more meetings with the Texas Klan hierarchy but was un-
able to persuade, cajole, or pressure Clark into, deserting
26 Testimony of Erwin J. Clark, ibid., 65.
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Henry or the ex-congressman into dropping out of the race.
In exasperation Evans turned to two of his cohorts in the
Realm of Texas, Marvin, his successor as Titan of the
Dallas Province, and Grand Dragon Harwood of Fort
Worth. Marvin staged an elimination primary in the Dallas
Klan, the ·biggest local in the Southwest, and Mayfield re-
ceived a majority over Henry and Strong. The leaders
of Fort Worth Klan No. 101 conducted a like poll among
the large .membership of that chapter, and again Mayfield
received a .majority of preferential votes. Harwood then
communicated the action of the two north Texas Klans
to the other 240 or so Klans in the state, and within a short
time nearly every active Klansman in Texas, including the
members of Henry~s chapter, Waco Klan No. 33, had ac-
cepted Mayfield as the official Klan candidate.27
Strong quietly accepted his fate and withdrew from the
senatorial race in June. Henry, however, stubbornly refused
to withdraw) even thoQgh completely abandoned by most
of his sheeted brethren. Henry would attract only a hand-
ful of Klan votes and would finish last in the Democratic
primary, but his public denunciations of the Klan politicos
who he felt had betrayed him did much to air the political
machinations of the order in Texas.28
By July 22, the day of the Democratic primary, Evans
and his friends "in Texas had united about 100,000 Klans-
men behind Mayfield, an advantage that enabled the rail-
road commissioner to lead five opponents in the senatorial
race. Elderly C.harles A. Culberson, the incumbent, seek-
ing a fifth term in the national upper house, finished a
poor third. Billie Mayfield of Houston (no relation to
Earle) 1 editor of a weekly Klan newspaper and a candi-
date for lieutenant governor, as well as candidates endorsed
by the Klan for state treasurer and state superintendent
27 Testimony of Henry, Clark, and Dave C. McCord, ibid., 55, 423-
26, 377. See also pp. 569-70.
28 Testimony of H. M. Keeling, ibid., 463; Dallas Morning News,
July 29, 1922.
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of public instruction, survived the first primary and en-
tered the runoff campaign.29
In the senatorial runoff Earle B. Mayfield faced the most
controversial figure in Texas politics, James E. Ferguson of
Temple. Ferguson, a demagogic, ruthless politician, was
making a comeback after being impeached and ousted
from the governorship in 1917 and running a bootless race
for President on his own "American party" ticket in 1920.30
The oracle of the white tenant farmer and day laborer,
Ferguson had also become the outstanding antiprohibi-
tionist in the state. Now he locked horns with Mayfield
in one of the fiercest campaigns in the history of a state
long noted for its vitriolic politics. Although "Farmer
Jim," as Ferguson called himself, could find little wrong
with the Klan except its political ambitions, he denounced
those ambitions and the Klan candidate in the crude but
effective fashion for which he had become famous. Among
other choice epithets, he referred to Mayfield as a "Klan-
didate," a cCdrunkard," and the 4Ccrown prince of the Klan."
Mayfield completely ignored the Klan issue (he explained
that it was cCa matter over which the United States Senate
has no jurisdiction"), concentrating instead on Ferguson's
besmirched public record and his well-known moistness
on the liquor question.31
When the runoff primary returns were in, Mayfield had
won the nomination over Ferguson by a margin of 44,607
29 On the Klan affiliation of Billie Mayfield, George D. Garrett.
candidate for treasurer, and Ed R. Bentley, candidate for state school
superintendent, see the testimony of Brown Harwood in Senator from
T exas Hearings, 558-59.
30 For a more favorable view of Ferguson, see Onida Ferguson
Nalle, The Fergusons of Texas (San Antonio, 1946), written by Fer-
guson's daughter. For a summary of Texas political history in the
twenties, see Rupert N. Richardson, Texas, the Lone Star State (2d
ed., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1958), ch. XX; and Seth S. McKay,
Texas Politics, 1916-1944, 'With Special Reference to the German
Counties (Lubbock, 1954), ch. m.
31 Dallas Morning News, August 16, 26, 1922; McKay, Texas Poli-
tics; Nalle, Fergusons of Texas, 162-64.
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votes. The Klan had nominated its favorite for senator, but
its choices for lieutenant governor, state treasurer, and
state school superintendent were beaten by their non-Klan
opponents. A large majority of Klan-endorsed candidates
in Harris (Houston), Dallas, McLennan (Waco), Jefferson
(Beaumont), Tarrant (Fort Worth), Wichita (Wichita
Falls), and many less populous counties, however, were
nominated.32 In Atlanta, Evans was jubilant. He had good
reason to be happy. His supporters in Texas had done an
excellent job of organizing the rank and file, not only be-
hind Mayfield, but behind local candidates. In Dallas, for
example, Klansmen set up precinct organizations outside
the regular Democratic party machinery, conducted fund-
raising drives for local Klan politicians, and perhaps gave
money to Mayfield headquarters. The Fort Worth Klan
made its members pledge to vote for the Klan ticket in the
county primary and suspended two Knights who refused to
support the entire slate.33
Klansmen and sympathizers controlled the state Demo-
cratic convention, held in San Antonio the first \veek in
September, and shouted down all attempts to incorporate
an anti-Klan plank in the party platform.34 After the con-
vention, angry Fergusonites and other Democratic Klan
haters, calling themselves "Independent Democrats," bolted
the party, fused with the Texas Republican party (which
had gone on record against the Klan), and chose George
E. B. Peddy, the young assistant district attorney of Harris
32 Alexander Heard and Donald S. Strong, Southern Primaries and
Elections, 1920-1949 (University, Alabama, 1950), 133; testimony of
Jesse Martin in Fort Worth Grain and Elevator Co. v. Alliaru;e Insur-
ance Co. (No. 1068) (United States District Court, Fort Worth,
Texas), reported in Fort Worth Star-Telegram, January 2, 1924.
33 Testimony of E. J. Jones, McCord, J. F. Collier, Keeling, and
F. G. Van Valkenburg in Senator from Texas Hearings, 364, 373-75,
380, 382, 399-402, 466-77, 533-35; testimony of Martin and T. H.
Mills in Fort Worth Grain and Elevator Co. v. Alliance Insurance Co.,
reported in Fort Worth Star-Telegram, January 2, 1924.
34 San Antonio Express, September 7, 1922.
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County, to oppose Mayfield in the general election cam-
paign.35
Peddy's campaign against the Klan in the fall, while
less blustering than Ferguson's of the summer, was just as
vigorous. But his chances were doomed from the outset.
The votes of the Klansmen and their allies the prohibi-
tionists remained solid for Mayfield; the primary pledge
worked against the youthful Houstonian; and the secretary
of state refused to certify Peddy's name for the November
ballot because he had voted in the Democratic primaries.
Peddy's supporters were not without legal weapons of
their own. They charged Mayfield with excessive cam-
paign expenditures and with being the candidate of a
political conspiracy formed by the Klan, and they tried
through the courts to have his name barred from the gen-
eral election ballot. After a bewildering .round of litiga-
tion, the state supreme court certified the name of May-
field, the regular Democratic nominee. On November 5
Mayfield was elected senator, with 264,260 votes to 130,744
write-in votes for Peddy.36 Just before the election, Evans,
worried that Mayfield's name might be left off the ballot,
may have given a delegation of Texas Klan officials $25,000
to use in educating Klansmen over the state in the proper
way to write their candidate's name on the ballots.27
Submerged by Mayfield's vote in the general election,
Peddy and his backers carried their charg.es against May-
field and the Klan before the United States Senate Com-
mittee on Privileges and Elections. A subcommittee con-
ducted an extended inquiry into the 1922 campaign in
Texas, the Klan's part in the election of Mayfield, an-d the
expenses of the senator-elect. After interviewing a number
35 Dallas Morning News, September 18, 1922.
36 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, September 26, 1922; Austin Ameri-
can, September 29, October 28, November 5, 1922; Dallas Morning
News, October 3, 1922; Heard and Strong, Southern Primaries and
Elections, 167-69.
37 Testimony of J. Q. Jett in Senator from Texas Hearings, 193.
127
of Klansmen from Atlanta and Texas and discovering
abundant evidence of the solid backing given Mayfield by
the Klan, the subcommittee finally voted to recommend his
confirmation. On February 3, 1925, the Senate voted un-
animously to seat Mayfield.38
The election of Mayfield amounted to a striking victory
for the Klan, one of the best known and most spectacular
of its numerous conquests in the twenties. And there were
many more Klan successes in Texas during 1922 and 1923.
The order probably had a majority in the house of repre-
sentatives of the 38th 'Texas Legislature, which met in Jan-
uary of 1923. In county after county in the eastern two-
thirds of the state the Klan's dominance was unquestioned.
In 1923, a political off year in Texas, Klan endorsees lost in
the city elections in San Antonio and EI Paso, but the
Klan established its firm control over the governments of
Dallas, Fort Worth, and Wichita Falls.39 At the beginning
of 1924 Lone Star Klansmen could boast of the fact that
Texas was the number one Klan state politically, and could
look forward to even greater conquests that year.
The year 1922 saw the Klan enter statewide contests in
four states. In Texas the secret organization elected a Uni-
ted States Senator, although failing in the other races for
state office. In Oregon the Klan was responsible for the
election of a Democratic governor in a predominantly
Republican state, and in Georgia the order was strong
enough to tum out a hostile governor and elect its own
man to succeed him.40 Finally, the Klan plunged into the
malestrom that was Oklahoma politics in the 1920s and
38 Dallas Morning News, February 4, 1925; Congressional Record,
68th Congress, 2d Session. (1925), 2929-30.
39 Austin Statesman, February 25, 1923; Fort Worth American
Citizen, April 13, 1923.
40 On Klan successes in 1922 in states outside the Southwest, see
"Klan Victories in Oregon and Texas," Literary Digest, LXXXV (No-
vember 25, 1922), 12; Rice, Ku Klux Klan in American Politics, 46,
49, 58-63; Waldo Roberts, "The Ku-Kluxing of Oregon," Outlook,
CXXXIII (March 14, 1923), 490-91.
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tried to elect a governor. The Klan lost that contest, but
at the local and district level and in the state legislature it
built a system of power that would bring about the down-
fall of a foolhardy governor who had the temerity to join
battle with the masked crusaders.
So 1922 was a watershed for the Klan movement. Hence-
forth, in almost every state where it attained much strength,
the Klan would be preeminently a political organization.
The paradox of a militant secret society, essentially totali-
tarian in philosophy and structure, thrusting its way into
the democratic processes was obvious to outsiders and to a
growing number of Klansmen. The dangers of dissension
arising from this paradox would hereafter plague the Klan.
7.
HNeither Klan nor King"
IN THE EARLY 1920s Oklahoma was in only the second
decade of statehood. The Sooner State presented what one
writer called "a curious mixture of the Old South, the
pioneer West, and hustling modern Rotary Club Babittism."l
On one hand there was rampant business pro~perity based
mainly on the state:Js expanding oil industry; on the other,
widespread agricultural distress had given rise to a strong
agrarian radical movement. On the liquor question most
Oklahomans not only voted dry, but they were willing, as
members of the Klan, to take a horsewhip or a razorstrop
to suspected bootleggers. By 1922 Oklahoma had had four
governors; three of them, togetller with a lieutenant gover-
nor, had been threatened with impeachment by contrary
legislatures. The current governor, James B. A. Robertson,
was under indictment in a district court in Okmulgee for
accepting a bribe from a violator of the state banking
laws.2 Oklahoma already had a tradition of mistrusting its
public officials and taking quick action against them, at
both state and local levels, if there was any suspicion of
misconduct.
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In 1922 two potent ingredients were added to the already
spicy Oklahoma political stew-the Klan and the Farmer-
Labor Reconstruction League. The Klan, concerned mainly
with bringing law and order to Oklahoma, infiltrated both
political parties. Oklahoma did have a legitimate two-party
system in the early twenties, although the Republican party
had never elected a governor and had carried the state in
only one presidential election, that of 1920. But the Repub-
licans were in the majority in most of the state's northern
counties, had won control of the state house of representa-
tives in 1920, and usually offered stiff opposition to the
Democrats in all elections. By contrast, the Farmer-Labor
Reconstruction League, organized in September 1921 by
representatives of the Farmer's Union, the state Federation
of Labor, and the Railway Brotherhoods, worked only
within the Democratic party, although it included many
former Republicans and Socialists. On February 23, 1922,
the Reconstruction League, in convention at Shawnee,
adopted a platform emphasizing. liberal economic and social
reform. It chose as its gubernatorial candidate in the
Democratic primary John Callaway "Jack" Walton, the
mayor of Oklahoma City.3
Walton was in his early forties when he decided to run
for governor. Born in Indiana, he had worked on a railway
construction gang in the Oklahoma Territory and in Mexico
City. He had briefly studied civil and electrical engineering,
worked in Oklahoma City as a salesman for a while, and
then, in 1906, formed a small utilities company. In 1917
1 Bruce Bliven, "From the Oklahoma Front," New Republic XXXVI
(October 17, 1923), 202.
2 See the Tulsa Tribune, September 18, 26, 1922; New York Times,
December 3, 1922, sec. I, pte 2, p. 5.
3 On the Farmer-Labor Reconstruction League, see Gilbert C.
Fite, uOklahoma's Reconstruction League: An Experiment in Farmer-
Labor Politics," Journal of Southern History, XIII (November 1947),
535-55, and "John A. Simpson: The Southwest's Militant Farm
Leader," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXV (March 1949),
563-84.
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he had been elected commISSIoner of public works in
Oklahoma City, and two years later he had been elected
mayor of the capital city. As mayor, Walton issued a
warning to the members of his police force that membership
in the Klan would not be tolerated. The city Chamber of
Commerce fought him because he supported local packing-
house workers during a strike, and Walton, displaying the
same penchant for direct action that later characterized his
brief reign as governor, threw the Chamber of Commerce
president in jail for several hours.4 Walton's personal ap-
pearance, while not unattractive, was unimpressive. An
observer described him as "thick set, of medium height,
\vith college-cut brown hair, the rounded, fleshy face of the
politician) large protuberant eyes, and a weak mouth."5
But the mayor, posing as the poor man's friend, had a
certain charm which appealed to the Farmer-Labor people
and which would help to make him governor of Oklahoma.
In the 1922- gubernatorial campaign most of the liberal
and radical sentiment in Oklahoma united in the Recon-
struction League and behind Walton. The "progressive"
element, meaning the prohibitionist, economy-minded seg-
ment of the-population concerned principally with honest
government and law and order, divided its support between
Thomas H. Owen, former chief justice of the state supreme
court, and Robert H, Wilson of Chickasha, the state super-
intendent of public instruction and a Klansman. ~ometime
in the spring of 1922, probably early in May, Grand Dragon
Edwin DeBarr and his associates in the hierarchy of the
Oklahoma Klan decided that the Klan should throw its
75,000 or so votes behind Wilson. On May 14 E. B. Howard
of Tulsa, a Klansman and a former United States Repre-
sentative, withdrew from the governor's race. Howard then
announced fOf Congress. With the support of the powerful
4 Howard A, Tucker, Governor Walton's Ku Klux Klan War (Okla-
homa City, 1923), 3·6.
5 Bliven, "From the Oklahoma Front," 203.
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Klan organization in Tulsa County, he would be nominated
in the Democratic primary and elected in November.6
The Klan did not openly campaign for Wilson, but by
August 1, the day of the party primaries, the fact that the
Klansmen had formed ranks solidly behind the state school
superintendent was common knowledge. The Klan heir-
archyalso sent out word that George F. Short, Democratic
candidate for attorney general, must be elected. Short's
opponent had called the Klan's outrages "unspeakable and
innumerable" and had pointed out that not one night-rider
had been brought to justice.7
Wilson's strength, and the bulk of the Klan's, lay in the
central, northern, and eastern parts of the state. Walton
drew his main support from the farmers in tIle western and
southern counties and from the oilfield workers and miners
in the eastern and southeastern counties.8 The Oklahoma
City mayor was a colorful campaigner. He carried a jazz
band with him in his jaunts over the state while he
thundered denunciations of Owen and the Oklahoma City
Daily Oklahoman, Wilson, the 4:4:Marland and Dutch-Shell
oil interests," the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce,
and the Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company. While he
did not mention the Klan or Wilson's connection with the
secret society, he received the endorsement of thousands of
Roman Catholics over the state, along with the enthusiastic
support of Patrick S. Nagle, recognized Socialist chief in
Oklahoma and editor of the Oklahoma Leader.9
Two days before the primaries Klansmen circulated
6 Ernest T. Bynum, Personal Recollections of Ex-Governor Walton
(2d. ed., Oklahoma City, 1924),39-40; Victor E. Harlow, Oklahoma:
Its Origin and Development (Oklahoma City, 1949), 357; Tulsa
Tribune, May 15, 1922.
7 New York Times, June 18, 1922, sec. VIII, p. 6.
8 See the county by county survey of the gubernatorial race in
Tulsa Tribune, July 23, 27-31, 1922.
9 Oscar Ameringer, If You Don't Weaken (New York, 1940),
369-72; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 16, 1922; Harlow,
Oklahoma, 358.
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model Klan Democratic tickets in many of the Protestant
churches of Oklahoma City. Wilson headed the ticket,
which included an expression of preference for most state
offices and an endorsement of a full slate of candidates for
county offices. Shortly before noon on the day of the
primaries, the sheriff in Tulsa arrested two election workers
for passing out sample Klan ballots for both Republican
and Democratic primaries. The Tulsa ticket indicated the
Klan's choices among Republican county candidates and
Democratic state and county aspirants. Again Wilson
headed the Democratic Klan state.10
Walton-"Our Jack," as the Reconstruction Leaguers called
him-led the Democratic ticket in the August 1 primary.
Although he did not have a clear majority over Wilson and
Owen, Oklahoma law and party regulations made no
provision for a runoff primary, and the trust-baiting mayor
won the nomination. Final returns gave Walton 119,504
votes; Wilson, 84,569; and Owen, 64,229. Short won the
Democratic nomination for attorney general. Although fail-
ing to nominate a candidate for governor, the Klan nomi-
nated most of its favorites in both parties for county and
district offices in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Okmulgee, Muskogee,
Osage (Pawhuska), Washington (Bartlesville), Grady (Law-
ton), Rogers (Claremore), and other counties.11 A Tulsa
newspaper after the primaries commented that "politicians
admit that the Knights of the Invisible Empire have
control of the political situation in this county today and
must be reckoned with."12
Grand Dragon DeBarr now had to reckon with an angry
board of regents at the University of Oklahoma. The
previous spring the board of regents had instructed faculty
members at the University not to take part in "the con-
10 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 31, 1922; Tulsa Tribune,
August 1, 1922.
11 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 15, 1922; Tulsa Trib-
une, August 3, 4, 1922.
12 Tulsa Tribune, August 6, 1922.
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troversy that exists throughout the state in connection with
the Ku Klux Klan and the Anti-Ku Klux Klan." On August
5 the president of the board, pointing out that DeBarr had
made speeches on Wilson's behalf and had mailed model
Klan tickets to local Klans over the state, charged the
chemistry professor with conduct "in direct violation of the
policy of the university." Claiming that he had been
"greatly misrepresented," the Grand Dragon retorted: "If
thirty years of living and doing in Norman and in Oklahoma
is not sufficient defense, then I have none other to make."
And the Norman chapter of the University alumni associa-
tion added: "If Dr. DeBarr is a Klansman, then the Klan
is to be congratulated on the high type of its membership."
The board of regents voted to reprimand DeBarr officially.
The professor talked for a time of taking the whole affair
into court, but he eventually accepted the regents' con-
demnation and stayed on at the University. In the spring
of 1923 he resigned the Grand Dragon's office and was
succeeded by N. Clay Jewett, a handsome Oklahoma City
businessman.13
At the state Democratic convention in September, Walton
and his followers stood on the "Shawnee platform" adopted
by the Reconstruction League the previous February and
refused to accept the conservative regular Democratic
platform. The party endorsed the league's proposals, where-
upon many Democrats who could not accept the radicalism
of the league and its candidate bolted the Democratic
party and threw their support to the Republican nominee,
spade-bearded John Fields, editor of a conservative agri-
cultural weekly called the Oklahoma Farmer. The bolters,
who coalesced around an organization formed in Oklahoma
and Tulsa counties under the name "Constitutional Demo-
13 "The University of Oklahoma and the Ku Klux Klan," School
and Society, XVI (October 7, 1922), 412-13; Oklahoma City Daily
Oklahoman, August 6, 7, 16, 1922; Atlanta Imperial Nighthawk,
May 9,1923.
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crats," included many Democratic Klansmen, particularly
in the industrial counties in eastern Oklahoma. The state
Klan organization took no part in the general election
campaign, and Wilson endorsed Walton and the Democratic
party, thereby inaugurating a ~hort honeymoon between
Walton and the Klansmen who remained Democrats.14
The general election, on November 7, saw Walton poll
280,206 votes to Fields' 230,469, a surprisingly large total
for a Republican candidate for governor. Fields carried
Tulsa County, strong Klan territory and usually Demo-
cratic; there the rest of the Democratic state candidates
piled up majorities averaging about 3,000 votes over their
Republican opponents. In Tulsa County the Klan could
not lose. In the races for sheriff and county attorney, for
example, the nominees of both parties were Klansmen. In
the former contest a Democrat was elected, but a Republi-
can was elected county attorney.15
On January 10, 1923, Walton began his administration
with the biggest barbecue in Oklahoma history, held at the
state fairgrounds.16 He promised to enact the Shawnee
platform, but he did not talk about the Klan, claiming that
it was a "dead issue." Only a few weeks after his inaugura-
tion, however, he ordered Attorney General Short to help
the county attorney of Harmon County in his investigation
of the whipping of a man near Hollis. The inquiry pro-
duced no results, but the Klan-haters among Walton's
followers gained assurance that "Our Jack" was not in
sympathy with the masked order. Aldrich Blake, a Musko-
gee publicity agent whom Walton had appointed to the
wholly extraconstitutional post of "executive counselor,"
announced, "The governor is determined that these masked
14 Harlow, Oklahoma, 358-59; Bynum, Personal Recollections of
Ex-Governor Walton, 41.
15 Tulsa Tribune, November 8, 1922.
16 Edward E. Dale and Jesse L.Rader, Readings in Oklahoma
History (Evanston, Ill., 1930), 735-39.
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outrages must stop, and he will use every power of the state
government to see that persons participating in such mobs
are punished."17
But Walton was not content to pin his fortunes solely on
the following of farmers, laborers, Socialists, and Catholics
that had elected him. When he came into office, Walton
faced a legislature that, while overwhelmingly Democratic,
contained a majority of conservative Klansmen and sym-
pathizers, hostile to the Farmer-Labor movement and c;c;Our
Jack:" Walton realized that the conservative majority was
unwilling to accept more than a few Reconstruction League
proposals, that there was strong opposition to him within
his own party, and that the biggest single group opposing
him was the Klan. So he hopefully turned toward the many
prominent Klansmen who flocked to his office in the capitol
during the early days of his administration. As Ernest T.
Bynum, Walton's campaign manager, confidant, and state
banking commissioner, described it: ,c;From the very begin-
ning of hisoeofficial term friendly relations with the klan
increased until his most confidential advisers in the House
and Senate appeared to be of that persuasion. Leading
appointments were conferred upon members of the hooded
order, and not infrequently he would hold long conferences
behind locked doors with titans, cyclopses, and kleagles.
. . . He wanted to do all he could for his new friends without
breaking with the 0Id."18
In one of those conferences behind locked doors the
governor became a c;c;Klansman at Large." Before Walton
took office, Dr. W. T. Tilley, a Muskogee Kleagle, contacted
Minor Meriwether of Tulsa, Great Titan of Province No.3,
about the creation of such a designation for the new chief
executive. Meriwether wrote Imperial Wizard Hiram W.
Evans on tht: matter; Evans replied that the title Klansman
at Large could be conferred by the Realm administration
17 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, January 29, 1923.
18 Bynum, Personal Recollections of Ex-Governor Walton, 71-72.
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with the approval of the Wizard on "public officials whose
membership is for the good of the order to remain a secret."
Meriwether then wrote KIeagle Tilley that he could go
ahead with whatever he had in mind for Walton.19 Some-
time in late January, Tilley met in Walton's capitol office
with Walton and Dr. A. E. Davenport, the state health
commissioner and a Klansman. Walton filled out an appli-
cation for membership in the Klan as a Klansman at Large
and gave Tilley twenty dollars as a klectoken for the
special title. Meriwether forwarded the klectoken and the
governor's application to Grand Dragon DeBarr in Okla-
homa City, together with a recommendation that Tilley be
granted life membership in the Klan for ~~one of the best
pieces of work that has been pulled by a Klansman in the
history of the state." But, cautioned the Titan, ~~Governor
Walton does not want anyone ... to know of this. I
believe it wise for you not to approach him in any way for
the present." Brown Harwood, the ex-Dragon from Texas
who had become Imperial Klazik (officer in charge of
Realms), wrote Tilley expressing "deep appreciation" for
the "splendid feat of service" of securing Walton's applica-
tion, and on May 5, 1923, Klan Emperor William J. Simmons
conferred life membership on the Muskogee man.20
While Walton was becoming a Klansman at Large, one
of his most ardent followers in the house of representatives,
Fred Brydia of Pontotoc County, introduced a bill to re-
quire publication of the names of all members of secret
19 Minor Meriwether to Dr. W. T. Tilley, January 11, 1923, photo-
graphic copy in Jack C. Walton Collection, Division of Manuscripts,
University of Oklahoma Library, Norman.
20 Minor Meriwether to Edwin DeBarr, February 14, 1923, Brown
Harwood to W. T. Tilley, undated, William J. Simmons to Tilley,
May 5, 1923, reprinted in Oklahoma City Oklahoma Leader, De-
cember 14, 1923. Copies of correspondence relating to Walton's
becoming a Klansman were printed in other newspapers in Okla-
homa, but the Oklahoma Leader, the Socialist and Reconstruction
League organ edited by Patrick S. Nagle, carried the most complete
collection of letters.
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organizations operating within the state. Several known
Klansmen in the house charged that Brydia was turned
down when he applied for membership in the Klan. Brydia
heatedly denied the charge. The Walton administration
ignored both Brydia and his anti-Klan bill. When the bill
came to a vote, the house rejected it, with only the Farmer-
Labor representatives, about thirty strong, casting their
votes for its passage.21
Despite his dalliance with the Klan, "Our Jack" wanted
to keep his Farmer-Labor support intact, and he worked
earnestly with the Reconstruction League minority in the
legislature to put into law the league's program. Some
ameliorative measures were passed, but the main planks
of the Shawnee platform-a state bank, a state insurance
system, a generous soldiers' bonus-died as the session came
to a close. By the time the 9th Oklahoma Legislature
adjourned, it had listened to a speech by a national lecturer
for the Klan, had tacked an antievolution amendment onto
the free textbook bill passed during the session, and had
blocked most of the efforts of the governor and the Recon-
struction League to enact the league's liberal platform.22
In the meantime Walton instigated a major shakeup in
the administration of the state institutions of higher learn-
ing. He removed five of the regents of the University of
Oklahoma and appointed five of his friends to fill their
places. Under increasing pressure from Walton, the presi-
dent of the University resigned. Walton rernoved the presi-
dent of the Agricultural and Mechanical College and
appointed a Socialist politician to the post, a move that
brought so much vilification from the alumni of the school
and other conservative groups that Walton quickly fired
the Socialist and appointed a man with more orthodox
21 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 1, 2, 1923; 9th
Oklahoma Legislature, House Journal, Regular Session, 255, 291,
406, 409, 422, 441, 442.
22 New York Times, March 17, 1923; Tulsa Tribune, same date.
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economic views. The fumbling governor succeeded in
alienating all groups concerned. To make matters worse,
he accepted a $48,000 home in Oklahoma City as a "gift"
from a well-known oilman, proclaimed that during his
administration the practice of capital punishment would
be abandoned, and instituted a liberal pardon and parole
policy~ sometimes setting free convicted criminals before
they reached the state penitentiary.23
By the spring of 1923 Jack Walton, who had promised
so much and accomplished so little, was on the verge of
political bankruptcy. He had driven away many of his
original followers and virtually destroyed the Farmer-Labor-
Catholic-Socialist coalition that had made him governor.
And he had not built any real basis of support among the
conservative groups, who still distrusted him and wanted
to see him out of the governor's chair. It seemed that the
legislative session had ended just in time for Walton. There
was an increasing amount of talk around Oklahoma City
that Walton's opponents might resort to the already tradi-
tional Oklahoma practice of bringing impeachment charges
against the governor.24 Walton needed some new issue, a
distraction, a device with which to rebuild his collapsing
popularity. Once again he turned to the Klan. This time,
however, he did not propose an alliance with the hooded
order.
During the first few months of 1923 the epidemic of
Klan terrorism which had surged over Oklahoma for two
years slackened appreciably. Evans, as Imperial Wizard,
was working to curb the violent acts of local Klans over
the nation, particularly in the Southwest, while the Okla-
homa Klan itself was turning away from vigilantism and
23 Bliven, "From the Oklahoma Front," 204; Harlow, Oklahoma,
360; Edwin C. McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State
( Norman, 1954), 343-44; Edward E. Dale and Morris L. Wardell,
History of Oklahoma (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1948), 338.
24 See the analysis of the political situation in the state in Tulsa
Tribune, June 13, 1923.
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devoting more and more of its attention to politics. But
there were still some Klansmen who liked to venture into
the night to rectify someone's objectionable conduct or
settle a personal grudge. As the summer approached, a
new outbreak of masked attacks occurred in Oklahoma,
although not on nearly so large a scale as the earlier cam-
paign of terrorism. Walton announced that he was going
to give the local law officers a chance to stop the masked
lawlessness, but that if they failed, he would call out the
national guard and see if the state could not protect its
citizens. "This is serious and I mean business," said the
governor. But he did not specifically attack the Klan.25
Attorney General Short admitted that his office had
received many complaints describing the activities of hooded
bands, but he added that since almost all the communica-
tions were anonymous, it was difficult to conduct an effec-
tive investigation of the allegations.26 Walton waved aside
the advice of Short and others around him. He decided
on a scheme whereby he would substitute general anti-Klan
sentiment for the lost support of the Reconstruction League,
make himself a national figure, and destroy the credibility
of his critics by painting them CCwith the common brush of
Klannishness."27 He would, in short, declare war on the
Klan.
On Tuesday, June 26, acting on a complaint signed by
three Okmulgee County citizens that the sheriff was CCutterly
indifferent" to the presence of mob violence, Walton de-
clared martial law in the county and ordered between 300
and 400 national guardsmen to move into the area and
supersede the civil authority. "I am going to stamp mob
rule and mob violence out of Oklahoma," snapped Walton,
"if I have to put every county under military law. . . . I
have tried and tried to get results through the regular civil
25 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, May 14, 1923.
26 Ibid, May 15, 1923.
27 Bliven, uFrom the Oklahoma Front," 204.
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agencies without success. Local officials are too often allied
with these secret, lawless mobs and I have gotten no results.
I am determined to get results.''28
The state troops set up a military court in Okmulgee and
invited people who had been abused by masked bands to
come forward and testify. Adjutant General Baird H.
Markham said that he could see little need for martial law
in Okmulgee County. A man identified only as "a prominent
citizen of Okmulgee" told a newspaper reporter that the
membership of the Klan in the county had declined from a
peak of about 3,000 to 1,500, with small attendance at the
meetings. An anti-Klan organization called the "True Blues"
had ceased to function, and most Klansmen and ex-
Klansmen had joined a county peace movement to try to
allay strife between the Klan and its enemies.29
Only three days after the declaration of martial law
Walton, on General Markham's recommendation, \vithdrew
all troops from Okmulgee County except for a small district
around the mining town of Henryetta. The military court
had uncovered no evidence of mob rule in the county, and
it appeared unlikely that it would. A company of troops
stayed in Henryetta until July 12, when Walton, after con-
ferring with county officials and reaching what he termed
':':perfect accord in regard to the Okmulgee County situa-
tion," issued an order ending martial law in the Henryetta
district and withdrawing the troops.30 Throughout the
entire Okmulgee ':':war" not one state official had mentioned
the name of the Klan.
The Okmulgee enterprise proved a damaging venture.
While the state health commissioner was reporting that the
governor was on the verge of a nervous breakdown and
would have to go into seclusion, Walton went on a house-
28 Tulsa Tribune, June 27, 1923; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman,
same date.
29 Tulsa Tribune, June 28, 1923.
30 Ibid., June 29-July 1, July 5, 12, 1923.
142
buying tour in Muskogee. Executive Counselor Blake
asserted that as many as 2,500 people had been whipped
in Oklahoma during the past year.3! The newspapers of
the state, led by the Tulsa Tribune, began training their
editorial guns on the governor. "The whole life of the state
suffers from the whims of this pitiful child-man:!" declared
the Tribune after Walton had pardoned two men convicted
of vote fraud in Tulsa earlier in the year. "For his own
good, no less than that of the state, he should go, and as
soon as possible. The mess he has made of the biggest
chance any Oklahoman ever had proves how utterly impos-
sible he is." The Tulsa daily predicted that Walton would
almost certainly be impeached at the next session of the
legislature.32 The harassed ex-railway hand doubtless agreed
with the Tribune's prediction. His military sortie into
Okmulgee County had been a failure, mainly because
people refused to get excited about Klan lawlessness and
because he could obtain no solid evidence against the order.
He needed a concrete example of mob violence, something
to arouse the people and give him a real excuse to send in
the troops.
The excuse for which he had been waiting came the
evening of August 9 in Tulsa. Six unmasked men kid-
naped suspected narcotic peddler and bootlegger Nathan
I-Iantaman, a Jew, outside the Wonderland Theater, put
him in an automobile, took him to a spot on the Sand
Springs road, and lashed him unmercifully with a black-
snake whip. The next day Walton said that he thought the
sheriff and county attorney in Tulsa were investigating the
incident well enough without his intervention. But on the
eleventh he deputized a Tulsa political hack' named Lee
Kunsman to· look into the whipping, and a day. later he
received Kunsman and the battered Hantaman in his
31 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 19, 1923; Tulsa Tribune,
July 20, 1923.
32 Tulsa Tribune, August 1, 1923.
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executive chambers in Oklahoma City. Late Monday after-
noon, August 13, Walton declared the city of Tulsa under
martial law and sent about 150 national guardsmen into
the oil city. Early the next morning Adjutant General
Markham convened a military court of inquiry in a suite
in the Hotel Tulsa, while in the lobby downstairs and in
the streets outside dozens of men carrying special police
commissions from Walton detained passers-by and ques-
tioned them about the Klan's activities in the city. On
August 15 three companies of guardsmen were in Tulsa
as the military authorities took control of the police depart-
ment and the sheriff's office, forbade criticism of state and
military personnel, and prohibited the carrying of firearms
in the city limits. Although the military court could find
no trace of Hantaman's floggers, it did begin interviewing
victims of hooded assaults dating back to 1921. On the
afternoon of the fifteenth, guardsmen arrested two men for
a flogging that had occurred the previous Apri1.33
Press reaction to the imposition of martial law in Tulsa
was immediate and mostly condemnatory. cCThe grounds
are not sufficiently clear to warrant martial law," concluded
the Ponca City News. The Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman
criticized the dispatch of troops to Tulsa and pointed out
Walton's inactivity during the violent packinghouse strike
of 1920 in Oklahoma City. A Pawnee weekly reasoned that
CCby his [Walton's] very acts, his failure to enforce the
simplest laws, his failure to protect life and property, he
gives the Klan an excuse for existing in Oklahoma."34 Only
the Tulsa Daily World, a Republican paper, sympathized
with the governor. CCAs between the invisible empire and
its flagrant disregard of the rights of citizenship," com-
mented the Tulsa journal, C'its treasonable and vicious
33 Tulsa Daily World, August 11, 1923; Tulsa Tribune, AugUst 12,
14, 16, 1923; New York Times, August 14, 1923, p. 5.
34 Oklahoma City Daily Oklah()111,an, August 15, 1923; Ponca City
News and Pawnee Courier-Dispatch, quoted in Tulsa Tribune, Au-
gust 16, 19, 1923.
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defiance of orderly government, as evidenced by the blazing
crosses and mob activities, The World admits its choice is
with Governor Walton."35
The days passed with guardsmen patrolling the streets of
Tulsa, enforcing a curfew, and bringing more prisoners to
the national guard armory for detention. Three admitted
Klansmen confessed to participating in a whipping and
received two-year sentences from the military court. The
night of August 30 Walton heard that another Tulsa
resident, a suspected car thief, had been kidnaped within
a block of Markham's headquarters. Charging tha.t the
civil authorities in Tulsa County were in "secret sympathy
with those responsible for mob floggings,:" he decreed
absolute martial law and the suspension of habeas corpus
for the entire county. Two hundred more guardsmen
entered the city of Tulsa and began strict enforcement of
a sundown curfew. Now the civil officers could operate
only after securing permission from the military. Walton
left Oklahoma City on a speaking tour in the eastern half
of the state, where he told his listeners to shoot on sight
any masked men who tried to assault them. "I don't care
if you burst right into them with a double-barreled shot-
gun," shouted Walton. "I'll promise you a pardon in
advance."36
More than three weeks after the martial law edict for
Tulsa, Walton finally moved toward an open fight with the
Klan. Blake began a series of syndicated newspaper articles
describing the mob outrages in Tulsa County and placing
responsibility for the deeds directly on the Klan. The Klan
leaders in Oklahoma were slow in responding to Walton's
declaration of war on their organization, but finally they
acted. Jewett retorted that the governor's only interest was
persecuting the Klan and that he was trying for the Demo-
35 Tulsa Daily WO1'ld, quoted in "Masked Floggers of Tulsa,"
Literary Digest, LXXVIII (September 22, 1923), 17.
36 Tulsa Daily World, August 24, 1923; Tulsa Tribune, August 31,
September 1, 4, 1923; New York Times, September 1, 1923, p. 2.
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cratic vice-presidential nomination in 1924 (this was the
same charge Louisiana Klansmen had made against Gover-
nor Parker earlier in the year). Jewetl claimed that the
Oklahoma City Klan had refused to accept Walton when
he had applied for membership. While some of the Tulsa
floggers belonged to the Klan, admitted the Grand Dragon,
the organization as a whole was not responsible for any
mob violence. Then Jewett threw his long-expected chal-
lenge at the governor: "Jack Walton and all his cohorts
never will be able to break the power of the Klan in
Oklahoma."37
Now it was Walton's tum. In a speech at the Marshall
County fair in Madill he proclaimed that all Klan parades
were "banned in Oklahoma from now until the termination
of my administration." Walton perhaps hoped that the
Klan would defy him and furnish an excuse for more
extreme measures; instead, Grand Dragon Jewett complied
with the governor's latest edict by issuing an order for-
bidding local Klans from holding any masked assemblies.
From Atlanta, Evans said that the Imperial Klan would not
interfere in the Oklahoma troubles because the order
wanted to avoid giving Walton an excuse for putting the
whole state under martiallaw.38
On the twenty-eighth day of military rule in Tulsa,
September 11, Walton came to the oil city to confer with
a delegation from the local Chamber of Commerce. There
he laid down his terms for the withdrawal of the troops:
the selection of a new jury commission and the resignations
of the sheriff, the police commissioner, and the police chief.
Leaving the businessmen to consider his terms, Walton
retired to the Tulsa Country Club for a round of golf. The
actions of the Chamber of Commerce delegation were
puzzling. On September 12 the group voted to reject
37 Tulsa Tribune, September 7, 1923; New York Times, September
8, 1923, p. 15; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, same date.
38 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 9, 1923; New
York Times, September 11, 1923, p. 19; Tulsa Tribune, same date.
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Walton's terms, but the next day the business leaders
reported officially: "We find that the Ku Klux Klan is
responsible and check it up to them to remove the soldiers
from our city." Walton abandoned the negotiations and
prepared to return to Oklahoma City. Before his departure
he turned angrily on the Tulsa Tribune, which had led the
criticism of his policies, and fastened military censorship
on the paper's editorial page. A day later, under threat of
court action by the owners of the Tribune, Walton removed
the censor.39
Now, with the whole state at his mercy, "Our Jack"
reached out for more power. He sent an emissary to
Muskogee, headquarters of the Eastern Province of the
Klan in Oklahoma, to threaten martial law unless Exalted
Cyclops W. R. Sampson of Muskogee Klan No.3 resigned
within twenty-four hours.4o But before he could act on his
threats in Muskogee, Walton decided to go one step further
in his struggle for political survival. He would declare
the whole state under martial law.
On September 13, 1923, to counter growing opposition
everywhere, but especially in Oklahoma City, where a
special grand jury was about to convene to investigate his
misadministration and illegal use of power, Walton pro-
claimed that military rule was in force in all of the state's
seventy-eight counties. Tenning members of the Klan
cCenemies of the sovereign state of Oklahoma [who] shall be
dealt with by the military forces of this state," he called
up 6,000 additional guardsmen. Walton clamped absolute
martial law on Oklahoma County and Creek County
(Sapulpa), the latter of which had a particularly ob-
streperous anti-Walton county administration.41 The Daily
39 Tulsa Daily World, September 12, 13, 14, 1923; Tulsa Tribune,
September 14, 1923.
40 Tulsa Tribune, September 14, 1923; New York Times,' Sep-
tember 15, 1923, p. 17.
41 Tulsa Tribune, September 16, 1923; Oklahoma City Daily Okla-
homan, same date.
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Oklahoman advised its readers to remain orderly as the
troops moved into Oklahoma City. "This unjustified shame
must be suffered in silence while Governor Walton rides
his anti-klan war-horse to the end of the road," fumed the
most popular daily in the state. "The governor's ambition
is a much desired end, but he has no more right to suspend
the privileges of citizenship ... than masked men have to
inflict penalty with a split strap."42
On Sunday, September 16, as crowds milled aimlessly
in the rain in the streets of the capital, guardsmen set up
machineguns before the police station, the city hall, and
the county courthouse. Ninety-five miles to the east, in
Henryetta, Walton told the delegates to the state labor
convention that he was going forward with the fight against
cCinvisible government" and would not tolerate the cKlan
grand jury" in Oklahoma City.43
With a machinegun trained on the door of the courthouse,
the special grand jury failed to convene in Oklahoma City.
While the Oklahoma Leader, the Socialist and Farmer-
Labor organ, lamented that Walton had acted "in as arbi-
trary and illegal a manner as ever the klan did," a military
court began hearing witnesses brought before it to relate
their experiences at the hands of the secret society.44
Members of the state legislature straggled into the capital
and met secretly in different parts of the city. Jewett now
eloquently described the Klan as "the peg on which a
political bankrupt has hung the tattered habiliments of
grotesque failure while making his last frantic bid for
public favor."45
On September 21 Walton disclosed testimony given
before the military court in Oklahoma City, in which the
42 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 16, 1923.
43 New York Times, September 17, 1923, p. 1; Oklahoma City
Daily Oklahoman, same date.
44 Oklahoma City Oklahoma Leader, quoted in Tulsa Tribune,
September 18, 1923.
45 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 20, 21, 1923.
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county attorney, the sheriff, and a district judge admitted
joining the Klan. The next day, Hogging charges were filed
against Jewett for participating in the beating of Edward
R. Merriman on March 7, 1922. In Shawnee a joint military-
civilian court brought charges of Hogging against three men,
all admitted Klansmen, and the county attorney there said
every city officer in the Pottawatomie County town, from
mayor to patrolman, was a Klansman.46
Legislators continued to gather in Oklahoma City. With
the city humming with rumors that members of the house
of representatives would convoke a special session on their
own to impeace the governor, Walton issued orders to his
private army to "shoot to kill" to prevent the "Klan legisla-
ture" from assembling. The representatives formulated
plans for meeting in the state capitol on Wednesday,
September 26. Thousands of people crowded into Okla-
homa City to see what would happen when the legislators
defied the governor. Among the spectators were a few
leaders of the Farmer-Labor Reconstruction League. Break-
ing completely with the man they had once called "Our
Jack," the Reconstruction Leaguers condemned "the sacri-
fice of constitutional guarantees" by Walton.47 The Farmer-
Labor politicians, along with non-Klan citizens in every part
of the state, sent up the cry "neither Klan nor king."
At 9 A.M. on September 26 a company of riHemen met
sixty members of the house of representatives before the
doors of the house chamber and ordered them to disperse.
Wesley E. Disney of Muskogee asked the commanding
officer if they were being turned away as individuals or as
a legislature. "You are being dispersed as a legislature,"
he answered. The dissident representatives returned to their
headquarters in the Hotel Skirvin to plan their next move.
46 New York Times, September 22, 1923, p. 1; Tulsa Tribune,
September 22, 23, 1923.
47 W. D. McBee, The Oklahoma Revolution (Oklahoma City,
1956), viii, 50; Ameringer, If You Don't Weaken, 386; Oklahoma
City Daily Oklahoman, September 25, 1923.
149
Disney and a few others went to the state supreme court
and filed suit against Walton for illegally dispersing a
legislature.48
Now Walton began a legal contest to prevent the holding,
on October 2, of an election on the proposition of empower-
ing the legislature to convene without being called by the
governor. The election, originally scheduled to cover four
proposed constitutional amendments, was broadened to
include a fifth, the matter of a special legislative session,
as a result of the agitation of thousands of people, Klan
and non-Klan, who signed a petition to get the proposition
on the October 2 ballot. Walton secured an injunction from
a district judge in Oklahoma City to prevent the state
election board from placing the special session question on
the ballot, but the state supreme court quickly overruled it.
The state election board then ordered the election held on
the prescribed date, whereupon the governor reconstituted
the board to give himself a 2-to-l majority. The new board
issued instructions to the county authorities that the election
was not to be held. Theday before the election, however,
district courts in Ardmore and Oklahoma City granted
injunctions against the actions of the new board. Frustrated
in his legal fight, Walton turned to the threat of military
force. On election eve he proclaimed an indefinite post-
ponement of the referendum and warned the people of
Oklahoma, "There may be bloodshed, but there will be no
election." He added that his entire national guard force of
6,000 men plus his corps of special state policemen were
ready to shoot anyone who violated his decree. In county
after county the authorities announced that they intended
to ignore Walton's orders.49
On election day, balloting took place in all counties except
Bryan, Harper, Cimarron, Delaware, and Johnston. As one
48 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 26, 1923; New
York Times, September 27, 1923, p. 1, September 29, p. 9.
49 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 29-0ctober 1, 1923;
New York Times, October 1, 1923, p. 1, October 2, p. 1.
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writer described the drama, the state's "most solid citizens
said their family prayers, then buckled on weapons not
used since Indian days, and went solemnly to the polls,
defying Walton and all his armed men to interfere with
their most fundamental right."50 There was no violence in
any county, but only because Walton's policemen and the
guardsmen did not follow his orders to shoot people who
tried to vote. In Tulsa County the authorities deputized
about two hundred citizens, most of them apparently
Klansmen, to guard the election boxes and preserve order.
The deputies began disarming Walton's special policemen,
scores of whom were in the city. All of the gunmen quietly
gave up their arms and left the courthouse area when
ordered away. In every other part of the state, county and
city law officers swore in citizens, including numerous
Klansmen, to keep the peace and to prevent Walton's men
from interfering with the election. One estimate put the
number of election box deputies operating in the state at
10,000.51
The result of the election was a staggering defeat for
Walton. The constitutional amendment to legalize the
assembly of the legislature without his call carried by a
vote of 209,452 to 70,638. About 200,000 people stayed
home from the polls, most of them not wanting to risk
being shot by one of Walton's gunmen or being hit by a
stray bullet from a gun battle. Newspapers over the state
exulted in the triumph. This, by all odds, meant certain
impeachment for Walton when the legislature convened.
But Walton was not through. "I am still governor," he
assured his remaining supporters. "The fight on the invisible
empire has just started in Oklahoma." He called on all
anti-Klan forces in the state to organize and sign cards
50 Stanley Frost, "The Oklahoma Regicides Act," Outlook, CXXXV
(November 7,1923),396.
51 Tulsa Tribune, October 2, 1923; New York Times, same
date, p. 1.
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pledging their allegiance to him. He claimed that his life
was in danger. cCI am daily in receipt of threats of assassina-
tion," he said, CCbut I had rather die by the hand of an
assassin than die the death of a coward."52
Walton now realized that his only hope of escaping
ouster lay in court action. So in the first days of October,
as he looked for legal weapons to use against the legislature,
he began slowly withdrawing the troops and abandoning
military rule. By October 7 he had disbanded all the
military courts in Oklahoma, Creek, Murray, Pottawatomie,
and Payne counties. The next day, with only a handful of
guardsmen left in Tulsa, Adjutant General Markham re-
ceived final demobilization orders from the governor. In
all, the Tulsa tribunal had heard testimony relating to about
120 floggings in the county. Military authorities had filed
bills of information against thirty Hoggers. Four men had
confessed to participation in whipping parties and received
prison sentences. Eight accused citizens were released at
preliminary hearings, and six were bound over to district
court for trial (the state subsequently dropped its charges).
Seven men were indicted in neighboring Wagoner County
(where the authorities eventually dismissed the indict-
ments).53
On October 3 Walton got a temporary injunction in
district court in Oklahoma City to prevent certification of
the election returns by the state election board. Six days
later his application for a permanent injunction was denied.
In the meantime, however, he stole a march on the legisla-
ture by calling the lawmakers into special session on
October 11 (Cto consider proposed legislation against acts
of lawlessness by masked mobs." He declared that he would
resign if the legislature enacted the kind of anti-Klan law
52 McReynolds, Oklahoma, 347; New York Times, October 3, 1923,
p. 1; Tulsa Tribune, October 2, 3, 1923.
53 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 5, 1923; Tulsa Daily
World, October 8, 1923; Tulsa Tribune, September 21, 1923.
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he wanted, which included a membership registration pro-
vision in addition to an article prohibiting the wearing of
masks in public.54
The 9th Oklahoma Legislature convened in special session
at nine o'clock on the morning of October 11. Before a full
gallery the house of representatives elected W. D. McBee,
who was not a Klansman, speaker of the house. Members
of the state senate then filed into the house chamber to hear
the clerk of the house read Walton's message to the
legislature. When the message ended with a request for a
stiff antimask law, scattered applause came from the gallery,
but on the Hoor the representatives and senators sat silently.
The house then adopted a resolution establishing a com-
mittee to investigate the Walton administration. The com-
mittee included several Klan solons, but its chairman,
Disney, did not belong to the order.55 In such rapid order
the legislature turned away from Walton's appeal for an
antimask law and put into motion the machinery for getting
rid of the beleaguered governor.
The house investigating committee called Blake and
other state officials to appear before it, whereupon Walton
fired them all. In a temperate statement Blake called
Walton "a man of limitations" who had acted against his
advice in putting the state under martial law. Blake said
he was finished with Walton but that he intended to con-
tinue fighting the Klan. On October 13 Blake testified
before the committee, while in the house itself a shouting
majority of representatives by voice vote tabled a proposed
resolution asking for an investigation of the Klan's strength
in the house.56
The house committee drew up twenty-two charges against
54 New York Times, October 4, 1923, p. 1, October 7, p. 1, Oc-
tober 10, p. 3; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, October 7, 1923.
55 New York Times, October 12, 1923, p. 1; Oklahoma City Daily
Oklahoman, same date.
56 Tulsa Tribune, October l3, 17, 1923; New York Times, Oc-
tober 13, 1923, p. 1, October 14, p. 4, October 16, p. 23.
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Walton and presented them to the full membership of the
house. Of the charges the first sixteen concerned the corrupt
nature of the Walton administration, the governor's personal
irregularities, and his general incompetence; and the last
six pertained to Walton's declaration of martial law. While
the charges were under consideration in the house, there
were numerous rumors that Walton was planning this or
that drastic action. One of the most widely believed pieces
of gossip was that he was about to pardon the entire popu-
lation of the state penitentiary at McAlester. To counteract
whatever measures Walton may have had in mind, the
house quickly voted his impeachment on two charges and
sent them to the senate, which voted 36-to-l to suspend
Walton pending the outcome of his formal trial. Lieutenant
Governor Martin E. Trapp, who once had faced impeach-
ment himself during the Robertson administration, became
acting governor.57
The house eventually sent the remaining twenty charges
to the senate, which accepted them and convened as a court
of impeachment on November 1. That same day a special
train, carrying hundreds of Oklahoma Klansmen to Dallas
for "Ku Klux Klan Day" at the Texas State Fair, pulled
into the railroad station at the Texas city bearing a banner
that read: "Did we impeach Walton? Hell yesI" As the
senate began its trial of Walton, the governor's lawyers
asked to challenge the qualifications of each senator by
inquiring about his Klan membership. The senate refused
the request with a thundering voice vote, and the long trial
got underway.58
On the eighteenth day of the impeachment proceedings
Walton suddenly rose from his chair and told the senators:
57 New York Times, October 24, 1923, p. 1; McReynolds, Oklahoma,
348; Frost, "Oklahoma Regicides Act," 396; Dale and Wardell, His-
tory of Oklahoma, 342-43.
58 McReynolds, Oklahoma, 348; Tulsa Tribune, November 1, 1923;
New York Times, November 2, 1923, p. 1, November 3, p. 6, No-
vember 7, p. 15, November 8, p. 3.
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"I do not care to stand this humiliation any longer for
myself, my family or my honorable attorneys. You may
proceed as you see best." Then, followed by his wife and
lawyers, he walked out of the senate chamber. Two days
later the senate sustained eleven of the twenty-two articles
of impeachment, acquitted Walton on five counts, and
dismissed the remaining six articles, which related to the
imposition of martial law. Ten months and ten days after
he took office "Jack the Klan Fighter," as one of the eastern
periodicals called him, found himself officially removed
from the governorship. He had expected the senate to
convict him. It would have been something of a miracle
if the upper house had not sustained at least one of the
articles, and one was all that was needed to remove him.
But he was sorely disappointed when the senate dismissed
the charges having to do with his martial law decrees. He
and his lawyers had planned a spectacular revelation of
Klan activities in Oklahoma, including a description of the
alignment of county officials with the order. The senate
convicted Walton on charges of collecting campaign funds
illegally, padding state payrolls, using the national guard
to prevent a lawful grand jury from convening, paying his
private chauffeur with state funds, issuing deficiency
certificates to place unauthorized employees on the state
payrolls, suspending the writ of habeas corpus in violation
of the state constitution, making excessive use of the
pardoning power, and being generally incompetent.59
With Walton safely relieved of the governorship and
Trapp firmly implanted in the executive office, the legisla-
ture took up the matter for which it had been called in the
first place-the passage of anti-Klan legislation. Just as
Fundamentalism, racism, nativism, and rigid moralism were
much broader than the Klan in Oklahoma, so the movement
59 New York Times, November 18, 1923, p. 2, November 20, p. 1;
9th Oklahoma Legislature, Extraordinary Session, Transcript at Pro-
ceedings of the Senate, State of Oklahoma, Sitting as a Court of
Impeachment to Try John C. Walton, Governor, 1812-930, 1935.
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to impeach Walton went far beyond his declared enemy,
the Klan. By the time the legislature finally convened, only
a relatively small number of diehard farmers and laborers
still supported Walton; otherwise, public sentiment was
united in the feeling that the power-hungry governor must
go. But with Walton out of the way, opinion in Oklahoma
began once more to divide on the Klan issue-on the specific
issue of what, if anything, the legislature should do about
regulating the hooded organization. There was even a
division of opinion within the Klan. Early in the special
session Grand Dragon Jewett announced the official Klan
attitude toward an antimask law: The Klan opposed legisla-
tion banning the mask entirely, but did not "object to
legislation that would penalize the illegal use of the mask."60
Some rightwing Klansmen in the legislature were in favor
of adjourning without doing anything that would affect
the order. Other Klan solons, following Jewett's lead,
wanted a mild antimask law. One admitted Klansman,
Senator Clark Nichols of Eufaula, favored not only an
antimask law, but a law requiring the registration of secret
organization membership lists.61
Although he was a Klansman, Nichols represented the
viewpoint of the new governor, a conservative, quiet man
who had never berated the Klan but who nevertheless had
strong objections to the white-robed order. The day after
Walton's conviction, Senator Tom Anglin of Holdenville
introduced the Trapp administration's version of anti-Klan
legislation-a law to require that a list of the membership
of all secret organizations be filed with state and county
officials, and to prohibit the wearing of masks in public
places.62 Such a measure, which would have gone a long
~o N. c. Jewett, Grand Dragon, Realm of Oklahoma, to All Hydras,
Great Titans and Furies, Giants, Exalted Cyclops and Terrors, and
All Klansmen, Realm of Oklahoma, October 10, 1923, reprinted
ibid., 88-89.
61 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 28, 1923.
62 Ibid., November 20, 1923.
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way toward stripping the Klan of its secrecy, had little
chance of passing both houses, and this fact pointed up the
strength of the Klan in the legislature. The debate over the
anti-Klan bill split the parties in the senate. Five Republi-
can senators supported the administration's position, while
the remaining six Republicans lined up with Wash E.
Hudson of Tulsa, one of the most extreme Klansmen, and
the other Klan Democrats. Hudson and his group suc-
ceeded in emasculating Anglin's bill and several other
strong bills proposed in the senate. At one point in the
debate Hudson, who opposed any anti-Klan legislation,
delivered a long eulogy of the order. "The Ku Klux Klan
cleaned up those leeches on society, those peddlers of dope,
sellers of whiskey and traffickers in women [in Tulsa
County]," declared the Tulsa Klansman. "I know of only
one man who was Hogged [who] did not get what he
deserved."63
The senate finally passed a bill which outlawed public
mask-wearing and provided minor penalties for offenses
committed while disguised and for sending anonymous
threats. The vote on the measure was 27 to 11. The anti-
Klan forces, disappointed because the bill did not contain
a membership publication clause, denounced the measure
as a Klan bill. As the legislature adjourned for the Thanks-
givin.g holidays, Representatives John Miller of Tulsa, Jess
Pullen of Sulphur, and Allen Street and R. A. Singletary
of Oklahoma City made plans for fighting any legislation
regulating the Klan. Speaker McBee, Klan-hater J. P.
Callahan of Latimer County) and Disney called on the
house members to pass a strong bill.64
The Klansmen in the house had a sudden change of heart
when the senate bill came before the house and Richard
63 Tulsa Tribune, November 23, 25, 1923; New York Times, No-
vember 24, 1923, p. 3, November 27, p. 21; Oklahoma City Daily
Oklahoman, November 28, 1923.
64 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 29, 1923; New
York Times, November 29, 1923, p. 23; Tulsa Tribune, November
28, 1923.
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Elam of Osage County offered an amendment to require
the registration of the officers of secret societies. Im-
mediately after Elam finished speaking, the rightwing
Klansmen proclaimed their support of the simple unmasking
bill passed by the senate. Disney pleaded with the repre-
sentatives C;C;to pass a Klan bill with teeth." c;c;Jack Walton
wants this milk and water bill passed by the Senate adopted
here," said Disney. He predicted accurately that if a strong
bill were not passed, Walton would claim that the Klan
dominated the legislature and would run for the United
States Senate in 1924. Despite the entreaties of Disney,
Speaker McBee, and others, the house passed the senate
bill without amendment, 71 to 15.65
By the time the bill came to him, Trapp had given up
hope of seeing an effective piece of anti-Klan legislation
enacted. He finally signed the c;c;milk and water bilr' into
law on January 15, 1924, with the comment: c;c;The bill is as
good an anti-masking measure as I have read." The law, the
first statute regulating Klan mask-wearing to be passed in
any state, was to go into force ninety days from the date
of Trapp's signature.66 Less than a month after the enact-
ment of the law, however, Trapp brought pressure on the
Oklahoma Klan hierarchy to refrain from staging a masked
parade at the annual Klorero (state convention) in Okla-
homa City. Jewett at first refused Trapp's requests, asserting
that the Klansmen would parade in c;c;full regalia," including
hood visors worn down. But on the night of February 22,
1924, in a drizzling rain, Jewett rode horseback at the head
of a procession of about 4,500 robed, hooded, but unmasked
Klansmen and Klanswomen from Oklahoma, Texas, Arkan-
sas, Kansas, and Missouri.67 In all future demonstrations in
65 Tulsa Tribune, December 5, 1923; New York Times, December
6, 1923, p. 3, December 8, p. 15; 9th Oklahoma Legislature, Ex-
traordinary Session, House Journal, 379, 397, 399, 538, 549, 583.
66 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, January 16, 1924; Session
Laws of the State of Oklahoma (Oklahoma City, 1924), ch. II, pp. 2-3.
67 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, February 18, 20, 22, 23, 1924.
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Oklahoma, members of the Klan appeared with the visors
of their hoods pinned back.
Jack Walton's fight with the Klan focused the attention
of the whole country on Oklahoma. For months the nation
read of martial law, troop movements, floggings, legal
maneuverings, the expulsion of legislators from the state
capitol, the impeachment of a governor, and the power of
the Klan in the Sooner State. Some writers outside Okla-
homa saw Walton as "Jack the Klan Fighter" or "Oklahoma's
Klan-fighting governor."68 Most Oklahomans, however, both
Klan and non-Klan, came to view their governor as a petty
tyrant and a blustering incompetent.
This writer finds it impossible to believe that Walton
sincerely considered the Klan a menace when he declared
war on the secret order. Walton had ignored the anti-Klan
bill introduced in the house of representatives during the
regular legislative session in 1923. Early in the session he
had joined the Klan as a "Klansman at Large" in an attempt
to win the favor of the organization. When the rank-and-
file Klansmen refused to embrace him and when his Farmer-
Labor following began to fall apart, Walton picked up the
Klan as the issue with which to recoup his crumbling
fortunes. His irresponsible actions brought the state close
to civil war. Perhaps Walton's greatest sin was that he
forced people who did not like the Klan to choose between
the hooded order and a despotic governor. To rid the state
of Walton, the non-Klan segment of the electorate joined
forces with the Klan. As a result the Klan received the
boost it needed for the Oklahoma political wars of 1924, a
presidential election year.
68 For national periodical coverage of the martial law period in
Oklahoma, see, for example, "Masked Floggers of Tulsa"; H. J.
Haskell, "Martial Law in Oklahoma," Outlook, CXXXV (September
26, 1923), 133; "Oklahoma's Uncivil Civil War," Literary Digest,
LXXVIII (Septelnber 29, 1923), 10-11; "Jack, the Klan Fighter in
Oklahoma," ibid., LXXIX (October 20, 1923), 38-44; Aldrich Blake,





By 1924 THE KLAN was, more than anything else, a
political organization. However much its leaders, including
Hiram W. Evans, might protest that the Klan was not "in
politics," the fact remained that in state after state the order
was the most powerful single element at work. Evans, as
Imperial Wizard, was the unchallenged ruler over three to
five million Klansmen, citizens of an Invisible Empire that,
while no longer invisible, was certainly imperial.1 During
1922 and 1923 the Klan helped to elect governors in Oregon
and Georgia, a United States Senator in Texas, Representa-
tives in several states, and local officials-sheriffs, attorneys,
judges, mayors, police commissioners-in every part of the
nation. In 1924 the order enjoyed even greater success,
electing governors in Colorado and Maine, winning almost
complete control of the state of Indiana, and joiniNg with
its sympathizers to elect governors in Ohio and Louisiana
and a United States Senator in Oklahoma. Equally im-
portant, the Klan for the first time threw its weight into
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national politics. There its main accomplishment was to
influence the process by which the Democratic party
adopted a platform and nominated a presidential candidate.
At the beginning of 1924 the Klan was strongest politically
in those states where the Democratic party was in the
majority. That year the organization scored its principal
victories by working within the Republican party, while in
Texas and Arkansas, predominantly Democratic states, the
order was beaten. Considering the whole political history
of the Klan in the 1920s, however, the secret society wielded
its greatest power in the Democratic party. This was
especially true at the national level when the parties chose
presidential candidates and tried to elect them.
In 1924, for example, Imperial Wizard Evans and his
~'board of strategy" were on hand at the Republican national
convention in Cleveland, but the Klan played a minor role
throughout the boringly harmonious gathering. Even in
delegations from strong Klan states like Indiana and Okla-
homa there was little evidence of Klan influence. In the
sessions of the platform committee, Rene B. Creager, the
Republican leader in Texas, and a few other Klan-haters
argued for a statement denouncing the Klan by name. But
the committee, and the delegates to the convention as a
whole, wanted above all else to avoid or soften potentially
dangerous issues. Consequently the platform submitted to
the delegates and adopted without opposition contained
an innocuous plank in which the party pledged "its unyield-
ing devotion to the Constitution and to the guarantees of
civil, political, and religious liberty therein contained."2
The placid state of affairs at the Republican convention
was nowhere to be found at the Democratic national con-
1 The estimate of three to five million Klansmen in 1924 seems to
represent a consensus of membership estimates given by observers
during the 1920s.
2 Arnold S. Rice, The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics (Wash-
ington, 1962), 74-75.
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vention in New York. There the presence of the Klan issue
brought about the longest deadlock in the history of Ameri-
can political parties and almost tore the Democratic party
in two.
The Klan:Js national objectives in 1924 were threefold: to
block either major political party from condemning the
Klan by name in its party platform; to help win the Demo-
cratic presidential nomination for William Gibbs McAdoo
of California; failing to nominate McAdoo, to prevent the
nomination of Alfred E. Smith, the Catholic, antiprohibi-
tionist governor of New York, or Oscar W. Underwood, the
anti-Klan United States Senator from Alabama. The achieve-
ment of half of the first objective turned out to be easy for
the Klan when the Republican convention refused to go on
record against the organization. Attainment of the rest of
the Klan's goals, however, was much harder. One of them,
the -nomination of McAdoo by the Democratic party, proved
impossible.
The reasons for the Klan:Js attachment to McAdoo are
not wholly clear. The Californian was a native of the
South, born in either Georgia or Tennessee (both states
claimed him). He had been one of the outstanding figures
in the administration of Woodrow Wilson, serving both as
Secretary of the Treasury and director general of the rail-
roads during World War I. He was an unequivocal advo-
cate of prohibition, and his economic views had apparently
grown increasingly conservative in the postwar years. Dur-
ing the early months of 1924 the disclosure of his associa-
tion with oilman Edward L. Doheny, implicating him in
the celebrated Teapot Dome scandal, cut into his popu-
larity with many Democratic progressives.3 But McAdoo
remained attractive to the Klan because he was a Protestant,
3 See David H. Stratton, "Splattered with Oil: William G. McAdoo
and the 1924 Presidential Nomination," Southwestern Social Science
Quarterly, XLIV (June 1963), 62-73.
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a dry, and noncommittal on the Klan issue.
Of McAdoo's two principal opponents for the Democratic
nomination, Smith was a Catholic, a wet, a friend of the
hated Tammany political machine in New York City, and
a foe of immigration restriction. Underwood was a dry,
southern Protestant conservative, but also a determined
enemy of the Klan. The secret order probably centered
its attention on McAdoo because, quite obviously, he was
the least objectionable serious candidate for the Democratic
nomination. Some of McAdoo's stanchest supporters, like
Democratic national committeeman Thomas B. Love of
Dallas, pointed to "the parochialness and bigotry of that
organization [the Klan]" and urged him to "disassociate
your name from alleged adhesion to the K. K. K."4 But
McAdoo acquiesced in the Klan's adoption of him, silently
accepted its help, and never publicly took a stand against
the order. Thus historians are justified in concluding: "It
could not be doubted that at least in some sense that
McAdoo was the Klan candidate."5
Smith's strength was concentrated in the populous eastern
states, which sent large delegations to the Democratic
convention. In the South and Southwest, Smith was anath-
ema, not only to Klansmen, but to most other people in
those areas, who held basically the same attitudes as the
Klan on the questions of religion, city machine politics,
foreign immigration, and prohibition. By contrast, Under-
wood had a rather strong following in the southern and
southwestern states. In the contest for convention delega-
tions carried on in the states of the South and Southwest,
it was Undern'ood who presented the stiffest opposition to
4 Thomas B. Love to William Gibbs McAdoo, October 23, 1923,
Thomas B. Love Papers, Archives of the Dallas Historical Society,
Dallas. On the McAdoo movement nationally, see Lee N. Allen,
HThe McAdoo Campaign for the Presidential Nomination in 1924,"
Journal of Southern History, XXX (May 1963), 211-28.
5 David B. Burner, HThe Democratic Party in the Election of 1924,"
Mid-America, XLVI (April 1964), 100.
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McAdoo's, and the Klan's, plans for capturing the state
delegations.
Arkansas was the first of the southwestern states to
choose a delegation to the national convention. The Klan
hierarchy in Arkansas was not particularly enthusiastic over
McAdoo or any other Democrat, a condition that perhaps
resulted from the apparent apathy of Grand Dragon James
A. Comer, a nominal Republican, toward national affairs in
the Democratic party. Comer was very much interested in
Democratic politics inside Arkansas, and in 1924, under his
leadership, the Klan would have a candidate for governor
of the state. Since there was not a strong McAdoo move-
ment in Arkansas, it seems that most Arkansas Klansmen
inclined toward the favorite-son candidacy of United States
Senator Joseph T. Robinson as a means of blocking the
Underwood backers in the Democratic State Central Com-
mittee. One of the leading Robinson supporters was Klans-
man Virgil C. Pettie, secretary of the state committee and a
highly respected Democrat.6
In Arkansas the meeting of the state central committee at
Little Rock in April served as the state convention. Before
the meeting there was some speculation about an open fight
between Underwood and Robinson committee members,
but all was tranquil when the state committee chose
delegates to cast the state's eighteen votes at the Democratic
national convention. Although the delegation was officially
uninstructed, the committee adopted a resolution ~~request­
ing" the delegates to vote for Robinson. Pettie was one of
the delegates-at-Iarge from Arkansas.7
Contrasted with the absence of an effective McAdoo
organization in Arkansas and the peaceful nature of the
state convention was the contest for the twenty national
convention votes of Oklahoma. In the Sooner State there
G On the Klan membership of Virgil C. Pettie, see the New York
Times, June 22, 1924, p. 3.
7 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 23, 24, 1924.
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was never any solid sentiment in favor of an Underwood
delegation, but at the county convention a fight shaped up
between the non-Klan and anti-Klan supporters of the
Trapp administration, working for an uninstructed delega-
tion, and McAdoo's following, which included most Klans-
men. In some respects the fight was a ramification of the
split developing in late 1923 between Governor Martin E.
Trapp and the Klansmen in the state legislature over the
passage of a bill to regulate the Klan.s
Klan-haters and "moderates" controlled most of the
county conventions in Oklahoma. Of 1,082 delegates at
the state Democratic convention in Oklahoma City, only
about one-third favored an instructed McAdoo delegation.
In Stephens County (Duncan), home of the embattled
Speaker W. D. McBee, a thoroughgoing anti-Klan group
won control of the convention, whereupon a number of
Klansmen walked out. Compromise was the keynote at the
state convention, held in early May. Henry S. Johnston of
Perry, a Klansman and Grand Master of the Oklahoma
Masonic Lodge, was elected convention chairman, but most
of the important committee posts went to non-Klan men
and women. The convention, with the Klan in the minority,
voted to send an uninstructed delegation to New York. To
keep the Klansmen and Klanswomen happy, however, the
delegates adopted a resolution endorsing McAdoo for the
presidential nomination. Most of the votes against the
resolution came from anti-Klan delegations from eighteen
small counties.9 Grand Dragon N. Clay Jewett, not satisfied
with the compromising spirit of the convention, which made
it possible for the Klan to exercise some influence without
being vilified, attempted to block the reelection of Scott
Ferris of Lawton as national committeeman and secure the
post for his friend Edward M. Seamans, outgoing state
8 See pp. 155-57.
9 Tulsa Tribune, January 21, 1924; Oklahoma City Daily Oklaho-
man, April 30, May 7, 1924.
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Democratic chairman. But Ferris was elected by a large
majority.10
Across the Red River in Texas, a straightforward McAdoo
versus Underwood, Klan versus anti-Klan struggle occurred.
The Texas Mc.t\.doo movement, fostered mainly by the Klan,
was extremely well organized; the Klan probably reached
the zenith of its political power in the state during the
contest for the forty votes at the national convention. The
Klan and its allies easily controlled an overwhelming
number of the poorly attended precinct conventions in
Texas, and thus the conventions in most of the state's 254
counties. After the precinct battles, Underwood's sup-
porters realized that they had lost the Texas delegation
to the national convention. W. E. Lea of Orange, campaign
manager for Underwood in Texas, charged that the Klan
was responsible for McAdoo's victory in the precincts,
and that the order went so far as to distribute handbills
in the local gatherings instructing those who attended to
vote for a McAdoo delegation to the county conventions.11
The Klan was the dominant element at the state Demo-
cratic convention, held in Waco late in May. Perhaps two-
thirds of the delegates at the state meeting were Klansmen,
Klanswomen, and Klan sympathizers. Prior to the con-
vention the Democratic State Executive Committee first
endorsed Governor Pat M. Neff for the presidential nomina-
tion, but then reversed itself and voted its endorsement of
McAdoo. At the state convention a large majority voted for
an instructed McAdoo delegation.12 The delegation included
10 Klansman [Carlton Weaver] to N. C. Jewett, Grand Dragon of
the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Oklahoma, November 1924, Carlton
Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma
Library, Norman. See also Tulsa Tribune, July 30, 1924.
11 Dallas Morning News, May 4, 6, 1924.
12 Lee N. Allen, "The Democratic Presidential Primary Election of
1924 in Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, LXI (April 1958),
474-93. There is a copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Demo-
cratic State Executive Committee, including the initial endorsement
of Neff, in the Thomas B. Love Papers.
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such prominent Texas Klansmen as Earle B. Mayfield, a
delegate-at-Iarge; Mike T. Lively of Dallas; and Marvin A.
Childers of San Antonio.13
In Louisiana the Klan had only a small part at the state
Democratic convention in Baton Rouge, which voted to
send an uninstructed delegation to the national party con-
clave. Before the convention Swords R. Lee of Alexandria,
the outstanding Klansman in central Louisiana, stated flatly
that "there will not be any attempt on the part of the klan
to control or in any way interfere with the state Democratic
convention." The Klan was evidently as good as Lee's word.
The state convention went along with the current vogue
for "harmony and peace" in Louisiana politics. The few
Klan delegates at the convention acquiesced in the domina-
tion of the convention by an alliance of upstate politicians
and industrialists, led by a former governor, Jared Y.
Sanders, and the New Orleans machine under the leadership
of Martin H. Behrman. In the sessions of the platform
committee a small group of anti-Klanners tried to incorpo-
rate a denunciation of the Klan in the platform, but the
committee voted down the proposed plank, 13 to 4. The
anti-Klanners carried their fight to the floor of the con-
vention, where a motion to table their substitute resolution
carried with a roar of "yeas." The Louisiana delegation,
with twenty votes, was led by Sanders, Behrman, Governor
Henry L. Fuqua, and former Governor Ruffin G. Pleasant of
Shreveport. Only two known Klansmen, Lee and Jelf B.
Snyder of Tallulah, went to New York as members of the
delegation.14
The Democratic national convention met on June 24 in
the sweltering confines of New York's Madison Square
Garden. The first candidate for the presidential nomination
to have his name placed before the convention was Under-
wood. When Forney Johnston of Alabama, making the
13 Dallas Morning News, May 27, 1924.
14 New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 28, June 6, 1924.
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nominating speech for Underwood, referred to the Klan by
name and condemned its "un-American and un-Democratic
political action," the Underwood and Smith delegates staged
a wild demonstration.15 Some Louisiana delegates joined
in the parading and shouting, but the delegations from
Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma sat silently along with
groups from Georgia, Indiana, California, Missouri, and
other states. The Arkansas delegation paraded after favorite
son Robinson's name was placed in nomination. When
James D. Phelan of California presented McAdoo's name
to the convention, nearly all the Oklahoma delegates joined
the line of march, together with all but three or four of the
Texas delegates and alternates.16
After the nominating and seconding speeches for McAdoo,
Smith, Underwood, and a nUInber of minor candidates,
the convention delegates steadied themselves for the strug-
gle over the adoption of the party platform. Here the Klan
issue emerged with a vengeance. Evans and his Klan
"board of strategy" had come to New York from Cleveland
and had set up headquarters on the fifteenth Hoor of the
Hotel McAlpin. The board included Grand Dragons Nathan
Bedford Forrest of Georgia, Walter F. Bossert of Indiana,
James Esdale of Alabama, Comer of Arkansas, Fred L.
Gifford of Oregon, Jewett of Oklahoma, and Z. E. Marvin
of Texas, as well as publicity man Milton Elrod of Indiana,
United States Senator-elect Mayfield of Texas, and Pettie of
Arkansas, the last two being delegates-at-Iarge.17
Evans and his minions began organizing their forces and
lining up the Klan delegates for the expected fight against
15 Democratic National Committee, Official Report of the Proceed-
ings of the Democratic National Convention Held in Madison Square
Garden, New York City, June 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, July 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 7, 8, and 9, 1924 (Indianapolis, 1924), 102.
16 Dallas Motning News, June 26, 1924; Oklahoma City Daily
Oklahoman, June 25, 26, 1924.
17 New York Times, June 22, 1924, p. 3; Rice, Klan in American
Politics, 80.
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naming the Klan in the Democratic platform. The New
York World estimated the number of Klansmen in the state
delegations at 300. In the southwestern delegations perhaps
80 percent of the delegates from Texas and Arkansas were
Klan-oriented, while the non-Klan forces had a slight
majority in the Oklahoma group and were clearly in control
of the representation from Louisiana.1s
The majority report of the Democratic platform com-
mittee, one of whose members was Klansman Alva Bryan
of Waco, Texas, did not mention the Klan by name, con-
taining only an ambiguous condemnation of mob violence
and religious and racial strife. The minority report, pre-
sented by William R. Pattangall of Maine, an Underwood
man, pledged the party "to oppose any effort on the part
of the Ku Klux Klan . . . to interfere with the religious
liberty or political freedom of any citizen, or to limit the
civic rights of any citizen ... because of religion, birthplace,
or racial origin." A rancorous debate followed over the
minority plank. At one point during the speechmaking,
rowdy Smith and Underwood supporters on the Hoor and
in the balcony shouted down the patriarch of the party,
William Jennings Bryan, as he spoke in rambling fashion
against naming the Klan in the party platform.19
In the early morning hours, amid shouts, handclapping,
laughter, and boos, Permanent Chairman Thomas J. Walsh
called for a vote on the minority report. There were re-
peated polls of delegations and frequent vote changes. The
delegations from Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma
all voted under the unit rule at the convention. All four
delegations cast their votes against the minority report and
the naming of the Klan. A Louisiana man demanded a poll
of his state's delegation; the poll showed that the Louisiana
18 Rice, Klan in American Politws, 81; New York Times, June 22,
1924, p. 3.
19 Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 279-309;
New York Times, June 29, 1924, pp. 1-8.
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delegates stood 18 to 2 against the minority report. The
final vote on the platform issue almost rent the Democratic
party. A preliminary count gave the opponents of the Klan,
the advocates of the minority report, a one-vote majority
over the pro-Klan element and the proponents of harmony.
But during a recount a Georgia woman changed her mind
and voted against the minority plank, thus giving Klansmen
and those who wanted to compromise the Klan issue the
victory, 543 3/20 votes to 542 7/20. By a margin of less than
one vote the Democrats rejected an unequivocal anti-Klan
plank, made possible the adoption of a harmless affirmation
of personal liberties, and averted an almost certain split of
the party.20
With one crisis past, the convention delegates began the
onerous work of choosing a presidential nominee, a task
that set an alltime endurance record for national party
conclaves. The two strongest aspirants before the conven-
tion were McAdoo and Smith, and pro- and anti-Klan forces
coalesced as they had in the platform battle. For nine hot
days the delegates deadlocked between Smith and McAdoo.
The Californian led in the balloting, but his total was always
short of the two-thirds majority needed to secure the
nomination. Again and again, for 100 ballots, McAdoo
failed to obtain the necessary majority, and his fight with
Smith became increasingly hopeless. Oklahoma's twenty
votes went to McAdoo until the 43d ballot, when the
delegates switched to Robinson of Arkansas. On the 62d
ballot the Oklahoma votes went to the state's Democratic
United States Senator, Robert L. Owen, but a few ballots
later, Oklahoma was back with McAdoo. On the 96th
ballot the Oklahoma delegation swung to John W. Davis, a
Ne\v York corporation lawyer and a native of West Virginia.
Although technically uninstructed, the Arkansas delegation
20 Proceedings of the .De1nocratic National Convention, 279-334;
Tulsa Tribune, June 29, 1924; Dallas Morning News, June 30, 1924;
Burner, "Democratic Party in the Election of 1924," 99-100.
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cast every ballot for Robinson, its favorite son. On the first
ballot Louisiana gave its twenty votes to Senator Pat Har-
rison of Mississippi; the Pelican State delegation, voting
under the unit rule, then threw its votes to first one minor
candidate and then another before swinging to Davis on
the 67th ballot. Texas' forty votes, bound by the unit rule
and pledged to McAdoo, remained with the Californian
until he released his delegates after the lOath ballot. The
Texas vote then went to Davis.21
After McAdoo and Smith withdrew by mutual agreement
at the end of 100 fruitless ballots and released the delega-
tions pledged to them, the convention took only three more
ballots to choose a candidate for president. On the 103d
ballot the delegates gave the necessary two-thirds majority
to the respected but colorless Davis, whose views on the
Klan were not known.22 After sixteen strife-ridden days
the exhausted Democrats packed their bags and returned
to their homes. Their party was still intact, but the facade
of unity erected after weeks of battling over the Klan, and
to a lesser extent over prohibition and the League of
Nations, was indeed precarious.
With the two major party conventions, one boisterous,
the other placid, now part of Democratic and Republican
history, the parties turned to the business of getting their
candidates elected. Neither the states of the Southwest nor
the Klan was especially significant in the story of the 1924
presidential campaign. At the election in November the
southwestern states went Democratic, as they usually did,
while the strong Klan states of the Midwest went Republi-
can, as they usually did. The Klan issue never figured
prominently in the campaign, nor, for that matter, did any
other issue of much importance. Both Davis, the Democrat,
and Vice President Calvin Coolidge, the Republican nomi-
21 For the balloting on the presidential nomination, see Proceedings
of the Democratic National Convention, 338-979.
22 Ibid., 963-75; Burner, HDemocratic Party in the Election of
1924,u 100-105.
171
nee, largely ignored each other, spending most of their
darts on Robert M. LaFollette, the candidate of the ill..
fated farmer-labor protest movement organized as the
Progressive party. The Klan also concentrated its fire on
LaFollette. Evans called him a cCradical'l' and cCthe arch
enemy of the nation/l' referring to his advocacy of liberal
economic reforms and his opposition to American participa-
tion in the war. Evans termed Coolidge and Davis "na-
tionals and Americans, aides of the Klan in the attempt to
'Americanize America/ and for this reason the Klan will
take no part in the political struggle as far as they are
concerned.l"23
Evansl' remarks about Davis came before the Democratic
candidate made his famous attack on the Klan in a speech
at Sea Girt, New Jersey, on August 22. In that address
Davis implied that the Klan "raises the standard of racial
and religious prejudice" and therefore "does violence to the
spirit of American institutions and must be condemned."
Davis invited Coolidge to declare himself on the Klan issue,
but the dour man from Massachusetts treated the Klan as
he did most controversial matters-he simply gave no sign
that he knew it existed. But his runningmate, Chicago
banker Charles G. Dawes, mildly attacked the Klan's bigotry
and its extralegal attempts at law enforcement.24
In the Southwest the fact that Davis denounced the
Klan, and thus alienated the order's national leadership,
had little effect on the actions of Klansmen. In Oklahoma
the publicity director for the Democratic State Committee
charged that Grand Dragon Jewett, a Republican, was
traveling around over the state trying to line up local and
district Klan leaders for Coolidge and that he would hold
a conference of Klan bosses in Oklahoma City the night
23 New York Times, August 23, 1924, p. 3. On the Progressive
party of 1924, see Kenneth MacKay, The Progressive Movement of
1924 (New York, 1947).
24 New York Times, August 23, 1924, p. 1; Burner, "Democratic
Party in the Election of 1924,"" 105-13.
172
before the election. State Democratic chairman R. L.
Davidson joined in, predicting that each of the 216 local
Klans in Oklahoma would receive instructions that Klans-
men should, for the good of the order, vote for Coolidge.
Jewett denied that any meeting of Klan leaders would be
held before the election or that the local Klans would hold
special political Konklaves before November 3.25
The Grand Dragon of Oklahoma did not openly work
against Davis, to be sure. But after the election, in which
the Democratic candidate carried Oklahoma and the ';;Solid
South" but lost everywhere else, the Fiery Cross, the official
weekly newspaper of Realm headquarters published in Okla-
homa City, ran a long editorial denouncing Davis for his
stand against the Klan and placing responsibility for the
Democratic failure on the fact that Davis had attacked
the hooded order. In response to the editorial an unhappy
Klansman wrote Jewett an angry letter in which he accused
the Grand Dragon of working for Coolidge in Oklahoma.
Jewetfs maneuverings, concluded the Klansman, CCought to
cost the Klan half its strength in Oklahoma."26
In Arkansas, about two months prior to the election,
Klansman H. N. Street, president and general manager of
the Central & Gulf Railroad at Lonoke, decided to do what
he could to swing the heavily Democratic state to Coolidge.
Street enthusiastically wrote Harmon L. Remmel, longtime
Republican leader and collector of internal revenue in
Arkansas, that as a result of Davis' Sea Girt speech the
Republicans had a chance to carry Texas, Oklahoma,
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Arkansas. Remmel thanked the
Klansman for his "very patriotic letter" but expressed doubt
that Coolidge could carry Arkansas, whereupon Street got
more specific as to how this reversal of form could be
brought about. ;;'1 would advise that you personally go and
25 Tulsa Tribune, October 27, 28, 30, 1924.
26 Klansman [Carlton Weaver] to N. C. Jewett, November 1924,
Carlton B. Weaver Collection.
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have a heart to heart talk with Mr. J. A. Comer, Grand
Dragon, of the Realm of Arkansas," wrote Street. ('In this
talk lay before him the proposition of carrying Arkansas
for the National Republican Ticket.... I am going to
suggest the matter of expediency too-it is this-Comer is an
old Republican-later a Bull Mooser-as a matter of expedi-
ency be carefull [sic] of your steps."27
Remmel was intrigued by the possibility presented by a
Klansman of obtaining the 50,000 or so votes of the Klan
in Arkansas, which might be enough to give the state to
Coolidge. He did in fact talk to Comer. The Arkansas
Dragon predicted that Coolidge would poll more votes in
the state than had Warren G. Harding in 1920 and that
more Arkansans would vote Republican than ever before,
although he doubted that the Republicans would carry
Arkansas. Remmel urged C. Bascom Slemp, Coolidge's
private secretary, to arrange an interview with Comer in
order to discuss Republican prospects in Arkansas; Slemp
coaly replied that he would not be able to see the Grand
Dragon.28
In October, Imperial Wizard Evans, Comer, and other
Klan moguls met at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago.
Comer wired Remmel that he should come to Chicago and
talk over "matters political" with the Klansmen. Remmel
was reluctant to make the trip, but when Comer sent him
another telegram stating that the "subject [is] too important
to write or talk on phone," Remmel answered that he was
on his way.29 What transpired when the Republican boss
in Arkansas met with the Grand Dragon of Arkansas and
27 H. N. Street to Harmon L. Remmel, September 5, 1924, Remmel
to Street, September 8, Street to Remmel, September 12, Harmon L.
Remmel Papers, General Library, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
28 Remmel to C. Bascom Slemp, September 15, 1924, Slemp to
Remmel, September 18, ibid.
29 James A. Comer telegram to Remmel, October 15, 1924, Remmel
telegram to Comer, same date, Comer telegram to Remmel, same
date, Remmel telegram to Comer, October 16, ibid.
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the Imperial Wizard of the Klan is not known, for Remmel's
records of his dealings with the hooded order end abruptly
with his telegram informing Comer that he was coming to
Chicago. But whatever happened did not alter the fact
that Arkansas was a Democratic state. In November, Davis
carried Arkansas with 87,743 votes to 40,036 for Coolidge,
whose percentage of the vote was smaller than that of
Harding in 1920, when there was no Klan issue. After the
election Remmel wrote Republican James S. McConnell, an
attorney at Mineral Springs, and asked him whether he
thought the Klan vote in Arkansas was of any real help to
Coolidge. McConnell replied that while there was ':'no
concerted support" of the Republican by Klansmen, some
Knights voted Republican, but that ':'a far greater number
simply stayed at home and hoped for his election and many
others voted the Democratic ticket, also hoping for his
election."30
Democratic Klansmen in the other states of the Southwest
may also have hoped that Davis, \vho had denounced their
organization, would be beaten, but there is no evidence
that their sentiments brought any significant shift of votes
to the Republican ticket. Davis carried Oklahoma by about
35,000 votes, whereas in 1920 Harding had won the state's
electoral votes. Texas went Democratic in both elections,
but Davis polled nearly six times as many votes as Coolidge,
while James M. Cox, the Democratic candidate in 1920, did
not quite double Harding's vote. In Louisiana the results
of the election indicated a similar absence of Klan influence
on presidential politics. In 1920 Cox had about three times
as many votes as Harding; in 1924 Davis received about
four times as many votes as Coolidge in the Pelican State.S!
30 James S. McConnell to Remmel, November 15, 1924, ibid.
31 Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections (New
York, 1957), 406-17; Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote,
1896-1932 (Stanford, Calif., 1947), 21-24; Svend Petersen, A
Statistical History of the American Presidential Elections (New York,
1963), 86-88, 120, 133, 150, 157.
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The year 1924 marked the first essay of the Klan into
national politics. The order was a negligible factor in the
contest for delegates preceding the Republican national
convention and was not much in evidence at the convention
itself. In the Democratic party, however, the Klan worked
effectively, if covertly, in several southern and southwestern
states to win state delegations for its adopted favorite,
McAdoo. And at the epic Democratic national convention
the presence of the Klan,. both in body and in spirit, brought
the party close to disaster. Once the conventions were over
and the campaign began, the Klan ceased to figure promi-
nently. In Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma the
secret organization had little if any bearing on the presi-
dential campaign and seems to have exerted scant influence
on the relative strength of the parties in the four states.
But it was at the local and state level that a well-
organized minority like the Klan was able to wield its
political power most effectively. In 1924 the Klan almost
everywhere reached the apex of its career. The order be-
came the critical issue in a series of unprecedentedly hard
fought state campaigns. The outcome of those struggles
would decide the course of the Klan's history, not only in





THE YEAR 1924 marked the climax of the Klan move-
ment, and the beginning of the end. In that year the white-
robed order reached the peak of its power, numerically and
politically, in practically every state. It was a year of vic-
tory for the Klan in such widely scattered states as Maine,
Indiana, Georgia, and Colorado. The secret society strode
into the arena of national politics and, at the Democratic
national convention, raised its head for all to see. The Klan
electioneered more openly than it ever had, or ever would
again, in the Southwest, where its political enterprises gave
a Klan versus anti-Klan flavor to numerous state and local
races. The political machinations produced disastrous set-
backs in Texas and unquestioned defeat in Arkansas. In
Oklahoma and Louisiana the Klan scored apparent vic-
tories. Yet they were also Pyhrric victories, for they brought
disappointment and strife which speeded the downfall of
the Klan in those states. After 1924 the Klan ceased to be
the overriding element in southwestern state politics.
There are few better illustrations of the anomalous na-
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ture of Louisiana politics than the statewide campaign of
1923-1924. In the twenties Louisiana remained virtually
untouched by the agrarian protest and progressive reform
movements that had swept almost every other state in the
generation before the First World War. The state continued
to be ruled by an ultraconservative hierarchy comprised of
the sugar, rice, and cotton planters; the lumber, railroad,
and sugar refining interests; the oil interests centering in
the all-powerful Standard Oil Company; the upstate polit-
ical leaders who managed the dry, Protestant vote; and
the New Orleans political machine under Martin H. Behr-
man-the "Old Regulars" or the "Choctaw Club."! When-
ever all or most of these elements struck a balance on one
candidate, that candidate was usually elected. The year
1920 provided an exception to this political law of Louis-
iana. In that year John M. Parker, an ex-Bull Moose, won
the governorship behind an alliance of insurgent "New
Regulars" in New Orleans and dissatisfied upstate leaders.
A "reform" ticket overturned Choctaw dominance in New
Orleans. But by 1923-1924 Behrman and his Old Regular
organization, together with their business and financial
allies, were ready to reestablish the old order in the Cres-
cent City and in the state government at Baton Rouge.2
Into the oligarchial setup that was Louisiana politics in
the twenties came the Klan, representing a voting potential
of perhaps 54,000 dedicated native-born white Protestants.3
1 T. Harry Williams, "Gentleman from Louisiana: Demagogue or
Dell10crat," Journal of Southern History, XXVI (February 1960), 9;
Allan P. Sindler, Huey Long:ls Louisiana: State Politics, 1920-1952
(Baltinlore, 1956), 22-26.
2 George M. Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926
(Colunlbia University Studies in Econoluics, I-listory and Public Law;
Ne\v York, 19:36), 212-16, 218-19; Sindler, Huey Long:ls Louisiana,
40-45.
3 Since the Klan's membership rolls were secret, it is impossible to
give 1110re than approxinlations of the order's strength at a particular
tiIne. The estiInate of 54,000, by all odds a rather accurate guess, is
fro111 Robert L. Duffus, "The Ku Klux Klan in the Middle West,"
'Vorid's Wark, XLVI (August 1923), 364.
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But this voting potential was never realized, and the Klan
leaders in Louisiana apparently never made a serious at-
tempt to marshal it. This fact furnishes the outstanding
characteristic of the Klan's history in Louisiana. For rather
than organizing the Klan as an independent force in state
politics, as happened practically everywhere else, the Louis-
iana Klan leadership plunged the order into the delicate
process of maneuvering, bargaining, and jockeying that de-
cided each election. Thus in the only statewide campaign
in which it figured prominently, the 1923-1924 races, the
Klan became simply one more element to be reconciled,
one more faction in the prevailing political hierarchy. The
Louisiana Klan's lack of unity and purpose in the campaign,
the fact that its leaders horse-traded Klan votes here and
there, evidently for their own benefit, caused dissension
within the order in the state, made possible the passage of
stiff anti-Klan legislation, and led to punitive measures by
an angry Imperial Klan leadership. The account of the
regulatory laws of 1924 and the troubles with the national
organization relate primarily to the decline of the Klan in
Louisiana. Here the main concern is with the Klan's role
in the political contests of 1923-1924.
As early as March of 1923 several prominent Louisiana
Klansmen from different parts of the state met in New Or-
leans to talk about the approaching gubernatorial cam-
paign. This was the only such meeting the Klan moguls in
Louisiana ever held. The Klansmen realized, quite cor-
rectly, that they could not with any hope of success put an
avowed Klan candidate in the race for the governorship. As
the daily Ne_w Orleans Item pointed out, "nobody could
possibly be elected to general office in this state without
pledging himself against [the Klan's] Secrecy-and-the-
Mask."4 The Klan's best chance of making its presence felt
4 New Orleans Item, undated clipping in Huey P. Long Scrap-
books, vol. I (December 1923-Septelnber 1925), Department of Ar-
chives, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge. The Item supported
Huey P. Long in the 1923-1924 campaign.
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in the gubernatorial contest was to solidify behind a non-
Klan, Protestant candidate. But the Klan leaders could not
agree on a man, and the New Orleans Konklave broke up
with the Klansmen divided into two opposing factions. 5
The larger group, led by Great Titan Thomas F. DePaoli
of New Orleans, a member of the state legislature, and farm
demonstration agent Paul D. Perkins of Lakes Charles,
Great Titan of the southwestern Louisiana Province, favored
the candidacy of Henry L. Fuqua of Baton Rouge, general
manager of the state penitentiary. The other faction was
headed by Swords R. Lee of Alexandria. In 1920 Lee had
backed Parker in his campaign for the governorship, but he
had broken with the governor after his assault on the Klan.
Lee's choice for the governorship in 1923 was the explosive
young chairman of the Louisiana Public Service Commis-
sion, Huey P. Long. Long had plans for giving the state an
adequate system of roads, highways, and publicly owned
bridges. Lee, as a construction contractor, was especially
interested in Long's roadbuilding program; and he perhaps
saw an opportunity to further his own economic well-being
by swinging part of the Klan vote to Long, getting him
elected, and thus establishing a priority on lucrative high-
way contracts.6
The factionalization of the Klan leadership in Louisiana
meant not only that the order would fail to have a candi-
date of its own for the governorship, but that it would not
officially endorse any non-Klan aspirant. William C. Barn-
ette of Shreveport, general counsel for the Klan in Louis-
iana, laid down the official Klan position on the guberna-
torial race when he said that the Klan had no candidate
for governor and endorsed no candidate. He called on all
Klansmen to vote for the man they thought would best
5 New Orleans Tirnes-Picayune, March 2, 1923.
6 T. Harry Williams to writer, March 2, 1962, in the writer's pos-
session. Professor Williams, of the Department of History of Louis-
iana State University, is presently at work on a biography of Huey P.
Long and has had access to the hitherto-closed Long papers.
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serve the state regardless of his religious affiliation.7 The
leaders of the Klan, however, still felt free to engage in the
traditional Louisiana sport of trading blocs of votes.
Three men bid for the Democratic nomination for gover-
nor of Louisiana in 1923-1924. One of them, Long, was
making a premature venture into gubernatorial politics. In
1924, he was still a sectional candidate, with his following
concentrated mainly in the dry, Protestant, northern and
central Louisiana parishes. He had not yet developed the
statewide appeal that would enable him to carry the rural
Catholic parishes in 1928, sweep him into the governorship,
and inaugurate the most tempestuous era in the history of
the state. In 1924 he ran for governor on a platform calling
for extensive social welfare measures and the curbing of
big business. Long alternately straddled and ignored the
Klan issue in an effort to win votes from both Klan and anti-
Klan, Protestant and Catholic. He had the support of many
disgruntled citizens in the rural areas of north Louisiana,
mostly small farmers and day laborers; the Klan faction led
by Lee in Rapides and Ouachita parishes; and an cClnde_
pendent Regular" group in New Orleans which had splin-
tered from the Behrman machine.8
A second candidate whose appeal was primarily sectional
was Lieutenant Governor Hewitt Bouanchaud of New
Roads, Pointe Coupee Parish, a Catholic and a fierce, un-
compromising opponent of the Klan. Bouanchaud's strength
lay in the heavily Catholic, wet, southern Louisiana par-
ishes, which comprised the most populous portion of the
state outside of New Orleans and Shreveport. He also had
the support of the cCNew Regular" organization in New
Orleans.9
Fuqua, the third gubernatorial candidate, alone had a
real statewide following. His candidacy rested on a power-
7 Shreveport Journal, September 25, 1923.
8 New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 24, September 6, 1923; Sind-
ler, Huey Long's Louisiana, 48.
9 New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 11, 1923.
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ful alliance consisting of the Old Regular organization in
New Orleans, most of the large industrial interests, the
Protestant leaders in northern Louisiana and the eastern
"Florida parishes," and the followers of Klan leaders De-
Paoli and Perkins. Thus the Old Regular machine, sus-
tained mainly by Catholic voters, partly by immigrants,
and led by the Jewish Behrman and several Catholics, be-
came a partner in a statewide coalition which included a
large portion of the Klan membership in Louisiana.10 No
more striking tribute could be paid to the enervating char-
acter of Louisiana politics than the absorption of the Klan
into such an incongruous political grouping.
During the gubernatorial campaign Long avoided the
Klan issue. Both Bouanchaud and Fuqua went on record
against the hooded order and in favor of legislation to
abolish "secrecy and the mask." Fuqua did his best to play
down the Klan issue, whereas Bouanchaud threw charges
of Klan influence in every direction-at Fuqua, the Old
Regulars, the upstate Protestant politicians, and Long. But
neither he nor those who spoke in his behalf, including
Governor Parker, could arouse a great deal of interest in
an anti-Klan crusade. The New Orleans Times-Picayune,
which endorsed Bouanchaud as the only candidate not
tainted by the Klan, admitted that its survey showed that
the Klan was the principal issue in only seventeen of the
sixty-four parishes in the state.11
The outcome of the race depended on the efficacy of the
different political alignments. Fuqua, who pleaded for
"peace and harmony in the state," was the strongest candi-
date with the backing of a solid Old Regular-neutral Prot-
estant-industrialist-Klan combine. Long, with some Klans-
10 Reynolds, Machine Politics in New Orleans, 219; Jared Y. San-
ders, "The Ku Klux Klan," typescript in Jared Y. Sanders and Family
Papers, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University, Baton
Rouge.
11 New Orleans Tim.es-Picayune, September 30, October 3, 18, 20,
21, 30, November 8, 1923.
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men supporting him, urged poor people throughout Louis-
iana to take up their ballots against Standard Oil and the
other business giants; but business prosperity, the Klan is-
sue, and the fact that the agricultural depression was not
as severe as it would become in a few years, blunted much
of his appeal. Bouanchaud had a strong following in the
thickly settled southern Louisiana parishes where Catholic
citizens predominated, but he had few supporters in other
parts of the state.
From all indications a substantial majority of the Klans-
men in Louisiana voted for Fuqua.12 A few days before
the Democratic primary an Alexandria daily newspaper
carried an advertisement supposedly paid for by "friends
and supportersn of Fuqua. The advertisement consisted of
a denunciation by Carey P. Duncan, of Shreveport, the
little-known Grand Dragon of Louisiana, of rumors being
circulated in the central part of the state to the effect that
Long had once become a cCKlansman at Large." "Our judg-
ment is that this is a bold and bald attempt to use the Klan
for the purpose of advancing the political interests of a
candidate and as such should be resented by all loyal Klans-
men," wrote Duncan. cCI wish to impress on you and all
other Klansmen that the organization is not a political one
and should not be used to further the interest of any candi-
date.l'l' But at the bottom of the advertisement Klansmen
were urged to vote for Fuqua and "Be guided by facts, not
hearsay.l'l'13
At the Democratic primary, on January 15, Bouanchaud,
drawing almost all the anti-Klan votes in the state, led the
gubernatorial candidates, polling 84,162 votes to 81,382 for
Fuqua and 73,985 for Long. A runoff was optional, not
mandatory, under Louisiana law and party regulations.
Since it was obvious that most of the Long vote would go to
Fuqua, many quarters, including the New Orleans Times-
12 T. Harry Williams to writer, March 2, 1962.
13 New Orleans Times-Picayune, January 13, 1924.
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Picayune, called on Bouanchaud to withdraw and concede
the nomination. But Bouanchaud would not bow to the
inevitable; instead he began a round of negotiations for the
endorsement of Long's Independent Regular following in
New Orleans. He even appropriated the free textbook plank
in Long's platform as an added inducement to Huey's rural
backers. The Independent Regular organization eventually
gave its endorsement to Bouanchaud, but Long refused to
commit himself on the runoff contest, and the bulk of his
upstate retinue, including his Klan partisans in Ouachita
and Rapides parishes, went to Fuqua.14
On February 19 the "Fuqua ticket," the slate of state can-
didates endorsed by the Choctaws, most Klan leaders, and
some local Klans, swept the state. Fuqua carried New
Orleans by nearly 15,000 votes and won six of the eight
congressional districts in the state. The parishes carried by
Long in the first primary went almost solidly for the peni-
tentiary manager. Fuqua's margin over Bouanchaud was
about 33,000 votes. The other members of the Fuqua ticket,
which listed two Catholics, also were nominated and thus
assured of election in November. The candidate of the
Fuqua coalition for attorney general piled up a big major-
ity over Adolph V. Coco, the incumbent and the chief prose-
cutor of the Klansmen in the Mer Rouge cases a year
earlier.15
A few days after the primary Hiram W. Evans was in
Dallas, his hometown, where he was asked about the extent
of the Klan's involvement in politics. The Imperial Wizard
answered that in Louisiana most Klansmen voted for Fu-
qua, even though Fuqua was not a Klansman.16 Evans went
14 Ibid., January 18, 19, 20, 23, February 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 1924; Alex-
ander Heard and Donald S. Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections,
1920-1949 (University, Alabama, 1950), 69.
15 New Orleans Times-Picayune, February 18, 20, 21, 1924; Heard
and Strong, Southern Primaries a.nd Elections, 69.
16 Fort Smith Southwest American, February 23, 1924. This was
one of the very few occasions when Evans admitted to the Klan's
open participation in politics.
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on to boast that the Klan had helped to nominate the next
governor of Louisiana. His estimate of the situation was
generally correct. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Klan
leaders did not deliver a solid vote for Fuqua in 1924, that
in fact the Louisiana Klan hierarchy was incapable of de-
livering a solid bloc of Klansmen to any statewide candi-
date that year or any other year.17
The Louisiana Klan always lacked political unity beyond
the area of the legislative district. This condition, together
with the diverse ethnic complexion of the state, ruled out
independent action in state politics. In the legislative dis-
tricts, parishes, and towns of northern, eastern, and central
Louisiana, however, the Klan was sometimes capable of
mustering the same power that it did in other states. Dur-
ing the winter and spring of 1924 local Klans got involved
in political fights in several parishes. Candidates backed by
the Klan were successful in only about half of these con-
tests.1S
Despite occasional setbacks, by the spring of 1924 the
Klan in Louisiana was, on the surface, in a rather enviable
position. It shared credit for defeating a Catholic candidate
for governor and electing a conservative, Protestant advo-
cate of "peace." In the new state legislature, to convene
in May, about fifteen Klansmen or pro-Klan solons sat in
the house of representatives, while about ten Klansmen and
close sympathizers were in the senate.19 A new era of har-
mony and tranquility supposedly was dawning in Louisiana
politics. Yet the Klan remained divided in the Pelican State,
split between the Klansmen who had supported Long in the
first primary and those who had backed Fuqua and thus
17 T. Harry Williams to writer, March 2, 1962.
18 New Orleans Times-Picayune, November 1, 14, 16, 1923, April
6, 7, 12, 23, 1924.
19 Ibid., May 4, 1924. Great Titan Thomas F. DePaoli, state repre-
sentative from the twelfth ward in New Orleans, was defeated when
he tried for a second term by Fred J. Oser, independent Democratic
candidate. See ibid., January 16, 1924.
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tacitly accepted the new governor's plans for anti-Klan leg-
islation. This split became evident when the legislature
met and took up the question of regulating the Klan. The
subsequent fight over the bills introduced by the Fuqua
administration to curb the order intensified the factionalism
within the Realm of Louisiana and contributed to the dis-
integration of the Klan's power in the state.
Contrasting with its sectional character in Louisiana, the
Klan thrived in every part of Arkansas-in the Delta country
along the Mississippi, in the prairie counties in the southern
and central portions of the state, and in the mountains to
the west and north. There was nothing to prevent the Ar-
kansas Klan from electioneering on a statewide basis, and
as soon as the order was strong enough, it ventured, into
politics. In 1922 the political activities of the Klan in Ar-
kansas centered in Little Rock Klan No.1, which won con-
trol of the government of Pulaski County, endorsed a slate
of candidates for state office, and claimed victory when all
but one of its endorsees won the Democratic nomination.'
Two years later the all-powerful James A. Comer, Grand
Dragon of the Realm and Exalted Cyclops of the Klan in
Little Rock, had more grandiose designs. With the ven-
erable Thomas C. McRae refusing to run for a third term
as governor, the field was wide open for gubernatorial can-
didates. Comer was determined that one of the candidates
would be a Klansman and that he would receive the votes
of the 45,000 to 50,000 Knights of the Invisible Empire in
Arkansas.2o
In the early months of 1924 Virgil C. Pettie, secretary of
the Democratic Central Committee, looked like the best bet
to become the guber~~torial candidate of the Klan. Pettie
was one of the leading Democrats in Arkansas, an active
Klansman, and along with Comer, a member of Evans'
trusted inner circle of political advisers. In April, however,
20 The estimate of Klan membership in Arkansas is from Duffus,
"Ku Klux Klan in the Middle West," 364.
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Pettie announced that he would not run for governor.21
Comer had to look around for another promising Klans-
man. He found such a man in Lee Cazort, former speaker
of the state house of representatives, former president pro
tempore of the senate, and now a thirty-six-year-old gentle-
man farmer at Lamar, Johnson County.22
The Grand Dragon realized that a show of democracy
was necessary in the form of a statewide Klan elimination
primary, the device used so effectively in the Pulaski County
races of 1922. So on the night of May 28, as a· driving rain-
storm swept almost the entire state, the local Klans staged
their elimination polls. By rising vote, rather than by mailed
ballots, the Klansmen signified their choices for governor
and for all the other state offices as well. The rainstorm
severely cut attendance at the Klavern meetings, and this
evidently benefited Cazort. The number of Klansmen vot-
ing in the Klaverns ranged from 40 in the Pocahontas Klan
to 2,000 in Little Rock. Cazort piled up a 4-to-l margin
over the only other Klansman bidding for the blessing of
the order, Commissioner of Mines, Manufacturing, and
Agriculture Jim G. Ferguson. Ferguson carried only four
small Klans, as less than five thousand Knights voted in the
chapter primaries.23 Klansmen throughout Arkansas, espe-
cially Grand Dragon Comer, now waited quietly for Fergu-
son to withdraw from the gubernatorial race, as all the can-
didates had supposedly agreed to do if they failed to ob-
tain the Klan nomination. But the days and weeks passed,
and still Ferguson did not withdraw.
In the meantime, Arkansas Klansmen had been busy
choosing slates of candidates in the county races. From
February through July, Little Rock Klan No. 1 held pri-
maries by mail for the various county and district offices,
21 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 8, 1924.
22 Fort Smith Southwest American, January 5, 1923.
23 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, May 28-30, 1924.
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so that by the time of the Democratic primary in August,
the Klan in Pulaski County had once again chosen a full
slate of county and legislative candidates, plus a candidate
for the state railroad commission from the Little Rock
district.24
The Klan's prospects for giving Cazort the Democratic
nomination looked better and better as the governor's race
moved into the summer months. There were six candidates
contending for the gubernatorial nomination, and since in
1924 there were no laws or party rules providing for a run-
off, one candidate could win the nomination with a rela-
tively small percentage of the total vote. Cazort and his
benefactor, Comer, ostensibly commanded a bloc of nearly
50,000 Klansmen and Klans\vomen. The other prominent
candidates were Ferguson, the Klansman rejected in the
Realm-wide elimination primary; former secretary of state
Tom J. Terral of Little Rock; and John E. Martineau,
judge of chancery court in Little Rock. Of all the aspirants,
only Martineau openly opposed the Klan, and then only
its "secret politics" and its "Republican Grand Dragon," not
its nativism and racism and its history of violence. He
charged that "if Cazort is elected, you will have a Re-
publican Governor just as effectively as you would if Comer
were elected.;P'25
Cazort campaigned as an avowed Klansman. He ap-
peared at Klan local and district meetings in different parts
of the state, affirming his membership in the secret order
and promising to uphold its principles if elected. At EI
Dorado, the free and easy oil town, he told his listeners
that "what we need is not more laws but more satisfactory
law enforcement." And at a big Fourth of July initiation
ceremony in Little Rock he shouted that he was "carrying
24 Ibid., February 13, 20, March 21, 1924.
25 John E. Martineau for Governor broadside, David Y. Thomas
Papers, University of Arkansas General Library, Fayetteville.
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the Klan's battle Hag into this campaign, not as an indi-
vidual but as a Klansman."26
A month before the Democratic primary, Ferguson, who
had not mentioned the Klan since his defeat in the Klan
elimination poll, suddenly blasted the secret order. "1 have
no fight against the Klan and the principles for which it
stands," proclaimed Ferguson in a full-page advertisement
in daily newspapers over the state, ~~but I am against the
Little Rock crowd into whose hands the destiny of the order
has fallen." Among other things he accused Comer of
changing the original date for the Klan primary from May
16 to May 28 so that Cazort could have more time to cam-
paign among Klansmen, and of denying him a mailing list
of all the Exalted Cyclops in the state. Ferguson said that
fewer than 5,000 Klansmen and less than half of the local
Klans in Arkansas participated in the primary, and that
Comer's office had never given out any specific returns from
the primary, announcing only that Cazort won by a big
margin.21
Ferguson's charges threatened to split the Klan vote in
Arkansas. Comer and the officials of the Little Rock Klan
angrily called a meeting of the chapter. On Thursday night,
July 17, the Klansmen in Little Rock voted to suspend Fer-
guson and two other Klan politicians who had refused to
withdraw after losing in the elimination primaries. Then,
to shore up the cracks of dissension in the walls of the chap-
ter and to whip up enthusiasm just before the August 12
Democratic primary, the Little Rock Klan began holding
a series of political rallies, addressed by the Klan candi-
dates for Pulaski County offices and by some of the Klan
choices for state offices.28
Two days before the party primary, on Sunday, August
10, Klan No.1 of Little Rock presented its political piece
26 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, June 17, 26, July 4, 5, 1924.
27 Ibid., July 13, 1924.
28 Ibid., July 19, August 6, 1924.
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de resistance-a big advertisement published in the daily
Arkansas Gazette headed "Sour Grape Candidates for Gov-
ernor." In the advertisement the Klan said that four candi-
dates for governor had asked for the endorsement of the
order during the course of the campaign. Cazort, "the polit-
ical grape-picker of 1924," got the Klan nomination, while
the other three-Ferguson, Terral, and Jacob R. Wilson of
EI Dorado, a minor candidate-were turned down as being
unworthy of the Klan's favor. Ferguson was, according to
the Klan statement, a sower of strife \vho had refused to
abide by the Klan's selection of Cazort. Terral's applica-
tion for membership had been rejected by the Little Rock
Klan three times and by the EI Dorado Klan once. After-
ward, Terral had joined the Klan in Morehouse Parish,
Louisiana. Then he came back to Little Rock and showed
his card to Comer, who demanded that he return it. But
Terral refused and stayed in the governor's race.29
So the Democratic voters of Arkansas went to the polls
to choose a gubernatorial nominee, and the next governor,
amid charges by Ferguson that the Arkansas Klan was a
Republican machine, by the Klan that nearly all the candi-
dates had sought its favor, and by Martineau that Terral
was cCa Klansman, but without a Klan home" and that thou-
sands of individualistic Klansmen were going to vote for
him.30 To almost everyone's surprise, Terral took a slender
early lead, added to it as the tabulation of votes proceeded,
and won the nomination. The final returns gave Terral
54,553 votes; Cazort, 43,466; Martineau, 35,438; and Fergu-
son, 27,155. The results showed clearly that general dis-
satisfaction with Comer's regime, and particular unhappi-
ness over the questionable manner in which Cazort had
become the Klan candidate, had vitiated the political unity
of the Arkansas Klan. The Klan once again displayed its
power in Pulaski County, carrying all the county races. But
29 Ibid., August 10, 1924.
30 Martineau broadside, Thomas Papers.
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the Klan failed to carry the county for Cazort; Martineau,
the popular chancery court judge, polled 3,843 votes in
Pulaski to the Klansman's 3,744.31
Cazort led in only 16 of the 75 counties in the state. He
lost not only Pulaski County, but other counties where the
Klan was supposed to be in the saddle, like Clark (Arka-
delphia), Arkansas (Stuttgart), and Phillips (Helena) .3~
The Klan simply had not united behind the avowed Klan
candidate for governor. A Klansman from Lonoke gave an
accurate post mortem on the contest when he wrote: "Look
at Cazort's vote ... Judge Martineau was the anti-Klan
candidate. Yet, he got lots of Klan votes. So did Terrall
[sic]-they elected him. They did not want Cazort. I did
not & voted for Martineau; because I liked him person-
ally."33
Hence widespread dislike of Comer, his methods, and his
candidate proved fatal to the chances of the Arkansas Klan
to elect a governor. Ferguson's barbs had done their work,
along with two years of growing resentment against Comer
in the Realm and in the city of Little Rock. The Grand
Dragon knew when he was beaten. In a note of congratu..
lations he assured Terral that the Klan would make no fight
against the Democratic nominee at the general election in
November. Ferguson, although also beaten, was reasonably
happy over the course of events. He claimed to have drawn
enough Klan votes away from Cazort to prevent his nomi-
nation. In a letter of resignation sent to Little Rock Klan
No.1 (significantly, he waited until after the primary to re-
sign from the Klan), Ferguson proclaimed: "The defeat of
Comerism at the polls last Tuesday signifies that Democ-
racy wants no meddling with Democratic rule in Arkansas
31 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, August 13, 14, 29, 1924; Heard
and Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections, 23-24.
32 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, August 13, 1924.
33 H. N. Street to Harmon L. Remmel, September 12, 1924, Har-
nlon L. Remmel Papers, University of Arkansas General Library,
Fayetteville.
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by the Little Rock crowd of election manipulators that has
seized control of the Ku Klux organization in this state."34
Most of the other candidates for state office endorsed by
the Klan in its May elimination primary won their contests,
but the Klan was not an issue in any of the state races ex-
cept the gubernatorial campaign. Pulaski County was about
the only place where the Klan held a firm grip on the
county government. In late August, however, enemies of
the Klan controlled the Pulaski County Democratic conven-
tion, which adopted a resolution barring from the Demo-
cratic ballot any candidates henceforth nominated in spe-
cial "pre-primary elections." The next month anti-Klan
Democrats secured a majority at the organization meeting
of the county central committee. Klan-haters were elected
to the controlling offices of the party agency.35
The state Democratic convention met in mid-September
in Little Rock. Just before the opening of the convention,
the state central committee wrote into the rules of the state
party a restriction similar to the one adopted by the Pulaski
County convention-a provision barring from the party pri-
mary any candidate who previously participated in any
"run-off or primary other than a run-off or primary held UD-
der the authority of the Democratic party." The next day,
ho\vever, the resolutions committee of the convention re-
jected a proposal to denounce the Klan's political activity
and its religious prejudice, adopting instead a platform plank
that simply affirmed "obedience to the orderly processes of
law" and condemned "any effort to arouse religious or racial
dissension." Outside the committee room, before the as-
sembled delegates, former United States Senator Walter F.
Kirby, the keynote speaker, shouted that "there is no room
in the Democratic party for an invisible empire." And on
the Hoor Robert A. Cook, who had succeeded Comer as
Cyclops of the Little Rock Klan, added that he agreed with
34 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, August 1.5, 24, 1924.
35 Ibid., August 16, 27, September 6, 7, 1924.
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Kirby. "What the Ku Klux Klan should do," said Cook, ~~is
to pay less attention to politics and more to constructive
work. . . . It is time for us to quit quarreling and get back
to the original purposes of Klankraft."36
After failing with Cazort, and except for a short detour
into the Little Rock city primaries of late 1924, Klansmen
in Arkansas pretty well held their course on the "original
purposes of Klankraft" and stayed out of politics. Comer
retained his post as Grand Dragon for several more years,
but antagonism toward him continued to mount until it
eventually brought about a split in the Little Rock Klan.
The Klan's one brief venture into statewide politics in Ar-
kansas proved a failure, not because Klansmen over the
state lacked dedication to the mission of the order, but be-
cause they wanted an honest chance to choose their own
candidate for governor without Comer's dictating the choice
to them. Klansmen in Texas wanted the same thing, and
they also protested when their Grand Dragon employed
similar autocratic methods.
Observers of Texas politics agreed that the Klan would
have a candidate for governor in 1924. In a sense the elec-
tion of Earle B. Mayfield to the United States Senate in
1922, and other Klan victories of that year, were only a
prelude to 1924, when the order was expected to make
an all-out drive for the governorship. By 1924 the Klan in
Texas was a highly organized, efficient minority. Working
quietly and mysteriously, this minority nearly controlled the
political life of the state. Perhaps as many as 400,000 Texans
had belonged to the Klan at one time or another. The
membership of the order in Texas was quite fluid, as it was
everywhere else, but in 1924 there were between 97,000
36 Ibid., September 10, 11, 1924; Henry M. Alexander, "The
Double Primary," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, III (Autumn 1944),
225-26; Platform of the Democratic Party of Arkansas, Adopted Sep-
tember 11, 1924, Thomas C. McRae Papers, University of Arkansas
General Library, Fayetteville.
193
and 170,000 paid-up Klansmen in the state.37 " In the spring
the Klan demonstrated its power, if any further demonstra-
tion· was needed, by dominating the p-recinct, county, and
state Democratic conventions and thus the Texas delega-
tion sent to the Democratic national convention. The
Klan was already having internal difficulties in Texas, how-
ever. Early in 1924 dissension broke out in the Realm over
the selection of a gubernatorial candidate.
In Houston, Billie Mayfield, an ex-colonel in the Texas
National Guard and the unsuccessful Klan candidate for
the lieutenant governorship in 1922, published a crudely
moralistic, pro-Klan weekly newspaper. In the first weeks
of 1924 he began exhorting Klansmen in the columns of his
newspaper to unify behind Dallas attorney V. A. Collins as
the Knight to go forward witll the cause of 100 percent
Americanism and moral reform in the coming guberna-
torial race.38 Collins, an active member of Dallas Klan No.
66, had served in the state senate, where he had been an
ardent advocate of the statewide prohibition legislation
passed during the First World War and a member of the
senate committee that wrote the verdict removing Jim Fer-
guson from the governorship. When Colonel Mayfiield~s
Weekly, Billie Mayfield's paper, endorsed Collins, the Dal-
las lawyer had never seen an issue of the paper or met its
editor. Mayfield nevertheless boomed Collins as if the two
,vere old friends. 39
Mayfield actually had little influence in Texas Klan cir-
cles, or at least among those who counted-the Realm offi-
cials. This hard truth he soon discovered when the Collins
boom collided with the wishes of Z. E. "Zeke" Marvin of
Dallas, a wealthy native of Indiana who had risen through
37 Washington Post, November 2, 1930, sec. I, p. 4; New York
Times, February 21, 1926, sec. VIII, p. 1; Duffus, "Ku Klux Klan
in the 11icldle Wcst," 364.
~8 Houston Colonel n!aufiield's Weekly, January 19, 1924.
:m'v. A. Collins to writer, February 24, 1962, in the writer's pos-
session.
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Texas Klan .ranks to the office of Grand Dragon. Marvin
was a good friend and a leading disciple of Imperial Wiz-
ard Evans. With Evans and the Dallas Klan, about 13,000
strong, behind him, Marvin ran matters virtually as he
pleased in the Realm. Like his counterpart in Arkansas, the
Texas Dragon .had his own candidate in mind for the gov-
ernorship-District Judge Felix D. Robertson, a member of
the Dallas Klan and, like Collins, a zealous prohibitionist.
In late January, Marvin announced from Realm headquarters
in Dallas that Robertson would be the official candidate of
the Klan in the coming gubernatorial primary.40
"I am not ready, and the Klan is not ready," exploded
Billie Mayfield in Houston, "to accept as its governor the
call boy of an individual man in Texas no matter what
exalted position he holds within the Klan."41 Mayfield be-
gan a running editorial fight with Marvin and the weekly
Texas 100 Per Cent American, organ of the Dallas Klan and
thus of the Grand Dragon. Mayfield's attacks apparently
aroused enough Klansmen to worry Marvin. The Grand
Dragon visited the Waco, Fort Worth, Houston, and San
Antonio Klans to assure the hooded Knights that Robertson
had been selected very simply and democratically. Robert-
son had been nominated by the executive committee of the
Realm, comprised of seven officials from each of the five
Provinces, plus five additional Klansmen from each Prov-
ince, making a total of sixty. The Klorero, or state conven-
tion, of October 1923 had stipulated the makeup of the
executive committee. Marvin neglected to add, however,
that as Grand Dragon he exercised direct or indirect ap-
pointive power over every member of the executive com-
mittee and over all of those attending the Klorero.42 The
40 Interview of the writer with an ex-Klansman, Dallas, May 18,
1959.
41 Houston Colonel Mayfield~s Weekly, February 2, 1924.
42 Dallas Texas 100 Per Cent American, February 15, 1924; Con-
stitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Atlanta,
1921), art. XVIII, sec. 7.
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nomination of Robertson by the state Klan executive com-
mittee hardly expressed the voice of the rank and file.
Klansmen in Fort Worth and Waco endorsed Robertson,
but Houston and San Antonio Klansmen rebelled against
Marvin's dictation and rejected his proposal. Billie May-
field, intensifying his attacks on the Realm leaders, charged
that during 192.3 ivlarvin sold large amounts of whisky ille-
gally through his chain of drugstores in Dallas. Trading
Klannish blows \vith the Texas 100 Per Cent American, May-
field clen1anded a l~ealnl-wide elimination primary. Finally,
yielding to the din raised by Mayfield and others, Marvin
decreed that each of the 300 or more local Klans in Texas
could hold its o\vn elimination primary to decide between
Robertson and Collins. Mayfield, while continuing to push
Collins' candidacy, congratulated himself on his successful
fight for democracy in the Realm and announced that all
was \vell in Klandom. "Slip me your hand, Zeke, it's all
over now," wrote the Houston Klansman. "Weare going
singing into the battle together, and the fighting· can't start
any too soon for me."43
Klansmen over Texas, perhaps fearing that the Evans-
Marvin clique would bolt the Klan if they did not abide by
the wishes of the Grand Dragon, overwhelmingly approved
Robertson by standing vote in the local primaries in March.
!vlarvin and his cohorts, however, were still not quite sure
that ~'1ayfield could be trusted. So they brought the Klan
editor to Dallas for a conference. Mayfield spent the better
part of a day talking \vith Marvin and the leaders of the
Dallas Klan. After the conference Mayfield saw an angry
Collins and told him that ~flarvin had presented a "great
inducement" to the Houstonian to cease supporting Collins
and s\\'ing to Robertson in his editorials.44 When he got
back to Houston, Nlayfield did a neat about-face, condemn-
4:l IIollston Colonel ~f(Jufield's vVeek1u, February 16, 2,'3, March 1,
1924.
·14 Ibid., ~[arch 22, 1924; V. A. Collins to writer, February 24, 1962.
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ing Collins for trying to promote strife and assuring his
readers he would not follow the Dallas attorney in a bolt.45
Collins hit the campaign trail to tell the voters how ~~a
tyrannical conspiracy" of Klan leaders had betrayed his
candidacy. His only sin, he said bitterly, was announcing for
the governorship without the consent of the Realm hier-
archy. After his announcement, Marvin had begun a syste-
matic campaign of vilification within the Klan and finally
had had him suspended from the order.46 Collins, appear-
ances became less and less frequent during the course of
the campaign. He still says, "I had never sought the Klan
support or asked any member of the Klan to support me,
but . . . was just running as a private citizen on my
merit."47 His fate was to be the same as that of Robert L.
Henry in 1922.
The Texas Klan remained united and its opposition dis-
united at the first Democratic primary in July. The Klan
vote enabled Robertson to lead eight candidates for the
governorship, with 192,508 votes. His nearest opponent,
polling about 46,000 fewer votes and entering the runoff
against the Klansman, was Mrs. Miriam Amanda "Ma"
Ferguson, the wife of James E. Ferguson.48
In 1924 Ferguson had vowed a fight to the death with
the Klan. After removing him from the governorship in
1917, the legislature had barred Ferguson from contending
for state office. But the advent of woman's suffrage made
it possible for a Ferguson to run for governor again-except
that in 1924 it was Ferguson's wife. From the beginning of
the campaign "Pa" Ferguson, as he now referred to himself,
doing most of his wife's speechmaking, concentrated his
45 Houston Colonel Mayfield's Weekly, March 22, 1924.
46 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, March 10, 1924; Dallas Morning
News, April 11, 1924; V. A. Collins to writer, February 24, 1962.
47 V. A. Collins to writer, February 24, 1962.
48 Dallas Morning News, July 29, 1924; Heard and Strong, South-
ern Primaries and Elections, 136-38.
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choice invective on the Klan. He stepped up his attacks in
the runoff campaign, which featured four weeks of the
worst vituperation in Texas political history. Ferguson de-
scribed his wife's opponent as "the great grand gizzard
mouthpiece of the Grand Dragon," while Robertson called
the ex-governor a ....whisky-throated politician," a ....thief,"
and a ....liar."
In the runoff all the defeated gubernatorial candidates of
the first primary, including Collins, gave their endorsement
to Mrs. Ferguson, as did most of the daily newspapers in
the cities and such prominent Texans as former United
States Senator Joseph ,v. Bailey, former Governor Oscar
B. Colquitt, and Alvin Owsley, national commander of the
American Legion. By August 23, the day of the second
primary, Robertson and the Klan faced a heterogeneous but
powerful coalition of loyal Fergusonites, principally ....wets,"
tenant farmers, small farmers, and day laborers; people who
sincerely disliked the hooded order on moral and ideologi-
cal grounds; and nervous politicians who wanted to end the
disruptive presence of the Klan in state politics.49
The combination was too much for the Klan. Mrs. Fergu-
son amassed a vote of 413,751 to 316,019 for Klansman Rob-
ertson. The anti-Klan coalition also gave Barry Miller of
Dallas, a bitter foe of the Klan, the nomination for lieuten-
ant governor over Will C. Edwards, the Klan candidate. Dis-
trict Attorney Dan Moody from Georgetown, who had sent
a Klansman to prison for a flogging in 1923, took the nomi-
nation for attorney general from Edward B. Ward of Cor-
pus Christi, generally supported by the Klan. After the run-
off primary Dallas and Tarrant counties were the only major
49 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, August 22, 1924; Waco Times-
Herald, August 14, 1924; Dallas Alorning News, August 20, 1924;
Sam H. Acheson, Joe Bailey, the Last Democrat (New York, 1932),
394; V. A. Collins to writer, February 24, 1962; Ouida Ferguson
Nalle, The Fergusons of Texas (San Antonio, 1946), 168-80; Charles
W. Ferguson, "James E. Ferguson," Southwest Review, X (October
1924), 30-31.
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counties in Texas still under the dominance of the Klan,
as in many counties, large and small, slates of anti-Klan
candidates were nominated. The final setback of the sum-
mer for the Klan came at the state Democratic convention,
held in Austin early in September. With forces hostile to
the Klan controlling roughly 90 percent of the county dele-
gations, the convention endorsed the nomination of Mrs.
Ferguson, denounced the Klan as un-Christian and un-
American, and demanded the public registration of secret
organizations and an antimask law.50
In the general election campaign thousands of Texas
Democrats, decrying "Fergusonism" and "government by
proxy," left the dominant party and threw their votes to
the Republican candidate for governor, Dr. George C.
Butte, dean of the University of Texas School of Law. The
only group formally bolting the Democracy was an organi-
zation called the "Good Government Democratic League,"
formed under the leadership of national party committee-
man Thomas B. Love of Dallas.51 But most Klansmen, it
seems, also voted for Butte, who received almost three times
as many votes as any previous Republican candidate for
governor in Texas. Butte showed his greatest strength in
Dallas, Harris (Houston), Tarrant (Fort Worth), Jefferson
( Beaumont), McLennan (Waco), and other counties that
were both Klan hotbeds and Democratic citadels. The mas-
sive, if unofficial, backing the Klan gave the Republican
candidate was a last-ditch effort to stop the hated Fergu-
sons. The bolt entailed going over to a party that had con-
50 Austin Statesman, August 25, September 3, 4, 1924; Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, August 31, 1924; C. V. Terrell to Oscar B. Colquitt,
August 28, 1924, Oscar B. Colquitt Papers, University of Texas Ar-
chives, Austin; Heard and Strong, Southern Primaries and Elections,
136-38. For a Klan ticket circulated by the Abilene Klan endorsing
Felix D. Robertson, Will C. Edwards, and Edward B. Ward, see Con-
gressional Record, 68th Congress, 2d Session (1924), 94.
51 See the folder headed "Good Government Democratic League,"
Thomas B. Love Papers, Archives of the Dallas Historical Society,
Dallas, for material on the anti-Ferguson movement.
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demned the Klan in both its 1922 and 1924 state platforms.
The influence of the secret society in a Republican state
administration would have been negligible. Yet even this
desperate crossing of party lines proved futile. There were
enough determined anti-Klanners and do-or-die Democrats
left in the state to give Mrs. Ferguson 422,588 votes to
Butte's 294,970.52
The failure of the Klan to win the Democratic nomination
for Robertson, then to block the Fergusons in the general
election; the loss of nearly all the counties it had formerly
dominated; and the election of a legislature that was pre-
ponderantly anti-Klan-these developments signaled the
passing of the Klan as a force in Texas politics. "It was all
over," recalled a former Klansman. "After Robertson was
beaten the prominent men left the Klan. The Klan's stand-
ing went with them."53 By the end of 1924 Texas, once the
most cherished prize of the men who ran the Klan, was
no longer the number one state in Klandom. Other states-
Indiana, Ohio, Alabama-became more important than Tex-
as in Klan affairs. Oklahoma, too, superseded Texas in the
Invisible Empire, for in the Sooner State the Klan man-
aged to stave off a shattering political defeat, cling to a bit
of its prestige, and thus make possible its survival for sev-
eral more years.
The Klan's fight with Jack Walton in 1923, carried to a
triumphant-and legal-conclusion, was quite a boon to the
order in Oklahoma. The Klan was evidently losing strength
in the summer of 1923, when Walton set out to crush the
organization. By the end of the year, however, with Walton
ejected from the governorship by an alliance of Klansmen,
neutrals, and anti-Klan citizens unable to tolerate Walton,
the Oklahoma Klan was stronger than ever. At the begin-
ning of 1924 more than 100,000 Oklahomans held citizen-
52 Dallas Morning News, November 9, 18, 1924; Heard and Strong,
Southern Primaries and Elections, 136-38.
53 Interview of the writer with an ex-Klansman, Dallas, May 18,
1959.
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ship in the Invisible Empire.54 Despite the presence of
some dissension among Klansmen over the passage of the
antimask law, the Klan in Oklahoma was a well-defined
bloc of determined voters, ready to proceed to greater con-
quests in 1924 and, specifically, to renew the fight with its
prime enemy, Walton.
In the spring the Klan fortified its power by sweeping
to victory in several hard-fought city elections in north-
eastern Oklahoma. Tulsa, Okmulgee, Muskogee, Sand
Springs, and other towns continued under the dominance
of the Klan element.55 As the summer approached, the
Klansmen readied themselves for the race for United States
Senator, in which, again, the Klan faced Walton. As Wesley
E. Disney had predicted, the ex-governor, charging be-
trayal in that he was "elected by a majority of 50,000 and
put out by 40," returned to the political wars in search of
the Senate seat being vacated by the retiring Democrat
Robert L. Owen.56
From the outset Walton's calnpaign speeches consisted
almost solely of harangues against the Klan. His especial
targets were the pro-Klan Protestant Ininisters in the state.
"If they would preach love and neighborliness instead of
this vicious doctrine," declared the Klan-fighter, "we
wouldn't be in the state we're in now."57 The Klan matched
him barb for barb. While he was speaking at Heavener, in
southeastern Oklahoma, several hundred Klansmen inter-
rupted him and marched for half an hour around the plat-
form on which he was standing. The white-robed but un-
masked Klansmen carried a banner reading "We'll have no
Jack in the Senate." After the demonstrators tired, Walton
finished his speech.58
54 Duffus, "Ku Klux Klan in the Middle West," 364.
55 Tulsa Tribune, February 29, March 4, 8, 13, 19, April 2, 8,
9, 1924.
56 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, December 1, 1923.
57 Tulsa Tribune, July 12, 1924.
58 New York Times, June 28, 1924, p. 7.
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From either Klan or anti-Klan vantage points it soon be-
came apparent that Walton was running a strong race. It
looked as if many Oklahomans who could not wait to oust
Walton the previous fall now felt that he would be less ob-
jectionable in Washington than in Oklahoma City. If they
were going to beat back this new threat from Walton, the
Klansmen had to form ranks behind one of Walton's two
principal opponents, Representative E. B. Howard, a Klan
member and elected with the help of the Tulsa Klan in
1922, or Charles G. Wrightsman, also of Tulsa, a reform-
minded millionaire oilman. Wrightsman received the en-
dorsement of the remnants of the Farmer-Labor Reconstruc-
tion League, whose leaders now thoroughly repudiated
Walton. One of the favorite diversions of political ob-
servers in the state was guessing whether Howard or
Wrightsman would get the official nod of the Klan. Most
of the bets were on Howard, an admitted Klansman. On
the night of July 29, with N. Clay Jewett out of the state,
a group of Klan officials, headed by Exalted Cyclops Wil-
liam Shelley Rogers of the Tulsa Klan, listened to a speech
by Howard in a park outside Oklahoma City. The Klans-
men then adopted a resolution declaring their support for
the Tulsa Representative. The next day, however, Jewett
denounced the resolution as completely unauthorized and
meaningless. "The Klan is not placing its endorsement on
any man," said Jewett. C:'There is not a single candidate
running in the Democratic primary upon whom the Klan
felt it could put its approval."59
Only two days before the primaries, on August 2, the
weekly Fiery Cross, published in Oklahoma City as the
official organ of state headquarters, came out officially for
Wrightsman. The editorial, while specifying that Wrights-
man was not a Klansman, urged members of the order:
"Don't split the votes Tuesday. [The nominee] will be
59 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 18, 29, 1924; Tulsa
Tribune, July 29, 1924.
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Jack Walton unless the electorate swings solidly to Charles
J. Wrightsman. He is the best man in the race. Why not
support him?" This had all the appearances of the long-
awaited Klan endorsement. But then, to the amazement
of hooded Knights over the state, on the eve of the pri-
maries Jewett sent telegrams to every local Klan in the
state, ordering Klansmen to vote for Howard. "Howard is
a Klansman," read the telegrams. C:C:We stand with him be-
cause we believe he can win." The Grand Dragon's edict
came too late for most Klansmen to make a statement, but
Cyclops W. R. Sampson of the Muskogee Klan announced
that he would continue to back Wrightsman.60
What was behind Jewett's confusing maneuvers? The
bulk of the evidence indicates that the Grand Dragon, a
devout Republican, deliberately used the power of his of-
fice to befuddle obedient Klansmen, cripple the Klan's
chances of beating Walton, and thus strengthen the chances
of Okmulgee oilman W. B. Pine, the unopposed Republican
senatorial candidate, at the general election in November.
And this was precisely the result of Jewett's turnabout.
With the Klan vote disrupted, Walton, pulling heavy ma-
jorities in the rural areas and in Oklahoma County, won
the nomination with 91,510 votes to 83,922 for Howard.
Wrightsman finished a poor fourth behind Thomas B. Gore,
the blind former United States Senator. In the county pri-
maries, however, the Klan managed to sustain its unity,
thus perpetuating its control in many counties, including
the two most populous, Tulsa and Oklahoma.61
The daily newspapers over the state were nearly unani-
mous in expressing their disgust over Walton's nomination
and blaming the indecisiveness of the Klan for his trium-
phant return. C:C:Say what he will and damn the Klan as he
60 Tulsa Tribune, August 3, 4, 1924; Oklahoma City Daily Okla-
homan, same dates.
61 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 2, 6, 1924; Tulsa Trib-
une, August 8, 1924; Edwin C. McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History
of the Sooner State (Norman, 1954), 350.
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will," grumbled the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, "the
best political friend that J. C. Walton ever had, the only
political asset that he has today is the Invisible Empire."62
The Tulsa Tribune, which had endorsed Wrightsman, ob-
served that "All Jewett accomplished ... was the nomina-
tion of Walton, and the injection of the Klan issue into the
final [general election] campaign."63 Attacked from all
sides, the Grand Dragon tried to answer the angry Klans-
men and other anti-Walton voters who suddenly found
Walton leading the Oklahoma Democracy into the Novem-
ber election. Jewett's mouthpiece, the Fiery Cross, claimed
that Jewett had the Klan weekly initially sanction Wrights-
man only as a trial balloon. The Dragon then discovered
that most Klan members favored Howard, whereupon he
began trying to line up the Democratic Klansmen behind
the Tulsa Representative. "The Grand Dragon merely de-
sired to get the opinion of the majority and abide by their
decision," reported the official publication of state head-
quarters. "In this instance the majority wanted Howard.
The state office merely carried out the wishes of the ma-
jority."64
This explanation failed to satisfy most Klansmen. An es-
pecially incensed group of Knights was concentrated in
Tulsa and was led by State Senator Wash E. Hudson, an
enemy of Jewett since the special legislative session of the
previous fall. Hudson called for a renunciation of "partisan
politics" and a return to the Klan's "great mission of pa-
triotism, brotherly love and Christianity." Proclaiming ~~We
will be God's men or Jewett's slaves," the florid Hudson
formed a ~(Klansman's Klean-up Kommittee" to purify the
Oklahoma Klan. Jewett announced his suspension from the
Klan as Hudson began holding a series of conferences in
Tulsa with about 350 Klansmen from over the state.65
62 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 9, 1924.
63 Tulsa Tribune, August 15, 1924.
64 Oklahoma City Fiery Cross, quoted ibid., August 8, 1924.
65 Tulsa Tribune, September 1, 8, 17, 18, 22, 24, 1924.
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On September 24 Hudson and the rebellious faction drew
up a list of demands and sent them to Grand Dragon Jewett,
who was in Kansas City attending the second Imperial
Klonvocation, the biennial national convention of the Klan.
The disgruntled Klansmen demanded the withdrawal of
the Klan from politics and the institution of more democ-
racy into the Klan's rigidly hierarchial structure. Jewett
termed the demands "amusing." Imperial Wizard Evans
quickly gave Jewett a vote of confidence and denied that
the Hudson faction had the right to submit anything to the
Wizard or the Klonvocation. Before the delegates in Kan-
sas City, however, Evans announced that hereafter his ap-
pointment of a Grand Dragon would have to be ratified by
all the local Klans in a state. In Tulsa, Hudson was jubi-
lant. This, he enthused, was the first step toward the demo-
cratic reform of the Klan.66
As the Klonvocation adjourned, William Shelley Rogers,
the Tulsa Cyclops and another foe of Jewett, told reporters
that harmony again reigned in the Oklahoma Klan and that
all Klansmen who were Democrats would vote against Wal-
ton in November. This made official what most people had
expected since the August primary-that Oklahoma Knights
of the Invisible Empire, like their brethren in Texas, were
preparing to bolt the Democratic party. Walton's place at
the head of the state ticket caused not only Klansmen, but
many other Democrats, to do a good deal of soul-searching.
The state central committee refused to draw up a party
platform for the November contest. With obvious trepida-
tion it endorsed Walton for the senatorship. As one news-
paper described it, "Holding its nose, shutting the eyes and
making one big gulp of the bad medicine, the Democratic
state central committee yesterday swallowed Jack Wal-
t0l1."67
In the general election campaign "Democrats for Pine"
66 Ibid., September 25, 26, 27, 1924.
67 Ibid., August 10, September 26, 1924.
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clubs sprang up throughout the state, and a number of
hitherto stanchly Democratic newspapers joined the Klans-
men and other ballot-splitting Democrats. Walton also had
his loyal followers. A bipartisan "Anti-Klan Association of
Oklahoma" tried its best to unify Klan-haters behind
the Democratic nominee. Governor Martin E. Trapp an-
nounced that he was supporting Walton as the lesser of
two evils. To minimize vote fraud he ordered all county
election boards to appoint an equal number of Klan and
anti-Klan representatives to the precinct returning boards.68
The first returns made it clear that enough Democrats
had crossed party lines to crush Walton's hopes for going to
Washington. .t\s the rest of the Democratic ticket, includ-
ing presidential candidate John W. Davis, swept Oklahoma,
Pine piled up an enormous lead over Walton, finishing with
339,646 votes to 196,417 for the ousted governor. Pine be-
came the state's second Republican Senator. Walton car-
ried only ten counties, most of them in the southern and
southeastern part of the state. The Democrats retained
control of most of the county governments and sent a large
majority of Democratic representatives and senators, many
of them still Klan-oriented, to the state legislature.69
After the election, in which Democratic Klansmen had
helped mightily to send a Republican to the United States
Senate, Grand Dragon Jewett congratulated the Oklahoma
Klan on turning back the menace of Walton. "But now
that our most pressing duty to country is fulfilled," con-
cluded Jewett, "it is but the part of wisdom that we turn
our attention to our second duty, that of building up and
strengthening the order. We have been busy being citizens
68 Ibid., September 9, 1924; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, Sep-
tember 15, October 13, November 3, 4, 1924; Eufala Indian Journal,
September 11, 1924. On the origins of the Anti-Klan Association of
Oklahoma, see the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, December 1, 2,
9, 1923, February 23, 29, 1924.
69 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 5, 7, 1924; New
York Times, November 6, 1924, p. 1; McReynolds, Oklahoma, 351.
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of Oklahoma. Now let us get busy being citizens of the
INVISIBLE E~IPIRE, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN."70
But with the election past and their enemy at least tem-
porarily banished, many Democrats in the Klan, who could
not forget Jewett's political meanderings before the Demo-
cratic primary, turned their wrath on the Grand Dragon.
One prominent Klansman put into words what numerous
other Oklahoma Knights were thinking.
Carlton Weaver, a newspaper publisher in Wilburton
and head of the local Klan, wrote a letter of resignation to
Jewett. In the letter Weaver took the Dragon to task "for
degenerating the organization in Oklahoma, into a political
machine with a Republican Engineer at the throttle, pur-
pose to discredit, disrupt and demoralize the Democratic
party in the state." Weaver charged that Jewett deliber-
ately "gummed up" the senatorial race with his' bewilder-
ing tactics before the Democratic primary. «A ten year old
school boy should have had sense enough to know that this
procedure served to divide and confuse the Klan vote,
rather than unite and solidify it," wrote the bitter Klans-
man, "and as a result of your mehtod [sic], many Klansmen
in Oklahoma believed that your purpose was to promote
the nomination of Jack Walton in order to insure the elec-
tion of a Republican in November." Weaver went on to
accuse Jewett of working clandestinely to swing Oklahoma
to Calvin Coolidge in the presidential election. "I love the
Democratic party next to my church," said Weaver as he
bade farewell to the Invisible Empire, "and I do not want
a Republican dictating to it and enforcing himself in its
counsels and organizations. . . . Oklahoma has ridden it-
self of Jack Walton.... I submit to you that the next best
accomplishment for the people of this state will be to kick
the Klan out of Oklahoma politics, that it may function as
a fraternal organization with its members voting as their
70 Oklahoma City Fiery Cross, November 12, 1924.
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conscience dictates and not as they are advised by a parti-
san dragon."71
The bizarre events of 1924, climaxing in Pine's landslide
victory over Walton, did not mark the last of the Klan's
dabbling in Oklahoma politics, but henceforth the order
was seldom capable of acting as an independent force in
primaries and elections. Jewett, the Republican Grand
Dragon, may have got his wish with the election of a sec-
ond Republican to the United States Senate from Okla-
homa, but in the process his influence in Sooner State Klan
affairs was destroyed'.
The Klan in the Southwest never again brandished the
power at the state or even at the local and district level that
it did from 1922 to 1924. Although more significant as an is-
sue than as an organization in the 1923-1924 gubernatorial
campaign in Louisiana, the Klan still represented a potent
faction to be absorbed, mitigated, and exploited in the pre-
vailing political equilibrium. With its leadership and its
votes divided between two candidates, the Louisiana Klan
lost much of its crusading spirit and defensive solidarity, a
development heralding its downfall. In Arkansas the de-
termination of the Grand Dragon to see his favorite get
the Klan's endorsement for governor led to a division of
Klan voting strength and the frustration of its political am-
bitions. The Realm of Texas, ruled by an equally stubborn
Dragon, was also plagued by dissension over the Klan's
choice of a candidate for governor. No formal split oc-
curred in the ranks of Texas Klansmen, but an anti-Klan
coalition sent the Klan candidate to defeat at the hands of
an impeached governor's wife. It is almost a certainty that
the Grand Dragon of Oklahoma, like the Realm leader in
Arkansas a Republican, purposefully confused Klansmen
71 Klansman [Carlton Weaver] to N. C. Jewett, Grand Dragon of
the Ku Klux Klan, Realm of Oklahoma, November 1924, Carlton
Weaver Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Oklahoma
Library, Norman.
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before the Democratic primary so that Walton would win
the Democratic nomination for United States Senator and
thus make possible the election of a Republican to the Sen-
ate in November. To turn back Walton, Democratic Klans-
men dutifully followed their Grand Dragon into the Re-
publican party, but after the election the Oklahoma Knights
felt free to denounce and repudiate their Republican
leader.
The political struggles of 1924 illumined the perilous path
that a secret society like the Klan had to follow in its evolu-
tion from a vigilante body into a militant, yet more respect-
able and less cohesive, political organization. The clash be-
tween the personal ambitions of politicians and the demo-
cratic ideal on one hand, and the ramrod tactics of the Klan
autocrats on the other, severely and irreparably crippled the
order in Texas, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. In the
years after 1924 disillusionment, decline, and disintegration
were the main characteristics of Klan history in the South-
west.
10.
The Road to Obscurity
DURING THE LAST HALF of the 1920s the Klan fell
apart in the states of the Southwest, and nearly everywhere
else. There were many reasons for this collapse, some of
which will be noted in the succeeding chapter. One of the
greatest maladies was dissension. Inner strife, beginning in
1924 on a critical scale and continuing for several more
years, sapped the order in each of the southwestern states.
Only in Oklahoma did the Klan retain anything like its old
vigor, and even there the organization speedily fell into
disrepute. By 1926 each political party in Oklahoma was
trying to saddle the other with the onus of Klanism. The
decline of the Klan in the Southwest roughly paralleled the
ebbing of the Klan tide in other parts of the nation. Klan
activity virtually ceased in such once-strong states as In-
diana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Colorado, and even Georgia, the
mother state of the Klan. By 1928 the Klan in Louisiana,
Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma-and almost everywhere except
Alaban1a-\vas a hollow and unfrightening shell of the pow-
erful body that had existed a few years earlier.1
In Louisiana the process of decomposition began as far
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back as the spring of 1924. cCPeace" was the keynote at the
opening of the second regular session of the Louisiana Gen-
eral Assembly, on May 12, 1924.2 Henry L. Fuqua, nomi-
nated in February and elected in April by an alliance of the
New Orleans machine, most of the Klan vote, most of the
industrial and planter interests, and the majority of the
non-Klan Protestant politicians, came into office on a plat-
form emphasizing peace and harmony, and very little else.
Fuqua had, however, pledged that his administration would
enact laws to regulate the activities of secret organizations;
and in supporting the Baton Rouge man for governor many
Klansmen, including several in the state legislature, had
obligated themselves to work for such legislation or at least
to acquiesce in it. This \-vas the dilemma confronting the
Louisiana Klan as the legislature convened and undertook
the organization of the senate and house of representatives.
Compromise was the order of the day in Louisiana gov-
ernn1ent and politics, and the Fuqua administration achieved
its objectives. A "moderate" Klansman from Shreveport, a
Fuqua worker, was elected speaker of the house; a Catholic
supporter of Hewitt Bouanchaud in the recent primaries
became president pro telTI of the senate; and a former Klans-
man, Oramel H. Simpson of New Orleans, sat in the lieu-
tenant governor's chair..A.s the New Orleans Times-Picayune
remarked facetiously, "Peace, peace, beautiful religious
peace, envelops the Louisiana legislature tonight."3
1 Alabama presents something of a case of arrested Klan develop-
lnent. The order began to grow and attract attention in that state
only when it was declining almost everywhere else. The Alabama
Klan was probably more important in the anti-AI Smith movement in
1928 than the Klan organization in any other state. On Klan history
in Alabama in the late twenties, see Arnold S. Rice, The Ku Klux
Klan in American Politics (Washington, 1962), 88-99; and R. A.
Patton, "A Ku Klux Klan Reign of Terror," Current History, XXVIII
(April 1928),51-55.
2 The legislative session of 1924 was the second regular session
under the Louisiana constitution of 1921.
a New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 13, 1924.
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Little more than a week of the legislative session had
passed when three antimask and secrecy bills were intro-
duced simultaneously in the house and senate. A Catholic
presented the bills to the members of the house, while an
admitted Klansman brought the measures before the senate.
The bills provided for the publication of the membership
of all secret organizations operating within the state in
December of each year, a 1-to-5 year penitentiary sentence
for masked assaults, and a misdemeanor penalty for ap-
pearing publicly while disguised, the Mardi Gras holiday
excepted. Monroe Klan No.4 telegraphed its endorsement
of the bills to the state senator and the two representatives
from Ouachita Parish. Great Titan Paul D. Perkins of Lake
Charles commented that the bills were sound and should
pass the General Assembly unanimously.4
Not all Klansmen, however, were so enthusiastic over the
anti-Klan bills. Throughout north Louisiana and in the
legislature there were Klansmen who had backed Huey P.
Long in the first Democratic gubernatorial campaign, had
reluctantly swung to Fuqua in his runoff race with Catholic
Bouanchaud, and now recognized no obligation to accept
legislation inimical to their organization simply to fulfill a
political bargain made by some of their fellow Klansmen.
Dr. E. L. Thompson, for example, pastor of the Central
Christian Church and leader of the Klan in Shreveport,
blasted the whole legislative attempt to regulate the order
as a Catholic plot. The publication of the Klan's member-
ship rolls, the pastor predicted, would lead to boycotting of
Klan businessmen throughout the state and retaliatory
boycotting by Klansmen against Catholic and Jewish mer-
chants.5
Opposition to the attempt to regulate the Klan, both
inside and outside the legislature, centered on the member-
ship registration measure. On June 2 the Louisiana house
4 Ibid., May 21, 23, 28, 1924.
5 Ibid., May 30, June 1, 1924.
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passed the three administration bills-by a vote of 91 to 3
on the prohibition of mask-wearing, 97 to 0 on the outlawry
of masked assault, and 80 to 17 on the registration require-
ment. All of the representatives who voted against the
antisecrecy bill were from the central and northern Loui-
siana parishes. The senate passed the bill to restrict mask-
wearing by a vote of 37 to 2; the bill to make masked assault
a felony passed 36 to 3. An acrid debate broke out over the
membership registration bill. It finally passed the senate by
a vote of 28 to 11. Again the opposition to the bill came
mainly from the upstate Klan and pro-Klan legislators who
had not ridden the Fuqua bandwagon in the gubernatorial
campaign. Governor Fuqua signed the three bills into law
on June 12, 1924.6
The Imperial hierarchy in Atlanta was highly indignant
over the passage of the bills. The membership registration
law particularly alarmed Atlanta because one of the Klan's
greatest assets, one of its most effective weapons, was the
secret character of its membership.7 What upset Hiram W.
Evans and his associates most was the fact that some
allegedly devout Klansmen inside and outside the Louisi-
ana legislature, including most of the state Klan officials,
had actually encouraged and advocated the measure. This
the Imperial Klan could not tolerate. Evans named an
"Imperial Representative" to discover what was behind the
betrayal of the Klan's most sacred tenet. The representative,
Jalnes Murray of Shreveport, announced that the Klansmen
6 Ibid., June 3, 12, 13, 1924; Louisiana General Assembly, Hoose
Journal, Second Regular Session (1924), 55-56, 74-75, 89-90, 115-16,
126-28, 137-40, 285-88, 314-15; Senate Journal, 84-85, 92-93, 125-26,
128-29, 170-72, 181-83, 184-85.
7 The Louisiana membership registration law followed by a year
the passage of a similar law by the assembly of the state of New
York. That law required organizations not incorporated in the state
to file membership lists and other records. See "The Klan Defies a
State," Literary Digest, LXXVII (June 9, 1923), 12-13; New York
Times, ~1ay 5, 1923, p. 3, May 28, p. 1, June 2, p. 13, June 23,
p. 13, July 12, p. 1, July 24, p. 1, August 20, p. 2.
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who had helped push the anti-Klan laws through the legisla-
ture would soon be expelled from the order.s
In late July, when he came to Shreveport for the second
Klorero, or state convention, of the Klan in Louisiana, Evans
did not mention the rumored banishment of the Klan
leaders or the anti-Klan laws, except to remark darkly:
"The honest people of Louisiana can be depended upon to
care for those who came in sheep's clothing and betrayed
the organization that relied on their promises." While he
was in Shreveport, however, as he had promised, Evans
carried out the fraternal execution of the errant Klansmen
whose deviation from true Klankraft had aroused his anger.
The Klorero was in the midst of choosing delegates to the
Imperial Klonvocation, to be held in Kansas City in Sep-
tember, when Evans walked into the meeting room in the
Youree Hotel. Without fanfare he announced the expulsion
of Grand Dragon Carey P. Duncan; Great Titans Thomas
F. DePaoli, R. Will Germany, and Perkins; Grand Kludd
(state chaplain) C. C. Miller of Baton Rouge; and Grand
Kligrapp (state secretary) Clayton P. Spring of Shreveport.
This broke up the formal session of the Klorero and left
the Louisiana Klan without a state hierarchy.9
From Shreveport, Evans and his retinue went to Alex-
andria, stronghold of the Klan supporters of Long. There
the Wizard met with about fifty or so prominent Klansmen
still in his favor. He named a three-man committee, con-
sisting of William C. Barnette of Shreveport, Robert D.
Ellis of Amite, and Swords R. Lee of Alexandria, to govern
the Realm.10
Having purged the Klansmen who had cooperated with
the Fuqua administration, Evans turned to the matter of
circumventing the law requiring publication of the Klan's
9 Shreveport Journal, August 11, 1924; New Orleans Times-
Picayune, August 12, 1924.
If) New Orleans Times-Picayune, August 17, 1924.
8 New Orleans Times-Picayune, June 14, 1924.
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membership rolls. His strategy was rather simple. He had
all the local Klans in Louisiana, together with the district
and state offices, transfer their records membership lists,
and regalia to Atlanta. All Klansmen relinquished their old
membership cards and received new cards designating them
"Imperial Klansmen" rather than Klansmen in the Realm
of Louisiana. Each local Klan retained a skeletal member-
ship consisting of its officers and perhaps one or two other
leading Klansmen. Thus while the chapters and their officers
remained under the jurisdiction of the state of Louisiana,
the great majority of Klansmen in the state, by joining the
"back to Atlanta" movement, escaped the provisions of the
membership registration law. The same procedure was
followed for the Women of the Ku Klux Klan, so that by
the end of 1924 practically all the Klansmen and Klans-
women in Louisiana were of the Imperial stripe.11
In December the Klan and Women of the Klan filed their
membership lists with the secretary of state. The list for
the women's order showed eighteen chapters and 191 mem-
bers in the state organization. The list for the Klan, sworn
to by Barnette as "chairman of the state committee," named
sixty-one local Klans and 432 Klansmen as still belonging to
the state organization.12 The New Orleans Klan, Old
Hickory Klan No.1, did not appear on the membership
list. Perhaps it had been disbanded. Or because of De-
Paoli's close association with it, perhaps its charter had been
revoked.
Hence by making most of the members of the Klan in
Louisiana cClmperial Klansmen" the order managed to evade
the provisions of the state registration law and escape hav-
ing its membership in the Pelican State brought into public
view. The great wave of boycotting which the Reverend
11 Ibid., November 15, December 31, 1924.
12 Shreveport Journal, December 18, 30, 1924; New Orleans Times-
Picayune, December 29, 1924, January I, 1925.
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Dr. Thompson and others had predicted never occurred;
indeed the registration requirement scarcely affected the
activities of .the Klan in· Louisiana. c1he anti-klan forces
... ·took· good .~iin, pulled the trigger, and now find
they hit every organization in the state except the one they
were shooting at," observed the Times-Picayune.13 The
effect of the antimask law was also negligible. As the mem-
bership of the order continued to decline, the Klansmen
found few occasions for staging their famous mass demon-
strations. On February 24, 1925, Mardi Gras, hooded and
masked Knights and Klanswomen paraded and frolicked in
several towns over the state.14 The next year Mardi Gras
passed without any Klan activity.
After 1924 the Klan declined rapidly in Louisiana. The
second membership list filed by the Klan, made public early
in 1926, showed fifty chapters in the state, a loss of eleven
since the previous registration. When Evans returned to
Shreveport, a reporter asked him about the condition of the
Klan in Louisiana and in the nation as a whole. By this
time the Wizard's attitude was a far cry from his embullient
mood of a year and a half earlier. cCThe Klan is a secret
organization that minds its own business,:" was Evans curt
reply. And a federal prohibition agent recalled that during
the height of Klan power in Louisiana government agents
freqently received information from Klan sources about
bootlegging activities in the northern part of the state.
c'Nowadays nothing indicates Klan inspiration of infor-
mants," said the federal man. By mid-1926 probably no
more than 6,500 Klansmen were still active in Louisiana.
What about Morehouse Klan No. 34, whose violent deeds
were detailed in virtually every daily newspaper in the
country during 1922 and 1923? cCKlan activities in More-
house Parish appear to have subsided," wrote an Arkansas
13 New Orleans Times-Picayune, November 15, 1924.
14 Shreveport Journal, January. 7, February 24, 25, 1925.
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observer in the late summer of 1926, cCand the name of
Captain Skipwith, head of the local Klan, seldom is
mentioned."15
Within two or three years after the passage of the
anti-Klan laws and the outbreak of strife within the Realm
hierarchy, the Louisiana Klan ·Jia~. folded up except in
Shreveport and a few other ..places.·'The Realm organization
was still alive. Murray, .Cyclops of Shreveport Klan No.2,
served as Grand Dragon' during 1926; in February of the
next year Rush H. Davis, also of Shreveport, was appointed
Dragon by the Imperial Wizard. But now only occasional
lectures or social events comprised the business of the
scattered chapters. "Members of the Ku Klux Klan and
their families were guests at a watermelon feast at the
fair grounds Thursday night," read a typical report on
Louisiana Klan doings in the late twenties. "After the feast
a musical program, including songs and specialty num-
bers [,] was rendered at the dance pavilion.')16 There were
only a few. Klansmen left to raise the cry of battle when Al
Smith ran for the presidency in 1928, but together with
ex-Klansmen and sympathizers they could make a fairly
loud noise.
In Arkansas the disintegration of the Klan was even more
rapid. The outbursts of Jim G. Ferguson against the James
A. Comer regime, the split of the Klan vote, and the con-
sequent defeat of Lee Cazort in the 1924 gubernatorial
primary-these elements debilitated the Klan in Arkansas
and contributed to its breakup in the last half of the
twenties. In the fall of 1924 Comerites and anti-Comer
Klansmen in the Little Rock Klan managed to unite to put
over the Klan ticket in the city primary. Charles E. Moyer,
outgoing county judge, won the mayoralty nomination
15 Ibid., January 7, 16, 19~6; New York Times, February 21, 1926,
sec. VIII, p. 15; Washington Post, November 2, 1980, sec. I, p. 4;
Little Rock Arkansas Gazette;: September 6, 1926.
16 Shreveport Journal, Feb~ary 17, 19, September 7, 1927.
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fronl an infuriated Ben D. Brickhouse, who had been
elected with Klan support two years earlier, but who had
since broken with the secret order. In April 1925, at
Stuttgart in the Arkansas rice belt, the Klan ticket piled
up a S-to-l margin in the city election. But in Fort Smith,
where the Klan vote had ousted a hostile mayor in a recall
election in 1923, the list of candidates endorsed by the
Klansmen lost to the ticket of the local anti-Klan faction in
a contest that drew the largest vote in the city's history.17
The city primaries and elections in the winter and spring
of 1924-1925 were the last political adventures of the Klan
in Arkansas. Thereafter the local Klans had all they could
do to hold their memberships together. The backbone of
the Arkansas Klan, Little Rock Klan No.1, broke under the
strain of its running fight with Grand Dragon Comer. The
fight had its origins in the gubernatorial campaign of 1924
and in the charges that Comer was trying to ('Republicanize'~
Arkansas. Troubles during the summer of 1925, stemming
largely from developments within the Women of the Ku
Klux Klan, aggravated the bad feeling between the Grand
Dragon and Klan No.1.
From its inception the Women of the Ku Klux Klan
was something of a protectorate of Comer. In mid-1923,
when Imperial headquarters sanctioned the formation of a
women's order, Comer put $8,000 into the Women of the
Ku Klux Klan to get it started. The national offices of the
Women of the Klan were established on the second Hoar
of the Ancient Order of United Workmen hall in Little
Rock, where Comer closely supervised the affairs of the
new organization. Mrs. Lulu A. Markwell of Little Rock
was the first Imperial Commander. In June 1924 Mrs.
Markwell resigned abruptly, probably because of difficulties
with Comer. Miss Agnes B. Cloud of Dallas, as Imperial
17 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, November 8, 21, December 8, 16,
1924, April 8, 1925.
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Vice Commander, was the heiress apparent to the leadership
of the women's order. Instead Miss Robbie Gill of Little
Rock, the Imperial Secretary and a close acquaintance of
Comer, became Imperial Commander and moved the
order's national offices to a palatial home which she dubbed
the "Imperial Palace." A year later Miss Gill, an attractive,
dark-haired woman in her thirties, married Grand Dragon
Comer.18
Within a few weeks Miss Cloud and two other Dallas
Klanswomen, accusing the newlyweds of waste, extrava-
gance, and misappropriation of funds, filed suit against
them in chancery court in Little Rock. Miss Cloud asserted
that legally she was supposed to have succeeded Mrs.
Markwell as Imperial Commander, and that Mrs. Comer
was a usurper. The Imperial Commander and Grand
Dragon's wife notified the three rebellious Klanswomen
that they were suspended from the women's order, while
Evans telegraphed her and Comer that they had his full
support in the upcoming power struggle. In September the
plaintiffs filed an amended petition setting out their specific
charges: that Mrs. Comer, as Imperial Commander, had
received $17,850 in salary which should have gone to Miss
Cloud; that Mrs. Comer bought an expensive sedan for her
husband, using funds of the women's order; that she bought
an "Imperial Crown" worth $750; and that Comer had
received $18,000 in legal fees as Imperial Klonsel (attorney)
for the Women of the Klan. On October 3, 1925, Chan-
cellor John E. Martineau, who had run for governor
primarily as an anti-Klan candidate in the summer of
1924, refused to review the plaintiff's charges, holding that
he lacked jurisdiction in the dispute. He did rule that the
plaintiffs could examine the books of the Women of the
18 Emerson H. Loucks, The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsylvania: A Study
in Nativism (Harrisburg, 1936), 150, 160; Little Rock Arkansas
Gazette, June 30, 1925.
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Klan and file another amended petition setting out further
charges against the Comers.19
A few weeks later Little Rock Klan No. 1 and Rose City
Klan No.1, the women's chapter, broke with the Grand
Dragon. The night of November 5, 1925, the members of
the men's chapter adopted a resolution expressing a lack
of confidence in Comer, citing their unsuccessful efforts
to persuade him to resign, and proclaiming the secession
of the Little Rock chapter from the Klan and the formation
of a new organization. "His [Comer's] usefulness was at
an end and had been for many months, on account of
inactivity as leader of the state organization, and because
of loss of prestige," read the resolution. The new organiza-
tion was to feature "greater secrecy" and "utter banishment
of the spirit of monetary gain." Four days later the rebels
chartered their organization" the "Independent Klan," under
the laws of Arkansas. On November 11 most of the mem-
bership of Rose City Klan No.1 voted to follow the men
from the Invisible Empire and to organize as an auxiliary
to the Independent Klan. In their "ordinance of secession"
the women assailed Comer's dictatorial methods and the
dominance of the Women of the Ku Klux Klan by Klans-
men, most notably by Comer.20
The secession of the Little Rock Klansmen and Klans-
women added more litigation to the dockets of the courts
in the city. Little Rock Klan No. 1 filed replevin suits in
circuit court for the regalia and records taken by the
"Independent" Klansmen when they seceded, and also for
the use of a tabernacle which had been the meeting place
of the men's and women's chapters for Some time. The
Imperial Klan filed an injunction suit in chancery court to
restrain the splinter group from using the name "Klan."
19 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, August 30, September 1, 7, 8,
16, October 1, 4, 1925.
20 Ibid., November 6, 8, 10, 11, 1925.
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The secessionists got around this last dispute simply by
changing the name of their organization to the "Mystic
Knights of Arkansas." The circuit court judge decided the
replevin suits by awarding the records and regalia to the
Little Rock Klan and having the chapter pay Robert A.
Cook of the Mystic Knights $315 in back rent on the
tabernacle, which Cook owned.21
The settlement of the litigation resulting from the split
in the Little Rock men='s and women='s Klans left only the
legal battle for control of the Women of the Ku Klux Klan.
After examining the accounts of the women's organization,
Miss Cloud filed another amended petition before Chan-
cellor Martineau. This time she accused the Comers of
fraudulent bookkeeping; of piling up a deficit of $70,000
in a seven-month period; of enjoying excessive profits from
the sale of a robe factory owned by Comer in Little Rock,
valued at $23,000, to the Women of the Klan for almost
$73,000; and of numerous instances of petty graft relating
to expenses for furniture, travel, an automobile, and other
items. Chancellor Martineau, soon to become the Demo-
cratic nominee for governor, overruled the Comers' de-
murrers to the charges and eventually appointed a special
master in chancery to hear the case. On October 8, 1926,
the special master dismissed the suit because the plaintiff
could not raise $250 for court costs. In February of the
next year Miss Cloud dropped a suit she had filed in circuit
court for the salary Mrs. Comer received after becoming
Imperial Commander.22 This action brought an end to the
court fights between various factions of Klansmen and
Klanswomen in Arkansas.
Mrs. Comer remained Imperial Commander of the Women
of the Ku Klux Klan, wWle Comer carried on as Grand
21 Ibid., November 18, December 13, 17, 18, 1925, January 23,
27, February 23, March 6, 1926.
22 Ibid., January 31, February 19, August 18, 20, October 8, 1926,
February 12, 1927.
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Dragon of the Realm of Arkansas. Yet in Arkansas they
presided over a crumbling portion of the Invisible Empire.
By the early part of 1926 there were fewer than 10,000
active Klansmen in the Realm.23 Most of the Klansmen in
Little Rock had gone into the Mystic Knights of Arkansas.
Klans in Stuttgart, Arkadelphia, Conway, Fort Smith,
Helena, and a few other places remained active with
drastically shrunken memberships. The Little Rock chapter
of the Women of the Ku Klux Klan was still carrying on
charity work in the city as late as the spring of 1927.24
The reVOlt, among the Klansmen and Klanswomen did not
connote any division along ideological lines. The Mystic
Knights and their women~s auxiliary on one hand and the
Little Rock Klansmen and Klanswomen on the other
shared the same feelings about Catholics, Jews, Negroes,
foreigners, and libertines. So it was possible for Imperial
Wizard Evans to return to the city in the fall of 1926 and to
speak to Klansmen, Klanswomen, and cCformer members,"
including many of the secessionists, on the Klan program
for the next two years. The Wizard emphasized the Klan~s
concern with stricter enforcement of the prohibition amend-
ment, the upbuilding of the public school system, and, most
important, a fight to the death to prevent the election of
Smith to the presidency.25 Two years later, when Smith
was a presidential candidate, many Klansmen, ex-Klansmen,
Mystic Knights, and ex-Mystic Knights were ready to vote
against him.
No sensational episodes like the banishment of several
Realm officials in Louisiana or the secession of Klansmen
and Klanswomen in Little Rock punctuated the collapse of
the Klan in Texas. During the last half of the twenties a
few ambitious noises emanated from the Texas part of the
23 New York Times, February 21, 1926, sec. VIII, pp. 1, 15.
24 Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, April 22, 1927.
25 Ibid., November 12, 1926.
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Invisible Empire, but for the most part the order passed
its last years in the Lone Star State rather quietly.
The Texas Klan suffered a crushing defeat in the summer
and fall of 1924, when Mrs. Miriam A. cCMa" Ferguson won
the Democratic gubernatorial nomination over Klansman
Felix D. Robertson, and then triumphed over the Republi-
can candidate, who received most of the Klan vote in the
general election. The Klan never again functioned as an
organization in Texas politics, at either the state or local
level. The prestige of the order in Texas disappeared almost
overnight. Politicians who had tagged along with the Klan
for years suddenly deserted the organization, and people
who had cringed in terror before the specter of the hooded
fraternity now turned vengefully on it. Two mysterious
explosions followed by fire destroyed the Fort Worth Klan's
showplace Klavern, constructed at a cost of $50,000 and
seating 4,000 people; and incendiaries made three unsuc-
cessful attempts to burn Beethoven Hall, the rented head-
quarters of San Antonio Klan No. 31.26
In December of 1924 Z. E. Marvin, apparently yielding to
growing resentment within the Realm over the disastrous
events of the year, resigned from the office of Grand
Dragon. He was succeeded by Marvin A. Childers of San
Antonio, lawyer and high-ranking Texas Mason, who moved
Realm headquarters from Dallas to San Antonio and abol-
ished the office of Great Titan of Province No.2, occupied
in the past by such lights as Evans and Marvin.27 Marvin's
retirement and the removal of Realm offices from Dallas to
San Antonio signaled the end of the dominance of Texas
Klan affairs by the Dallas Klan.
The 39th Texas Legislature, showing an extraordinarily
heavy turnover from the previous Klan-oriented legislature,
was generally hostile to the Klan. For once trying to follow
26 Fort Worth Star-Telegra1n, November 7, 1924; San Antonio Ex-
press, November 22, 1924.
27 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, December 18, 1924.
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the specific mandate of the state Democratic platform, the
solons sought to enact laws prohibiting the wearing of
masks in public and requiring the registration of secret
organization membership lists. A membership registration
bill died on the calendar of the state senate as the session
ended. But the legislature did succeed in passing a stiff
antimask bill, by votes of 84-22 in the house and 25-1 in the
senate. Governor Ferguson, enjoying one of the most
harmonious legislative sessions in Texas history, signed the
bill into law on March 7, 1925.28
One estimate placed the number of Klansmen in Texas
in mid-1925 at nearly 80,000, which represented a drop of
perhaps one-half from the previous year.29 But the dissolu-
tion had just begun. In October, Dallas Klan No. 66
banished Marvin after he had a bitter quarrel with the
chapter leaders, evidently over his failure to be elected
Exalted Cyclops of the local Klan. Marvin retired to attend
to his chain of drugstores and his real estate holdings in
Dallas. The next month Imperial Klan headquarters under-
took an investigation of the financial affairs of Klan No. 66.
The inquiry showed that the chapter accounts were in
chaotic condition, with dues lagging, expenditures un-
itemized, and funds withheld from the Imperial treasury.
To the Evans regime such circumstances were inexcusable.
Atlanta demanded that the local Klans conform at all times
to Imperial requirements in financial matters. National
headquarters took charge of. the funds of the Dallas Klan,
placing a supervisor with the authority of a receiver in
complete control. While the Imperial investigators were
in Texas, they looked into the records of Fort Worth Klan
No. 101, and they found ineptness and mismanagement
similar to that in the accounts of the Dallas Klan. Once
2839th Texas Legislature, 110use Journal, Regular Session, 46,
906-907; General Laws of the State of Texas, Regular Session, 39th
Legislature, 213-14.
29 Washington Post, November 2, 1930, sec. I, p. 4.
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again Imperial Wizard Evans appointed a supervisor to
administer the affairs of a sick chapter.30
Marvin, no\v outside the Invisible Empire, told a news-
paper reporter that conditions were uniformly bad in the
Realm of Texas. He said that the membership of the Dallas
Klan, once the largest chapter in the Southwest and pos-
sibly the largest in the nation, had dwindled from 13,000
in 1924 to 1,200. The attendance at the weekly Konklaves
once ranged from 800 to 3,500; now scarcely 150 attended.
"This condition prevails over the State of Texas," observed
Marvin. C'At the opening of the year [1926] not a province
in Texas could pay its help. In Texas there are not 18,000
members."31
The Texas Klan held its annual Kloreros in 1925 (at
Arlington) and in 1926 (at Temple). The latter gathering
combined the attendance of both Klansmen and Klans-
\vomen, and was open to all members of the men's and
women's orders in the state, whereas previous Kloreros in
Texas were open only to authorized delegates from the
chartered Klans. Attendance was belo\v expectations at the
outdoor meeting, held in a park owned by Temple Klan
No. 33. The men and women who came watched drills
and an aerial circus, listened to band concerts, and heard
nativist orations by Lloyd P. Bloodworth of Fort Worth,
now Grand Dragon, Imperial Klazik H. Kyle Ramsey, and
Imperial Commander Robbie Gill Comer. All the speakers
predicted a bright future for the Klan in America. But the
Klorero of 1926, probably the last ever held in the Realm
of Texas, looked more like a big picnic than a rally of
detern1ined superpatriots.32
The Klan no longer functioned in politics, but it could
30 Dallas ~lorning News, October 11, November 29, 1925; New
York Times, February 21, 1926, sec. VIII, p. 1; Fort Worth Star-
Telegra1n, January 31, 1926.
:n ~l'W York Tinles, February 21, 1926, sec. VIII, p. 1.
~~:! Fort 'Vorth Star-Telegram, September 11, 12, 13, 1925; Waco
Tinles-IleraZd, July 29, 30, 1926.
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still serve as an albatross to hang around the neck of a
political enemy. In the 1926 gubernatorial campaign Fer-
guson and his wife, under heavy fire for their extravagant
use of the pardoning power and accused of gross mis-
handling of state finances, resurrected the Klan issue to
use against their chief opponent in the Democratic pri-
maries, Attorney General Dan Moody. Ignoring the fact
that Moody had been elected in 1924 principally on his
record as an anti-Klan district attorney, the Fergusons
charged that he was soliciting votes from Klansmen and
ex-Klansmen, and predicted that the Klan would ride again
if Moody became governor.aa The "voters of Texas paid
scant attention to the fanciful charges of the husband-wife
team, whose chronic misconduct in office proved to be more
important than Klan and anti-Klan harangues. Moody
overwhelmed the woman governor in the runoff primary.
Most Klansmen and former members probably voted for
Moody in the runoff, but their votes were not nearly as
weighty as the ballots of the tenant farmers and anti-
prohibitionists, practically allot" whom voted. for Mrs.
Ferguson.
The state Klan hierarchy was still intact as late as 1927,
when Shelby Cox, former district attorney of Dallas County,
served as Grand Dragon. A few local Klans continued to
hold meetings, listen to lectures, do a little charity work,
and burn an occasional cross. As elsewhere, most Texas
chapters had lost their more sober and substantial members,
and now some local Klans were supported only by a sadistic
and unruly element. Fort Worth Klansmen were probably
responsible for the Hogging in 1927 of Morris Strauss, a
young Jewish businessman. And four years later a Com-
33 Rice, Ku Klux Klan in American Politics, 72-73; Austin Ameri-
can, July 4, 1926; Dallas Morning News, August 14, 1926. See also
Oscar B. Colquitt to J. F. McKnight, August 16, 1926, Colquitt to
Dan B. Myer, same date, Colquitt to Fred C. Marth, same date,
Colquitt to Paul H. Brown, same date, Oscar B. Colquitt Papers,
University of Texas Archives, Austin.
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munist labor organizer charged that Dallas Klansmen had
abducted and beaten two of his subordinates after they
were released from jail.34 By 1928, with only 2,500 or so
hooded Knights left i~ Texas, the Klan as an organization
was incapable of fighting Al Smith in the state.35 But the
few remaining Klansmen could join forces with ex-Klansmen
and other nativists and rabid prohibitionists to help swing
Texas into the Republican column in the presidential
election.
In Oklahoma, dissension and general loss of interest
brought a steady deterioration of Klan membership. The
secret order did not fare badly in the state political
campaigns of 1924. It retained control of most of the county
offices it had seized two years earlier, sent a strong repre-
sentation of Klansmen to the state legislature, and, by
concentrating both Democratic and Republican Klan votes
behind one candidate in the general election, defeated the
despised Jack Walton and sent W. B. Pine to the United
States Senate. After the election, however, many Demo-
cratic Klansmen bitterly attacked Grand Dragon N. Clay
Jewett, accusing him of intentionally frustrating the Klan's
chances in the Democratic senatorial primary, conspiring
to elect a Republican senator, and working for the Republi-
can party in the presidential race in the state. The Grand
Dragon's prestige was at a dismal level by late November
of 1924, when Governor Martin E. Trapp called the state
senate into special session to elect a new president pro tern.
Jewett had been vilifying Trapp for some time for various
reasons. The governor had opposed an instructed McAdoo-
for-president delegation to the Democratic national con-
vention, and he had supported the whole Democratic
34 Forth Worth Star-Telegram, July 9, 1927; New York Times,
March 15, 1931, p. 26. See the Shreveport Journal, February 17,
18, 1927, for an account of the Klorero of the Realm of Louisiana
held in Shreveport, attended by Texas Grand Dragon Shelby Cox
and Grand Kligrapp Burt O. Snelen.
35 Washington Post, Novelnber 2, 1930, sec. I, p. 4.
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ticket, including Walton, in the general election. Moreover,
Trapp's wife was a Catholic. Jewett did his best to organize
the Klansmen in the state senate against Trapp's choice for
the presidency pro tern, William J. Holloway of Hugo, who
either was or had been a Klansman. Holloway was unani-
mously elected president pro tern, with even extreme Klans-
men, like J. M. Gulager of Muskogee and Wash Hudson
of Tulsa, voting for the administration candidate. As a final
blow to the Oklahoma Dragon, Hudson, leader of the
insurgent "Klansman's Klean-up Kommittee" of the previous
September, was unanimously reelected majority leader of
the Democrats in the senate. "While it is likely that both
senate and house contain a majority of members who are
or have been klansmen," noted the Tulsa Tribune, "more of
them are Trapp klansmen than Jewett klansmen."36
Jewett's prestige continued to fall when the legislature
met in regular session in January 1925. Five Klansmen were
prominent in the race for speaker of the house; yet all five
assailed Jewett and hoped that the Grand Dragon would
eliminate one of the contenders by endorsing him. "They
figure Jewett's o. k. is enough to kill any politician," com-
mented the Tribune. 37 On January 5 the house members
voted along straight party lines, 81 Democrats to 26 Re-
publicans, to elect one of the Klansmen, Jess B. Harper of
Talihina, speaker.38
It was obvious that the present Grand Dragon had be-
come a liability to the Klan in Oklahoma. Sometime in
the early part of 1925 Imperial Wizard Evans removed
Jewett and appointed as Grand Dragon Claude E. Hoffman,
a little-known Oklahoma City Klansman, passing over such
distinguished Knights as W. Shelley Rogers of Tulsa and
w. R. Sampson of Muskogee. Hoffman served for about
36 Tulsa Tribune, November 9, 1924; Oklahoma City Daily Okla-
homan, November 24, 25, 1924.
37 Tulsa Tribune, December 14, 1924.
38 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, January 6, 1925.
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two years. Zach A. Harris, a Protestant minister from
Blackwell, became Grand Dragon in 1927 and held the
office almost to the end of the decade.39
By the spring of 1926 only some 18,000 Klansmen re-
mained active in the Realm of Oklahoma. State Klan head-
quarters, which once occupied the whole of a tall building
in Oklahoma City, now were lodged in a single room. The
Democratic State Central Committee reported Klan activity
in only ten counties in the state.4Q There were still some
pockets of Klan strength, such as Tulsa, Muskogee, and
Okmulgee, but even in those places the membership of the
order had dwindled and the remaining Klansmen were
turning away from politics. General defeat awaited the
few local Klans that ran candidates in the spring city
elections.41
The Klan as an issue-but not as an organization-figured
prominently in the gubernatorial campaign of 1926, when a
Klansman, albeit not an active one, was elected governor.
There is little doubt that at the time of his candidacy for
governor Henry S. Johnston was a Klansman, although it is
likely that he ceased to be active in the Klan some time
before the campaign began. Johnston, from Perry, was a
past Grand Master of the Oklahoma Masonic Lodge and
had been chairman of the Oklahoma constitutional con-
vention in 1907. A. E. Munrush, former secretary of the
Oklahoma City Klan, and oilman Pat Henry of the capital
city, one of the wealthiest Klansmen in the state, were
leaders in the Johnston campaign. There were numerous
rumors that Johnston held periodic conferences with high-
ranking citizens of the Invisible Empire. Outgoing Gover-
nor Trapp complained that Johnston's "campaign is being
conducted very much like a klan ceremonial, with all the
39 Tulsa Tribune, -January 18, 1925; Oklahoma City Daily Okla-
homan, May 21, 1927.
40 New York Times, February 21, 1926, sec. VIII, p. 1.
41 Tulsa Tribune, February 19, March 17, April 7, 15, 16, May 13,
1926.
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conspicuous and known klansmen active in his behalf and
in control of his state headquarters." Trapp said that
Johnston's offices in the Tradesman's National Bank Build-
ing in Oklahoma City featured c'a continual procession of
kluds [sic], goblins, kligraphs [sic] and kleagles. It is their
last, supreme stand to control Oklahoma and thwart it."42
In the course of the Democratic primary campaign Otto
A. "Big Boy" Cargill, like Walton trying to jump from mayor
of Oklahoma City to governor, was eventually forced to
acknowledge that he had also belonged to the Klan. "I
want to say this," added Cargill hastily. "I am not a member
of the klan now." Congressman Elmer Thomas, an agrarian
liberal from Medicine Park, in the process of beating down
Walton's forlorn, last-minute bid for the Democratic sen-
atorial nomination, confessed that he had joined the order
and attended a few meetings back in 1922. State Senator
William J. Otjen fronl Enid, trying for the Republican
gubernatorial nomination, denied that he was presently a
Klansman, but he remained silent when asked about his
past affiliation with the secret organization. And Orner K.
Benedict, the postmaster of Tulsa, who beat Otjen in the
Republican primary, would later explain to the voters that in
1921 he, too, had joined the Klan, "having been led to believe
that some such organization was necessary at that time to
suppress lawlessness and vice, with which the city of Tulsa
and Tulsa County were overrun." Then, however, discover-
ing the Klan's terrorism and its political ambitions, he
deserted the Invisible Empire.43
So it seems that two of the candidates for the Democratic
gubernatorial nomination, Johnston and Cargill, were or
had been Klansmen; that both Thomas and Walton, the
Democratic senatorial candidates, had belonged to the Klan
42 Edwin C. McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State
(Norman, 1954), 352-53; Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, July 18,
21, 1926; Tulsa Tribune, May 27, 1926.
43 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, June 14, July 17, 18, 20, 21,
October 6, 1926.
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briefly; and that the two Republican candidates for gover-
nor, Otjen and Benedict, had once put on the white robes
of the order. Johnston, with the statewide backing of the
Woman's Christian Temperance Union, most other dry ad-
vocates, and most of the remaining Klansmen, won the
Democratic nomination and entered the general election
campaign against the Republican Benedict. Thomas, poll-
ing more than twice as many votes as Walton, would go on
to wrest a seat in the United States Senate from John W.
Harreld, the Republican incumbent.44
The outstanding characteristic of the general election
campaign was the rapid-fire fashion in which Republicans
and Democrats tossed the Klan issue back and forth in the
governor's race. The Democrats circulated photostatic
copies of Tulsa Klan records to prove Benedict's connection
with the order. Benedict branded the charge that he was
dominated by the Klan "a contemptible, malicious false-
hood," and said that in fact it was Johnston who was the
Klan candidate. One newspaper referred to the Tulsa Re-
publican as the "latest and most impressive of the recruits
in this vulnerable and vociferous army of eager joiners and
apologetic quitters."45
Even further to confuse the voters, both parties con-
demned the Klan by name in their state platforms, drawn
up at the state conventions in August and September. The
Republicans promised to keep Oklahoma free of the Klan's
"pernicious" influence, while the Democrats went on record
as "opposed to any attempted domination or control of the
administration of any branch of the county, state or national
government by the Ku Klux Klan."46
In Oklahoma, 1926 proved to be another Democratic
year. Johnston, the dormant Klansman, defeated Benedict,
44 Ibid., August 7, 1926.
45 Ibid., August 15, 17, October 4, 24, 25, 29, 1926; New York
Times, October 6, 1926, p. 3, October 8, p. 2.
46 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, August 31, September 5, 6,
1926.
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the former Klansman, by a count of 213,167 votes to
170,714. More than 25,000 Democrats who had voted in
the primary failed to vote in November. The Democrats
won large majorities in both houses of the legislature and
captured seven of eight congressional seats.47
The governor's race of 1926 in Oklahoma provided the
anomaly of a Klansman elected governor at a time when the
Klan was rapidly losing members over the state. The
apparent contradiction resulted from the fact that despite
the atrophy of the Oklahoma Klan, a fair number of Klans-
men and ex-Klansmen retained their influence in the Demo-
cratic party. They worked ardently for Johnston, not so
much because the Noble County man was a Klansman,
but because his economic thinking was ultraconservative
and he was willing to take care of his friends with regard
to appointments, legislation, and pardons. Hence when
Johnston became governor, he named several Klansmen
and former members to important governmental positions,
particularly in the state highway department, and pardoned
two Klansmen from Altus who had been convicted on
Hogging charges in 1925.48 These actions by the pliant
governor alienated some of his supporters, but they formed
only part of the many abuses that brought about an
abortive attempt to impeach him late in 1927. Both ex-
Klansmen and people who had never belonged to the order,
Democrats and Republicans, helped to impeach and remove
him during the 1929 legislative session.49
At the end of 1927 Klan membership in Oklahoma stood
47 McReynolds, Oklahoma, 352.
48 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, May 3, 1927. Johnston was a
good lodge man and in many ways a quite naive person. He ap-
parently viewed the Klan as just another lodge. So when he did
favors for Klansmen and ex-Klansmen, he was simply aiding his
lodge friends.
49 On the impeachment and conviction of Governor Johnston, the
fifth of Oklahoma's first seven governors to be threatened with such
legislative action, see McReynolds, Oklahoma, 353-56; Oklahoma City
Daily Oklahoman, January 8-March 21, 1929.
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at not more than 13,500.50 This total was a long way from
the 100,000 or so Klansmen active in the state during 1924,
but it was enough to make Oklahoma one of the largest
surviving Realms in the late twenties. And while most
Americans who stayed in the Klan were, in the words of
Charles Merz, ~~settling down along the road to eat hot
buns and play charades," the leadership of the Oklahoma
Klan still was interested in politics.51 Like Evans and the
other Imperial officials, Grand Dragon Harris and his
subordinates in Oklahoma were intent on heading off the
Al Smith boom within the Democratic party. In the fall
of 1927 Harris was already holding conferences with fellow-
Klansmen to plot the capture of the state delegation to
the Democratic national convention of 1928.52
Klansmen in the other southwestern states were no longer
as ambitious or as well-organized as their brethern in
Oklahoma. Yet the spirit of the Klan lingered-in Texas,
in Louisiana, in Arkansas, in Alabama, in Georgia, and in
many other states where the order had once commanded
respect, or still did. By combining with its allies-the
prohibitionists, the ~'anti-Romanists," and people who sim-
ply distrusted an Irishman from New York City-the Klan
could still fight Al Smith.
50 This was the figure implied by Grand Dragon Zach A. Harris
when he announced that about 10,000 Klansmen, three-fourths of
the Realm membership, would attend the fifth annual Klorero.
Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 5, 1927.
51 Charles Merz, "The New Ku Klux Klan," Independent, CXVIII
(February 12, 1927), 196.
52 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 5, October 11,
1927.
II.
The End of the Road
IN THE LAST HALF of the twenties, Hiram W. Evans
and the men who ran the Klan tried in various ways to keep
the order afloat. In the fall of 1925 Evans announced that
the Klan was moving its main offices from Atlanta to
Washington, D.C., where the organization supposedly could
carry out its new "educational" program in more effective
fashion. The Klan established propaganda headquarters in
a building at Seventh and I streets in Washington and set
to work at its new task of "Americanizing America." The
character of the order now changed somewhat. Whereas
earlier the Klan had operated as a political machine in most
areas, during the last half of the decade it became, at least
officially, a pressure group concentrating its attention on
national legislation. To dramatize its power, in 1926 the
Klan held its third Imperial Klonvocation in Washington.
The high point of the Klonvocation was a colorful parade
of some 40,000 Klansmen and Klanswomen down Penn-
sylvania Avenue.!
Attractive innovations on the fraternal side of the Klan
accompanied the deemphasis of politics. The Klan turned
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to the hallowed fraternal device of adding new degrees to
the hierarchial character of its membership. About 1925
the Imperial Klan, reactivating William J. Simmons' old
idea of a "second degree of Klankraft," proclaimed that all
Klansmen, or first degree Knights, could take a second
degree, that of "Knights Kamelia." Probably no more than
one million Klansmen paid their five dollars, the initiation
fee for the second degree, and became Knights Kamelia.2
Early in 1928 Klan headquarters established a third
degree in connection with the national unmasking of the
order. By that time the mask served little purpose for the
Klan. Dropping antimask bills into the hoppers of senates
and houses of representatives had become something of a
sport in state legislatures. Practically every northern state,
as well as Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana in the Southwest,
had passed some kind of law abolishing public mask-
wearing except on specified holidays. Since there was
little to lose, and perhaps something to gain in the way of
public relations, Imperial Wizard Evans decreed that the
Klan would lift its mask officially the night of February 23,
1928. The act of abandoning the mask, which someone
called "open faces openly arrived at," coincided with the
induction of all Klansmen into a third degree, the CCKnights
of the Great Forest." On the designated night about 85,000
Klansmen, perhaps half the surviving membership of the
order, went through the mask-lifting ceremony and became
Knights of the Great Forest.3
As the Klan lost members, it took up new issues. Claim-
ing that the Johnson-Reed Immigration Restriction Act of
1924 adequately curbed the influx of C'indigestible" im-
migrants from southern and eastern Europe, Evans said
1 Fort Worth Star-Telegram, October 23, 1925; New York Times,
September 14, 1926, p. 1.
2 Washington Post, November 2, 1930, sec. I, p. 4.
3 Ibid.; New York Times, February 23, 1928, p. 1; Shreveport
Journal, February 24, 1928; "The Klan Goes In for a Face-Lifting,"
Literary Digest, XCVI (March 10, 1928), 15-16.
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that the Klan would emphasize the "Americanization" of
the alien elements within the United States.4 Under Evans'
leadership the Klan showed more concern \vith an isola-
tionist foreign policy. This took form especially in highly
vocal opposition to American participation in the World
Court as advocated by that indisputably lOO-percent-
American President, Calvin Coolidge. In the late twenties
rigid enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead Act, the instruments of nationwide prohibition,
became as important to the Imperial Klan as it had always
been to the secret order in the southwestern states. Finally,
the Klan trumpeted its support for a federal department of
education and federal aid to the public school system as
weapons for preserving the separation of church and state
in America.5
But the one great rallying cry of Klansmen, the one preju-
dice that had been the ideological bulwark of the Klan
since the kluxing days of Edward Y. Clarke and Mrs.
Elizabeth Tyler, was anti-Catholicism. The Klan might
play down racism and moral authoritarianism in favor of
new goals, but hatred of "Romanists" and "Romanism"
remained the prime element of its philosophy. From 1925,
when the Klan went into its nosedive, through the discour-
aging years of the late twenties, Evans and his corps of
Klan lecturers incessantly admonished patriotic Protestants
to remain on guard against the "Catholic menace" and the
Pope's chief agent in American politics, Al Smith.
Of all the figures in public life in the twenties, none
took as much abuse at the hands of the Klan as Governor
Alfred E. Smith of the state of New York. Smith, the son
of Irish immigrants, represented everything the Klan, and
4 Evans announced this alteration of policy in a speech before the
Klorero of Texas, held in Arlington, reported in the Fort Worth
Star-Telegram, September 13, 1925.
5 Charles Merz, "The New Ku Klux Klan," Independent, CXVIII
(February 12, 1927), 179-80; Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, Novem-
ber 12, 1926.
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perhaps most rural-minded Protestant Americans, detested
-New York City, Tammany Hall, liquor, Catholicism,
foreignism. In 1924 the Klan shared credit for blocking
Smith's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination.
Four years later the hooded, but now unmasked, order was
ready to make its last stand in American politics-to rally
once more 100 percent Americans throughout the country
for the struggle against popery and Smith.
The prospect of a Catholic in the White House was as
repugnant to Klansmen in the Southwest as to Knights in
other parts of the country. Oklahoma, however, was the
only southwestern state where the Klan held on to any
political ambitions and acted with any degree of unity.
In the fall of 1927 Grand Dragon Zach A. Harris and other
Oklahoma Klan leaders held a series of conferences to
discuss their chances for capturing the state Democratic
convention, to be held the next spring, and for sending an
anti-Smith delegation to the national party convention.6
In the winter and early spring of 1928 the Klan failed to
control any of the county Democratic conventions, but in
several counties the delegations chosen for the upcoming
state convention contained known Klansmen. The pro-
hibitionists, the Klansmen, and the Johnston administration
forces had a clear majority at the state Democratic con-
vention, meeting in April at Oklahoma City. Such a coali-
tion could easily have controlled the state convention and
sent an anti-Smith delegation to the national convention.
Instead, the followers of Governor Henry S. Johnston
united with the pro-Smith forces, overruled the ultradry
and Klan delegates, and controlled the convention. The
delegation chosen for the Democratic national convention
in Houston was officially uninstructed, but it listed a
plurality of Smith supporters. One of the anti-Klanners
gloated that "We had them [the Klansmen and drys]
6 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, September 23, October 11,
1927.
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whipped at the start and rolled them clear out of the
conventioD."7
The enthusiastic but harmonious atmosphere at the Demo-
cratic national convention in Houston contrasted remark-
ably with the intraparty carnage in New York four years
earlier. The Al Smith boom, gaining momentum since
1927, swept through the specially constructed hall that
housed the convention and gave the New Yorker the
nomination on the first ballot. The Louisiana delegation
voted as a unit for Smith, while seventeen of Arkansas'
eighteen delegate votes went to the archenemy of the
Klan. Ten Oklahomans cast their votes for Smith, eight for
United States Senator James A. Reed of Missouri, and two
for Cordell Hull of Tennessee. The forty votes of Texas
went to its favorite son candidate, financier Jesse H. Jones
of Houston.s To balance the ticket with the wet, eastern
nominee, Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas, con-
sidered a prohibitionist, received the vice-presidential nomi-
nation. The party platform pledged support of nationwide
prohibition, but in his acceptance speech Smith contradicted
the pledge by advocating modification of the dry laws.9
Evans and his staff, who had been unobtrusive observers
in Houston, went back to Washington making inHated
promises that the Klan would defeat Smith in November.
Oklahoma Klan leader Harris said that the Klan would
bolt the Democratic party and support Herbert Hoover,
the Republican presidential nominee. The state president
of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union also predicted
7 Ibid., April 1, 2, 11, 1928.
sNew York World, World Almanac and Book of Facts (1929),
851. Technically Smith was not nominated on but after the first
ballot. At the end of the first rollcall of states Smith was ten votes
short of the two-thirds majority required for the nomination. The
Ohio delegation then switched its votes to the New Yorker and
Inade him the party's candidate.
9 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The 1928 Campaign: An
Analysis (New York, 1931),34-35,165; Nevin E. Neal, "A Biography
of Joseph T. Robinson" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Oklahoma, 1958), 251-53.
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a bolt of dry, Protestant Democrats. James A. Comer, the
Arkansas Dragon, declared that the addition of Robinson
to the Democratic ticket did not alter the opposition of the
Klan and the Arkansas Anti-Saloon League to Smith. Comer
then prepared questionnaires asking for a commitment on
the subject of "Rum and Romanism," which he sent to state,
district, and Pulaski County candidates. He encouraged
local Klans in other Arkansas counties to do likewise.1o
During the 1928 presidential campaign the Klan fought
Smith openly in most states, especially in Alabama, where
the order still wielded considerable power.11 Yet its efforts
as an organization to stir up sentiment against the Demo-
cratic nominee were feeble indeed. In Louisiana, for
example, ex-Klansman William C. Barnette, former general
counsel for the Klan in the state, said that he was per-
sonally opposed to making religion an issue in the campaign
and that he would support the entire Democratic ticket
"most heartily." In all the speechmaking during the cam-
paign in Louisiana the Klan was not mentioned. Many
ex-Klansmen, like Dr. E. L. Thompson, former head of the
Shreveport Klan, urged Protestants, prohibitionists, and
patriots in Louisiana to vote against Smith because he was
a Catholic, an ally of Tammany Hall, a wet, an opponent of
the 1924 immigration restriction act, and an advocate of
political rights for the Negro. But in Arkansas, Lee Cazort,
candidate of the Klan in its ill-fated effort to win the
governorship in 1924, won the Democratic nomination for
lieutenant governor and took to the hustings in behalf of
the Smith-Robinson ticket in the state. And when Smith
spoke to a roaring crowd in Oklahoma City, Governor
Johnston, a rigid prohibitionist elected with Klan help in
10 Arnold S. Rice, The Ku Klux Klan in American Politics (Wash-
ington, 1962), 86-87; Oklahon1a City Daily Oklahoman, July 1, 1928;
Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, July 2, 16, 1928. Several prominent
Protestant 111inisters in Arkansas, including Robinson's own pastor at
the First ~Icthodist Church in Little Rock, spoke against the Smith-
Robinson ticket. See Neal, HRobinson,'" 278-82.
11 See Rice, Ku Klux Klan in American Politics, 87-88.
239
1926, sat on the platform with the Democratic nominee.12
Anti-Smith organizations, going under various names,
were formed among Democratic voters in each of the
southwestern states. As far as can be determined, the state
Klan organizations llad no official connection with these
"Hoovercrat" groups. Yet numerous Klansmen and ex-
Klansmen were active in the anti-Smith movement. In
Texas, V. A. Collins and Shelby Cox of Dallas, Marvin A.
Childers of San Antonio, Lloyd P. Bloodworth of Fort
Worth, Edward B. Ward of Corpus Christi, and Alva
Bryan of Waco were among the Knights and former Knights
of the Invisible Empire who joined the "Anti-AI Smith
Democrats of Texas" and worked enthusiastically for Hoover.
Cox, Childers, and Bloodworth were past Grand Dragons
in Texas. The leaders of the Texas opposition to the Demo-
cratic nominee, however, men like former Governor Oscar
B. Colquitt and national committeeman Thomas B. Love,
had been either anti-Klan or neutral during the Klan's peak
years in the Lone Star State.13 The same was true of
Oklahoma, where former United States Senator Robert L.
Owen served as the nominal leader of the bolting Demo-
crats, and where the Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman,
long a foe of the Klan and a Democratic paper, urged drys
and supporters of "clean government" to desert the party.
Despite Imperial Wizard Evans' boasts, the Klan as an
organization had very little to say about which candidate
carried the states of the Southwest, or any other state, in
1928. In most places the Klan was more important spirit-
ually than physically. Religious prejudice and stern moral-
ism, elements that had given rise to the Klan in the first
12 Shreveport Journal, June 30, October 19, 1928; Little Rock
Arkansas Gazette, October 25, 1928; Oklahoma City Daily Okla-
homan, September 21, 1928.
13 "State Headquarters Staff of the Anti-AI Smith Democrats of
Texas with a brief summary of services performed in behalf of Mr.
Hoover" and "List of those who did service in behalf of Mr. Hoover
from their respective homes over the state," typescript copies, Oscar
B. Colquitt Papers, University of Texas Archives, Austin.
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place, were still factors in southwestern politics, and they
benefited the Republican and anti-Smith cause in the
region. In other parts of the country, and perhaps in the
Southwest, the greatest asset the Republicans had was the
unprecedented industrial and financial prosperity sweeping
the nation, which many people equated with the Grand
Old Party.14
. In November, Smith, aided by Robinson's presence on
the ticket, carried Arkansas by about 40,000 Yotes, but ran
some 30,000 votes behind the state Democratic ticket. Smith
and Robinson carried Pulaski Cou.nty, once a hotbed of the
Klan and its offshoot, the Mystic Knights, by a 2..to..1
margin. Smith polled nearly three times as many yates
as Hoover in Louisiana; the Democrat's percentage of the
Yote was almost as great as that of John W. Davis in 1924.
In Oklahoma and Texas, however, the story was different.
For the second time since statehood the Republican ticket
carried Oklahoma in a presidential election, Hoover polling
a staggering 394,052 votes to Smith's 219,206. At the same
time the Democrats retained control of the state legislature
and most of the county governments. In Texas the pr.esi-
dential race was much closer. For the first time in history
Texas, by a narrow margin, went Republican. Hoover
received 372,720 votes to 347,320 for Smith. Over the nation
Hoover had 21,392,190 votes and carried forty states; Smith
received 15,016,443 votes and carried only eight states.i5
The presidential campaign of 1928 demonstrated that
14 Arthur S. Link, American Epoch; A History of the United States
since the 1890's (New York, 1956), 350-52; Peel and Donnelly,
The 1928 Campaign, 114-16. Edmund A. Moore, A Catholic Runs
for President (New York, 1956) emphasizes the importance of the
Catholic issue in causing Smith's defeat, but also points up the
critical nature of the prosperity issue.
15 Eugene H. Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elect.ions. (New
York, 1957), 417-29; Edgar E. Robinson, The Presidential Vote,
1896-1932 (Stanford, Calif., 1947), 24'-27; Svend Petersen, A Statis-
tical History of the American Presidential Elections (New York, 1963),
89-90, 120, 133, 150, 157.
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while bigotry's foremost purveyor, the Klan, was almost
dead, bigotry was still very much alive. The fulminations
of the Klan at national and state levels represented the last
political gasps of a dying organization. After that year
what was left of the once-mighty secret fraternal order
went to pieces. In July of 1929 the Klan, declaring that its
mission in the national capital was fulfilled with the defeat
of Smith, abandoned Washington and moved its head-
quarters back to Atlanta. Imperial Kligrapp H. Kyle Ramsey
and about thirty other officials transferred their records to
Atlanta, but Imperial Wizard Evans continued to live in
Washington, at a home on Massachusetts Avenue. A few
years later he, too, made the journey back to the birthplace
of the Klan. By the end of June 1929 the nationwide mem-
bership of the order was down to about 82,000; a year
later, with economic distress spreading over the country
and touching all classes, there were probably fewer than
35,000 Knights left in the Invisible Empire.16
The figure of 7,000 Klansmen, given by one newspaper
late in 1928 as the membership in Oklahoma, was probably
too high. In the middle of the next year there were perhaps
2,000 Klansmen left in Oklahoma, perhaps 1,500 in 1930.
The end of the decade found Klansmen numbered in the
hundreds in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, rather than
in the thousands and tens of thousands.17 Imperial head-
quarters relieved Harris of the Oklahoma Grand Dragon-
ship in 1929 and evidently did not name a successor. Rush
H. Davis of Shreveport was still Grand Dragon of the
Realm of Louisiana in the fall of 1929, when Evans spoke
to a sparse crowd at the Shreveport city hall on "American-
ism." Two electric crosses and several robed but unmasked
Klansmen, including Davis, appeared on the stage with the
16 Washington Post, July 6, 1929, p. 1, November 3, 1930, sec. I,
p.4.
17 Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, November 25, 1928; Wash-
ington Post, November 3, 1930, sec. I, p. 4.
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Imperial Wizard.18 The Realm organizations for Arkansas
and Texas were probably disbanded after 1928, leaving the
local Klan as the only organizational unit within the states.
Far from the hooded crusade of the first half of the decade,
but illustrative of what the few remaining Klan chapters
were doing in the late twenties and early thirties, was a
notice printed in an obscure comer of a Shreveport news-
paper: "The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan will broadcast
a program of old-time banjo and fiddle numbers over radio
station KSBA Tuesday night, according to announcement by
station owners. The program will be on the air for 30
minutes, beginning promptly at 8 0:#clock.':#19
The Klan collapsed in the last half of the 1920s because
of factors fully as varied and complex as the reasons for its
rise in the first half of the decade. The conditions causing
the rapid decay of the order differed from region to region,
from state to state, and even from community to community.
Some general developments debilitating the Klan through-
out the nation, however, can be noted, as well as the more
particular circumstances related to the decline of the move-
ment in the Southwest.
One student of the white-robed fraternity has suggested
that an organization like the Klan, emphasizing perpetual
crisis and the divisive character of society, appealed only to
a certain number of people. Sooner or later all or nearly all
of these people would join the organization. When the Klan
had realized its membership potential in an area, there was
no place for it to go but down.20 This thesis has much
validity when applied to a state like Pennsylvania, where
the Klan was very strong numerically but did not venture
openly into politics. In those states where the Klan eventu-
18 Shreveport Journal, October 11, 1929.
19 Ibid., February 26, 1929.
:w Norman F. Weaver, '~The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Wis-
consin, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin, 1954), 105.
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ally became a political organization, however, the thesis
does not quite stand. For if the Klan were successful in
politics over a period of several years, it could keep growing
simply because numerous people-politicians, businessmen,
even criminals-would join the order to protect their own
interests. Under conditions of prolonged success the mem-
bership potential of the Klan might be limited only by the
size of the native-born, white, Protestant population of a
community, county, state, ~r, perhaps ultimately, the nation.
Two observers of modern American fraternalism have
shown that during the 1920s, under the impact of urbaniza-
tion and industrialization, all of the adult fraternal orders,
the "lodges," entered a process of decline which has con-
tinued to the present. Supplanting the fraternal orders,
both in conviviality and social service, were the business-
men's clubs like llotary, Kiwanis, and Lions.21 The Klan,
as an adult fraternal order, obviously fits into this pattern
of decline; its descent \vas unquestionably more precipitate
than that of any other established fraternal organization. Yet
the Klan in the southwestern states and in other parts of the
country became, in its ultimate form, a political organiza-
tion. The sagging of the American institution of adult
fraternalism does not adequately explain why the Klan
fell apart in the Southwest.
The war-induced hysteria, which in the immediate post-
\var years turned into anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism,
fear of radicals and Bolsheviks, suppression of Negroes,
and revulsion against foreign immigration, had gradually
subsided with tilne. Intolerance of everything that did not
square \vith the native white Protestant's rigid conception
of "100 percent ..'\nlericanisffi," which furnished much of
the impetus behind the surge of the Klan in the early
21 :-\ocl P. Gist, Secret Societies: A Cultural Study of Fraternalism
in the United States (University of l\1issouri Studies, XV, October
1, 1940), 4:3-44; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present (New
York, 1949),44.
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twenties, seemed to slacken as the decade passed the
halfway mark.22 The return of prosperity, indeed the
commencement of a brief era of unprecedented abundance,
quieted the anxieties and diverted the energies of middle-
class America. George B. Tindall has submitted that even
in the South (and Southwest) "business progressivism," not
prejudice and reaction, set the tone for politics and govern-
ment, especially after 1925.23
Achievement of at least one of the Klan's objectives, the
drastic curbing of immigration, probably helped to assuage
the passions of some Klansmen. The stopgap immigration
act of 1921 was the first to embody the national origins
quota system. The 1921 measure substantially curtailed
the number of immigrants eligible to enter the United
States each year, and established restrictionism as perma-
nent national policy. But because it was based on the 1910
census and thus allowed a preponderance of immigration
of "inferior" and "backward" peoples from southern and
eastern Europe, it did not satisfy the powerful Immigration
Restriction League, the Klan, and other aggregations of
racial nativists. Agitation for more discriminatory legisla-
tion brought about the more comprehensive and more
severe Johnson-Reed Act of 1924, which adopted the census
of 1890 as the basis for the immigrant quota to be allowed
from each nation each year and prohibited Japanese
immigration entirely. The act of 1924, by shifting the
weight of immigration back to the supposedly superior
"Nordic" or "Teutonic" peoples of northern and western
Europe, satisfied the Klan and almost all the other advocates
of restriction.24
22 For the decline of racial and religious nativism in the late
twenties, see Oscar Handlin, Race and Nationality in American Life
(New York, 1957), ch. VII; and Tholnas F. Gossett, Race: The History
of an Idea in America (Dallas, 1963), ch. XVI.
23 George B. Tindall, HBusiness Progressivism: Southern Politics in
the Twenties," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXII (Spring 1963), 92-106.
24 John I-ligham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American
Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1955), eh. XI.
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The older bedfellow of racial nativism was the concept
of white supremacy. By the late twenties white people,
north and south, could relax in the assurance that the
demands for first-class citizenship and the stirrings of
Negro nationalism appearing in the postwar years had, for
the time being, subsided.25 Two obvious signs of the
recession of racial antagonism were the steady diminution
of the number of lynchings reported each year and the
absence of major race riots during the last eight years of
the decade.
Anti-Catholic feeling apparently waned throughout the
country with the enactment of the 1924 immigration legisla-
tion, aimed largely at Catholic Europeans, and with the
simple passage of time and the realization that at least for
the moment America was safe from the fancied ambitions
of the Pope. In a sense the fact that Al Smith finally was
able to nail down the Democratic presidential nomination
in 1928 revealed the extent to which religious prejudice had
slackened in his party. Smith's candidacy provoked only a
moderate rally of the moribund Klan movement.
During the campaign of 1928, however, Smith encoun-
tered a kind of bitter, uncompromising opposition in the
Southwest, especially in Oklahoma and Texas, that was
immeasurably broader than the Klan was or ever had been.
While anti-Catholicism may have abated somewhat through-
out the nation, even in the South and Southwest, the vigor
and extent of the reaction against Smith indicate that this
abatement had little connection with the decline of the
Klan in the overwhelmingly Protestant states.
It has been suggested and implied in this study that
while nativism and racism, the ideological'underpinnings
of the Klan, were important to the growth of the order in
the Southwest, they were secondary to moral authoritarian-
ism-the desire to use the Klan for the radical, often violent,
25 See Edmund David Cronan, Black Moses: The Story of the Uni-
versal Negro Improvement Association (Madison, Wis., 1955).
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alteration of individual standards and conduct. The expla-
nation for the disintegration of the Klan in Texas, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, and Louisiana lies partly in the evil effects of
its hooded vigilantism and the failure of its drive for "law
and order."
Thousands of solid middle-class citizens in the four states
joined the Klan because they honestly believed there was
a need to bring together people who wanted adequate law
enforcement and who \vere disturbed by the crime and vice
that seemed to surround them. The Klan could, they
thought, be used to promote observance of the law and
moral uplift. Violence and terrorism should play no part
in this campaign to establish a safer, more lawful, and more
moral comnlunity. But these law-abiding citizens soon
discovered that the Klan, with its secret membership rolls
and its masked members, attracted all kinds of native white
Protestants, including a dismayingly large number of sad-
ists, grudge-holders, and fanatics. «In the early days of the
organization,:t:t admitted Harris, the Oklahoma Klan leader,
cCmany men joined who simply desired to take part in a
whipping with some personal enemy as the victim."26 Then,
too, the Klan, like a lynch mob, seemed to bring out the
worst in many timid souls, whose circumspect daytime
behavior turned into vengeful vigilantism at night under
the anonymity of a robe and hood. Too many of the
upright Klansmen did nothing when, as frequently hap-
pened, their local chapter came under the dominance of
terrorists. Nevertheless, the same extralegal activities that
repelled non-Klan citizens also drove some Klansmen from
the Invisible Empire.
There were, for example, the cases of Oscar F. Holcombe,
the mayor of Houston, and Henry F. Tanner, the police
chief of Dallas. Holcombe joined the Klan shortly after it
was organized in Houston and attended a few meetings.
He soon discovered that in many instances the police chief
26 Quoted in Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman, May 21, 1927.
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of the southeast Texas city and most of the other law
officers in town were acting in accordance with the orders
of the local Exalted Cyclops, H. C. McCall. Mayor Hol-
combe told McCall that he "vas resigning from the Klan
and that McCall had to stop interfering in the affairs of
the police department. When McCall continued his med-
dling, Holcombe brought in several peace officers from
West Texas counties to protect citizens from Klan vigilantes.
The local chapter ran a candidate against Holcombe in one
city election and fought him at every opportunity. In the
spring of 1922, in the midst of an outbreak of whippings in
Dallas, Police Chief Tanner publicly resigned from the
Klan. He said that when he joined the organization he had
the impression that it aided law enforcement, but that he
quickly saw that it was more an impediment to law officers
than an aid.27 Other public figures, like United States
Representative Elmer Thomas of Oklahoma and Tulsa
postmaster Orner K. Benedict, became disenchanted after
a short stay in the Invisible Empire and left the Klan.
When men like Holcombe, Tanner, Thomas, and Bene-
dict dropped out, the Klan, always striving passionately
for respectability, felt their absence in a loss of prestige
in the community and in the state. The presence of
disreputable elements inside the Klan made life in the order
insufferable for men of standing. Their exit contributed to
the Klan's fall.
Terrorism was by no means the only internal evil from
which the Klan suffered. Probably the most important
factor behind the breakup of the Klan in the Southwest
was dissension. And the Klan's autocratic structure was
the greatest contributor to the growth of internal conflict.
The dictatorial character of the Klan hierarchy, based on
the principle that all po\ver should originate in the Imperial
27 Testimony of Oscar F. Holcombe in Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, Inc. v. George B. Kimbro, Jr. (No. 105180) (61st District
Court, Harris County, Texas), reported in Houston Post-Dispatch,
March 25, 1925; Dallas Morning News, April 13, 1922.
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Wizard and move downward from him, presented a ready-
made opportunity for unscrupulous and power-hungry
leaders. These Klan officials sometimes abused their au-
thority in order to achieve their designs for political prefer-
ment and personal aggrandizement. Their manipulations
involved the membership of the order in struggles essentially
unrelated to the Klan~s program of Americanism, law en-
forcement, and morality. In 1924, in Oklahoma, state Klan
boss N. Clay Jewett switched the Klan's endorsement at the
last minute, brought about the senatorial nomination of
Jack Walton over two candidates who were popular with
Klansmen, and set up the election of a Republican United
States Senator. And in Louisiana outraged Klansmen cried
betrayal when several state Klan officials struck an alliance
with the tainted New Orleans machine behind guberna-
torial candidate Henry L. Fuqua and then helped the Fuqua
administration enact a series of laws to regulate the Klan.
Most Klansmen served the order blindly. They were
supposed to obey their immediate leader, the Exalted Cy-
clops, and the other officials up the chain of command.
They were to follow without question the decrees, com-
mands, and instructions of the Imperial Wizard or, as in the
case of Clarke during the Simmons Wizardship, the man
who had the Wizard's ear. Simmons, Clarke, and later
Evans rationalized that such a "military" system was neces-
sary to protect the Klan from its enemies and to carry out
the mission of the order. Many Klansmen, however,
brought up in the belief that the democratic way was the
best way, came to chafe under dictation from the higher-
ups and to resent the fact that they had little to say about
the making of policy, the endorsement of politicians, and
the choice of their leaders.
Politics was the area in which the undemocratic nature
of the Klan inspired the most internal disorder. Since even
at the local level it was usually a minority, the Klan's only
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hope of success was to operate within the two established
parties. The Klan worked within the Democratic party in
the South and in most of the Southwest, ordinarily within
the Republican party in the North, and within both parties
in border states like Oklahoma and at the national level.
A division of voting strength, either in the party primaries
or in the general election, was fatal to the Klan's chances.
Yet this necessity to concentrate the power of the order
behind one candidate often led to autocratic methods on
the part of its leaders and dissension among subordinates
and the rank and file Klansmen.
This was the case in Texas in 1922, when Evans overrode
all opposition to the naming of Earle B. Mayfield as the
Klan senatorial candidate, and in 1924, when Grand Dragon
Z. E. Marvin virtually dictated the endorsement of Felix D.
Robertson for the governorship. In Arkansas, according to
rebellious Klansman Jim G. Ferguson, Comer carefully
arranged the statewide elimination primary held by the
Klan so that the controversial Dragon's choice, Cazort,
could become the Klan candidate for governor. Many
Arkansas Klansmen refused to vote for Cazort in the August
Democratic primary, and a neutral candidate got the
nomination.
The heavyhanded techniques of the Klan leaders thus
brought strife to the southwestern Realms. In Texas and
Arkansas dissension was coupled with defeat, for the Klan
failed miserably in the 1924 gubernatorial races. By the
end of that year Marvin was no longer the head of the
Klan in Texas, and the membership of the organization was
falling off rapidly over the state. Comer kept his Realm
together until the fall of 1925, when the secession of the
Little Rock men's and women's Klans broke the back of the
order in Arkansas. Resentment against Jewett mounted in
Oklahoma untU Evans removed him in 1925. In Louisiana
Evans personally took charge of a Klan organization that
was being tom to pieces by factionalism. He liquidated
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one faction, overhauled the state leadership, and had
nearly every Klansman in Louisiana move his fraternal
affiliation to Atlanta to escape the new state membership
registration law.
The financial affairs of the Klan were beyond the knowl-
edge or control of the rank and file. The Klan clearly took
in enormous sums of money in the twenties. During 1922,
according to the estimate of Simmons, the daily income of
Imperial headquarters in Atlanta seldom fell below $10,000.
Some 3,500 men, paying ten dollars a piece in initiation
fees and most of them buying $6.50 robes, joined the Klan
each day. The next year, Simmons estimated, the income
of the Imperial Klan was about three million dollars. In the
period from February 17 to July 14,1923, David C. Stephen-
son, chief Kleagle and later Grand Dragon of Indiana,
remitted $641,475 to the Imperial treasury.28 The ascension
of Evans to the Imperial Wizardship was supposed to bring
a regularization of Klan finances, and in fact there was
probably stricter accounting during his administration than
under Simmons, Clarke, and Mrs. Tyler. On several
occasions, however, the Evans regime was forced to go
into court to combat suits brought by unhappy Klansmen
charging corruption and Imperial theft. Not once during
28 William G. Shepherd, "Ku Klux Koin," Collier's, LXXXII (July
21, 1928), 38; Marion Monteval (pseud.), The Klan Inside Out
(Claremore, Oklahoma, 1924), 62-63. David C. Stephenson, a pudgy
former coaldealer, organized the midwestern states and received
almost absolute authority from Evans to govern the northern Realms.
He became the most powerful individual in the state of Indiana. His
henchman was elected governor in 1924, and at the next legislative
session Stephenson virtually controlled the state government. In the
spring of 1925 he brutally assaulted a woman who worked as a state-
house secretary and eventually went to prison for life. When
Stephenson fell, he brought the mighty Indiana Klan down with him.
The bibliography on the Hoosier State Klan leader is already rather
large. The best scholarly treatment of his career is in Weaver,
'''Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, and
Michigan," ch. IV. A much more titillating account is in Isabel
Leighton (ed.), The Aspirin Age, 1919-1941 (New York, 1949),
105-29.
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its long career did the Klan make a public statement of its
receipts and disbursements, although Evans was proud to
display the steady improvement of the Klan's assets in
relation to its liabilities under his administration.29
Citizenship in the Invisible Empire was expensive. The
initiation fee and the purchase of a robe marked only the
beginning of the economic demands on the ordinary Knight.
A Klansman paid an Imperial tax of $1.80 per year, plus a
small additional duty, usually ten cents per month, levied
by the state office. The local Klan had its own per capita
tax, which customarily varied from six dollars to ten dollars
annually. Klansmen had to make "voluntary" contributions
when the chapter funds were low. If a member fell behind
in his payments, he was automatically suspended from the
Klan and could be reinstated only when he had paid his
back taxes.30
The local Klans also required their members to pay
sufficient dues for the rental of a meeting hall or the con-
struction of the chapter's own Klavern, for the purchase of
ritual equipment, for the payment of accountants' and
lawyers' fees, and for the traveling expenses of the local
officers. Klansmen might contribute to the campaign ex-
penses of aspiring Klan politicians, as in Dallas; buy Klan
life insurance; or subscribe to the various publications of
the order. Knights were expected to give money for the
maintenance of the local Klan's church work and its charity
program.
All of these expenses that went with active membership
in the Klan amounted to a considerable burden on the
average Klansman. As long as matters went well and a
Knight could feel secure in the efficacy of his movement,
29 See Proceedings of the Second Imperial Klonvocation, Held in
Kansas City, Missouri, September 23-26, 1924 (Atlanta, 1924), 87,
90-91, 183-85, for Evans' fullest statement of the Klan's assets and
liabilities under his regime.
30 Constitution and Laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
(Atlanta, 1921), art. xv, sec. 2, 3, art, XVIII, sec. 18.
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the expense was bearable. But when the Klan met defeat
and its enemies gained the advantage, or when dissension
drained the strength of the order, as happened in the
Southwest, a minion of the Imperial Wizard was apt to
doubt whether the preservation of Protestant .;\mericanism,
white supremacy, and old-fashioned morality was really
worth the cost. Most Klansmen decided that someone else
could do the preserving; they would save their time, money,
and standing in the community.
With defeat and dissension came apathy, an even more
ravaging malady. Tens of thousands of weary Klansmen,
bored and disgusted by the continual bickering in their
chapters and state organizations, left the Invisible Empire
by the simple device of letting their dues lapse. They
remained on the membership rolls of the Klan, but they
would never again pass through the doors of the Klavern.
The meetings grew longer; the ne\vs from inside the Realm
was discouraging; there were debts to be met and people
to be helped, but less and less money with which to operate.
How many Klansmen over the Southwest and throughout
the nation were like the member of the Sour Lake, Texas,
Klan, who gave up after the close of a meeting in 1925
and burned his robe and hood by the roadside on his way
home?31 Most Klansmen may not have cut their ties with
the Klan in such dramatic fashion. But enough of them
quit the organization to reduce the Klan, once the feared
crusader for Americanism and moral conformity, to the
status of a toothless lodge.
The Imperial Klan and a few surviving chapters carried
on into the early 1930s. Depression decimated the remain-
ing membership of the order. Robed and masked Klans-
men appeared during a Halloween celebration in Little
Rock in 1933. The next year Imperial Wizard Evans
aroused himself briefly, denounced Huey P. Long, recent
31 This incident was related to the writer by the ex-Klansman
involved~ who now lives in Jefferson County, Texas.
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governor and now United States Senator, as a menace to
organized society, and proclaimed that national head-
quarters was organizing Louisiana Klansmen to fight Long.
But the CCKingfish," as Long called himself, was not worried.
He warned Evans that if he set foot in Louisiana, 'fie will
leave both feet right here, with the toes turned up." The
Wizard had no reply.32
In the late thirties the Klan managed to achieve a moder-
ate revival by playing on the gro\ving conservative reaction
to the liberalism of the New Deal. The Klan vilified
industrial unionism as practiced by the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, sounded warnings against the new men-
ace of communism (no longer Catholicism), and decried
the destruction of the Constitution by radicals, liberals,
and Communists. The Klan evidently organized some new
chapters in Oklahoma, but Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas
went virtually untouched by this mild upsurge of Klanism,
anti-New Deal variety.33 In 1939 Evans finally resigned
the Wizardship. Delegates to a special Klonvocation in
Atlanta elected James Arnold Colescott, a veterinarian from
Terre Haute, Indiana, and for two years Evans' "chief of
staff," as the new national leader of the Klan.34
By the time he left the Wizardship, Evans had built up
a thriving business as a dealer in emulsified asphalt for
highway construction. In 1940 tIle state of Georgia brought
suit under the Sherman Antitrust Act against Evans and
other parties for conspiring to control the sale of asphalt
32 John G. Fletcher, Arkansas (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1947), 367;
New York Times, August 18, 1934, p. 5.
33 New York Times, July 1, 1934, sec. IV, p. 7; Oklahoma City
Daily Oklahoman, November 4, 1937. The best discussion of the
Klan's posttwenties history is in Rice, Klan in American Politics,
chs. VIII, IX. See also Edwin D. Hoffman, "The Genesis of the
Movement for Equal Rights in South Carolina," Journal of Negro
History, XLIV (October 1959), 346-69.
34 New York Times, June 11, 1939, p. 47; Heywood Broun, "Up
Pops the Wizard," New Republic, XCIX (June 21, 1939), 186-87;
Rice, Klan in American Politics, 107.
254
to the state. Initially a federal district court ruled that the
state was not a "person" as defined in the Sherman Act and
thus could not sue in the federal courts. In 1942, however,
this ruling was overturned by the United States Supreme
Court.35 The state of Georgia then prosecuted Evans and
nineteen other persons in Superior Court in Atlanta on
criminal charges in connection with asphalt sales, highway
maintenance work, and printing jobs. Evans, claiming that
he was caught in the middle of a political feud, loudly
pleaded his innocence of any wrongdoing. The Georgia
jury failed to reach a verdict and the Superior Court judge
declared a mistrial. The state did not seek a new trial, and
Evans slipped into oblivion.36
Under Evans' successor in the Klan, Colescott, the revival
begun in the late thirties continued. Perhaps 30,000 Klans-
men enrolled in the order in Florida, and by the spring of
1940 the new Imperial Wizard was boasting that the Klan
operated in thirty-nine states and had 500,000 members.
More sober estimates placed the membership of the Klan
at about 200,000, with probably two-thirds of that total
confined to the South.37
The coming of the Second World War destroyed what-
ever chance the Klan may have had for regaining its former
power and prestige. On April 28, 1944, harassed by a fed-
eral suit for $685,000 in delinquent income taxes, the na-
tional officials of the Klan met in secret session and,
according to Colescott, "voted to suspend the constitutional
laws of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., to revoke all
charter KIans and to order disbandment of all provisional
Klans."3s This act marked the official demise of the Invisible
Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., the secret
35 State of Georgia v. Evans et al., 315 U. S. 482.
36 Gustavus Myers, A History of Bigotry in the United States
(New York, 194,3), 329-,3l.
37 New York Ti1nes, April 18, 1940, p. 48; Rice, Klan in American
Politics, 107.
38 New York Times, June 5, 1944, p. 21.
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fraternal order founded by Simmons back in 1915. Mter
the war, in 1947, Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia had his
attorney general file an ouster suit against the skeletal
organization. The suit forced Colescott and the rest of the
Klan officials, who had retained their titles, to surrender the
charter of the order to the state under whose corporation
laws the Klan had always operated.39
In the postwar years the Deep South experienced a
renewal of Klan terrorist activities, directed primarily
against Negroes. Now several more or less localized
organizations, still relying on the magic of the name ~'Klan,"
sprang up in the southern states. The largest was the
~~Association of Georgia Klans," established under the
leadership of Dr. Samuel Green, an Atlanta dentist who
took the title Grand Dragon. The Association of Georgia
Klans has since disbanded, but today scattered groups with
names like "Florida Ku Klux Klan," the "Original Klan of
the Confederacy," and the ~~Gulf Ku Klux Klan" hold
meetings in the southern states. The largest present-day
Klan organization appears to be the ~'United Klans, Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.," headed by Robert Shelton, a
Birmingham air-conditioning salesman. All of these Klan
groups harp on one theme-that the Supreme Court de-
segregation decision of 1954 will "mongrelize" the South,
that the "niggers" must be kept "in their place," and that
the whole movement for civil rights and social equality is
at base a liberal-Socialist-Communist-Jewish conspiracy.40
Yet today the average Southerner finds little use for these
various robed and hooded societies. The southern racist
39 Ibid., June 14, 1947, p. 30.
40 On the post-World 'Var II career of the various Klan organiza-
tions in the South, see Rice, Klan in American Politics, ch. IX; Leslie
Velie, "The Klan Rides the South Again," Collier:1s CXXII (October
9, 1948), 13-15, 74, 75; Carey McWilliams, "The Klan: Post War
Model," Nation, CLXIII (December 14, 1946), 692-93; Reese
Cleghorn, "The Segs,:1:1 Esquire, LXI (January 1964), 71-76; and
Ben Haas, K.K.K. (Chicago, 1963).
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usually turns to the frankly political but more respectable
\Vhite Citizens Council. The modern-day superpatriot
turns to the John Birch Society or any of a host of other
"antisubversive" organizations. And the moral zealot of the
1960s? There are fewer and fewer organizational outlets
for his zeal, but he can probably find enough ephemeral
local cleanup groups to satisfy his interests. Forty years
ago the racist, the superpatriot, and the crusader for moral
orthodoxy came together in a white..robed secret fraternal
order that numbered its members in the millions and rode
to power in every part of the nation. The Klan of the
twenties has disappeared. But its spirit and its goals remain,
sustenance for new crusades for 100 percent Americanism
and moral conformity.
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Source material for the study of the Klan, in the way of
publications of the order, is of considerable magnitude. The
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cial publications of the Klan used for this study include:
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Klan were published, of which the two most valuable are:
Henry P. Fry, The Modern Ku Klux Klan (Boston, 1922),
a revelation by an ex-Kleagle; and Marion Monteval
(pseud.), The Klan Inside Out (Claremore, Oklahoma,
1924), a book by an ex-Klansman who apparently was con-
nected with Imperial headquarters and made off with some
Klan records.
Some of the best items in the interpretive literature of the
Klan are: Stanley Frost, The Challenge of the Klan (In-
dianapolis, 1923, 1924); John M. Mecklin, The Ku Klux
Klan: A Study of the American Mind (New York, 1924);
Frank Tannenbaum, Darker Phases of the South (New
York, 1924, chi I; Frank Bohn "The Ku Klux Klan Inter-
preted," American Journal of Sociology, XXX (January
1925), 385-407; Guy B. Johnson, "A Sociological Interpre-
tation of the New Ku Klux Movement," Social Forces, I
(May 1923), 440-45; Rollin L. Hartt, ~~The New Negro,"
Independent, CV (January 15,1921),59-60, which does not
mention the Klan but presents some interesting observa-
tions on the postwar status of the Negro; Charles Merz,
"The New Ku Klux Klan," ibid., CXVIII (February 12,
1927), 179-80, 196; and Robert L. Duffus, ~~Ancestry and
End of the Ku Klux Klan," World's Work, XLVI (Septem-
ber, 1923),527-36.
Among the most informative articles on the founding
and early history of the Klan are: Robert L. Duffus, "Sales-
man of Hate: The Ku Klux Klan," 'Vorld's Work, XLVI
(May 1923), 31-38; William G. Shepherd, "How I Put Over
the Klan," Collier's, LXXII (July 14, 1928), 10-11; Shep-
herd, "Ku Klux Koin," ibid. (July 21, 1928),8-9; Shepherd,
"Fiery Double Cross," ibid. (July 28, 1928), 8-9, all three
based largely on personal interviews with William J. Sim-
mons and Hiram W. Evans; and Walter F. White, cCRe_
viving the Ku Klux Klan," Forum, LXV (April 1921),
424-34.
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The later history of the Klan in the 1930s and 1940s is
best covered in the New York Times and other newspapers.
Some articles are of value, including: Stetson Kennedy and
Evelyn M. Crowell, "The Ku Klux Klan," New Republic,
CXIV (July I, 1946), 928-30; Heywood Broun, "Up Pops
the Wizard," ibid., XCIX (June 21, 1939), 186-87; Leslie
Velie, "The Klan Rides the South Again," Collier's, eXII
(October 9, 1948), 13-15, 74, 75; and Carey McWilliams,
c'The Klan: Post War Model," Nation, CLXIII (December
14, 1946), 692-93.
Published material of a scholarly nature on the Klan is
scarce. Benjamin H. Avin, c'The Ku Klux Klan, 1915-1925:
A Study in Religious Intolerance" (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Georgetown University, 1952) makes a good be-
ginning toward explaining the religious bias of the move-
ment but is marred by a concern with refuting the Klan's
arguments. Four state and regional studies are presently
available. Norman F. Weaver, c'The Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan in Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan" (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1954),
stresses the sociological orientation of the Klan in the Mid-
dle West. Weaver's greatest failing is a tendency to over-
generalize from the Klan experience in these four states. A
fine study of a strong Klan organization in a populous east-
ern state is Emerson H. Loucks, The Ku Klux Klan in Penn-
sylvania: A Study in Nativism (Harrisburg, Pa., 1936).
Loucks' work, based primarily on personal interviews, ques-
tionnaires, and some local Klan records, benefited from a
type of material not available to later investigators of the
Klan. Despite its title, Arnold S. Rice, The Ku Klux Klan
,in American Politics (Washington, 1962), is actually a re-
gional treatment. Rice defines the Klan as mainly a south-
ern phenomenon and then discusses the political career of
the order only in the states south of the Mason-Dixon line
and the Ohio River. He ignores the Klan's political activi-
ties in Louisiana almost completely and skips lightly
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through Arkansas, Texas, and the other states he terms
southern. Rice handles the Klan in local and state politics
in the South, and then he turns to national politics in 1924
and 1928 before presenting the best scholarly account
yet written of the posttwenties history of the Klan. Much
of the material on the career of the order in Texas included
in this study also appears in Charles C. Alexander, Crmade
for Conformity: The Ku Klux Klan in Texas, 1920-1980
(Houston, 1962). A brief look at some of the doings of the
Klan in Florida is David Chalmers, "The Ku Klux Klan in
the Sunshine State: The 1920's," Florida Historical Quar-
terly, XLII (January 1964), 209-15.
The best single piece of source material on the Klan in
the Southwest is Senator from Texas. Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Committee on Privileges and Elec-
tions, United States Senate, 67th Congress, 1st and 2d Ses-
sions (1924), the widely publicized hearing on the election
of Earle B. Mayfield to the United States Senate from Texas
in 1922. Running to more than 1,200 pages, the publica-
tion is rich with testimony of Klansmen and ex-Klansmen
relating to the Klan's role in the nomination and election
of Mayfield. Of less value for the Klan in Texas and the
rest of the Southwest is The Ku Klux Klan. Hearings before
the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives, 67th
Congress, 1st Session (1921), comprising testimony taken
during the truncated investigation of the Klan by Congress
in the fall of 1921.
One must search far and wide through manuscript ma-
terials for bits and pieces of information on the Klan in the
southwestern states. In over three years of looking the
writer has been unable to discover any Klan materials be-
yond the Scarce items deposited here and there in libraries
and collections. Apparently such matter as Klan records,
membership rolls, and correspondence has been destroyed
or safely hidden from the prying eyes of researchers. The
papers of figures outside the Klan usually are not of any
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great value to the historian of the hooded organization.
Collections examined by the writer which were not useful
for this study include: Pat M. Neff Papers, Baylor Univer-
sity Library; Joseph W. Bailey Papers, Dallas Historical
Society; Edwin DeBarr, Elmer Thomas, W. B. Pine,
Thomas P. Gore, and James R. Tolbert collections, all at
the University of Oklahoma Library; Charles H. Brough
Papers, University of Arkansas Library; and Rene L. De-
Rouen Papers, Louisiana State University Library. Former
Governor Dan Moody of Austin, Texas, assured the writer
that an examination of his papers would yield no informa-
tion on the Texas Klan. Adjutant General Roy V. Kenny
of the state of Oklahoma informed the writer that tran-
scripts of the hearings before the military courts in Tulsa
and Oklahoma City in 1923 were not in his office and that
he did not know of their whereabouts.
The writer's search through manuscripts for pieces of
southwestern Klan history was not entirely fruitless. The
papers of Judge James R. Hamilton, in the possession of
Mrs. Hamilton, Austin, Texas, contain a number of letters
pertaining to Judge Hamilton's fight against the Klan from
the bench of the 55th Criminal District Court in Austin.
The Oscar B. Colquitt Papers, University of Texas A.rchives,
are useful for Texas gubernatorial politics in 1924 and 1926
and the Klan's role in the governor's races. The Thomas B.
Love Papers, Archives of the Dallas Historical Society,
Dallas, are also of some benefit for an outside view of the
Klan in Texas politics. The Campbell Russell, Jack C. Wal-
ton, and Carlton Weaver collections, Division of Manu-
scripts, University of Oklahoma Library, Norman, are mod-
erately helpful. The Weaver papers contain an illuminating
letter which Weaver, Cyclops and newspaper editor of Wil-
burton, \vrote to Grand Dragon N. Clay Jewett relating to
the Klan's, and specifically Jewett's, activities in the presi-
dential and senatorial campaigns of 1924 in Oklahoma. At
the General Library of the University of Arkansas, Fayette-
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ville, the David Y. Thomas and Thomas C. McRae papers
are of only slight assistance. The Harmon F. Remmel Pa-
pers, however, include a series of letters and telegrams ex-
changed between the Republican leader and prominent
Arkansas Klansmen concerning Klan politics in Arkansas.
At the Department of Archives, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, the James B. Aswell and Family Scrapbooks
and the Huey Long Scrapbooks, together with the Jared
Y. Sanders and Family Papers and the M. S. Newsom and
Family Papers (Merrit M. Schlig Memorial Collection) ,
were fairly beneficial on various aspects of Klan history in
the Pelican State.
The principal source for this writer, and for anyone else
who studies the Klan today, consists of daily and weekly
newspapers. Klan activities were almost always news-
worthy, and during the twenties dailies in every part of
the nation printed thousands of dispatches and local re-
ports on the doings of the secret order. Used with skill and
discretion, newspapers can be invaluable for the history of
the Klan in a particular area. The New York Times gave
the finest coverage of national Klan affairs and reported
many episodes of a state or local character in the South-
west. Most dailies in the southwestern states maintained
a neutral attitude on the subject of the Klan, although at
one time or another they all condemned mob violence as
exemplified in the Klan's vigilante forays. In Texas the
Dallas Morning News printed the New York World's syndi-
cated expose of the Klan in 1921 and fought the order at
every turn thereafter. Much less vituperative than the
News, although anti-Klan, were the Austin American and
Statesman and the Denison Herald. The Fort Worth Star-
Telegram, the Houston Post, the Waco Times-Herald, and
the San Antonio Express were noncommital on the Klan
issue. In Louisiana the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
which also printed the New York World's articles, was vin-
dictively anti-Klan. The Shreveport Journal completely ig-
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nored the organization on its editorial pages. In the 1920s,
as today, the Little Rock Arkansas Gazette was far and
away the most important and useful daily newspaper pub-
lished in the state of Arkansas. The Fort Smith Southwest
American, like the Gazette neutral with regard to the Klan,
is less helpful than the Little Rock daily. The Oklahoma
City Daily Oklahoman, the Tulsa Tribune, and the Tulsa
Daily World were used for coverage of Oklahoma Klan
affairs. The Daily Oklahoman, usually Democratic, and the
Daily World, Republican, editorialized against the Klan,
while the Tribune was rather a friendly neutral in its rela-
tions with the organization. The Daily Oklahoman and the
Tribune, but not the Daily World, joined forces with the
Klan to fight Jack Walton during the martial law period in
1923 and when Walton ran for the United States Senate the
next year.
Klan and pro-Klan weekly newspapers are invariably en-
lightening, not only for the policies and attitudes of the
Klan in a particular area, but for coverage of specific events
as well. Unfortunately libraries and newspaper collections
have been generally derelict in acquiring and preserving
such journals. The Newspaper Collection of the Univer-
sity of Texas has a nearly complete microfilm file (1921-
1924) of the Houston Colonel Mayfielas Weekly, vigor-
ously puritanical and blatantly pro-Klan, although not offi-
cially sanctioned by the order. The University of Texas
also has scattered issues on microfilm of the Atlanta Search-
light, official organ of Imperial headquarters until 1923;
the Forth Worth American Citizen; the Dallas Texas 100
Per Cent American, semiofficial publication of Dallas Klan
No. 66; the Tyler American; and the Elgin Pure Democ-
racy. The Newspaper Collection at Louisiana State Uni-
versity has random issues on microfilm of the Columbia
Caldwell [Parish] Watchman, a pro-Klan newspaper pub-
lished briefly in northeastern Louisiana. There are a few
issues of the Oklahoma City Fiery Cross, the official pub-
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lication of Realm headquarters, in the Campbell Russell
Collection, Division of Manuscripts, University of Okla-
homa Library. The writer was unable to locate copies of
the Little Rock Arkansas Traveller, semiofficial weekly of
Little Rock Klan No.1.
Personal interviews in 1959 with two citizens of Dallas,
both prominent in the Texas Klan in the 1920s, were rather
productive of information on the activities of the order in
the Lone Star State. The two ex-Klansmen, who asked to
remain anonymous, conversed freely about general develop-
ments in the Realm of Texas but were reluctant to talk on
some topics and forgetful on others. V. A. Collins, at-
torney-at-Iaw now living in Livingston, Texas, was kind
enough to write a long, instructive letter relating his
troubles with Texas Klan officials in 1924 and the circum-
stances of his break with the organization and campaign
for the governorship. Other attempts to secure personal
interviews or exchange correspondence with important for-
mer Klan members, people in a position to throw light into
the darkest corners of southwestern Klan history, proved
unsuccessful. The writer talked with a number of admitted
former Klansmen, suspected ex-Knights, and anti-Klanners.
Such conversations, usually casual, were of little profit; for
as a rule, when the writer's notebook was opened the sub-
ject was closed.
A reasonable amount of serviceable published matter
dealing at least partly with the Klan in the Southwest is
at hand. Most general histories of Texas, Louisiana, and
Oklahoma touch on the Klan, however lightly. Of use for
the political history of Texas in the twenties are: Rupert N.
Richardson, Texas, the Lone Star State (2d ed., Englewood
Cliffs, N. J., 1958), chI xx; Seth S. McKay, Texas Politics,
1916-1944, with Special Reference to the German Counties
(Lubbock, 1952); Ralph W. Steen, "A Political History of
Texas, 1900-1930," in Frank C. Adams (ed.), Texas Democ-
racy (4 vols., Austin, 1937), I, 319-464; Steen, Twentieth
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Century Texas: An Economic and Social History (Austin,
1942); and Lee N. Allen, "The Democratic Presidential Pri-
mary Election of 1924 in Texas," Southwestern Historical
Quarterly, LXI (April 1958), 474-93. Reinhard Luthin,
American Demagogues: Twentieth Century (New York,
1954), contains a provocative essay on the career of James
E. and Miriam A. Ferguson of Texas. But s-ee also Charles
w. Ferguson, "James E. Ferguson," Southwest Review, X
(October 1924), 29-36; and Ouida Ferguson Nalle, The
Fergusons of Texas (San Antonio, 1946). A concise narra-
tive of the Klan's career in Texas politics is Charles C. Alex-
ander, "Secrecy Bids for Power: The Ku Klux Klan in Texas
Politics in the 1920's," Mid-America, XLVI (January 1964),
3~28. Contemporary periodical material on the Texas Klan
includes: Edward T. Devine, "The Klan in Texas," Survey,
XLVIII (April 1, 1922), 10-11; Devine, "More about the
Klan," ibid. (April 8, 1922), 42-43; and "Klan Victories in
Oregon and Texas," Literary Digest, LXXV (November
25, 1922), 12.
Edwin A. Davis, Louisiana: The Pelican State (Baton
Rouge, 1959), is an able survey, but inadequate for the
twentieth century. Allan P. Sindler, Huey Longs Louis-
iana: State Politics, 1920-1952 (Baltimore, 1956), is useful
for the general political history of the twenties, with em-
phasis on Long, but has little material on the Klan. Thomas
E. Dabney has a chapter on the Klan in One Hundred
Great Years: The Story of the Times-Picayune from Its
Founding to 1940 (Baton Rouge, 1944); while George M.
Reynolds, in Machine Politics in New Orleans, 1897-1926
(Columbia University Studies in Economics, History and
Public Law; New York, 1936), covers the character of the
Old Regular organization that allied with part of the Louis-
iana Klan in the 1924 gubernatorial campaign. T. Harry
Williams provides an introduction to his forthcoming
biography of Huey P. Long in "Gentleman from Louisiana:
Demagogue or Democrat," Journal of Southern History,
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XXVI (February 1960), 3-21. The Mer Rouge murder
cases of 1922-1923 in Morehouse Parish, Louisiana, and
the Klan's relation to the murders, received considerable
contemporary periodical coverage, including: "Murders of
Mer Rouge," Literary Digest, LXXVI (January 13, 1923),
10-12; "Mer Rouge Murders Unpunished," ibid. (March 31,
1923), 10~11; and Leonard L. Cline, cCIn Darkest Louisiana,"
Nation, CXVI (March 14, 1923), 292-93.
The best general history of Oklahoma is Edwin C. Mc-
Reynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State (Nor-
man, 1954). More pedantic, but still of value, is Victor E.
Harlow, Oklahoma: Its Origins and Development (Okla-
homa City, 1949). Both McReynolds and Harlow devote
more attention to the twentieth century, including the
career of the Klan, than one ordinarily finds in state his-
tories. Gilbert C. Fite looks at a portion of the anti-Klan
sentiment in Oklahoma by way of describing Sooner State
farm politics in cCOklahoma's Reconstruction League: An
Experiment in Farmer-Labor Politics," Journal of South-
ern History, XIII (November 1947), 535-55, and cCJohn A.
Simpson: The Southwest's Militant Farm Leader," Missis-
sippi Valley Historical Review, XXXV (March 1949), 563-
84. For the struggle between Jack Walton and the Klan in
1923, culminating in Walton's ouster from the governor-
ship, see: Howard A. Tucker, Governor Walton's Ku Klux
Klan War (Oklahoma City, 1923); Ernest T. Bynum, Per-
sonal Recollections of Ex-Governor vValton (2d ed., Okla-
homa City, 1924); W. D. McBee, The Oklahoma Revolu-
tion (Oklahoma City, 1955); c'Masked Floggers of Tulsa,"
Literary Digest, LXXVIII (September 22, 1923), 17; c'Okla-
homa's Uncivil Civil War," ibid. (September 29, 1923),
10-11; "Constitution Week in Oklahoma," ibid., LXXIX (Oc-
tober 13, 1923), 12-13; "Jack, the Klan-Fighter in Okla-
homa," ibid. (October 20, 1923), 38-44; "Oklahoma King-
less, Not Klanless," ibid. (December 8, 1923), 9; cCMartial
Law in Oklahoma," Outlook, CXXXV (September 26,
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1923), 133; Stanley Frost, "The Oklahoma Regicides Act,"
ibid. (November 7, 1923), 395-96; Frost, "Night Riding
Reformers: The Regeneration of Oklahoma," ibid. (No-
vember 14,1923),438-40; Frost, cCBehind the White Hoods:
The Regeneration of Oklahoma,~~ ibid. (November 21,
1923), 492-94; Frost, cCThe Klan, the King, and a Revolu-
tion: The Regeneration of Oklahoma," ibid. (November
28, 1923), 530-31; Aldrich Blake, cCOklahoma's Klan-Fighting
Governor," Nation, CXVII (October 3, 1923), 353; and
Bruce Bliven, cCFrom the Oklahoma Front," New Republic,
XXVI (October 17, 1923), 202-205.
There is no worthwhile survey of the history of Arkansas.
Hazel Presson, The Story of Arkansas (3d ed., rev., New
York, 1958) and Olin E. McKnight and Boyd W. Johnson,
The Arkansas Story (New York, 1955) are uncritical treat-
ments written primarily, it appears, for secondary school
readers. David Y. Thomas (ed.), Arkansas and Its People:
A History, 1541-1930 (3 vols., Chicago, 1930) consists of
complimentary biographical sketches and subjective writ-
ing. John Gould Fletcher, Arkansas (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1947) is a series of impressionistic essays on the history of
the state. Henry M. Alexander has some comments on the
Klan in Arkansas politics in c'The Double Primary," Arkan-
sas Historical Quarterly, III (Autumn 1944), 217-68. Other
periodical material dealing with the history of the Klan in
the Wonder State includes: Charles C. Alexander, CCWhite-
Robed Reformers: The Ku Klux Klan Comes to Arkansas,
1921-1922,~~ Arkansas Historical Quarterly, XXII (Spring
1963), 8-23; Alexander, c'White Robes in Politics: The Ku
Klux Klan in Arkansas, 1922-1924," ibid. (Fall 1963), 195-
214; and Alexander, cCDefeat, Decline, Disintegration: The
Ku Klux Klan in Arkansas, 1924 and After," ibid. (Winter
1963), 310-31.
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Acadia Parish, La., 46
Ada, Okla., Klan aids widow, 47
Alabama, 2, 3, 5, 79, 161, 166,
167, 199, 209, 232, 238
Alexandria, La., 28, 53, 166, 179,
182, 213; antimask ordinance,
99; Klan established, 41; storm
fund, 92
Alpena, Ark., 62
Altus, Okla., 231; assault
conviction, 81





American Protective Assn., 14, 18
Amite, La., 120, 213
Anarchists, 13, 24





Anti-Klan Assn. of Oklahoma, 205
Anti-Klan legislation, 99, 137-38,




Ardmore, Okla., 28, 32; court re-
strains Walton's election board,
149
Arkadelphia, Ark., 190, 221; Jun-
ior Klan established, 105
Arkansas, 18-19, 21-28, 30-31,
33-35, 51-54, 56, 59, 61-64,
73, 77, 86-87, 89-90, 92-93,
96-98, 100-101, 103-105, 108,
112-18, 156, 160, 163, 167-70,
172-76, 185-92, 207-209, 216-
21, 232, 237-38, 240-43, 246,
249, 253; antievolution refer-
endum, 86-87; Democratic pri-
mary, Aug. 1922, 114-16; gen-
eral election, 1928, 240; labor
violence at Harrison, 62, 6.'3;
Ozark region, 61-63; state
Democratic primary, Aug. 1924,
189-91
Arkansas Anti-Saloon League, 238
Arkansas County, Ark., 190
Arkansas General Assembly,
Klansmen in, 117
Arkansas House of Representa.
tives, antievolution bill, 86-87
Arlington, Tex., 89, 224
Arnall, Ellis, 255
Ashland, Ala., 79
Assn. of Georgia Klans, 255
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Aswell, Jalnes B., denounces
Louisiana governor, 71
Atlanta, Ga., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, lO-
ll, 80, 102, 107, 108, 109, 110,
125, 212, 214, 223, 250, 255;
Klan headquarters moves out,
233; returns, 241
Augusta, Maine, 20
Austin, Tex., 28, 46; Klan estab-
lished, 39; visitation fight, 88
Bailey, Joseph W., 197
Bald Knob, Ark., election, 1923,
117-18
Bale, John W., 4 .
Baltimore, Md., 72
Baptist church, 88-90; anti-Klan
congregations, 88
Barnette, William C., 74-75, 120,
179,213,238
Bartlesville, Okla., 133; Klan
opposed, 99
Bastrop, La., 68-75
Baton Rouge, La., 28, 40, 78, 90,
120, 177, 179, 210, 213; city
primaries, summer 1922, 119-
20; Klan demonstrates against
Governor Parker, 71; Klan es·
tablished, 40; state Democratic
convention, 1924, 166
Beaumont, Tex., 26, 28, 46, 90,
108, 125, 198; D. L. Matthews
tarred twice, 63; J. S. Paul
Hogged and tarred, 42, 57n;
Klan established, 39; R. F.
Scott flogged, 42, 570
Beeson, C. W. and Rowena, 101
Beethoven Hall, San Antonio,
destruction attempted, 222
Behrman, Martin H., 166, 177,
180, 181
Bellaire, Tex., 38
Benedict, Orner K., 229, 230;




Billings, Walter, Hogged, 45
Birmingham, Ala., 6, 20, 255
Birth of a Natton, The, 1,4, 18
Blake, Aldrich, 135-36, 142, 144;
break with Walton, 152
Bloodworth, Lloyd P., 224, 239
Bolsheviks, 13, 24, 33-34, 242
Boone County, Ark., 62
Booth, A. B., 39
Bootlegging. See under Crime;
see also Prohibition
Bossert, Walter F., 108, 167
BOW1Ilchaud, Hewitt, 180, 181,
182-83, 210, 211
Bourland, Fagan, 117
Brickhouse, Ben D., 116; breaks
with Klan, 216-17
Brist0w, Okla., 49
Broken Arrow, Okla., 67
Broken Bow, Okla., couple
Hogged, 66-67
Brown, A. E. and L. J., 51-52
BrOwnsville, Tex., 24n
Brunot, H. F., 120
Bryan, Alva, 168,239
Bryan, William Jennings, 168
Bryan County, Okla., obeys Wal-
ton election decree, 149, 150
Brydia, Fred, introduces Oklaho-
ma anti-Klan legislation, 137-38
Buchanan, Bob, 50
Bull Moose party, 113-14, 173,
177
Burnett. T. Jeff, 72, 74, 75
Butler, L. P., 39
Butte" George C., 198
Bynum, Ernest T., 136
Bynu~ Turner, 119
Calcasieu Parish, La., 47, 77-78
California, 161, 167
Callahan, J. P., 156
Camden, Ark., election, 1923, 117
Cargill, Otto, 229
Carpenter, Fred, 68-69
Carron, Joe, slain, 50·51




Carter County, Okla., 50-51
Cash, W. J., 18
Catahoula Parish, La., 75-76
Catholicism, 14, 33-34, 85, 88,
90, 99, Ill, 161, 162, 180, 184,
235,236,238,243,245,253
Catholics, 17, 18, 21-22, 25-26,
41, 47, Ill, 113, 115, 117, 118,
119, 132, 136, 181, 182, 183,
211, 221, 227, 232, 245
Catholic schools, outlawed in
Oregon, 111-12
Catts, Sidney J., 14-15
Caucasians, 16
Cazort, Lee, 77, 186, 187-88, 189,
190, 192, 216, 238, 249
Cedar Grove, La., Junior Klan
established, 105
Central & Gulf Railroad, 172
Central Christian Church,
Shreveport, 90, 211
Chappuis, C. L., introduces Lou-
isiana anti-Klan legislation, 46
Chicago, Ill., 13, 173-74
Chickasha, Okla., 131
Childers, MalVin A., 165-66, 222,
239
Choctaw Club, 177, 183
Cimarron County, Okla., obeys
Walton election decree, 149-50
Citizens Bureau of Investigation,
5
Clansman, The, 18n
Claremore, Okla., 133; women's
secret order formed, 100-101
Clark, B. F., Hogged, 63
Clark, Erwin J., 122
Clark County, Ark., 190
Clarke, Edward Y., 6-7, 8-11, 18,
36-38, 43, 53, 57, 79-80, 83,
107-109, 235, 248, 250; ban-
ished from Klan, 102; recruit-
ing contract canceled, 110
Clarkson, E. R., 4
Clarksville, Ark., 53
Cleveland, Ohio, 167; Republican
national convention, 1924, 160
Cline, Jerry, 78
Cloud, Agnes B., 105n, 217-18,
220
Coburn, W. S., murdered by
Phillip Fox, 102
Coco, Adolph V., 71-74, 183
Colescott, James Arnold, succeeds
Evans as Imperial Wizard, 253,
254-55
Collins, V. A., 193, 195-96, 197,
239
Colonel Mayfielas Weekly, 96,
193
Colorado, 159, 176, 209; Klan in
politics, 118
Colquitt, Oscar B., 197, 239
Columbia, La., Women of the
Klan established, 104
Comer, Janles A., 52, 103, 104,
108, 113-14, 116, 117, 118,
163, 167, 172-74,-185-86, 187,
188, 189, 191-92, 216, 273,
249; quarrel with Little Rock
Klan, 217, 221; rallies Arkansas
Klan for Evans, 101
Comer, Robbie Gill, 217-18, 220,
224
cCCommittee of 1000," 62
Communism, 13, 253
Communists, 225-26, 253, 255
Confederate States of America, 17
Congress of Industrial
Organizations, 253
Congress of the United States:
House Rules Committee hear-
ings on Klan, 10-11, 34, 57;
Senate investigates Mayfield
campaign, 126-27; Senate re-
pudiates Versailles Treaty and
League of Nations, 12
Conway, Ark., 53, 115, 221
Cook, Robert A., 191-92, 220
Coolidge, Calvin, 170-74, 206,
235; noncoIDlnittal on Klan,
171-72
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Corpus Christi, Tex., 197, 239
Corsicana, Tex., pastor rejects
Klan, 88-89
Cox, James M., 174
Cox, Shelby, 225, 239
Crane, Martin M., 50
Creager, Rene B., 160
Creek County, Okla., 47, 49, 65;
military courtadjoums, 151;
under absolute martial law, 146
Crime, 21, 28-30, 63, 77; boot-
legging, 23, 27, 30-32, 34, 41,
47, 52, 55, 63, 68-69, 75-76,
77-78, 142; drunkenness, 32;
gambliI)g, 31,32, 55, 76; Klan
fails .to reduce, Ill; murder,
68·75, 77-78, 80-81, 102, 183;
narcotics traffic, 142; prostitu-
tion, 31, 32, 34, 69, 76; rob-
bery, 32; sabotage, 61; theft,
55. See also Violence
Crimm, B. B., 90
Culberson, Charles A., 50, 123
Dallas, Tex., 20, 26, 28, 29, 41,
50, 79, 89, 90, 93n, 94n, 96-97,
105n, 108, 122, 123, 162, 166,
183, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198,
217-18, 222, 239, 246-47, 250;
Alex Johnson branded, 41; city
election, 1923, 127; Hogging,
247; Hope Cottage established
by Klan, 93-94; Klan Day at
State Fair, 153; Klan estab-
lished, 39; Klan finances in-
vestigated' 223-24; Klansmen
visiting San Antonio driven
back, 99-100; labor organizers
beaten, 226; Women of the
Klan established, 104
Dallas County, Tex., 125, 197-98,
225
Daniel, F. Watt: Klan warns, 69;
lnurdered, 70, 73, 80; recov-
ered from lake, 71-72
Daniel, J. L., 69, 73; Hogged, 70
Daniels, Ray, Hogged, 6'3
Daugherty, Harry M., 71
Davenport, A. E., 137
Davenport, C. C. "Tot," 70, 73
Davidson, R. L., 171-72
Davidson, T. W., 81
Davis, John W., 169-72, 174, 205,
240; takes stand against Klao,
171,172-73
Davis, Rush H., 216, 241
Dawes, Charles G., mildly attacks
Klan, 171
DeBarr, Edwin, 108, 118-19, 133-
34, 137; resigns Klan office, 134
Delaware County, Okla., obeys
Walton election decree, 149-50
Democratic party, 32, 113-17,
119, 125-26, 130, 134-36, 156,
160-72, 174-77, 180, 182-83,
185-91, 193, 196, 198-99, 204-
208, 210, 222-23, 226-32, 235-
37, 238-40, 245, 248-49; na-
tional convention, 1924, 176;
national convention, 1928, 236-
37
Denison, Tex.: Klan patrols "lov-
ers' lanes," 76; visitation fight,
88
Denver, Colo., 20
DePaoli, Thomas F., 40, 121,
179, 181, 184n, 213, 214; de-
fends Klan in Louisiana House,
46-47; leads Louisiana Klan for
Evans, 101-102
DeQuincy, La.: church returns
Klan donation, 88; Klan estab-
lished,47
DeRidder, La., preacher tarred,
53-54
Deweyville, Tex., Hogging, 42
Disciples of Christ church, 89-90
Disney, Wesley E., 200; in fight
on Walton, 148-49, 156-57
Dixon, Thomas B., 18n
Doheny, Edward L., 161
Dreyfous, Jules, introduces Lou-
isiana antimask legislation, 46
Dreyfuss family, 26 .
275
Duhon, Sam E., murdered, 77-78
Duncan, Carey P., 182, 213
Duncan, Okla., 164
Dunn, Byron, executed for
murder, 77...78
Dunn, Robert: convicted of mur-
der, 77; sentence commuted
to life, 78
Eastern Orthodox churches, 16-17
Eaton, W. V., 39-40
Edinburgh, Tex., 24n
Edwards, Will C., 197
EI(;line, Ark., 13
Elam, Richard, 156-57
El Dorado, Ark., 31, 52, 187,
189; city election, 1923, 117;
Klan hospital fund diverted, 92;
"Law Enforcement League,"
52-53
El Dorado Natural Gas and Pe-
troleum Co., bunkhouse raided,
64
Elections: Arkansas antievolution
law, 1928, 86-87; Arkansas
Democratic primary, Aug. 1922,
114-16; Arkansas Democratic
primary, Aug. 1924, 189-91;
Arkansas general, 1928, 240;
Bald Knob, Ark., school trustee,
1923, 117-18; Baton Rouge
city primary, summer 1922,
119-20; Camden, Ark., school
trustee, 1923, 117; Dallas city,
1923~ 127; EI Dorado, Ark.,
city, 1923, 117; EI Paso city,
1923, 127; Fort Smith city,
1925,217; Fort Smith city re-
call, 1923, 117, 217; Fort
Worth city, 1923, 127; Georgia
state, 1922, 127; influenced bv
Klan, 159; Little Rock city,
1922, 112-14; Little Rock city,
spring 1923, 117; Little Rock
city primary, Dec. 1922, 116-
17; Little Rock city primary,
1924, 192; Little Rock Demo-
Elections (continued):
cratic primary, 1924, 216-17;
Little Rock special, Sept. 1922,
116; Louisiana Democratic pri-
mary, Jan.-Feb. 1924, 182-84;
Louisiana Fifth Judicial Dist.
special primary, March 1923,
120-21; Louisiana general, 1928,
240; Oklahoma constitutional
referendum, Oct. 1923, 149-50;
Oklahoma Democratic primary,
July 1922, 133; Oklahoma
Democratic primary, Aug. 1922,
133; Oklahoma Democratic pri-
mary, Aug. 1924, 202-203;
Oklahoma Democratic primary,
1926, 229-30; Oklahoma gen-
eral, Nov. 1922, 135; Okla-
homa general, Nov. 1924, 204-
205, 206-207; Oklahoma gen-
eral, 1926, 230-31; Oklahoma
general, 1928, 240; Oklahoma
state, 1922, 127; Oregon state,
1922, 127; San Antonio city,
1923, 127; Stuttgart, Ark., city,
April 1925, 217; Texas Demo-
cratic primary, July 1922, 121-
25; Texas Democratic primary,
July-Aug. 1924, 196-99, 222;
Texas general, Nov. 1922, 125-
28; Texas general, Nov. 1924,
198-99, 222; Texas general,
Nov. 1928, 240; Texas state,




Elks Theater, Baton Rouge, 120
Ellis, A. D., 90, 108
Ellis, Robert D., 120, 213
EI Paso, Tex., 28; city election,
1923, 127; Klan established, 39
EI Reno, Okla., mail clerk tarred,
46
Elrod, Milton, 167
Empire Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 97
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Enid, Okla., 229; Billy Ware




Eureka Springs, Ark., 62
Evans, Hiram W., 57, 94, 96, 98-
99, 100-101, 108, 109-11, 113-
14, 122-23, 125, 126, 159-60,
167, 171, 173-74, 183-84, 194,
195, 212, 213-14, 215, 218,
222, 223-24, 227, 232, 239,
241, 248, 249, 250, 252-53;
approves Walton's Klan mem-
bership, 136-37; biographical
sketch, 79; branding incident,
41, 80; declines interference in
Oklahoma, 145; decrees mask-
lifting, 234-35, 237; expels
Louisiana Klan leaders, 213;
Imperial Wizard, 110; Klan
national secretary, 109; leads
Klan into politics, 79-80; moves
Klan headquarters to Washing-
ton, 233; reform movement,
80-81, 83, 139-40; resigns as




League, 130, 131, 133, 136,
138, 201; condemns Walton,
148; cools toward Walton, 140
Farmers' Union, 130
Faulkner County, Ark., 115
Ferguson, James E., 193, 196,
198, 199, 255; impeachment
and ouster, 124, 193; tries
comeback, 124, 125
Ferguson, Jim G. (of Arkansas),
186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 216,
249
Ferguson, Miriam A., 196, 197,
198, 199, 222, 223," 235; de-
feated for reelection, 225; gov-




Fiery Cross, 172, 201-202, 203
Finley, William, convicted
Oklahoma Klansman, 67
First Christian Church, Little
Rock,89n
First Methodist Church, Little
Rock, 238n
First ~1ethodist Church, Wichita
Falls,89n
Florida, 3, 14-15, 254
Florida Ku Klux Klan, 255
Florsheim family, 26
Foreman, Eddie, Hogged, 64
Forest Avenue Christian Church,
Dallas, 90
Forrest, Nathan B., Jr., 108, 167
Fort Snlith, Ark., 51-52, 117, 118,
221; city election, 1925, 217;
city recall election, 1923, 117,
217; Klan screens needy, 92
Fort Worth, Tex., 28, 41, 96-97,
103, 108, 122, 194, 198, 224,
239; city election, 1923, 127;
gambler tarred, 41; Klan estab-
lished, 39; Klan finances in-
vestigated, 223-24; Klan head-
quarters destroyed, 222; Klan
pledges Y.M.C.A. aid, 92; Mor-
ris Strauss Hogged, 225-26;
\VOIDen of the Klan established,
103-104
Fox, Phillip, kills W. S. Coburn,
102
Frank, Leo, lynched at Milledge-
ville, Ga., 16
Franklin Parish, La., 72-73
Frazier, J. E., Hogged, 48
Frost, Jonathan, 5
Frost, Stanley, 20, 81-82
Fuqua, Henry L., 166, 179, 180-
81, 182-85, 210, 211, 212, 213,
248; wins Democratic nomina-
tion for governor of Louisiana,
183
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Galveston, Tex., Klan established,
39
Garrett, David I., 72-74
GassIer, Leo, 119
Georgetown, Tex., 197
Georgia, 5, 14, 108, 159, 161,
167, 169, 176, 209, 232, 245,
255; Klan in politics, 118;
state election, 1922, 127
Georgia House of Representatives,
4-5
Gennany, R. Will, 213; leads
Louisiana Klan for Evans, 101-
102
Gibbs', Walter H., slain at
Nashville, Ark., 64
Giffdrd, Fred L., 167
Gill, Robbie, 217-18, 220, 224
Gist, Noel P., 83
Good Government Democratic
League, 198
Goose Creek~ Tex.: couple beaten,
63-64; Klan established, 39
Gordon family, 26
Gore, Thomas B., 202
Grady County, Okla., 133
Grand Lodge of Texas, 94-95
G.r~nt,. Madison, 15
Gray, William K., 78
Greeks) 15-16
Green, Samuel, 255
Green Forest, Ark., 62
Gregor, E. C., lynched at
Harrison, Ark., 62-63
Griffith, David Wark, 1
Gulager, J. M.,. 227
Gulf Ku Klux Klan, 255
Gurdon, Ark., Klan established,
52




IIarding, "Varren G., 12-13, 71,
173-74
Harlingen, Tex., 24n
Hannon County, Okla., Hogging
investigated, 135-36
Harper, Ed, 77
I-Iarper, Jess B., 230
Harper County, Okla., obeys Wal-
ton election decree, 149-50
Harreld, John W., 230
Harris, Joel, beaten, 64
Harris, Zach A., 228, 231n, 232,
236,237,241,246
Harris County, Tex., 125, 198
Harrison, Pat, 170
Harrison, Ark.: "Citizens' Court,"
62; E. C. Gregor lynched, 62-
6.'3; George W. O'Neal Hogged,
62; Klan established, 61
Harrisonburg, La., Klan urges
law enforcement, 75-76
Harwood, Brown, 108, 123, 137
Haynesville, La., 31
llays, George T., denounces
Arkansas Klan ticket, 114
Heavener, Okla., 200
Heber Springs, Ark., 62-63j Klan
established, 61
Helena, Ark., 190, 221
Henry, Pat, 228
Henry, Robert L., 122-23, 196
Henryetta, Okla., 147; martial
law in, 141
Hobbs, B. I., Hogged and tarred,
41
Hoffman, Claude E., 227-28
Holcombe, Oscar F., resigns from
Klan, 46, 246-47
Holdenville, Okla., 155
Hollis, Okla., Hogging, 135
Holloway, William J., 227
Hoover, Herbert, 237, 239, 240
Hope, Ark., bootlegger beaten, 52
Hot Springs, Ark., 53; Klan
established, 52
House, E. Claude, 78
Houston, Tex., 28, 29, 36-38, 63,
108, 123-24, 125, 192, 194,
195, 198, 246-47; B. I. Hobbs
tarred, 41; Democratic na-
278
Houston, Tex. (continued):
tional convention, 1928, 236-
37; Klan aids hospital, 92; Klan
intercepts telegrams, 76; Klan
postal spies, 76; Klan screens
needy, 92; Klan taps phones,
76; peace officers imported, 46;
Sam Houston Klan No. 1 es-
tablished, 38, 39, 40
Houston Chronicle, 54
Howard, E. B., 131-32, 201, 202,
203




Humble, Tex., Klan established,
38
Iberia Parish, La., 46
Immigrants, 21-22, 24
Immigration, 15, 19, 33-34,
235-36,245





Evans in rift, 102
Independent Order of Odd
Fellows, 3, 91
Independent Regulars, 180, 183
Indiana, 25, 103, 108, 130, 159,
160, 167, 176, 193-94, 199,
209, 250, 253; Klan estab-
lished, 53; Klan in politics,
118; Klan supports Evans in
rift, 102; Women of the Klan
strong in, 104
Indianapolis, Ind., 20





Jefferson County, Tex., 125, 198
Jewett, N. Clay, 118-19, 134,
164, 167, 201, 202, 203, 204,
205-206, 207, 226,- 227, 248;
accepts antimask law, 155; ac-
cused of supporting Coolidge,
171-72; charged in flogging,
66, 147-48; defies Walton, 144-
45; leads Oklahoma Klan for
Evans, 101-102; leads unmasked
Klan parade, 156; rebukes Wal-
ton, 147
Jews, 14, 16-17, 18, 19, 21-22,
25-26, 33-34, 96, 115, 117,
142, 181, 211, 221, 225-26,
243, 255
John Birch Society, 256
Johnson, Alex, branded, 41, 80




Johnson County, Ark., 77, 186
Johnson-Reed Immigration Re·
striction Act, 234-35, 244
Johnston, Henry S., 166, 228,
229,230-31,236,237-38
Johnston County, Okla., obeys
Walton election decree, 149-50
Jones, Bob, 90
Jones, Jesse H., 237
Junior Ku Klux Klan, 105
Kahn family, 26
Kamelia (secret order for women),
100-101; destroyed by Evans,
101
Kansas, 97, 156
Kansas City, Mo., 97, 204, 213
Kenner Memorial Methodist
Church, Baton Rouge, 90
Kentucky, 172
Kight, Blanche and H. Tom, 101
Kimbro, George B., 36n, 38, 40,
42; leads floggers, 41
Kiwanis Clubs, 243
Klanhaven Assn., 93, 94
Knights Kamelia, 234
279
Knights of Liberty, 24-25
Knights of Pythias, 3, 91
Knights of the Great Forest, 234
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan: boy-
cotts, 56-57; Catholic schools,
111-12; chartered in Georgia,
2; church visitations, 42-43,
87-88; citizen arrests, 76; clergy
in, 87; collapse, 242; Congres-
sional investigation of, 10-11,
34, 57; control of courts and
juries, 77-78; cross burnings, 2,
4, 56-57, 75, 99; decline in
1920s, 105-106; decline in
Southwest, 209...32; decline of
vigilantism, 79; Democratic na-
tional convention, 1924, 16.1,
162, 166-70; demonstrations,
48, 75, 80, 200, 214, 288; dues
and assessments, 7-8, 251;
"elimination primaries," 114,
186, 188; factional strife, 100-
102, 104, 110, 112, 155, 179,
188-89, 210-11, 213-14, 217-
21, 223, 227, 248-51 (see also
lawsuits); failures at crime re-
duction, 81-82, Ill; head-
quarters move to Washington,
233; headquarters return to At-
lanta, 241; House Rules Com-
mittee hearings on, 10...11, 34,
57; income, 4, 7-8, 10, 88, 107,
250, 251; initiations, 47-48, 53,
98-99; initiation fees, 4; in-
surance programs, 4-5, 97, 251;
jargon and passwords, 3, 4, 7,
11, 95, 96; c'Klan line" on
responsibility for violence, 57-
59; law...enforcement programs,
77; lawsuits, 36n, 120, 149,
151, 218-20, 250-51, 258-55;
literature, 95-96; Masonry, 94-
95; membership as status sym-
bol, 95; membership dwindles,
94; membership figures, 6, 8,
28, 45, 49, 58, 54, 101, 107,
118, 120, 141, 177, 185, 192,
Knights of the Klan (continued):
193, 221, 223, 224, 228, 231-
32, 241, 250, 254; membership
figures in Southwest by states,
53; membership, national, esti-
mated, 159; national unmask-
ing, 284; non-Southern states,
8, 107 ( see also states by
name); official demise, 254-55;
opposed by churches, 88-89;
opposition incidents, 49-51, 67,
70-75, 81, 88-89, 99-100, 133-
34, 139-55, 171, 222, 246-47,
253; parades, 42, 98, 156-57,
238 (see also demonstrations);
philanthropies, 47, 52, 84, 87-
88, 91-95; politics, 77-79, 106,
109-10, 112-28, 159-75, 176-
208, 234...41, 244-45, 248-49,
253; postal spies, 76; profits,
7-8, 10, 83, 107; recruiting ac-
tivities, 7-9, 10, 36-41, 48-44,
107; regalia, 63n, 80; religios·.
ity, 84-85; ritual, 84-85, 95,
98-100; second degree, 234;
"secret service/' 5; social func-
tions, 98-100; sbikebreaking,
61-63; titles of leaders, 4; tele-
grams intercepted, 76; terror-
ism and intimidation, 23-24,
52, 53, 54, 55-58, 68, 75-76,
80-81, 83, 139, 246, 247; ter-
rorism ends, 80-81; third de-
gree, 284; threats, 56-57;
"whitecapping," 81; wiretap-
ping, 59-60, 76
Knowles, Harry· G., leaves pulpit
for Klan, 89-90
Know-Nothing party, 14, 18
Ku Klux Klan, 3, 6, 17-18, 33,
108; in fiction, 1
Kunsman, Lee, 142-43
Labor unions, 13, 61-63, 130, 226
Ladies of the Cu Clux Clan, 179
Ladies of the Invisible Empire,
103
280
LaFollette, Robert M., 170-71
Lake Charles, La., 179, 211; Klan
established, 41; Klan resists
general decline, 77-78
Lake Cooper, La., 71-72
Lake Lafourche, La., 71-72
Lamar, Ark., 77, 186
Landon, Grant, appoints
"whipping squad," 60
Laredo, Tex., 24n; Klan parade
prevented, 99·
Latimer County, Okla., 156
Lawton, Okla., 133, 164; Klan
established, 44
Lea, W. E., 165
League of Nations, 12, 170
Lee, Swords R., 166, 179, 180,
213
Leoparas Spots, The, 18n
Leslie, Ark., 62
Lions Clubs, 243
Little Rock, Ark., 26, 28, 51, 52-
53, 62, 64, 89, 90, 113-18, 163,
185, 186, 187-88, 189, 190,
191, 216, 217, 218, 249:1 252;
city Democratic primary, Dec.
1922, 116-17; city Democratic
primary, 1924, 192, 216-17;
city election, April 1922, 112-
14; city election, spring 1923,
117; Junior Klan established,
105; Kamelia Kourt established,
101; Klan charity circus, 92-
93; Klan established, 52; Klan
initiates 650, 53; Klan suspends
candidate members, 188; seces-
sion of Klans, 217-21; poolhall
operator flogged, 52; special
election, 1922, 116; state Dem-
ocratic primary, 1924, 216-17;
Women of the Klan established,
104; Women's Klan founds
children's home, 92-93; Wom-
en's Klan headquarters, 103;
Women's Klan splits, 104
Little Rock Arkansas Gazette, 30,
115~ 189
Lively, Mike T., 165-66
Lodge, Henry Cabot, 15
Long, Huey P., 179, 180, 181,
182-83, 184-85, 211, 252-5~;
called "Klansman at Large,»
182
Lonoke, Ark., 172, 190
Lorena, Tex., riot, 1921, 50
Louisiana, 18-19, 21-28, 30-31,
33-35, 38-47, 49, 51, 53-54,
56, 59-60, 68-76, 77-78, 86-90,
92, 98-100, 102-105, 108, 112,
118-20, 1452 159, 166-68, 170,
174-85, 188, 189, 207-16, 221,
232, 234, 237-38, 240-41, 246,
248-50, 253; Acadians, 47;
Fifth Judicial Dist. election,
March 1923, 120-21; cCFlorida
parishes," 118, 181; general
election, Nov. 1928, 240; c'Klan
No. 0, Realm of Louisiana,"
39; list of Klans by cities .and
towns, 40-41; Mer Rouge mur-
ders, 68-75, 80-81, 183; state
Democratic primaries, Jan.-Feb.
1924, 182-84
Louisiana Dept. of Health, 74
Louisiana General Assembly, 210;
anti-Klan legislation, 211-15
Louisiana House of Representa-
tives, antievolution bill, 86-87
Louisiana national guard, 71-72
Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 179
Louisiana State University, 69,
120
Louisiana supreme court, 120
Love, Thomas B., 162, 198, 239
Lyons, J. Horace, 78
McAdoo, William Gibbs, 161,
162, 1632 164, 165-66, 167,
169-70, 175, 226-27; declines
stand against Klan, 162
McAllen, Tex., 24n
McBee, W. D., 152, 156-57, 164
McBurney, Ralph, 119
281
McCall, H. C., 108, 247; rallies
Texas Klan for Evans, 101
McCarron, George C., 42
McConnell, James A., 174
McCullough, William D., ouster
as sheriff threatened, 47
McCurtain County, Okla., 66-67
McDougald, William, leaves
pulpit for Klan, 89
McIntosh, W. G., 74
McKinney, Tex., riot interrupts
Klan parade, 99
McKoin, B. M., 69,72, 74
McLennan County, Tex., 50, 125,
198
McRae, Thomas C., 30, 63,
115-16, 185
Madill, Okla., 145
Madison Square Garden, 166
Maine, 159, 168, 176
Malvern, Ark., 53; Klan
established, 52
Marion County, Ark., 62
Markham, Baird H.: convenes
military court, 143; opposes
Okmulgee military role, 141
Markwell, Lulu A., 104; heads
Women of the Klan, 103;
resignation, 217
"Marland and Dutch Shell oil
interests,'· denounced by John
Walton, 132
Marshall, Ark., 62; Klan
established, 61
Marshall, Tex., Ray Daniels
Hogged, 63
Martineau, John E., 187, 189,
190, 218, 220
Marvin, Z. E., 97, 108, 118-19,
123, 167, 193-94, 195-96, 224,
249; banished by Dallas Klan,
223; resignation, 222
Masonic Lodge, 3, 91, 94-95,
222, 228; Klan relationship, 94-
95; in Oklahoma, 164
Massachusetts, 171
Matthews, D. L., tarred twice, 63
Maupin, A. A., 66
Mayfield, Billie, 123-24, 192, 194,
195-96
Mayfield, Earle B., 121-24, 166,
167, 192, 249; campaign in-
vestigated, 126-27; elected sen-
ator, 126; named Klan candi-
date for senator in Texas, 123;
seated by unanimous Senate
vote, 126-27
Mecklin, John Moffatt, 19
Medicine Park, Okla., 229
Mencken, H. L., 20
Mercedes, Tex., 24n
Meriwether, Minor, 136
Merriman, Edward S., Hogged,
65-66









Milledgeville, Ga., Leo Frank
lynched, 16
Miller, Barry, 197
Miller, C. C., 90, 213
Miller, John, 156
Mineral Springs, Ark., 174
Mineral Wells, Tex., Constable
B. F. Clark Hogged, 63
Mississippi, 190
Missouri, 97, 156, 237
Missouri and North Arkansas Rail-
road, strike, 1921-1922, 61-63
Mobile, Ala., 6
Monk, Alonzo, leaves pulpit for
Klan, 89
Monroe, La., 28, 78, 211; Klan
established, 40-41
Moody, Dan, 197; governor of
Texas, 225
Moore, John H., leaves pulpit for
Klan, 88-89
282
Morehouse Parish, La., 68-75, 80,
189, 215-16; Klan established,
68; telephone lines cut, 70;
under martial law, 71-72. See
also Mer Rouge murders
Morgan, Jack, tarred, 43
Morrilton, Ark., 53
Munrush, A. E., 228
Murray, "Alfalfa Bill," 55
Murray, James, 212-13, 216
Murray County, Okla., military
court adjourns, 151
Muskogee, Okla., 28, 31, 89, 135-
36, 148, 200, 202, 227, 228;
Billy Ware Hogged, 44-45; Klan
established, 44
Muskogee County, Okla., 133
Mystic Knights of Arkansas, 220,
221,240
Nagle, Patrick S., 132
Nashville, Ark.: Joel Harris beaten,
64; Walter H. Gibbs slain, 64
Neff, Pat M., 29, 122, 165
Negroes, 1, 3, 4, 13-14, 17, 18,
21-24, 33-34, 41, 44, 47, 52,
58-59, 66, 80, 221, 238, 243,
245, 248, 255; numbers in
Southwest by states, 22-23
New Jersey, 25, 26
New Orleans, La., 24, 28, 39, 42-
43, 46-47, 89, 177, 178-79,
180, 181, 183, 184n, 210, 214;
Democratic machine in, 166,
177, 180, 210, 248; Old Hick-
ory Klan No. 1 established, 40
New Orleans Item:l 178
New Orleans Times-Picayune,
181, 182-83, 210, 215
New Regulars, 177, 180
Newton, Clarence P., 116
New York, N. Y., 232, 235-36,
237; Democratic national con-
vention, 1924, 161, 162, 166-70
New York state, 26, 161
New York Times, 118
New York World, 9-11, 47, 168
Nichols, Clark, 155
Nihilists, 13
Noble County, Okla., 231
Nordic peoples, 15-16, 244
Nonnan, Okla., 108-109, 134
Odum, Fred, 73-74
Ohio, 25, 159, 199, 209, 237n;
Klan established, 53; Klan sup-
ports Evans in split, 102;
Women of the Klan strong in,
104
Oklahoma, 18-19, 21-28, 30-35,
43-51, 53-56, 59-60, 64-68,
85-93,95-97,100-105,108-109,
112, 118, 127-60, 163-64, 167-
69, 171-72, 174-76, 199-209,
226-32, 234, 236-37, 239-41,
243,245-49; constitutional elec-
tion, Oct. 1923, 149-50; Demo-
cratic primaries, July-Aug. 1922,
133; Democratic primary, Aug.
1924, 202-203; Democratic pri-
mary, 1926, 229-30; general
election, Nov. 1922, 135; gen-
eral election, Nov. 1924, 204-
205, 206-207; general election,
1926, 230-31; general election,
1928, 240; Klan unmasked,
157-58; Women of the Klan
strong in, 104
Oklahoma A. and M. College,
president fired, 138
Oklahoma City, Okla., 28, 32, 43,
45, 47, 101-102, 130-31, 133,
139, 142-43, 145, 146-47, 156,
171-72, 201, 227, 228, 229,
236, 238-39; court denies Wal-
ton petition, 151; court re-
strains Walton election board,
149; Edward Merriman Hogged,




60; Women of the Klan es-
tablished, 104
283
Oklahoma City Chamber of Com-
merce, 132; president jailed by
Walton, 131
Oklahoma City Daily Oklahoman,
132, 202-203, 239; criticizes
Walton, 143; pleads for order,
146-47
Oklahoma County, Okla., 65, 133,
134, 202; military court ad-
journs, 151; under absolute
martial law, 146
Oklahoma Farmer, 134
Oklahoma Federation of Labor,
130
Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co.,
132
Oklahoma House of Representa-
tives, rejects anti-Klan bill, 137-
38
Oklahoma Leader, 132; opposes
Walton, 147
Oklahoma Legislature, 86, 87,
138; antimask bill passed, 154-
57; dispersed by Walton, 148··
49; members meet secretly,
147; Walton impeached, 152-
55
Oklahoma national guard: arrests
during military rule, 65; cap-
tain heads vigilantes, 60
Oklahoma Territory, 130
Okmulgee, Okla., 28, 31, 32, 129,
141, 200, 228; sheriff ousted,
49
Okmulgee County, Okla., 133;
under martial law, 140-41
Old Hickory Klan No.1, 40
Old Regulars, 177, 181
O'Neal, George W., flogged, 62
Orange, Tex., 165
Order of American Women, 103
Oregon, 159, 167; Klan in poli-
tics, 118; outlaws Catholic
schools, 111-12; state election,
1922, 127
"Original Klan of the
Confederacy," 225
Osage County, Okla., 133, 156-57
Oser, Fred J., 184n
Otjen, William J., 229, 230
Ouachita County, Ark., house-
burnings, 76
Ouachita Parish, La., 180, 183,
211
Owen, Robert L., 169, 200, 239
Owen, Thomas H., 131, 132, 133
Owsley, Alvin, 197
Palmer, A. Mitchell, 13
Palo Pinto County, Tex., 63
Parker, A. C., 90
Parker, John M., 70-71, 72, 144-
45, 177, 179, 181; attacks Klan,
71; decrees martial law in
Morehouse Parish, 71; opposes
Klan in Louisiana, 119-20; va-
cates Louisiana governorship,
94
Patman, Wright C., introduces
Texas anti-Klan resolution, 46
Pattangall, William R., 168




Payne County, Okla., military
court, 151
Peddy, George E. B., 125-26
Pennsylvania, 25, 84, 209, 242-
43; Women of the Klan strong
in, 104
Perkins, Paul D., 78, 179, 181,
211, 213; leads Louisiana Klan
for Evans, 101-102
Perry, Okla., 164,228
Pettie, Virgil C., 163, 167, 185-86
Phelan, James D., 167
Phillips County, Ark., 190
Pickett, Marvin, 74
Pike, Joe and Annie, Hogged for
making home brew, 66-67
Pine, W. B., 202, 204-205, 207,
226
Pine Bluff, Ark., 89
284
Pineville, La., 92
Pleasant, Ruffin G., 166
Pocahontas, Ark., 186
Poland, 16
Ponca City, Okla., 49
Ponca City News, assails Walton,
143 .
Pontotoc County, Okla., 137
Population figures for Southwest-
ern cities, 28
Pottawatoinie County, Okla., 65;
military court adjourns, 151
Pratt, Benton, 74
Presbyterian church, 88-89
Prescott, Ark., Klan aids
Christmas·fund, 52
Progressive party, 170-71
Prohibition, 21, 27, 30-32, 63,
129, 170~ 193, 221, 235-36,
237, 238. See also Antipro-
hibitionists; Crime:- bootlegging
Protestant churches, and" the
Klan, 89...90
Protestantism, 21, 83-85, 88, 90,
161-62, 177, 180, 181, 184,
210~ 235-36, 237~38, 243, 252
Pulaski County, Ark., 53, 113-18,





Ramsey, H. Kyle, 98-99, 108,
224, 241
Rapides Parish, La., 180, 183
Reconstruction, 1, 2-3, 6, 17-18
Red Cross, 6
"Red scare," 13
Reed, James A., 237
Reid, Columbus, 120
Reid, R It, 120
Remmel, Harmon L., 172-74
Renfro, ]. T., leaves pulpit for
Klan, 89
Republican party, 11-12, 113-14,
125-26, 130, 133, 134, 135,
Republican party (continued):
156, 160..61, 163, 170-75~ 187,
189, 198a 99, 205~ 206, 207-
208, 222, 226, 229, 230, 231,
237, .240~ 248,~49
Richards, Thoma.s F.: kidnapped,
69; murdered, 70, 80; recov-
ered from lake, 71-72
Richards, Mrs, Thomas F., 70-71
Richey, Raymond T.> 90
Richland Parish, La., 71-72
Ridley, Caleb R., 45
Robertson, Felix D., 194, 195,
196, 197, 1991" 222, 249
Robertson, James B. A., 44n, 51;
indicted in bribe, 129
Robinson, Joseph To) 163, 169-70,
237,238,240
Rogers, William Shelley, 201,
204, 227
Rogers County, Okla., 133






Sacco-Vanzetti case, 13, 15
St. Joe, Ark., 62
St. Joseph's Catholic Church,
Baton Rouge, 119
St. Mark"s Episcopal Church,
Beaumont, 90
Salvation Army, 6
Sampson, W. R., 202, 227
San Antonio, Tex., 24, 28, 46,
125, 166, 194, 195, 239; anti-
mask ordinance, 99; attempts
to bum Klan headquarters,
222; becomes state Klan head-
quarters, 222; city· election,
1923, 127; Klan aids Y.M.C.A.,
92; Klan established, 39; visit-
ing Klansmen driven back, 99-
100
San Augustine County, Tex., 63
285
Sanders, Jared Y., 166
Sand'Spriugs, Okla., 200
Sapulpa~Okla., poli<;echiefousted,
49; under absolute martial law,
146
Saye, John W., 50
Scandinavians, 15-16
Scott, R.F., HQgged,. 42, S7n
Sea Girt, N. J., Davi.s' anti...Klan
speech, 171, 172-73
Seamans-, Edward M., 164-65
Searcy County, Ark., 62
Seaver, John, 48
Sebastian County, Ark., 118
Sewanee, Tenn., 3




Short, George F., 132, 133, 135,
140
Shreveport, La., 26, 28~ ~9-40,
49, 90, 105, 10$, 120, J66.
179, 180, 182, 210, 211, 212,
213, 215, 216, 288, 241) 242;
"Big Konklave' of 1923.2 98-99;
Jack ·Morgan tarred, 43; Klan
establisheds 40; Women of the
Klanestabli~hed,104
Simmons, Willjai'll. Joseph, 2,7...
10, l7, 36-38,. 39, 48, 57, 79..-
80, 83, 94~~S; 100-101, 101-10,
137, .23.4, 248, .250, 253-54;
author of Klan constitution, 91;
banished from Klan, 110; bio-
graphical sketch, 1-4; exhorts
to charity, 91; founds second
Ku Klux Klan, 1-4; sells Klan
interests, l02; testi:mony be-
fore House Rules Committee,
57; tries to fonn second J(1an
degree, 102; "Wizardn .reduced
to "Emperor," 110
Simms, C. G., slain in Wilson,
Okla., riot, 50-51
Simpson, Oramel H., 78, 210
Singletary, R. A., 156
Sisson, Charles, flogged, 63
Skipwith, J. K., 68-70, 73, 98-99;




Sler,np, c. a~scom, 173
Slick, Okla., Klan opposes graft,
47
Smackover, .(\rk., floggings, 76-77;
gunfigb.t t 76-77; house-bum-
ings, 76; .tarrings, 76
Smith, Alfred E., 161-62, 167-70,
209:p, 216, 221, 232, 235, 236,
237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 245
Smith, Jeff, acquitted in Wilson,
Okla., riot, 51
S~ith) John, slain in Wilson,
Okla., riot, 50-51
S1llitPerman, John K., flogged, 66
Snodgrass, Charles M., 113
Snyder, Jeff B., 166
Socialist party, 130, 132, 136
Socialists, 13, 255
Sour 'Lake, Tex., 252
Southern Publicity Assn., 7-8
Southwestern Exposition and Fat
Stock Show, Klan Day, 96-97
Spri~g, Clayton P., 213
Standard Oil Co., 177, 182
State Fair of Texas, Klan Day,
96; 153
Steinhagen family, 26
Stephens County, Okla., 164
Stephenson, David C., 108, 250
Stevens, John, 99-100
Stone Mountain, 1, 2, 4
Strauss, Monis, Hogged, 225-26
Street, Allen, 156
Street, H. N., 172
Strong, Sterling P., 122-23
Stuttgart, Ark., 190, 221; city
election, April 1925, 217
Sunday, Billy, praises Klan, 90
Talihina, Okla., 227
Talladega County, Ala., 2
286
Tallulah, La., 166
Tammany Hall, 162, 235-36, 238
Tangipahoa Parish, La., 120
Tanner, Henry F., 246-47; resigns
from Klan, 247
Tarrant County, Tex., 125, 198
Taylor, Charlie, 90
Teapot Dome scandal, 161
Temple, Tex., 124, 224
Tenaha, Tex., woman tarred, 41
Tennessee, 3, 161, 172, 237
Terral, Tom J., 187, 189, 190
Terre Haute, Ind., 253
Teutonic peoples, 15-16, 244
Texarkana, Ark.-Tex., Negro
Hogged, 52
Texas, 18-19, 21-31, 33-38, 41...
42, 45-47, 49-54, 56, 57n, 58-
60, 63-64, 79, 86-90, 92...104,
105n, 108-109, 112, 114, 118~
120-26, 153, 156, 159-60, 162,
165-68, 170, 172, 174-76, 183,
192-99, 207-209, 221-26, 232,
234, 236-37, 239-41, 245-46,
249, 253; Democratic primary,
July 1922, 121-25; Democratic
primary, 1924, 222; general
election, Nov. 1922, 125-28;
general election, Nov. 1924,
198-99, 222; general election,
Nov. 1928, 240; list of Klans
by cities and towns, 39; Rio
Grande Valley, 24; state Demo-
cratic primaries, July-Aug. 1924,
196-99; state election, 1926,
225
Texas Chamber of Commerce,
opposes Klan, 50
Texas House of Representatives,
antievolution bill, 86-87
Texas Klanhaven Assn., 93-94
Texas Legislature, passes
antimask bill, 222-23
Texas national guard, 193
Texas 100 Per Cent American,
194, 195
Texas Railroad Commission, 122
Texas Rangers, 81
Texas State Fair, Klan Day, 96,
153
Texas supreme court, 126
Thomas, Elmer, 229; resigns
from Klan, 247
Thompson, E. L., 90, 211,
214...15,238
Tilley, W. T., 136-37
Tindall, George B., 244
Trapp, Martin E., 164, 205, 226,
227, 228-29; governor of Okla-
homa, 154,..55; pardons con-
victed Klansman, 67
Trapp, Mrs. Martin E., 227
Trapp administration, cold to Mc-
Adoo's nomination, 163-64
Tri-K Club, 105n
Tullas, La., visitation fight, 88
Tullis, R. L., 120
Tulsa, Okla., 20, 24, 28, 30, 31,
44, 45, 49, 67, 101-102, 131,
133, 136, 142, 156, 200, 201,
202, 203, 204, 227, 228, 229,
230, 247; J. E. Frazier Hogged,
48; John K. Smitherman Hogged
and mutilated, 66; JuDior Klan
established, 105; kidnaping and
curfe,v, 144; Klan established,
44; Khin eulogizes dead mem-
ber, 95; Klan warns sheriff, 49;
military court investigates flog-
gings, 151; Nathan Hantaman
flogged, 142; public Klan ini·
tiation, 47-48; race riot, 44;
under martial law, 143-51;
Women of the Klan estab-
lished, 104; women's secret
order formed, 100-101
Tulsa County, Okla., 32, 48, 49,
65, 132, 133, 134, 135, 229;
deputies disarm Walton police,
150; 31 Klansmen charged with
assault, 67; 27 Hogging charges
dropped, 67
Tulsa Daily WorId, defends
Walton, 143-44
287
Tulsa Tribune, 30, 32, 44, 203,
227; censorship, 146; predicts
impeachment of Walton, 142
Tyler, Elizabeth, 6-7, 8, 11, 18,
36, 107, 235, 250; leaves Klan,
lIOn
Underwood, Oscar W., 161-64,
165, 166-67, 168




United Klans, Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, Inc., 255
United States Supreme Court, 78,
254,255
University of Michigan, 109
University of Oklahoma, 109, 133-
34; five regents removed, 138
University of Texas School of
Law, 198
University of the South, 2-3
Upchurch, Z. R., 36-38
Urbanization, in Southwestern
states, 27-28
Violence, 21, 56, 57n, 58-61, 65-
74, 139-41, 246; assault, 81;
beating, 23-24, 52, 63-64, 65,
226; branding, 41, 80; Hogging~
23-25, 41-42, 44-45, 48, 52,
60, 62, 63, 64, 65-67, 68-75,
76-77, 81, 135, 142, 143, 151,
156, 197, 225-26, 247; homo-
cide, 50-51, 64, 68-75, 77-78,
102; house-burning, 76; kid-
naping, 68-75, 144; lynching,
13, 16, 62-63, 245; Missouri
and North Arkansas railroad
strike, 61-63; mutilation, 66;
Oklahoma leads in, 60; raid,
64; race riot, 13, 44, 245; riot,
50-51, 99; tarring, 23-25, 41,
42, 43, 47, 53-54, 63, 76-77;
200 incidents, 1921-1924, 59n.
See also Crime
'Vaco, Tex., 50, 122, 123, 125,
168, 194, 195, 198, 239; Klan
spy system, 59-60; state Demo-
cratic convention, 1924, 165-66
Wagoner County, Okla., 65; seven
Hogging indictments dismissed,
151
Walker, J. A., 60
Walmsley, T. Semmes, 72
Walsh, Thomas J., 168
Walton, John C., 45, 67-68, 199-
205, 206-207, 208, 226, 229,
248; accepts gift home, 139;
backed for governor by Recon-
struction League, 130; bans
Klan parades, 145; biographical
sketch, 130-31; campaign for
governor, 132; censors Tulsa
Tribune, 146; clemency poli-
cies, 139; decrees martial law
in Okmulgee County, 140-41;
decrees statewide martial law,
146; defeated in constitutional
election, 150; defies grand jury,
147; ends martial law, 151-52;
forbids election, 149; gives
terms for troop withdrawal,
145; governor of Oklahoma,
135; impeachment and ouster,
152-55; impeachment talked,
142; interferes in state colleges,
138-39; Klan fight reviewed,
158; loses public support, 138-
39; nominated for governor,
133; secretly joins Klan, 136-
39; turns against Klan, 135-39
\Vard, Edward B., 197, 239
Ward County, Ark., 64
Ware, Billy, Hogged, 44-45
Washington, D. C., 71, 237; Klan
departs, 241; Klan headquar-
ters, 233; Klan parade, 233
\Vashington County, Okla., 133
Watson, Tom, 14-15, 16
\Veaver, Carlton, 206
West Carroll Parish, La., 71-72
\Vestern Grove, Ark., 62
288
Wharton County, Tex., Klan
established, 39
White American Protestant Study
Club, 100-101
White Citizens Council, 256
White supremacy, 15-16, 19, 21,
251
Wichita County, Tex., 125
Wichita Falls, Tex., 28, 89, 125;
city election, 1923, 127; Klan
established, 39
Wilburton, Okla., 206
Williams, Stephen B., leaves
pulpit for Klan, 89
Williamson County, Tex.,
flogging conviction, 81
Wilson, Jacob R., 189
Wilson, Robert H., 131-32,
133-35
Wilson, Woodrow, 12, 13, 161
Wilson, Okla., riot, 1921, 50-51
Winn Parish, La., churches split
on Klan, 88
Women of the Ku Klux Klan,
100-105, 110, 214, 221, 249;
established, 102-103; Little
Rock chapter secedes, 217-21;
Little Rock children's home,
92-93; membership figures, 103,
104; parade, unmasked, 156
Women's Christian Temperance
Union, 230, 237-38
Woodmen of the World, 3
World Court, opposed by Klan,
235
Wrightsman, Charles G., 201,
202,203
Young County, Tex., 50
Younger, Edward L., 113
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